

Hirschler, Steven (2017) Brexit, immigration and expanded markets of social control. *Safer Communities*, 16 (4). pp. 176-185.

Downloaded from: <https://ray.yorks.ac.uk/id/eprint/4630/>

The version presented here may differ from the published version or version of record. If you intend to cite from the work you are advised to consult the publisher's version:

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/SC-05-2017-0016>

Research at York St John (RaY) is an institutional repository. It supports the principles of open access by making the research outputs of the University available in digital form. Copyright of the items stored in RaY reside with the authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may access full text items free of charge, and may download a copy for private study or non-commercial research. For further reuse terms, see licence terms governing individual outputs. [Institutional Repositories Policy Statement](#)

RaY

Research at the University of York St John

For more information please contact RaY at
ray@yorks.ac.uk

Brexit, immigration and expanded markets of social control

Journal:	<i>Safer Communities</i>
Manuscript ID	SC-05-2017-0016.R1
Manuscript Type:	Research Paper
Keywords:	Brexit, immigration, public policy, detention, EU citizens, privatisation

Title: Brexit, immigration and expanded markets of social control

Abstract

Purpose: This paper explores the implications of EU citizens' exposure to UK immigration practices currently operating on non-EU migrants in the wake of the Brexit referendum.

Design/methodology/approach: This article draws on recent literature analysing the impact of immigration as a factor in voter decision-making during the Brexit referendum. It challenges Hollifield's (1992) concept of the 'liberal paradox' through an analysis of private security firms' roles in contributing toward the expansion of immigration control markets. The paper concludes with a review of migrant experiences within prisons, detention facilities and dispersed housing for asylum seekers.

Findings: The findings suggest that the abandonment of EU citizens' freedom of movement into the UK will result in their exposure to a privatised immigration control regime that contributes to the commodification of immigrants at the expense of human welfare.

Originality/value: This paper provides a conceptual link between the role of immigration in the Brexit referendum and the implications of expanding the population of persons subject to immigration control to include EU immigrants. It draws on current debates about privatised social control markets to illuminate the social impact of valorising migrant bodies.

Keywords: Brexit, immigration, public policy, detention, EU citizens, privatisation

Paper type: General review

Introduction

Among the many uncertain outcomes of the United Kingdom's pending withdrawal from the European Union, European citizens' immigration status remains a question to which 'neither the government nor external researchers have more than a vague idea [of an] answer' (Portes, 2016, p. R16). Border control was a central theme of the Leave campaign prior to the 2016 'Brexit' referendum, but support for Brexit was not linked exclusively to desires to limit EU immigration. The ambiguous aim to 'take back control' was also associated with economic concerns, wariness of ceded sovereignty and dissatisfaction with political 'elites'. Nevertheless, support for tighter border controls and communities' exposure to increased immigration rates indicated greater support for the Leave message (see: Hobolt, 2016, Vasilopoulou, 2016 and Goodwin and Heath, 2016). If the UK government is to retain legitimacy in the estimation of Brexit supporters, it is likely that the freedom of movement of European Economic Area (EEA) citizens to and from the UK will no longer be guaranteed under the European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/38/EC. This is evident in the 2017 Conservative Party manifesto, which states that 'for the first time in decades, [...] we will be able to control immigration from the European Union' (Conservative Party, 2017, p. 55). If EU immigrants are subjected to further control, they face increased exposure to private security environments currently operating on other migrant categories. This article explores the implications of European immigrants' inclusion within an expanding immigration control market dominated by private security firms scrutinised for contractual failings and welfare concerns.

1
2 While recent developments in the privatised social control sector challenge Hollifield's
3 (1992) 'liberal paradox', his concept provides the basis for a discussion of the UK's seemingly
4 incompatible objectives of promoting free market expansion while maintaining a restrictionist
5 approach toward immigration. The referendum outcome places new demands on the UK
6 government to favour popular calls for tighter controls at the expense of business demands for a
7 widely available labour force. Given the uncertainty of EU immigrants' legal status post-Brexit,
8 this article considers the implications of their entry into a privatised social control environment.
9 The experiences of non-EU immigrants and asylum seekers within the detention and dispersal
10 estates reveal the conditions greater numbers of people may face if immigration rules applying
11 to EU migrants become more restrictive.
12
13

14 **Brexit, immigration and the imperatives of the state**

15
16
17 In exploring immigration policy in liberal democracies, Balch (2016, p. 74) writes that
18 '[u]nderstanding the politics of immigration is [...] understanding the essential features of the
19 state'. The state exists as an outcome of population management strategies and its legitimacy
20 depends on its capacity to demarcate the boundaries of belonging. Young (2003) explains that
21 logics of exclusion operate to reinforce national identities. 'Nationalism, fundamentalism, [and]
22 racism', he writes, manufacture 'a fixed identity based on the notion of a cultural essence which
23 is reaffirmed, rediscovered and elaborated upon' (ibid, p. 457). Foucault's 'state racism'
24 illuminates the distinction between populations worthy of protection and those excluded or
25 allowed to die. In defining the parameters of belonging, the state promotes an 'internal racism of
26 permanent purification' (Foucault, 2004, p. 62). From this perspective, the state not only
27 organises differences within populations, it *creates* those distinctions. Immigration control can
28 be understood as the operationalisation of racism, as it employs techniques and apparatuses of
29 power to distinguish between permitted and illicit populations. Doty (1996, p. 236) explains that
30 'national identity is constructed *vis-à-vis* the representation of the other'. While support for
31 Britain's withdrawal from the EU reflected sentiments ranging from dissatisfaction with perceived
32 political 'elites' to frustration regarding economic conditions, immigration remained a central
33 issue for Leave campaigners and supporters. The referendum result represents a distillation of
34 nationalist identity rooted in exclusionary conceptions of belonging.
35
36
37

38 Hollifield (1992) argues that in liberal democracies, states are compelled by two
39 incompatible imperatives. States must continue to serve their traditional function of defining the
40 limits of belonging and demonstrate their commitment to strict borders. However, they must also
41 promote market expansion and the free flow of capital; this requires permeable borders through
42 which labour can pass with little obstruction. This 'liberal paradox' represents the state's inability
43 to fully address domestic demands for border tightening, as politicians respond to business
44 pressure for access to global labour resources. He writes that '[r]ules of the market require
45 openness and factor mobility; but rules of the liberal polity, especially citizenship, require some
46 degree of closure, mainly to have a clear definition of the citizenry and to protect the sanctity of
47 the social contract' (Hollifield, 1998: p. 623). Freeman (1995) suggests that immigration policy
48 generally favours the interests of markets over popular calls for restrictive immigration control in
49 liberal democracies. However, as consecutive UK governments have introduced more restrictive
50 controls on migrant categories including asylum seekers, foreign students and family members
51 of UK citizens, this gap is narrowing. Morales et al. (2015) acknowledge that immigration has
52 become a more prominent factor in political decision-making due to persistent media attention
53 and public pressure, though Statham and Geddes (2006, p. 248) contend that policy
54 development remains an 'elite-led highly institutionalised field with a decisively restrictionist
55 stance'. Still, anti-immigration positions have become normalised alongside increased popularity
56 of Eurosceptic positions, such as those forwarded by the UK Independence Party (UKIP).
57
58
59
60

1
2 Immigration was a key concern for voters before the 2015 General Election; 70 per cent of
3 respondents in the British Election Study stated that they favoured decreased immigration
4 (Dennison and Goodwin, 2015, p. 175). UKIP played a central role in the Brexit campaign, as it
5 aligned the Leave vote with a vote against immigration. This was best exemplified when Nigel
6 Farage, the former UKIP leader, posed in front of a poster featuring migrants at the border
7 between Croatia and Slovenia that warned of a 'breaking point' for the UK (Stewart and Mason,
8 2016).

9
10 The EU referendum represented a rare opportunity for the electorate to directly inject
11 populism within the political process without the buffer of representative decision-making and
12 oppositional pressure from businesses. The imbalance between Freeman's restrictionist
13 'popular opinion' and the 'organised opinion' of political and corporate elites tipped toward
14 populism, as politicians faced a crisis of legitimacy if they rejected the majority view. The
15 referendum outcome resulted in a perceived mandate for tighter borders between Britain and
16 other EU states. Within the Leave narrative, immigration contributed to strains on public
17 services and housing. This narrative was effective, Gietel-Basten (2016, p. 674) explains,
18 because it drew upon existing concerns about net immigration rates. The 'deliberate' conflation
19 of refugees and EU migrants exemplified in UKIP's poster served to 'exploit currents running
20 much deeper than concern about primary school places or hospital waiting lists' (ibid, p. 676). In
21 their survey of 5,000 British citizens, Hobolt and Wratil (2016 in Hobolt, 2016, p. 1263) found
22 that 'immigration and the economy emerge[d] as the main arguments' of the campaign with
23 intended Leave voters focused on 'concerns about immigration'. Menon and Salter (2016: p.
24 1310) suggest that '[t]he steady focus on immigration made it hard for Remain campaigners to
25 emphasise the economic arguments'.

26
27 While the UK government has not committed to a strategy for managing EU migration
28 after Brexit, the Prime Minister, Theresa May, has suggested that free movement of EU citizens
29 may continue beyond the conclusion of Brexit talks during an 'implementation period' (May
30 quoted in Parker, 2017). A possible outcome for EU citizens includes their classification as
31 persons subject to immigration control (PSICs) similar to non-EU citizens under current
32 immigration rules. The government 'could subject EU citizens to the Immigration Act 1971 and
33 make it as difficult as possible for people to stay' (Tingley in O'Carroll, 2017). Stricter entry
34 requirements for EU citizens would increase the possibility of some entrants breaking new and
35 expanding rules, particularly those related to employment. Portes (2016, p. R17) explains that
36 '[j]ust as previous extensions of free movement rights to the citizens of new Member States
37 reduced illegal working [...], any controls will have the reverse effect'. This increased potential
38 for illegality means that EU citizens accused of breaking immigration rules may be subject to the
39 same penalties that face non-EU migrants, including detention and deportation.

44 45 **Expanding markets of control**

46
47 Any policy changes associated with EU immigration are likely to lead to expanded forms of
48 illegality, and uncertainty about EU migrants' immigration status in the UK coincides with an
49 increasingly privatised approach to immigration control. This widening social control environment
50 has provided the foundation for new markets in which migrant bodies are commodified. In 2013,
51 foreign nationals represented 13.9 per cent of the inmates incarcerated in prisons in England and
52 Wales (Pakes and Holt, 2017, p. 67). Banks (2011, p. 189) explains that increases in the foreign
53 national prison population since 1999 do not necessarily reflect foreigners' proclivity toward
54 criminality, as rates for 'sexual and violent offences [are] either comparable or lower for foreign
55 nationals' than they are for British nationals. Instead, 'increasingly restrictive immigration policy'
56 has broadened the parameters of illegality, including expanded offences for asylum seekers, such
57 as arriving without a passport or attempting to deceive immigration officials (ibid., pp. 190-191). As
58
59
60

1 Aliverti (2012) suggests, the increased use of criminal law to manage immigration offences
2 illustrates the state's reliance on it as a deterrent and an alternative to appropriately implemented
3 immigration policy.
4

5 Foreign national prisoners exist in a regime that merges penal and border control tactics
6 within an institutionalised programme of targeted exclusion. This is reflected in the 2009 'hubs and
7 spokes' policy that installed officials of the then UK Border Agency within six 'hub' prisons identified
8 as primary sites for foreign nationals in addition to a further two meant specifically for foreigners
9 (Webber, 2009 and Bosworth, 2011). While this system was designed to facilitate post-sentence
10 deportation efforts, it also reflects a racialised construction of foreign and British-born inmates. As
11 Kaufman (2012, pp. 705-706) explains in her study of foreigners incarcerated in England and
12 Wales, 'nuanced self-identification process[es]' and 'identifying foreign nationals along racialised
13 lines' has resulted in misidentification of British prisoners and the segregation of foreigners.
14 Additionally, foreign inmates face further incarceration following the end of their sentences while
15 awaiting possible deportation (Fekete and Webber, 2010, p. 5). The nexus between criminal justice
16 practice and immigration control, which Stumpf (2006) refers to as 'crimmigration', represents a
17 consolidation of carceral logics intended to classify and isolate migrants as uniquely deviant. 'In
18 this way', explain Pakes and Holt (2017, p. 65), 'both criminal justice and immigration law are
19 brought to bear on the individual [...] in a sequential fashion: first the prison sentence, then (the
20 threat of) deportation'.
21
22
23

24 At times, little distinguishes those detained for removal from those incarcerated for criminal
25 offences. Indeed, prisons have been used to hold immigration detainees that have not been
26 convicted of an offence (Chatwin, 2001 in Malloch and Stanley, 2005, p. 64). If EU migrants
27 become subject to immigration control, they may be remanded within an immigration removal
28 centre. The Immigration Act 1971 permits the use of detention 'where a deportation order is in
29 force against any person' [...] 'pending his removal or departure from the United Kingdom' (Sch. 3,
30 para. 2(3)). In practice, migrants whose immigration decisions remain outstanding have also been
31 detained (Malloch and Stanley, 2005, p. 63). In 2016, over 2,700 foreign nationals were detained in
32 11 IRCs around the UK at any time, while nearly 29,000 entered detention during the year
33 (Silverman, 2017, p. 3). For Bosworth (2011), detention is linked to the broader criminalisation of
34 migrants, particularly those from minority ethnic backgrounds. Popular representations of migrants
35 as criminal and exploitative contribute to the carceral rationalities underpinning the use of IRCs as
36 a display of sovereign control. Fekete (2005) explores how the criminalisation of immigration has
37 contributed to the ill treatment of immigrants and asylum seekers within social control
38 environments and during deportation. 'Target-driven deportation programmes', she writes,
39 'legitimise force and institutionalise brutality against asylum seekers. The harsh methods of control
40 and restraint used to enforce removals have on occasion led to the deaths of asylum seekers,
41 mainly from suffocation' (ibid, p. 71). In this estimation, border control logics represent symbolic
42 forms of violence as much as they are an example of systemic harm.
43
44
45

46 Narratives employing Agamben's (1998) 'bare life' to describe the state's reduction of
47 refugees and other migrants to populations subject to sovereign power situate the state as the
48 primary definer of belonging (see: Phillips, 2009; Ajana, 2013; Muller, 2004 and Diken, 2004), while
49 critical approaches address networks of power across agencies and the capacity for resistance
50 amongst immigrants (see: Owens, 2010; Tyler, 2006 and Darling, 2013). Consideration for the role
51 of expanded markets is important in developing nuanced representations of power. Foucault
52 argues that biopower, or the management of populations through diffuse forms of social ordering
53 and techniques of control, represented 'an indispensable element in the development of capitalism'
54 (Foucault, 1998, pp. 140-141). Similarly, neoliberal logics of marketisation are embedded within
55 modern social control regimes and they typically reinforce constructed representations of
56 immigrants and criminals. This is evident in related fields of study, which highlight the links
57 between neoliberalism and crime control strategies. For instance, Linnemann et al. (2013) examine
58
59
60

1 state responses to methamphetamine use and conclude that visual representations of typical users
2 are stratified along class lines. 'Built on fear, sophisticated advertising techniques and free market
3 rationalities,' they write, visual campaigns 'mark an important intersection of late-modern consumer
4 culture and crime control' (ibid: p. 605). Whyte (2007) expands the position further, linking the
5 protection of markets to the jingoism associated with the war on terror. He explains that the
6 militarism of the United States in the early 2000s allowed for the expansion of new markets, which
7 were often advanced by US corporations. Developing border control practices follow similar
8 trajectories, as protectionist, neoliberal narratives invite the entry of private actors into the
9 management of border security mechanisms.

10 For the private security sector, non-citizens are indispensable commodities within the
11 criminal justice estate. The broadened role of private actors is evidenced in the privatisation of
12 prison management, surveillance technologies, prisoner transportation, policing, electronic tagging,
13 and security services (see: Jones and Newburn, 2008; Nellis and Bunkerfeldt, 2013; Paterson,
14 2014 and White, 2014). Private firms including G4S, Serco, GEO and Mitie are also contracted to
15 manage immigration removals centres across the UK (Bosworth, 2012, p. 127). While these
16 centres are ostensibly the final stage of immigration control prior to deportation, some detainees
17 have been held for months or years. Silverman (2017, p. 4) states that 'as of Q4 2016, foreign
18 national offenders were detained for an average of 118 days before deportation'. IRCs, like
19 prisons, are sites of an intensified criminal justice response to immigration that 'has its own logics
20 that shape population boundaries in new ways both within and beyond the sovereign state'
21 (Silverman and Massa, 2012, p. 680). Security firms are essential to the delivery of border control
22 practices, as they provide the resources and personnel necessary to maintain real and symbolic
23 forms of social organisation.

24 Marketised immigration control valorises migrant bodies, or as Bloom (2016, p. 900) states,
25 it has led to the 'commodification of noncitizenship construction'. The expansion of this market
26 challenges Hollifield's 'liberal paradox', because it represents a convergence of otherwise
27 incompatible state aims. For Hollifield, the state's commitment to free market liberalism is at odds
28 with its efforts to restrict immigration. Whereas capitalism demands readily available, inexpensive
29 labour resources, local populations often resist the perceived intrusion of migrant residents and
30 labourers. As Castles (2004, p. 866), states, '[t]ypically, employers [...] favour recruitment of
31 migrant workers, while competing local workers may be opposed'. However, some industries
32 benefit from the existence of securitized populations. In the context of the privatized immigration
33 control sector, the gap between public sentiment and government policy catering to business
34 interests is bridged, as neoliberal strategies are employed in the expansion of the immigration
35 control sector. Increases in the number of persons subject to immigration control will result in an
36 expanded pool of commodified bodies. During a segment on *Question Time* on 27 March 2017
37 (Rawlinson, 2017), David Davis, the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, stated:

38 I think most people are in favour of migration, so long as it's managed. And the point is,
39 it will need to be managed. [...] From time to time, we'll need more [migrants] and from
40 time to time, we'll need less. You've got industries dependent on migrants, you've got
41 social welfare, you've got the National Health Service. You have to make sure they
42 continue to work.

43 Davis's comments reflect a qualified acknowledgement of the UK economy's reliance on
44 immigrant labour. Despite negative representations of migrants within media (Vollmer, 2017),
45 academic research illuminates migrants' net benefit to the economy. Pointing to circumstances in
46 the United States and elsewhere, Coleman and Rowthorn (2004) suggest that this contribution is
47 relatively small. However, Dustmann and Tommaso (2014, p. F595) find that between 2001 and
48 2011, EEA migrants and non-EEA migrants provided a substantial 'positive fiscal contribution' to
49

1 the economy, were less likely than British citizens to claim benefits and brought degree
2 qualifications and associated 'human capital'. While Davis's quote addresses this contribution, it
3 masks another reality. His 'industries' also include those benefiting from the control of immigrants.
4 The average daily cost of detaining a foreign national in an IRC is £86 (Home Office, 2017 in
5 Silverman, 2017, p. 5). This is over twice the *weekly* allowance the Home Office issues to
6 individual asylum seekers on Section 95 support under the 1999 Immigration Act, which currently
7 amounts to £36.95 (Home Office, 2017, p. 3).
8
9

10 The private detention industry offers security firms a springboard for entry into new
11 markets; this expansion is unlikely to abate if Brexit generates new populations subject to
12 immigration control. Representatives of private security firms understand that intensified border
13 strategies promise future business opportunities. This is evident in Mitie's 2016 annual report,
14 which states: '[W]e have a growing track record in providing services including immigration removal
15 centres. The Home Office is a key client and we see a continuing flow of opportunities for our Care
16 and Custody business' (Mitie, 2016, p. 14). While expanding social control markets may be driven
17 by financial incentives, profit may not be the only reason firms enter the sector; the opportunity for
18 further expansion may be a goal in itself. For instance, the COMPASS project (Commercial and
19 Operating Managers Procuring Asylum Support) represents a series of contracts between the
20 Home Office and three private security firms to house asylum seekers worth about £620 million
21 when introduced in 2012 (Twinch, 2013). However, the cost of procuring housing and managing
22 asylum accommodation has not necessarily led to immense financial returns for participating
23 companies. Still, involvement with COMPASS may lead to new contracts in other sectors or
24 generate wealth through tangential means, such as through expanded property portfolios. During a
25 Home Affairs Committee meeting on asylum in June 2013 (House of Commons, 2013, p. 12), the
26 former CEO of Serco, Jeremy Stafford, explained the firm's acceptance of low profit margins in the
27 COMPASS contract, stating:
28
29
30
31

32 [W]e are very focused on building an accommodation business [...]. We felt that we
33 could establish a very good platform that we felt was scalable. You are probably aware
34 that some of the services that we develop in the United Kingdom we then go and take to
35 other geographies. [...] For us, we felt accommodation management was an important
36 development area.
37
38

39 While such opportunistic strategies may reflect overlap between popular desires to limit
40 immigration and corporate interest in profiting from population management schemes, advocates
41 of restrictive policy face challenges from other business sectors. The Conservative government
42 has been unable to offer a consensus on the length of time freedom of movement will continue
43 after Brexit talks conclude, and businesses reliant on immigrant labour seek to avoid abrupt
44 disruptions if current employees are suddenly subjected to immigration control (Elgot and Mason,
45 2017). The Home Secretary, Amber Rudd, attempted to diminish concerns about such a scenario
46 by contradicting another minister's claims that freedom of movement would end in 2019,
47 suggesting instead that a transition phase would follow Britain's withdrawal from the EU (Mason
48 and Rawlinson, 2017). However, concessionary arrangements do not signal a reversal in plans to
49 end freedom of movement, as this remains the ultimate objective of both the Conservative
50 government and Labour opposition. Unless businesses supporting unfettered EU migration fully
51 convince officials to abandon these plans, which may necessitate the abandonment of Brexit
52 altogether, a more restrictive response to EU immigration remains an eventual outcome.
53
54
55
56

57 **Outcomes of the privatised immigration control industry**

58
59
60

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

The immigration control market has contributed to a variety of vulnerabilities for those within security firms' custody. For instance, G4S and Serco have been associated with major contractual failings, fraud, and the ill treatment of detainees. Despite being awarded a £284 million contract to provide security services at the 2012 Olympics, G4S was unable to fully staff the event; military personnel were brought in to make up the shortfall (Fussey, 2014, p. 221). In 2013, G4S and Serco were referred to the Serious Fraud Office following suspicions that they overcharged the Ministry of Justice for the electronic monitoring of prisoners, as the firms were invoicing the government for prisoners that were dead or incarcerated (Meikle, 2013). Conditions within immigration removal centres contribute to concerns for detainees' welfare. Athwal and Bourne's (2007) review of immigration detention in the UK illuminates firms' disregard for detainees' physical and mental health care. Canning (2014, p. 10) addresses the accusations of sexual abuse perpetrated by Serco staff in Yarl's Wood IRC and explains that '[t]he use of private companies in prison and detention' has resulted in a 'lack of accountability in the cases of abuse, deaths in custody or death during forced removal'. This was also evident in the case against G4S officers suspected of manslaughter in the death of Jimmy Mubenga during his deportation in 2010 (Taylor, 2014). While the officers were acquitted, the case remains indicative of the state's capacity to deflect criticisms of systemic harm by focusing attention on the failings of individual officers. Private firms' size and the state's dependency on their services means that formal prosecution of companies is impractical; punishment is limited to forfeited contracts or fines.

The privatisation of the immigration sector has contributed to the exclusion and stigmatisation of foreign nationals, particularly those most vulnerable to the extremities of the system. This is evident in the experiences of asylum seekers within the COMPASS housing project. In 2014, the National Audit Office identified problems with the delivery of COMPASS by G4S, Serco and their subcontractors. Issues included residents' inability to voice complaints, male officers' unannounced entry into female accommodation, poor housing conditions and disruptions to children's schooling during the transition period (National Audit Office, 2014). Grayson (2016, p. 6) writes that the 'UK asylum housing market' is composed of 'private landlords and private housing companies making excessive profits from asylum tenants' poor quality and overcrowded properties'. Asylum seekers' utility as profit-generating bodies has led to the normalisation of tactics contributing to their poor treatment (Darling, 2016). While EU migrants will not be subject to asylum dispersal rules, the COMPASS project reveals the potential conditions immigrants face in privatised social control markets. As long as profitability remains a key driver, human welfare may remain a secondary concern.

Conclusion

The Brexit referendum result and government responses to public pressure suggest a further reversal of Freeman's (1995) view that public policy favours liberal approaches to immigration control. National identities were reaffirmed along exclusionary boundaries of belonging following the referendum. Theresa May has avoided detailing the Conservative government's plans for EU citizens wishing to reside in the UK (Mason and Elgot, 2017). However, the 2017 Conservative Party manifesto is clear in its intent to restrict future EU immigration and the Labour Party has bluntly declared the end of freedom of movement for EU citizens in its manifesto (Labour Party, 2017, p. 28). Despite pressure from UK businesses to diminish the impact of government plans to end freedom of movement, increased restriction remains a likely eventuality. While Hollifield's 'liberal paradox' is illustrative of the disconnect between business interests and popular opinion, it is insufficient when attempting to model the increased harmony between restrictionist aims and expanding social control markets.

Should EU migrants be subject to immigration rules like those established in the 1971 Immigration Act, they face greater exposure to the privatised social control regime currently

operating in the management of non-EU migrants. The commodification of immigrants within a marketised social control environment has contributed to concern about migrants' welfare, as the firms involved are associated with fraud, harmful treatment and inadequate service provision. The expansion of this market to include EU immigrants may lead to the further valorisation of migrant bodies and bolster a system that promotes corporate profit at the expense of human welfare.

Safer Communities

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

References

- Agamben, G. (1998), *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Heeller-Roazen, D. (trans.), Stanford, Stanford University Press.
- Ajana, B. (2013), "Asylum, Identity Management and Biometric Control". *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol. 26 No. 4, pp. 576–595.
- Aliverti, A. (2012), "Making people criminal: The role of the criminal law in immigration enforcement", *Theoretical Criminology*, Vol. 16 No. 4, pp. 417–434.
- Athwal, H. and Bourne, J. (2007), "Driven to despair: asylum deaths in the UK", *Race & Class*, Vol. 48 No. 4, pp. 106–114.
- Balch, A. (2016), *Immigration and the state: fear, greed and hospitality*, London, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Banks, J. (2011), "Foreign National Prisoners in the UK: Explanations and Implications", *The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice*, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Vol. 50 No. 2, pp. 184–198.
- Bloom, T. (2016), "The business of noncitizenship", *Citizenship Studies*, Vol. 19 No. 8, pp. 892–906.
- Bosworth, M. (2011), "Deportation, detention and foreign-national prisoners in England and Wales", *Citizenship Studies*, Vol. 15 No. 5, pp. 583–595.
- Bosworth, M. (2012), "Subjectivity and identity in detention: Punishment and society in a global age", *Theoretical Criminology*, Vol. 16 No. 2, pp. 123–140.
- Canning, V. (2014), "Women, asylum and the harms of detention", *Criminal Justice Matters*, Vol. 98 No. 1, pp. 10–11.
- Castles, S. (2004), "The Factors that Make and Unmake Migration Policies", *International Migration Review*, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Vol. 38 No. 3, pp. 852–884.
- Chakelian, A. (2016), "A view from Brexitland: Boston, the town that voted strongest to leave the EU", *New Statesman*, available at: <http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2016/07/view-brexitland-boston-town-voted-strongest-leave-eu> (accessed 12 March 2017).
- Coleman, D. and Rowthorn, R. (2004), "The Economic Effects of Immigration into the United Kingdom", *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 30 No. 4, pp. 579–624.
- Conservative Party. (2017), *Forward, Together: Our Plan for a Stronger Britain and a Prosperous Future, the Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto 2017*, Conservative Party, London.
- Darling, J. (2013), "Asylum and the Post-Political: Domopolitics, Depoliticisation and Acts of Citizenship", *Antipode*, Vol. 46 No. 1, pp. 72–91.
- Darling, J. (2016), "Privatising asylum: neoliberalisation, depoliticisation and the governance of forced migration", *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, Vol. 41 No. 3, pp. 230–243.
- Dennison, J. and Goodwin, M. (2015), "Immigration, Issue Ownership and the Rise of UKIP", *Parliamentary Affairs*, Vol. 68 No. suppl 1, pp. 168–187.
- Diken, B. (2004), "From refugee camps to gated communities: biopolitics and the end of the city", *Citizenship Studies*, Vol. 8 No. 1, pp. 83–106.

- 1
2 Doty, R.L. (1996), "Immigration and national identity: constructing the nation", *Review of*
3 *International Studies*, Vol. 22 No. 3, pp. 235–21.
4
- 5 Dustmann, C. and Frattini, T. (2014), "The Fiscal Effects of Immigration to the UK", *The Economic*
6 *Journal*, Vol. 124 No. 580, pp. F593–F643.
7
- 8 Elgot, J. and Mason, R. (2017), "Cabinet accepts Brexit transition will mean years of free
9 movement", *The Guardian*, available at: [https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jul/20/cabinet-](https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jul/20/cabinet-accepts-brexit-transition-will-mean-years-of-free-movement)
10 [accepts-brexit-transition-will-mean-years-of-free-movement](https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jul/20/cabinet-accepts-brexit-transition-will-mean-years-of-free-movement) (accessed 01 June 2017).
11
- 12 Fekete, L. (2005), "The deportation machine: Europe, asylum and human rights", *Race & Class*,
13 Vol. 47 No. 1, pp. 64–78.
14
- 15 Fekete, L. and Webber, F. (2010), "Foreign nationals, enemy penology and the criminal justice
16 system", *Race & Class*, Vol. 51 No. 4, pp. 1–25.
17
- 18 Foucault, M. (1998), *The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*, Hurley, R. (trans.),
19 London, Penguin Books.
20
- 21 Foucault, M. (2004), "*Society must be defended*": *Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76*,
22 Macey, D. (trans.), London, Penguin Books.
23
- 24 Freeman, G.P. (1995), "Modes of immigration politics in liberal democratic states", *International*
25 *Migration Review*, Vol. 29 No. 4, pp. 881–902.
26
- 27 Fussey, P. (2013), "Command, control and contestation: negotiating security at the London 2012
28 Olympics", *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 181 No. 3, pp. 212–223.
29
- 30 Gietel-Basten, S. (2016), "Why Brexit? The Toxic Mix of Immigration and Austerity", *Population*
31 *and Development Review*, Vol. 42 No. 4, pp. 673–680.
32
- 33 Goodwin, M.J. and Heath, O. (2016), "The 2016 Referendum, Brexit and the Left Behind: An
34 Aggregate-level Analysis of the Result", *Political Quarterly*, Vol. 87 No. 3, pp. 323–332.
35
- 36 Grayson, J. (2016), "Solidarity Activism, Campaigning and Knowledge Production: Challenging
37 Refugee Inc. The Case of G4S and Corporate Asylum Markets.", *Concept*, Vol. 7 No. 2, p. 10.
38
- 39 Hobolt, S.B. (2016), "The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent", *Journal of European*
40 *Public Policy*, Vol. 23 No. 9, pp. 1259–1277.
41
- 42 Hollifield, J.F. (1992), *Immigrants, Markets and States*, London, Harvard University Press.
43
- 44 Hollifield, J.F. (1998), "Migration, trade, and the nation-state: The myth of globalization", *UCLA*
45 *Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 3 No. 2, pp. 595–636.
46
- 47 Home Office. (2017), *Report on Review of Cash Allowance Paid to Asylum Seekers: 2016*, Home
48 Office, London.
49
- 50 House of Commons. (2013), *Oral Evidence Taken Before the Home Affairs Committee, Asylum*,
51 House of Commons, London.
52
- 53 *Immigration Act 1971, c.77*, HMSO, London, available at:
54 <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1971/77> (accessed 12 May 2017).
55
- 56 Jones, T. and Newburn, T. (2005), "Comparative criminal justice policy-making in the United States
57 and the United Kingdom: the case of private prisons", *The British Journal of Criminology*, Vol. 45
58 No. 1, pp. 58–80.
59
60

1
2
3 Kaufman, E. (2012), "Finding Foreigners: Race and the Politics of Memory in British Prisons",
4 *Population, Space and Place*, Vol. 18 No. 6, pp. 701–714.

5
6 Labour Party. (2017), *For the Many, Not the Few: the Labour Party Manifesto 2017*, Labour Party,
7 London.

8
9 Linnemann, T., Hanson, L. and Williams, L.S. (2013), "'With Scenes of Blood and Pain': Crime
10 Control and the Punitive Imagination of The Meth Project", *British Journal of Criminology*, Vol. 53
11 No. 4, pp. 605–623.

12
13 Malloch, M.S. and Stanley, E. (2005), "The detention of asylum seekers in the UK: Representing
14 risk, managing the dangerous", *Punishment & Society*, Vol. 7 No. 1, pp. 53–71.

15
16 Mason, R. and Elgot, J. (2017), "Theresa May gives no cut-off date for freedom of movement", *The*
17 *Guardian*, available at: [https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/mar/29/theresa-may-gives-no-](https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/mar/29/theresa-may-gives-no-cut-off-date-for-freedom-of-movement)
18 [cut-off-date-for-freedom-of-movement](https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/mar/29/theresa-may-gives-no-cut-off-date-for-freedom-of-movement) (accessed 18 May 2017).

19
20 Mason, R. and Rawlinson, K. (2017), "EU nationals can register to enter UK during Brexit
21 transition", *The Guardian*, 27 July, available at:
22 [https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jul/27/freedom-of-movement-ends-with-brexit-says-](https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jul/27/freedom-of-movement-ends-with-brexit-says-immigration-minister-brandon-lewis)
23 [immigration-minister-brandon-lewis](https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jul/27/freedom-of-movement-ends-with-brexit-says-immigration-minister-brandon-lewis) (accessed 1 August 2017).

24
25 Meikle, J. (2013), "G4S and Serco hand over offender tagging contracts over fraud claims", *The*
26 *Guardian*, available at: [https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/12/g4s-serco-tagging-](https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/12/g4s-serco-tagging-contracts-fraud-allegations-monitoring-criminals)
27 [contracts-fraud-allegations-monitoring-criminals](https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/12/g4s-serco-tagging-contracts-fraud-allegations-monitoring-criminals) (accessed 13 May 2017).

28
29 Menon, A. and Salter, J.-P. (2016), "Brexit: initial reflections", *International Affairs*, Vol. 92 No. 6,
30 pp. 1297–1318.

31
32 Mitie. (2016), *Annual report and accounts 2016*. Mitie Group plc., Bristol.

33
34 Morales, L., Pilet, J-B. and Ruedin, D. (2015), "The Gap between Public Preferences and
35 Policies on Immigration: A Comparative Examination of the Effect of Politicisation on Policy
36 Congruence", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 41 No. 9, pp. 1495–1516.

37
38 Muller, B.J. (2004), "(Dis)qualified bodies: securitization, citizenship and 'identity management'",
39 *Citizenship Studies*, Vol. 8 No. 3, pp. 279–294.

40
41 National Audit Office. (2014), *COMPASS Contracts for the Provision of Accommodation for Asylum*
42 *Seekers*, The Stationery Office, London.

43
44 Nellis, M. and Bungerfeldt, J. (2013), "Electronic monitoring and probation in Sweden and England
45 and Wales: Comparative policy developments", *Probation Journal*, Vol. 60 No. 3, pp. 278–301.

46
47 O'Carroll, L. (2017), "EU citizens in UK could face 'deliberate hostility' policy after Brexit", *The*
48 *Guardian*, available at: [https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jan/16/eu-citizens-in-uk-could-](https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jan/16/eu-citizens-in-uk-could-face-deliberate-hostility-policy-after-brexit)
49 [face-deliberate-hostility-policy-after-brexit](https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jan/16/eu-citizens-in-uk-could-face-deliberate-hostility-policy-after-brexit) (accessed 12 March 2017).

50
51 Owens, P. (2010), "Reclaiming 'Bare Life'? Against Agamben on Refugees", *International*
52 *Relations*, Vol. 23 No. 4, pp. 567–582.

53
54 ONS. (2016), "Population of the United Kingdom by Country of Birth and Nationality", *Office for*
55 *National Statistics*, available at:
56 [https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigra-](https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/datasets/populationoftheunitedkingdombycountryofbirthandnationality)
57 [tion/datasets/populationoftheunitedkingdombycountryofbirthandnationality](https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/datasets/populationoftheunitedkingdombycountryofbirthandnationality) (accessed 23 March
58 2017).
59
60

1
2
3 Pakes, F. and Holt, K. (2017), "Crimmigration and the prison: Comparing trends in prison policy
4 and practice in England & Wales and Norway", *European Journal of Criminology*, Vol. 14 No. 1, pp.
5 63–77.

6
7 Parker, G. (2017), "Theresa May suggests EU migration will continue post-Brexit", *Financial Times*,
8 available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/853e78ae-1945-11e7-a53d-df09f373be87> (accessed 3
9 May 2017).

10
11 Paterson, C. (2014), "The global trade in (techno) corrections", *Criminal Justice Matters*, Vol. 95
12 No. 1, pp. 20–21.

13
14 Phillips, K. (2009), "Interventions, interceptions, separations: Australia's biopolitical war at the
15 borders and the gendering of bare life", *Social Identities*, Vol. 15 No. 1, pp. 131–147.

16
17 Pickard, J. (2017), "Welcome to the most pro-Brexit town in Britain", *Financial Times*, available at:
18 <https://www.ft.com/content/160a9604-e969-11e6-967b-c88452263daf> (accessed 17 March 2017).

19
20 Portes, J. (2016), "Immigration after Brexit", *National Institute Economic Review*, Vol. 238 No. 1,
21 pp. R13–R21.

22
23 Rawlinson, K. (2017), "Immigration levels will sometimes rise after Brexit, says David Davis", *The*
24 *Guardian*, available at: [https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/mar/27/immigration-levels-will-](https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/mar/27/immigration-levels-will-sometimes-rise-after-brexit-says-david-davis)
25 [sometimes-rise-after-brexit-says-david-davis](https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/mar/27/immigration-levels-will-sometimes-rise-after-brexit-says-david-davis) (accessed 11 May 2017).

26
27 Silverman, S. (2017), *Briefing: Immigration Detention in the UK*, COMPAS, University of Oxford,
28 Oxford.

29
30 Silverman, S.J. and Massa, E. (2012), "Why Immigration Detention is Unique", *Population, Space*
31 *and Place*, Vol. 18 No. 6, pp. 677–686.

32
33 Statham, P. and Geddes, A. (2006), "Elites and the 'organised public': Who drives British
34 immigration politics and in which direction?", *West European Politics*, Vol. 29 No. 2, pp. 248–269.

35
36 Stewart, H. and Mason, R. (2016), "Nigel Farage's anti-migrant poster reported to police", *The*
37 *Guardian*, available at: [https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/16/nigel-farage-defends-](https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/16/nigel-farage-defends-ukip-breaking-point-poster-queue-of-migrants)
38 [ukip-breaking-point-poster-queue-of-migrants](https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/16/nigel-farage-defends-ukip-breaking-point-poster-queue-of-migrants) (accessed 13 May 2017).

39
40 Stumpf, J.P. (2006), "The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power",
41 *American University Law Review*, Vol. 56 No. 2, pp. 367–419.

42
43 Taylor, M. (2014), "G4S guards found not guilty of manslaughter of Jimmy Mubenga", *The*
44 *Guardian*, available at: [https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/dec/16/g4s-guards-found-not-](https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/dec/16/g4s-guards-found-not-guilty-manslaughter-jimmy-mubenga)
45 [guilty-manslaughter-jimmy-mubenga](https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/dec/16/g4s-guards-found-not-guilty-manslaughter-jimmy-mubenga) (accessed 12 May 2017).

46
47 Twinch, E. (2013), "Subcontractors struggling with asylum seeker work", *Inside Housing*, available
48 at: [http://www.insidehousing.co.uk/subcontractors-struggling-with-asylum-seeker-](http://www.insidehousing.co.uk/subcontractors-struggling-with-asylum-seeker-work/6526212.article)
49 [work/6526212.article](http://www.insidehousing.co.uk/subcontractors-struggling-with-asylum-seeker-work/6526212.article) (accessed 11 May 2017).

50
51 Tyler, I. (2006), "'Welcome to Britain': the cultural politics of asylum", *European Journal of Cultural*
52 *Studies*, Vol. 9 No. 2, pp. 185–202.

53
54 Vasilopoulou, S. (2016), "UK Euroscepticism and the Brexit Referendum", *Political Quarterly*, Vol.
55 87 No. 2, pp. 219–227.

56
57 Vollmer, B.A. (2017), "Security or insecurity? Representations of the UK border in public and policy
58 discourses", *Mobilities*, Vol. 88 No. 1, pp. 1–16.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Webber, F. (2009), "Segregating Foreign National Prisoners", *Institute of Race Relations*, available at: <http://www.irr.org.uk/news/segregating-foreign-national-prisoners/> (accessed 7 May 2017).

White, A. (2014), "Post-crisis Policing and Public-Private Partnerships", *British Journal of Criminology*, Vol. 54 No. 6, pp. 1002-1022.

Whyte, D. (2007), "Market Patriotism and the 'War on Terror'", *Social Justice*, Vol. 34 No. 3/4, pp. 111-131.

Young, J. (2003), "To these wet and windy shores: recent immigration policy in the UK", *Punishment & Society*, Vol. 5 No. 4, pp. 449-462.

Safer Communities