Abstract

This article proposes a distinct role for solitude in education, specifically as a means of promoting self-realisation. Solitude is understood as a willed disengagement, as described by Koch, and its relationship to loneliness and to silence is explained. Notwithstanding a degree of disengagement, solitude can be and often is experienced as dialogic, with dialogue not only being internal (dialogue with the self) but also with others, near or distant. Self-realisation is described positively in terms of Macmurray’s ‘becoming more real’ and the deep ecology of Naess, and is distanced from psychological and psychotherapeutic approaches to self-actualisation and self-esteem, not least because self-realisation may involve a significant degree of suffering. Drawing on philosophical and literary sources from both Anglophone and Polish traditions, the significance of this research for schooling is not simply organisational (i.e. organising opportunities for those in school to have positive experiences of solitude) but moral and political.

Keywords: solitude, self-realisation, silence, Philip Koch, John Macmurray, Arne Naess.
Introduction

Alongside consideration of the importance of dialogue and community, and other forms of ‘togetherness’, in education (Alexander 2004, English 2016, Jasinski and Lewis 2016), there has in recent years been an increasing focus on forms of educational aloneness. Solitude (Stern, 2014a, Wałejko, 2016), silence (Lees, 2012, Caranfa, 2013, Forrest, 2013, Alerby, 2018), loneliness (Sagan and Miller, 2018), and contemplation (Lewin, 2015) have all been theorised and researched. Some see the two traditions of educational togetherness and aloneness as contrasting: solitude is a rest from community, loneliness results from the failure of dialogue. However, Nouwen writes of ‘the place of solitude in life together’ (Nouwen, 1978, p. 14) not as contrasting ideas but as ‘belong[ing] together’ (Nouwen, 1978, p. 17). Contrasting ‘private’ solitude with ‘public’ community is dangerous, as is seeing solitude as an aid to better communal life. ‘Solitude without community’, he says, ‘leads us to loneliness and despair, but community without solitude hurls us into a “void of words and feelings”’ (Nouwen, 1978, p. 17, quoting Bonhoeffer). This article builds on Nouwen’s insights, and defends the importance of solitude to educational communities (whereas Nouwen’s work focuses on
‘prophetic’ communities and ‘communities of resistance’), and does this specifically by bringing together educational philosophies centred on self-realisation (including ecological senses of self-realisation-in-the-world) with those that recognise the educational value of solitude. We draw on philosophical and literary sources from both Anglophone and Polish traditions. Our intention is to explore the distinctive contribution of a dialogic notion of solitude to specific understandings of self-realisation, centred particularly on the solitude philosophy of Koch (1994) (complemented by that of Rojo, 2018) and the self-realisation theories of the personalist philosophy of Macmurray (1992 [1932]) and the deep ecology philosophy of Naess (2008). This is presented as a moral and political project, as it addresses the relationship between education and developing selfhood in community¹. Schools, as educational institutions, are discussed throughout as places where solitude can contribute to self-realisation as part of their educational, moral and political purposes.

In the following section, solitude is distinguished from loneliness, and the educational significance of self-realisation (or becoming more real, Macmurray’s ‘moral ideal’, Macmurray, 1992 [1932], p. 150) is proposed.

Solitude and Self-Realisation

Solitude is described by Koch (1994) as voluntary and by Rojo as ‘built’: ‘In one’s own room, built by ourselves on the basis of a particular life experience and a certain way of thinking of ourselves and positioning ourselves in the world accordingly, we were able to imagine the future, another life different from the one we had or a continuation of it’ (Rojo, 2018, p. 7). Aloneness may be imposed (and as such may lead to loneliness) but

¹ The relationships between education, selfhood and community echo the concerns of Dewey, for whom democracy ‘is the idea of community life itself’ (Dewey, quoted in Barber, 1984, p. 117), and for whom ‘self is not something ready-made, but something in continuous formation through choice of action’ (Dewey, 1916, p. 351). Dewey’s work is not addressed here, however.
solitude involves a person willing a disengagement. The voluntariness arises from the impossibility of substantive, complete, solitude. ‘[T]he world is ultimately inescapable’ (Koch, 1994, p. 76), and so the experience of solitude will always involve some chosen disengagement. Voluntariness also arises from solitude requiring disengagement, not simply unengagement. (A single baked bean on a plate may be somewhat unengaged and ‘solitary’ but it is not experiencing ‘solitude’.) For Koch, solitude is achieved when a person ‘is disengaged from other people’ (Koch, 1994, p. 44), with disengagement being (in its fullest form) ‘perceptual, cognitive, emotional, [and] actional’ (Koch, 1994, p. 52). Even though experiences of solitude may result from accident or from aloneness imposed by others, a person’s experience of this as solitude still involves intentionality. A person may happen to find themselves in a situation that seems lacking in engagement (as, for example, being in a room or a cell without company), but it is not experienced as solitude unless the person disengages. Some children sent to their bedrooms as punishment might decide to treat this as an opportunity for solitude (in Koch’s or Rojo’s sense) rather than merely being separated. This is illustrated in the children’s book *Where the Wild Things Are* (Sendak, 1963), in which boy is punished by being sent to his room, and he decides to go to an imaginary place (where the wild things are), which we suggest is an experience of solitude, and once tired of that, thinks of his family downstairs once more, which we suggest is an experience of loneliness that is not solitudinous.

The poet Larkin describes how as a child solitude had seemed to be ‘a plentiful and obvious things’, not needing to be ‘sought’, but that as an adult solitude became ‘more difficult to get’ (Larkin, 1988, p 56). ‘Getting’ solitude is the achievement of

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2 Koch’s definition allows that a person may to an extent be in solitude even whilst in the company of other people – if they are emotionally disengaged from each other, for example.

3 It may be appropriate to argue for two versions of solitude, ‘willed’ solitude and ‘unwilled’ solitude, but the agentic significance of solitude, following Koch, is retained in this article, and so the term is restricted to the former use.

4 Larkin also makes the moral argument that ‘our virtues are all social’, so solitude is necessarily ‘vicious’ (Larkin, 1988, p 56). This seems to be one of the reasons he finds solitude difficult to get – as it appears
disengagement, and not simply the absence of (for example) other people. Silence, likewise, is not simply the absence of sound but involves the willed ignoring of such sounds as are present. In this model, therefore, silence can be a form of perceptual solitude, that is, (willed) oral/aural solitude.

Loneliness, in contrast, is not a state of disengagement, but an emotion. It is described as ‘pain accompanied by the idea of love that is now absent, when that pain is accompanied by self-rejection, for example because the absence is thought to be ‘deserved’” (Stern, 2014b, p. 182). Loneliness involves an absence, usually a rejection, by other people, and some form of self-rejection, but solitude, although it involves disengagement from others, is willed. Furthermore, solitude may paradoxically be wanted, at least in part, in order to be engaged – with those not present, and with oneself. The latter (engagement with oneself) is perhaps the more conventional view of solitude: willed disengagement as ‘engagement with oneself’ is described by Szczepanski, for example, as an ability of solitary communing with oneself, an experience of the inner world; living, acting and, perhaps, ‘taking refuge’ in there (Szczepanski, 1985). Solitude is here a dialogue with oneself which soothes suffering, perhaps, and fear. This might be contrasted with loneliness – as a lack of contact with oneself or rejection of oneself, caused by remaining merely in the outside world of people and things. In such situations, inwardness becomes empty and neglected, and the lack of contact with oneself leads to inadequate contact with others (Szczepanski, 1985). However, Nouwen’s warning should be heeded that solitude is more than simply a ‘relief’ from community, and is a way of disengaging from those who might be present precisely in order to engage with apparently absent people, a way of achieving ‘intimacy’ (Nouwen, 1978, p 17).

to be vicious or morally wrong. This may indeed by how Larkin experienced solitude, but we disagree that solitude is always experienced in this way. We argue elsewhere (Stern, 2014b p. 142-145) that solitude can be ‘virtuous’, and we argue in the current article for the moral value of solitude in education.
Solitude is therefore – potentially at least – a much more positive state than is loneliness. This article focuses, in particular, on ways in which solitude can be linked to an effort at self-realisation as described by the philosophers Macmurray and Naess – for whom self-realisation is the attempt to become more real, with ‘reality’ necessarily implying community (for the personalist philosophy of Macmurray) and the wider world (for the deep ecology philosophy of Naess). Self-realisation is distinguished here from psychological theories of self-actualisation, such as that of Maslow, for whom self-actualisation is ‘the desire for self-fulfillment, namely, … the tendency for him [sic] to become actualized in what he is potentially … [or] the desire to become more and more what one is, to become everything that one is capable of becoming’ (Maslow, 1943, p. 383). Maslow’s approach is more individualistic than that of Macmurray or Naess, without a clear sense of self-in-community (and self-in-personal-world) that is provided by Macmurray or self-in-world that is provided by Naess, but with a sense of (individual) ‘potential’ that is problematic. (Would self-actualisation of Maslow’s kind encourage potentially excellent murderers to fulfil their potential?) Self-realisation is also contrasted with the ‘vaguer and more popular notions [of self-realisation] to which ordinary people appeal when discussing the aims of education or indeed of life in general’ (Telfer, 1972, p. 216). As Macmurray describes it, ‘[w]e are all more or less unreal[: o]ur business is to make ourselves a little more real than we are’ (Macmurray, 1992 [1932], p. 143). Hence, self-realisation is an explicitly educational process, the ‘business’ of making ourselves more real.

Macmurray’s educational argument is that we become real in community, because it is in community that people treat us primarily as persons, and the educational purpose of schooling is achieved in the school community as ‘the self-realization of the personal’ (Macmurray, 1991, p. 158). In more conventional philosophical language, and talking of all forms of education and not just schooling, he says that ‘[t]o educate a child is to train
it to live; and a good education is one which succeeds in training a child to live well, to live his whole life as life should be lived’ (Macmurray, 1968, p 111, from an article published in 1931). This is the moral purpose of schooling, and the moral (rather than, or rather than just, the psychological or therapeutic) sense of self-realisation. And the process of self-realisation is never complete, as ‘our own reality lies always beyond us, and we reach after it but never grasp it’ (Macmurray, 2012 [1958], p. 662).

Self-realisation is impossible to achieve – for Macmurray and Naess – without relationships beyond the self, but it may also – crucially for this article – be achieved at least in part through solitude. Macmurray seems to ignore aspects of the value of solitude, and his philosophy could be described as ‘missing solitude’ (Stern, 2018a, p. 157). But his description of self-realisation is itself is of considerable value.

Self-realization is the true moral ideal. But to realize ourselves we have to be ourselves, to make ourselves real. That means thinking and feeling really, for ourselves, and expressing our own reality in word and action. And this is freedom, and the secret of it lies in our capacity for friendship. (Macmurray, 1992 [1932], p. 150.)

As a ‘moral ideal’ whose ‘secret’ lies in our ‘capacity for friendship’, this is an idea of self-realisation that is far from solipsistic or self-serving. Macmurray’s philosophy of friendship is worth an article on its own. Here, it should be pointed out that the ‘capacity for friendship’ might include (within the model described in this article, if not in Macmurray’s own philosophy) friendship with non-human beings, and with imaginary objects, whether fictional characters or the ‘imaginary friends’ that are important to many children.
Macmurray’s account of self-realisation in community does extend to a possible ‘universal community’ as ‘the inherent ideal of the personal’ in which ‘each cares for all the others’ (Macmurray, 1991, p. 159). Naess extends self-realisation further still. Combining the issue of ‘becoming’ with the boundary issue of ‘personhood’, Naess describes ‘increased self-realization … through the fulfilment of potentials that each of us has, … a broadening and deepening of the self’ (Naess, 2008, p. 83), with ‘potential’ articulated in a specifically Spinozist way. Spinoza’s ‘joy’ (laetitia) is how ‘we make the transition to greater perfection’, which Naess suggests is better described as greater ‘integrity’ or ‘wholeness’ (Naess, 2008, p. 128). Joy, for Spinoza, is ‘linked intrinsically to an increase in many things: perfection, power and virtue, freedom and rationality, activeness, the degree to which we are the cause of our own actions, and the degree to which our actions are understandable by reference to ourselves’ (Naess, 2008, p. 128).

For Naess, the ‘broadening and deepening of the self’ goes well beyond humanity: ‘with sufficient comprehensive maturity, we cannot help but identify ourselves with all living beings’ (Naess, 2008, p 82). So our deepening self is one with our deepening understanding and at-oneness with nature, or Spinoza’s Deus sive Natura: ‘God or in other words Nature’ (Spinoza, 2000, p. 226). This account of understanding and at-oneness with nature as dynamic, developing, and never complete, involves us being ‘of’ nature, not apart from nature. It is a clearly educational philosophy, involving increasing understanding which is also increasing self-realisation through an increasing at-oneness in the world (‘God or in other words Nature’).

It is proposed in this article that solitude is a vital source of many of these forms of self-realisation, and that the educational process of self-realisation is better achieved by educational communities (such as schools) where there are opportunities for willed disengagement from apparently present people, in order – for example – to engage with the apparently absent and with the non-human in the world. In the following sections, solitudinous dialogue is described, and then the self-realisation that may be
experienced in silence. The sense of self-realisation as a form of learning, and not (or not merely) a ‘therapeutic’ experience, is described in the conclusion which explores further the educational implications of solitude and self-realisation.

**Dialogue and Doubling in Solitude**

Solitude is proposed as a place in which self-realisation can be attempted, although it is unlikely ever to be completely achieved. Macmurray says that self-realisation means ‘expressing our own reality in word and action’ (Macmurray, 1992 [1932], p. 150, quoted in full above). Adding to his account, it is worth saying that solitude is also a place in which people are – characteristically, if paradoxically – in dialogue.

The paradox of solitude, that it is a situation often characterised by dialogue, is well described by poets such as Wordsworth or Dickinson, and by philosophers such as Arendt. The dialogue may be with absent others or with the ‘doubled’ self. Solitude can be a place where we can be ‘in the company of long-dead people, fictional people, non-human animals, nature, God or gods, and much more’ (Stern, 2014b, p. ix). The poet Philips, for example, wrote in the mid-seventeenth century of solitude as ‘my sweetest choice’ (Philips, 1710, p. 211). The narrator of the poem describes the relationship, in solitude, with the natural world and, indirectly, with people (from times gone by, as well as more recent visitors and the narrator’s lost lover), and with gods and mythical beings (demi-gods, Naiads, nymphs, Echo, Tritons) (Stern, 2014b, p. 94). When Wordsworth explores solitude, it is encounter with daffodils that makes for such a valuable and valued solitary experience (Wordsworth, 1994, p.187), whilst Dickinson wrote of ‘another Loneliness’ occasioned by ‘nature sometimes, sometimes thought’ (Dickinson, 1970, p. 502) which is described by Lewis (2009, p. 33) as closer to solitude than to conventional loneliness. Research in the twenty-first century on how people experience solitude suggests that it is often a withdrawal from people precisely in order to connect
with (other) people and with other non-human beings, and to be in dialogue with oneself (as reported in Stern, 2015). For that research (initially reported in Stern, 2014b), children and young people were asked in school about their experiences of both solitude and loneliness. Leonard, aged seven, is reported as enjoying solitude ‘when [he] went into the forest’ because he ‘liked climbing trees and exploring’, and Philippa (aged 12-13) enjoys solitude ‘when I’m with my cat’. Some enjoy being with absent or fictional ‘other people’, such as Maya (aged seven) who enjoys solitude ‘in my bedroom reading’ or Linda (aged 12–13) ‘listening to music’. Some explicitly find solitude an opportunity for dialogue with themselves, ‘doing art because you get some me time’ (Leigh, aged eight), or, as Annie (aged seven) says, she ‘wanted to be alone because I wanted to have some peace and be me for 20 minutes and do something I like doing’ (all quotations from Stern, 2015, p. 112).

Examples of poetic and youthful solitude are presented as reminders of the ordinary sense in which solitude can be used for meeting others. But the potential of solitude for dialogue is defended, here, on philosophical grounds – as a supplement to those who stress the value of dialogue that takes place between those immediately present (Alexander, 2004, Buber, 2002a [1965], English, 2016). Those who wish to wander alone in graveyards or historic sites are – typically – thinking about, and often taking part in a dialogue with dead people. There is a common-sense meaning of dialogue that would portray dialogue with dead people or with cats or daffodils as absurd or, at best, merely figurative. There are those who would say the same about dialogue with God or gods. These may be described as merely ‘imaginary’ dialogues. Yet there is a competing common-sense view of such encounters as precisely dialogic, even if the ‘other’ is not quite as talkative as living people with whom we might be in conversation. Philosophers such as Buber describe all forms of dialogue as acts of imagination, of ‘imagining the real’ or *Realphantasie* (Buber, 1998 [1965], p. 71). And he describes dialogic (or at least somewhat dialogic) encounters with non-human animals such as a
horse (Buber, 2002a [1965], p. 27), when Buber feels guilty at his taking personal pleasure from stroking the horse rather than being open to mutual dialogue. He also describes a form of dialogue with plants – as in his description of an encounter with a tree during a walk:

Not needing a support and yet willing to afford my lingering a fixed point, I pressed my walking stick against a trunk of an oak tree. Then I felt in twofold fashion my contact with being: here, where I held the stick, and there, where it touched the bark. Apparently only where I was, I nonetheless found myself there too where I found the tree.

At that time dialogue appeared to me. (Buber, 2002b [1967], p. 49.)

There are obvious limits to what can be communicated to, or by, horses or trees, or those lying dead in graveyards. And yet these dialogues are important to people, and may be experienced as of huge significance – as described by Buber, whose connection to a tree was itself an origin of his very understanding of dialogue. Szymborska, similarly, describes the 'one-sided acquaintance' with plants, saying that ‘Talking with you is essential and impossible. / Urgent in this hurried life / and postponed to never’ (Szymborska, 1998, p. 269-70).

A further philosophical example of dialogue in solitude is that given by Arendt, who puts the focus on the ‘doubling’ of the self in solitude, to achieve dialogue with the self. For Arendt the very act of philosophy is both solitary and in company. '[W]hile … a man [sic] indulges in sheer thinking, and no matter on what subject, he lives completely in the singular, that is, in complete solitude, as though not men but Man inhabited the earth’ (Arendt, 1978, p. 47), she says. Nevertheless, ‘solitude is that human situation in which I keep myself company’ (Arendt, 1978, p. 185, emphasis added).
Nothing perhaps indicates more strongly that man exists *essentially* in the plural than that his solitude actualizes his merely being conscious of himself, which we probably share with the higher animals, into a duality during the thinking activity. It is this *duality* of myself with myself that makes thinking a true activity, in which I am both the one who asks and the one who answers. Thinking can become dialectical and critical because it goes through this questioning and answering process. (Arendt, 1978, p. 185.)

Such ‘doubling’ was used by the twelfth century monk, William of St-Thiery, in his description of why a cell might be a reward for a monk yet a punishment for a prisoner:

‘He who lives with himself’, William warns, ‘has only himself, such as he is, with him.’ Therefore ‘A bad man can never safely live with himself, because he lives with a bad man and no one is more harmful to him that he is to himself.’ (Webb, 2007, p. 72.)

The extreme case, for William (according to Webb), is of ‘bad people’, and a similar example is given by Arendt, who describes ‘base people’ as ‘at variance with themselves’. ‘What kind of dialogue can you conduct with yourself when your soul is not in harmony but at war with itself? Precisely the dialogue we overhear when Shakespeare’s Richard III is alone’ (Arendt, 1978, p. 189). Richard III describes how he both loves, hates and fears himself, realising he is a ‘villain’, whilst being unable to fly from himself. Arendt describes how Richard III must join with other people in order to ‘escape’ his own company, at which point he rejects one of his ‘selves’, saying ‘Conscience is but a word that cowards use, / Devis’d at first to keep the strong in awe’ (quoted in Arendt, 1978, p. 189). The king finds himself lost, alone, and leaves his conscience uncommunicated to others when in company.
The move to a ‘doubling’ of the self is described by Taylor as a process of ‘internalization’, starting with Plato and developing an ‘inward turn’ with Augustine, adding a ‘disengagement’ of Descartes and Locke (Taylor, 1989, p. 177). With this disengagement, a philosopher’s solitude that became embedded in wider culture, there also came ‘new conceptions of the good and new locations of moral sources: an ideal of self-responsibility, with the new definitions of freedom and reason which accompany it’ (Taylor, 1989, p. 177). This implies a ‘radical reflexivity’ in which ‘we “have” selves as we have heads’, he suggests (Taylor, 1989, p. 177). Each ‘self’ may therefore be distinct: in Montaigne’s version, the search is not for a ‘universal truth’ of the self: it is a ‘search for each person’s originality’ (Taylor, 1989, p. 177). Hence there are ‘two important facets of the … modern individualism, that of self-responsible independence, on the one hand, and that of recognized particularity, on the other’ (Taylor, 1989, p. 185). Taylor adds a third facet: ‘the individualism of personal commitment’ (Taylor, 1989, p. 185). The post-Augustinian inward turn, and the later sense of the ‘particularity’ of the self and the self as moral judge of oneself, all depend on a ‘doubling’ – not found, according to Taylor, in earlier forms of selfhood. Such an approach illuminates Gadamer’s claim that all ‘education is self-education’ and yet ‘one can learn only through conversation’ (Gadamer, 2001, p. 529).

The doubling described by Arendt and Taylor – a doubling that is a new way of thinking and being – is connected directly to modern solitude traditions. Chudy described different ways of (moral) self-realisation, which he describes in terms of conscience-forming, including those related to a community (other people and education in general).

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5 This is not quite the same as Peters’ description of ‘responsibilising of the self’ as a form of ‘neo-liberal governance’ of the self (Peters, 2001), although Peters’ account might be regarded as a consequence of the longer-term development described by Taylor.

6 Ryle, similarly, described ‘self-teaching’ through – typically solitudinous – thinking, as ‘trying to make up for a gap in one’s education’: in thinking, ‘the soul is conversing with herself’ (Ryle, 1971, p. 218).
and those requiring silence and solitude as ‘gates’ to dialogue with oneself. There are
two versions of the internal dialogue: ‘ad intra’ means reflecting on myself, my own
intentions, motivations; ‘ad extra’ is a (silent) dialogue between my perspective and
reality (Chudy, 2009, p. 99). Thus the specific dialogue in solitude can make a person
more ‘real’ – that is, it can involve (modern) self-realisation. Notwithstanding the many
ancient and medieval solitude traditions, solitude is distinctively important in modern
education. In the modern world as described by Taylor and Arendt, solitude is of
educational value precisely because the ‘doubled’ self needs opportunities for
convosational self-education. And in the modern world as described by Macmurray
and Naess, the dangers of people being separated from the personal and/or the non-
human world are mitigated by an education that encourages solitudinous dialogic
engagement with people who are not immediately present and with the non-human
world. There are many opportunities for monologue, not least in educational settings
where ‘[e]ducational authority is generally treated as a monologic rather than a dialogic
experience’ (Bingham, 2008, p. 6), and where many philosophers ‘have fallen, with the
totality of their thought world, into a monologizing hubris’ (Buber, 1998 [1965], p. 103).
Buber’s account of ‘monologue disguised as dialogue’ (Buber, 2002a [1965], p. 22) is a
reminder that simply ‘thinking’ or simply ‘talking’ does not necessarily imply dialogue,
with dialogue characterised, for Buber, by surprise (Buber, 2002a [1965], p. 241, Stern,
2013). Opportunities for dialogue in solitude are also important in mitigating the
suffering experienced through loneliness. Dumm describes ‘the worst aspect of
loneliness’ as being ‘that it ends the possibility of meaningful experience by translating
the inner dialogue of solitude into a monologue of desolation’, as ‘[w]hen we are lonely
we are … deserted by all others, including our own other self’ (Dumm, 2008, pp. 40-

7 Buber himself is sceptical of the idea of ‘dialogue with the self’, quoting Feuerbach saying that ‘[t]true
dialectic is not a monologue of the solitary thinker with himself, it is a dialogue between I and Thou’
(Buber, 2002a, p. 32). Buber’s accounts of monologue and dialogue are nevertheless illuminating when
we consider dialogue in solitude, and it is argued elsewhere why Buber, like Macmurray, is ‘missing’
solitude (Stern, 2018a).
Dialogic and engaged solitude is of educational value. In the following section we consider the quieter side of solitude and the ‘oneness’ of individuality that can be achieved alone.

**Individuality and Silence: Quietly Becoming Me**

Recognising the ‘doubling’ of the self – as in Taylor’s or Arendt’s accounts – and the importance of this in understanding solitude, it is also important to account for the ‘return’, the sense of self-realisation as also a ‘oneness’. Taylor’s ‘particularity’ is a distinctive modern form of individuality. One of the surprises to scholars of individuality is that the word ‘individual’ did not originally mean particular or separate or distinct from others. Instead, it originally meant whole and undivided, ‘one in substance or essence; forming an indivisible entity’, as used in the fifteenth century phrase ‘to the glorie of the hye and indyuyduall Trynyte’ (OED, 2005). The etymological peculiarity of individual moving from ‘wholeness’ to ‘separateness’ perhaps suggests a route back to wholeness. Individuality may imply a particularity, but it could also point to a wholeness – perhaps even beyond the self, as described above in the Spinozist deep ecology of Naess. Just as there is a tradition of dialogue-in-solitude (including the ‘doubling’ involved in dialogue with oneself), there is a tradition of wholeness-in-solitude, of ‘becoming me’ or self-realisation as ‘enstasy’ – the virtue of being comfortable within oneself. The relationship between such individuality and silence is explored here.

Rojo describes how ‘[t]he world individualises us more and more, it makes us unique at the same time it demands us to be unique and we, almost without thinking, let

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8 Enstasy is the converse of ecstasy, i.e. being comfortable within oneself rather than escaping out of oneself (Stern, 2014b, 2018b).
ourselves become individualised’, and yet ‘this individualism is superficial at best and imposed from outside, not at all like the deep sense of individuality one acquires when one builds it up from the inside on one’s own’, as ‘one’s own training as an autonomous, responsible subject, the basis for education in the West, requires time’ (Rojo, 2018, p. 9-10). Although Rojo concludes with the need for ‘new generations to continue learning how to construct a room of their own, and how to dwell in it’ (Rojo, 2018, p. 10), he also recognises that there are many other forms of solitude as connection with the non-human. In Koch’s philosophy, solitude is disengagement from other people, not from ‘the world’. Hence Thoreau’s *Walden* only exhibits ‘[p]hysical [i]solation’ insofar as ‘there are no human beings within possible sensing distance of his body’ (Koch, 1994, p. 13, emphasis added). Thoreau is famously ‘in touch’ with his physical surroundings (and is hugely influential in the modern ecological movement), and yet describes himself, and is described by Koch, in such situations as in solitude. Solitude, for Koch, is therefore ‘most ultimately, simply an experiential world in which other people are absent’ (Koch, 1994, p. 15, emphasis added, and see Hodgson and Fulford 2016 for an educational interpretation). Encounters with daffodils or just pine needles (Thoreau, 2006 [1854], p. 142) are themselves described as solitudinous. And Koch – like Thoreau and Wordsworth – emphasise the importance of silence as a specific, oral/aural, form of solitude. Koch writes of Kafka ‘waiting impatiently for his parents and sisters to go to bed so that he could have the dining room table for writing, writing that ran away into the night, every night for most of his adult life’, because ‘[o]nly in that solitary silence could he relax and breathe, only there could he write through and write beyond the ever-present anxiety’ (Koch, 1994, p. 2). As Kafka himself wrote, ‘one can never be alone enough … there can never be enough silence around one … even night is not night enough’ (Kafka, quoted in Koch, 1994, p. 2, ellipses in Koch).

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9 Thoreau also described sociability in *Walden*, saying ‘I had three chairs in my house; one for solitude, two for friendship, three for society’ (Thoreau, 2016 [1854], p. 151), but it is his account of solitude that is used in the current article, and he remains a staunch promoter of solitude, saying ‘I love to be alone’, and ‘I never found the companion that was so companionable as solitude’ (Thoreau, 2016 [1854], p. 146).
For some, silence is the form of solitude in which self-realisation can best be encouraged. The hurly-burly of everyday life, the noise of the world, can distract us. In silence, an otherwise hidden ‘me’ can occur. Annie, aged 7, valued solitude: she ‘wanted to be alone Because I wanted to have some peace and Be me for 20 minutes and do something I like doing’ (quoted in Stern, 2014b, p. 29). To ‘be me’ and to ‘become me’ is a characteristic solitudinous quest. Our daily ‘noisy’ lives often involve saying what we actually do not want to say, or do not mean, and doing things that we do not want to do (Merton, 1969). In silence we may be connected to our very existence, allowing a recognition of – and the development of – our individuality (Halbfas, 1989, p. 43, Zawada, 1999, p. 27-28). As Kook says, silence ‘transcends man’s [sic] capacity for verbal articulation’ so that in silence ‘many worlds are fashioned’ (Kook, 1988, p. 187). The silence may occur after a noisy conversation, and may be all the more powerful for that: silence ‘after voices’ is described by Szymborska as ‘[n]ot a sluggish sort of silence’ as it ‘had its own throats once’ (Szymborska, 1998, p. 103). Silence can enable us to concentrate on our real desires (Merton, 1969). Of course, silence – like all forms of solitude – has many forms. Just as solitude can be used as a form of punishment and as a reward, as described above, so silence can be in more oppressive and in more liberating ways. In schools, for example, there is a long tradition of ‘oppressive’ silence, the silencing of children and young people as a form of aggressive control associated with punishment, shame, rejection, suppression, and fear (Lees, 2012, p. 60). However, Lees goes on to describe the ‘power of silence for democratic outcomes’ (Lees, 2012, p. 114), and is joined in this by researchers such as Alerby (2018), and Hägg and Kristiansen (2012). The psychologist Bosacki (2005) writes of the uses of silence by adolescents, as a critical ‘technique’ in their transition
towards adulthood, and Jasinski and Lewis (2016) stress the importance of ‘quieting’ the teacher’s voice in early childhood education\textsuperscript{10}.

One advantage of silent solitude, according to Merton (1973), is that it is harder to pretend, or to play games or act ‘madly’, because of the lack of an audience. When a person is alone, their own ‘craziness’ will exhaust them: silence can force us to close our mouths and get on with our lives. (On other occasions, it may terrify us, of course, just as solitude is described by Arendt as terrifying to Richard III.) The use of poetry to describe silence is no coincidence. T S Eliot is said to have described poetry as ‘writing with a lot of silence on the page’ (quoted in Maitland, 2008, p. 186). And poets describe as well as anyone the possibility of self-realisation in solitude:

\begin{quote}
When from our better selves we have too long
Been parted by the hurrying world, and droop,
Sick of its business, of its pleasures tired,
How gracious, how benign, is Solitude
\end{quote}


Self-realisation in quiet solitude can also be achieved by young children. Montessori, who implemented the systematic use of silence in pre-school education, notices that in silence children discover that they have internal life (Schmitz-Meder, 1991), and this is related to their developing self-realisation through their developing autonomy (Frierson, 2018).

\textsuperscript{10} These examples are given as illustrations of the possible value – and danger – of silence in schools. Fuller arguments about the politics of silence in school are given in Lees, 2012.
extension of Macmurray’s relational, communal, approach to self-realisation in a ‘personal world’ (Macmurray, 1945, p. 32). There is a sense therefore in which self-realisation is both an ‘individual’ harmonious unity (i.e. the harmonious unity of the self) and a larger harmonious unity (i.e. the harmonious unity in the world). The idea of unity implies a selfhood undivided. For those who see a person as consisting of separate elements, unity would involve the unity of those elements. The philosopher Wojtyła, for example, wrote that a person does not have a body, as one has a car or a cat, but a person is a body, and this makes a difference to how a person regards materiality (Wojtyła, 1985, p. 251-254). Self-realisation includes, in this regard, being more ‘real’ in gestures and the use of our voice, for example. Somebody thoughtful, comparing – as Merton (1958) suggests – the ‘inner’ world of judgements and desires and what is demonstrated outside, has a chance to achieve (more) self-realisation through the (greater) unity of inner and outer, with the body being a ‘means of expression’ (Wojtyła, 1985, p. 251-254). To ‘dance like nobody’s watchin’’ (attributed to Clark and Leigh11) is a celebration of the possibility of solitudinous self-realisation through gesture.

A person can experience solitude as, paradoxically, a source of understanding (going beyond narrow senses of self-understanding), in which ideas are developed: ‘a secret space for their birth’, when every spoken word reflects the mind and is literally ‘speaking somebody’s mind’ (Zawada, 1999, p. 21, p. 35). The reference to being or becoming ‘ourselves’ in solitude does not negate Macmurray’s or Taylor’s sense of selfhood being (also) communal and in tune with what is not self. And it does not imply a crude ‘be the best you you can be’ of popular self-help books (e.g. Lawler, 2015). The contented murderer is not – at least, not necessarily – successful at self-realisation in that sense. In the term ‘self-realisation’, ‘self’ may be communal (as in Macmurray’s philosophy), but that community is – we suggest – a community that can stretch well

11 https://quoteinvestigator.com/2014/02/02/dance/
beyond the immediately-present group of people in a family or in a school. We may
develop our selfhood in community with the long-dead, the distant, and the fictional, as
well as in the immediately-present group of people. Schools are particularly suited to
enabling such ‘long-distance’ community, making use of history, literature, geography,
religious education, for example, to introduce students to the dead and the distant. And
in our use of the term ‘self-realisation’, the ‘realisation’ is not becoming real entirely
apart from the rest of the world, but in the world as a whole – again, beyond the people
who are immediately present.

The sense of individuality as wholeness, often achieved in solitude and in silence, is of
considerable educational significance. A ‘hurrying world’ of performative school cultures
in which everyone, students and staff alike, are chasing externally-determined targets,
is subverted or at least mitigated by providing opportunities for quiet, non-oppressive,
solitude. There, the individual – whole – self may be more realised.

**Conclusion: Self-Realisation Beyond Therapy**

Self-realisation may be facilitated, distinctively, in solitude, and this has a role in
general education and schooling in particular (Stern, 2014b). There is a danger of
treating the promotion of self-realisation and of solitude as merely a therapeutic
process, part of a wider therapeutic culture described by Denton as a ‘cultural ocean in
which American adolescents swim’ which ‘saturates them in the ethos of therapeutic
individualism’ (Smith with Denton, 2005, p. 172; see also Ecclestone and Hayes, 2009).
School is better seen as a learning community than as a ‘therapeutic’ community
(Palmer, 1993, p. xix), and an emphasis on therapy may therefore act against the
school’s educational aims – as vividly described by Smith in his critique of the
emphasis on building self-esteem as a ‘kindly apocalypse’ (Smith, 2002, p. 87, and see
also Smith, 2006). Self-realisation should not be seen as primarily therapeutic –
especially when it is considered as an educational process appropriate to schools.

Self-realisation may involve significant degrees of suffering, and therefore it is not easy to see this as straightforwardly curative. Of course there is a great diversity in approaches to therapy, but the generally ‘curative’ approach, an approach trying to cure or mitigate forms of suffering or illness, is nevertheless typical of many therapies. The psychologists Kelly (1955) and Salmon (1988) describe the association between learning and suffering in terms of the parable of the Garden of Eden.

For Kelly …, the biblical parable of the Garden of Eden is the basic story of humanity. … By eating the forbidden fruit, Adam and Eve have come to a knowledge of good and evil. … We can no longer take everything for granted. We now possess, for better or worse, ‘the awful responsibility for distinguishing good from evil’. There is no going back to the innocence we shared with animals and birds, to the paradise of our pre-moral world. (Salmon, 1988, p. 19, quoting Kelly from Maher, 1969, p. 166).

Salmon goes on to contrast the ‘story we usually tell of education’ which involves a ‘quest’ which ‘ends when learners take their hard-earned reward and, following their arduous endeavours, come at last into their own’ (Salmon, 1988, p. 19), with a story of education as ‘paradise lost’ in which ‘[k]nowledge has consequences’ and in which ‘Adam and Eve cannot but live out the moral possibilities they grasp’ (Salmon, 1988, p. 19). Hence, ‘knowledge is not the end of the story, but rather the beginning of a new, qualitatively different chapter’ (Salmon, 1988, p. 19). Crucially, learning involves ‘the transformation of the protagonist’ as ‘Adam and Eve are irrevocably altered by the knowledge they acquire’, experiencing shame. This is the story of all learning: ‘like Adam, we may find that we must buy our knowledge dearly’ and ‘[w]hat we know may make us lonely in our social worlds … [and] may impose responsibilities we would far
rather not possess’ (Salmon, 1988, p. 19-20). Self-realisation is not put forward as becoming ‘cured’, and ‘[w]e know about ourselves only what we’ve been tested’ (Szymborska, 2010, p. 38, translated by MW), suggesting we become more real through facing difficult experiences. After some time, looking back from a distance, when we start licking our wounds, we may notice some changes inside that may be positive. It is not simply the suffering that has changed us, but we may still suffer, through our learning, through our self-realisation. The current article is not, therefore, presenting the value of solitude for self-realisation as a therapeutic contribution to schooling, but as an *educational* contribution.

It is all the more important to promote such educational solitude in a culture that is often disdainful of solitude and of those who enjoy being alone. Albisetti notes that people who love their solitude, are ‘recognized’ by the public: sometimes respected and sometimes feared. Feared, because people sense in them non-conformity, strong autonomy or even revolutionary elements. In their presence we feel encouraged towards self-realisation ourselves (Albisetti, 1999, p. 84). Likewise, fear is a common reaction to the ‘loner’ who prefers solitude. The ‘loner’, according to Rufus, is regarded as

- Cold.
- Afraid.
- Lacking in social skills.
- Sad.
- Lonely.
- Selfish.
- Secretive.
- Ungrateful.
- Unfriendly. (Rufus, 2003, p. xvi.)

Yet, she continues, ‘here we are, *not* sad, not lonely, having the time of our lives amid their smear campaign’ as ‘[l]oners, by virtue of being loners, in celebrating the state of standing alone, have an innate advantage when it comes to being brave – like pioneers, like mountain men, iconoclasts, rebels, and sole survivors’ (Rufus, 2003, p. xviii).
From Buber’s mild guilt at exploiting a horse to Richard III’s more extreme and more justified guilt at his murderousness, it is clear that the encounter with the ‘other’ (even the other self) in solitude has a moral dimension, connected to self-realisation. In educational settings, recognising and providing opportunities for solitudinous encounters is therefore critical. Monkish ‘rewarding’ solitude, in company with oneself (one-good-self), or more painful Richard III-like meeting with one’s conscience, both are of moral significance. Teaching learners that they cannot resign from the duty of meeting themselves, considering their decisions, is an important educational task that starts in early childhood. Educational solitude is also a way of reaching beyond the school to others long dead or distant – an ‘escape’ from the school whilst remaining physically within its walls (Stern, 2016). For Korczak, solitude is at the heart of children’s rights, including the right of children to be (not just to prepare to be) people: ‘children don’t turn into people, they are people already’ (Korczak, quoted in Boschki, 2005, p. 121).

If the educator-learner relationships, or other more conventional social relationships, in school are too dominant, and especially if they are too unequal, the self-realisation that could be achieved in solitude will be unlikely. It is in solitude that we meet ourselves and others beyond those immediately present to us – the long dead and the fictional. Korczak makes the educational relationship with children more equal than was envisaged by Buber, and it is in part through solitude – somewhat under-recognised by Buber, as also Macmurray (Stern, 2018a) – that this right is exercised. Solitude and self-realisation should therefore be intertwined in educational contexts.

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