Nationalities in a Class War: ‘Foreign’ Soldiers in the Red Army during the Russian Civil War

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Non-Russian soldiers played an important part in the Bolsheviks’ victory in the Russian Civil War. The contrast could not have been clearer between units of professional non-Russian troops, possessing valuable military expertise, and the rest of the disorganised Red Army. Non-Russian national units proved their worth in particular by supporting Vladimir Lenin’s fragile grip on power in the opening months of the Civil War when the new regime faced a very real possibility of defeat. Yet despite the clear benefits attached to employing non-Russian soldiers, the Bolsheviks remained uneasy about deploying them. In theory, there should have been few barriers to their easy integration into the army during the Civil War. This was a time when class position was perceived as a stronger dividing line than nationality. However, as this article will show, an exaggerated spymania could easily spark suspicions of volunteer soldiers from Europe, while concerns about rising national aspirations among minorities of the former Russian Empire undermined confidence in other national units. The Bolsheviks never entirely trusted their non-Russian troops despite the critical roles some came to play during the Civil War. In this way, Bolshevik attitudes towards non-Russian soldiers quickly came to resemble those held by the former Imperial regime. Despite an intention to make a clear break between the revolutionary state and its tsarist predecessor, the Bolsheviks experienced similar anxieties about using national units.

This article, moreover, will argue that the use of non-Russian soldiers pushed Iosif Stalin (at the time People’s Commissar for Nationalities) towards rejecting a multi-national army on the grounds that it would lack unity. The connection between military capability in the Civil War and state Russification, most active from the mid-1930s, has not been highlighted in recent research on the Soviet approach to the national question.[[1]](#footnote-1) This article suggests that Stalin’s Civil War experience shaped his attitude towards national policy in fundamental respects. It is likely that this experience had long-term consequences and contributed to the Russian-orientated national policy that became dominant in the 1930s. The Bolsheviks’ responses to their non-Russian soldiers in the Civil War can thus shed further light on the early roots of Stalinist national policy. While still owing much to the specific circumstances of the late 1920s and 1930s, the national policy deployed by the Stalinist regime in later years was also a product of the Imperial past and the experience of Civil War.[[2]](#footnote-2)

In examining the contribution of non-Russian soldiers to the Bolshevik war effort, three separate groups can be identified. The first includes soldiers that came to the Red Army from outside the former Russian Empire, such as German, Hungarian, and Chinese troops. Recruited chiefly from the ranks of former POWs, these soldiers were completely foreign to the Russian military establishment when they enlisted. A second group includes soldiers from territories formerly part of the Russian Empire that emerged as independent states during and after the Russian Revolution, namely Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, and Poland. The recent connection to the Russian Empire makes it difficult to classify this group as foreign in a strict sense; however, a similar sense of separation between them and the broader mass of the Red Army could easily be created, especially when tensions were running high about potential spies and subversives in the ranks. A final group covers non-Russian minorities serving in the Red Army from areas under Bolshevik control, primarily Central Asia. Non-Russian minorities such as Bashkirs, Tatars, and Uzbeks were important to the Bolsheviks not only in a military sense. Persecuted under the Imperial regime, they had normally been barred from serving in the military but now fought for the Bolsheviks on the promise of increased national autonomy.[[3]](#footnote-3) Indeed, having seized power in an expansive multi-national empire, the Bolsheviks were initially eager to accept non-Russian soldiers of all stripes. This was important for the immediate need to win the Civil War, but the incorporation of formerly persecuted minorities into the Red Army was one strand of a broader nationalities policy designed to prove that the new regime was nothing like the exploitative tsarist autocracy. Soldiers from Central Asia were not referred to as ‘internationalists’ as was common for soldiers from Europe, Asia, and those from new independent states. As we shall see, this was one of several distinctions visible among the Bolsheviks’ non-Russian troops.

1. The National Question and National Units in the Red Army

The Bolsheviks understood the Russian Civil War predominately in class terms. The fate of the Revolution was to be decided in a struggle against the reactionary White armies, not forgetting the assistance lent to them by bourgeois foreign governments. But while fighting this class war, the Bolsheviks sought to adopt a new approach to the national question. The rise of national movements, accelerated by war and revolution, made this unavoidable but the Bolsheviks also believed that the national question was central to the construction of socialism. As recent research has made clear, rather than exploit non-Russian minorities through a process of divide-and-rule, the Bolshevik leadership rejected the ‘Great Russian’ chauvinism of the tsarist autocracy and saw themselves as nation-builders.[[4]](#footnote-4) On seizing power, the Bolsheviks inherited a complex multi-national empire and Lenin understood that the long-term advance towards socialism could not be separated from the national question. As Francine Hirsch notes, the Bolsheviks believed that by eliminating the ‘backwardness’ of non-Russian minorities through deliberately advancing their political, cultural, and economic power, the entire population could be taken together on a path of development on a Marxist timetable.[[5]](#footnote-5)

This new approach to the national question was multifaceted and particularly active in the 1920s when minority languages and cultures were given official support in an effort to overcome the lingering effects of Russian national chauvinism, a process known as ‘indigenisation’ (*korenizatsiia*).[[6]](#footnote-6) The use of non-Russian soldiers in the Red Army in the Civil War was an early manifestation of this new approach; it was also recognition (in the short-term at least) that the security of the Revolution required compromises with minority groups, especially in areas where Bolshevik power remained weak. More generally, allowing non-Russian soldiers to serve in the Red Army had propaganda value. The Imperial regime had permitted a restricted pool of minorities to serve in the military (most notably non-Russian elites in the officer corps), however it took a cautious approach because of the perceived security risks attached to allowing too many non-Russians in the military.[[7]](#footnote-7) As part of their efforts to overturn old national policies, the Bolsheviks widened the scope for recruitment on national lines.

A variety of non-Russians soldiers, whether already living under Bolshevik control or having volunteered from outside Russia, fought in the Red Army during the Civil War. Some of these soldiers such as the Latvian Rifles had already given support to the Bolsheviks during the October Revolution.[[8]](#footnote-8) A recruitment drive beginning in the summer of 1918, after the principle of forming individual national units was agreed upon on 30 April, brought greater numbers of non-Russians into the Red Army.[[9]](#footnote-9) Motivations behind volunteering varied. A desire to secure greater national self-determination was important for some; but others, notably volunteers from Europe, signed up to defend the Revolution having been convinced by Bolshevik rhetoric foretelling the destruction of capitalism. It seems that Bolshevik propaganda materials did successfully convince some European soldiers to join the Red Army. During the Russo-Polish War, for instance, the Political Administration of the Red Army argued that propaganda pamphlets and newspapers were having a ‘wonderful influence’ on Polish legionnaires who then crossed over to the Bolsheviks’ side.[[10]](#footnote-10) Bolshevik propaganda sometimes had a marked effect on former POWs. This material could contain the first words that newly released POWs read - and in their native languages – encouraging them to volunteer.[[11]](#footnote-11) European soldiers were valuable to the Bolsheviks not simply for military reasons. In these optimistic years, the regime hoped that they would eventually help push a revolutionary wave across Europe.[[12]](#footnote-12)

Non-Russian soldiers typically fought in self-contained national units and were a valuable addition to the Bolsheviks’ disorganised Red Army. Professional volunteer soldiers from Europe and former territories of the Russian Empire plugged important gaps in a military suffering from a severe lack of expertise. The numbers of such soldiers serving in the Red Army fluctuated during the Civil War. The Latvian units were some of the largest in the early stages of the war, numbering approximately 20,000; Hungarian troops reached 50,000 by October 1918.[[13]](#footnote-13) In the summer of 1920, when the Red Army had swelled to over five million soldiers, approximately two hundred and fifty thousand soldiers from Europe or former Russian territories were serving in the ranks.[[14]](#footnote-14) By the end of the Civil War, according to military census data from October 1921, the largest groups of soldiers from Europe or the Baltic States were Poles at 0.7 per cent, Latvians at 0.6 per cent, and Germans at 0.5 per cent.[[15]](#footnote-15)

There were other ways that the Bolshevik leadership sought to compensate for low levels of military knowledge in the Red Army. It is well known that they employed former Imperial officers who had not crossed over to the White armies. However, while these so-called ‘military specialists’ brought valuable experience, many Party members saw them as the class enemy working within.[[16]](#footnote-16) War Commissar Lev Trotsky was forced to arrange safeguards to ensure that military specialists did not betray the regime, including threatening to punish families in reprisal for mutinies.[[17]](#footnote-17) In comparison to the military specialists, professional foreign soldiers from Europe, Asia, and those from the Baltic States, were understood to be more reliable. Their service in national units in the Red Army created nothing like the scandal that erupted in the Party over the use of military specialists. Moreover, that many European soldiers willingly volunteered to fight for Bolsheviks and seemed committed to the cause of world revolution created an immediate contrast to the military specialists, many of whom had to be coerced into joining the Red Army.[[18]](#footnote-18)

Certain national units were undeniably the best troops available to the Bolsheviks in the Civil War. Recruited to the Red Army in larger numbers between April and May 1918, the Latvians Rifles proved critically important to the weak Bolshevik regime.[[19]](#footnote-19) From an early stage, they were deployed against ‘counterrevolutionaries’ and defended the Bolsheviks’ headquarters in Petrograd. The Latvians also provided important non-military support, such as assisting efforts to nationalise the state.[[20]](#footnote-20) All of this won them special praise. Trotsky remarked in July 1918 that there was no other military unit ‘as disciplined, as firm and as self-sacrificing as the Latvian Rifles’.[[21]](#footnote-21) One month later, and after criticising regular Red Army units for a poor defence of Kazan and for acting like ‘cowardly mercenaries’, Trotsky again praised the Latvian units for showing ‘a high degree of warlike valour’. The Latvians were eventually awarded a special banner of honour for helping secure Kazan in August 1918.[[22]](#footnote-22) Other senior Bolsheviks echoed Trotsky’s praise of the national units. Stalin’s ally Semen Budennyi, the commander of the first cavalry army, also commended their fighting ability.[[23]](#footnote-23) These were professional soldiers and precisely what the new Red Army needed in the early months of the Civil War. As Ioakhim Vatsetis, the Latvian and Supreme Commander of the Red Army between September 1918 and July 1919, noted in his memoirs: ‘Besides the Lettish riflemen there were few military formations on which the Bolshevik Party could rely. Hunger made the troops’ morale bad. Propaganda against the Bolsheviks had so much influence that the Russian regiments declared their neutrality.’[[24]](#footnote-24)

It is not an exaggeration to suggest that without the national units, and particularly units of Latvians and former Hungarian POWs, the Bolsheviks might have been overcome in the early months of the Civil War.[[25]](#footnote-25) Both Latvian and Hungarian units played central roles in defending the Bolshevik regime from the People’s Army, the military force of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, in the summer of 1918. The inexperienced Red Army had lost ground to the People’s Army in the early months of 1918 and suffered serious defeats in May and June. Without professional soldiers from Europe and the Baltic States, it is entirely possible the Bolsheviks might have been defeated by the Socialist Revolutionaries at the outset of the Civil War, bringing a premature end to the Soviet experiment.

The Red Army, in a sense, as one historian has noted, became a unifying institution for nationalities.[[26]](#footnote-26) While remaining a predominately Russian force, the Red Army adopted a stronger multi-national character than had been true in the former Imperial Army. Notwithstanding some experimentation with national units during the First World War, the Imperial Army did not allow non-Russians to serve in their own regiments and some groups were exempt from service altogether (this included Finns and minorities from eastern Caucasia, Turkestan, and Kirghizia, because of doubts about their reliability).[[27]](#footnote-27) When non-Russian groups were used in military service, the Imperial Army usually required units to be three quarters Russian, Ukrainian, or Belorussian, with the final quarter compromising of a single (and less ‘reliable’) minority.[[28]](#footnote-28) Distrust of non-Russians had been especially heightened during the First World War, which saw a widespread campaign against ‘enemy’ minorities characterised by expropriations, internments, and mass deportations.[[29]](#footnote-29) Yet the ranking of nationalities on the basis of perceived loyalties was not a new phenomenon. It had been formalised decades earlier when the Imperial General Staff Academy founded the discipline of Military Statistics in 1845. This concluded that Russians were more reliable than other ethnic groups.[[30]](#footnote-30)

A further indication of how the Bolsheviks placed more trust in non-Russian troops than their predecessors can be seen in the critical roles assumed by national units aside from fighting the White armies in direct combat. Select national units were used as an internal security force, sometimes under the direction of the Soviet political police, the Cheka, and were deployed against striking workers and to put down peasant uprisings.[[31]](#footnote-31) Local regular Red Army units could not be consistently trusted to carry out such operations, particularly when soldiers had connections to a particular region. Indeed, during one peasant rebellion in Ukraine, and after a number of Red Army troops had already deserted to the peasant rebel leader Nestor Makhno, one Red Army commander commented: ‘For the suppression of the uprising it is necessary to send only Russian or international units. Local troops are not fit for this task.’[[32]](#footnote-32) The Cheka often used soldiers from outside Russia in their combat units, particularly Finnish troops.[[33]](#footnote-33) In April 1918, for example, the head of the Cheka, Feliks Dzerzhinskii (himself of Polish extraction), requested control of a Finnish detachment to use against supposed ‘counterrevolutionaries’ and ‘hooligans’.[[34]](#footnote-34) Similarly, during the extensive Tambov uprising between 1920 and 1921, it was the Latvian and Chinese units that took a leading role in putting down the peasant rebels.[[35]](#footnote-35) Desertion was an inescapable fact of life for the Red Army throughout the Civil War; thousands of soldiers deserted every single month.[[36]](#footnote-36) As one Red Army commander put it in a letter to Trotsky from November 1919, one way to keep the army’s strength up was to ‘at all costs keep our international units.’[[37]](#footnote-37)

 The sensitive tasks carried out by certain national units, however, went deeper than suppressing striking workers and putting down peasant uprisings. According to reports compiled by White intelligence agents, the Cheka used Latvian and Chinese detachments not only to suppress strikers, but also to carry out mass executions. These troops carried out death sentences against ‘counterrevolutionaries’ and disciplined the Red Army’s own Russian soldiers. The report highlighted a unit of foreign soldiers having executed twenty-eight Red Army men as punishment for unrest. White intelligence credited these foreign troops for keeping the Red Army in line.[[38]](#footnote-38)

2. Distrust, Disenchantment, and Spymania

There were limits to how far national units could be pushed. Frequently suppressing peasant rebellions, which often stemmed from legitimate problems with food supply and anger about grain requisitions, undermined the reliability of the national units. Just months into the Civil War, concerns were raised about the morale of the Latvians. There were reports of Latvian commanders refusing to use force against peasants - against people who were merely protesting about their living conditions. Geoffrey Swain has shown how a sense of disillusionment spread through Latvian units that had signed up to defend the Revolution but not envisaged this would entail using violence against protestors. Indeed, Latvian units were typically formed of landless peasants and tenant farmers and were sensitive to the Bolsheviks’ early promise to give land to the landless. Some units refused to fight after becoming increasingly disenchanted; others joined counterrevolutionary bands. In turn, the Bolsheviks began to report on the ‘moods’ of the Latvian troops after civilian uprisings were put down.[[39]](#footnote-39) Yet the morale among the Latvians evidently reached such a low point that in September 1918 Vatsetis secretly approached the German Consul General in Moscow about the possible repatriation of Latvian troops from Russia.[[40]](#footnote-40) Vatsetis, however, received no assistance from Germany, and the Bolsheviks refused volunteer soldiers permission to leave the Red Army before finishing two years’ service.[[41]](#footnote-41)

While the Bolsheviks were relying upon soldiers from Europe, Asia and the Baltic States for military defence, for carrying out mass executions, and putting down civilian uprisings, they did not entirely trust them. Even though the Bolshevik leadership made efforts to demonstrate that they rejected the Great Russian chauvinism of the Imperial regime, persisting national prejudices and wartime security fears continued to shape attitudes towards non-Russian troops as they had done before the Revolution. Throughout the Civil War, national units were subjected to questions about their reliability on the grounds that they might be concealing spies or subversives. Indeed, one of the main roles played by the Cheka during the Civil War was the monitoring of the Red Army for any sign that the ‘enemy’ was working within. Special Departments of the Cheka (*osobye otdely*) were created entirely for this purpose. Soviet counterintelligence similarly maintained observation over foreign nationals involved in military affairs.[[42]](#footnote-42)

There was special significance attached to any intelligence agents and subversive networks discovered inside the Red Army during these years.[[43]](#footnote-43) Pervasive to the Civil War was a powerful sense of spymania, fuelled to a large degree by the Bolshevik leaders’ deeply held belief that a network of capitalist powers was not only financing the White armies but managing the war from behind the scenes.[[44]](#footnote-44) Foreign governments did provide some financial assistance to the White armies and landed troops on Russian territory during the Civil War, but they played little more than a supporting role.[[45]](#footnote-45) The Bolsheviks, however, misperceived the true nature of this assistance. From their point of view, Russia was encircled by a close network of capitalist powers committed to the destruction of the Revolution. Alongside creating a siege mentality, this view of the world sharpened security concerns about foreign agents potentially infiltrating the state apparatus and Red Army.[[46]](#footnote-46) In an interview given in July 1919, for example, Stalin remarked that foreign powers were ‘bribing anyone that could be bribed’ in the Red Army for espionage.[[47]](#footnote-47) Two months earlier, he had sent a telegram to Lenin warning that a network of foreign spies could be found in Petrograd and operating across the Petrograd Front. Stalin wanted a concentrated purge and asked that the Special Departments increase their presence in the Red Army.[[48]](#footnote-48) In June 1920, Stalin claimed that the entire of Western Ukraine was littered with Polish spies, some of whom were managing to infiltrate the Red Army.[[49]](#footnote-49) A tough line was taken against any foreign nationals suspected of working for foreign powers or the Whites. In July 1919, an order was given to place all ‘suspicious’ nationals in concentration camps; this included English, Americans, Germans, Czechs, Greeks, Finns, and Poles.[[50]](#footnote-50)

European soldiers serving in the Red Army faced suspicion within this climate of spymania. Indeed some extensive conspiracies were supposedly discovered among European troops in particular. For example, before the official formation of the Red Army, Soviet counterintelligence claimed to have exposed a plot among Polish legionnaires in the Moscow Military District in late December 1917, commanded by the Polish-Russian General Iosif Dovbor-Musnitskii. The subsequent investigation led to the discovery of a subversive organisation of supposedly 762 people. The conspirators were said to have planned to strike at the Russian rear if the German Army resumed its offensive.[[51]](#footnote-51) During the later Russo-Polish War, Poles in Bolshevik territory faced greater scrutiny from the Cheka and this applied to those serving in the Red Army.[[52]](#footnote-52) The outbreak of war against Poland understandably heightened lingering suspicions of Poles working for the Bolsheviks. Indeed, Polish subversion and sabotage directed at the Red Army was understood as on the rise. For example, in March 1920, Dzerzhinskii ordered more information to be collected about Polish counterrevolutionaries and delivered to the Special Department; he also pointed to the existence of possible connections to Polish soldiers serving in the Red Army.[[53]](#footnote-53) In April, the Politburo ordered that all Poles be removed from their positions in military and civil institutions on the Western Front.[[54]](#footnote-54) Just months later, in November 1920, the deputy head of the Special Department, Genrikh Iagoda, requested that all Estonians, Latvians, Finns, and Poles who were not Party members be dismissed from their military positions if they had access to secret materials.[[55]](#footnote-55) Concerns about military security had evidently spread beyond Poles.

 It is important to stress, however, that many of the cases of espionage and subversion discovered by the Cheka were entirely groundless. The primary role of the Cheka was to unmask ‘enemies’ across the state and it rarely mattered how this was done. Interrogators had few qualms about using torture to secure a confession, which was often sufficient evidence of guilt. Fear of capitalist encirclement and spymania in this respect were deeply rooted in the ideology of the Bolshevik Party and in the leadership’s misperception of the world, but they were also products of the interrogation practices used by the political police. The groundless arrests made by the Cheka provided regular ‘evidence’ of foreign subversion that supported the Bolsheviks’ conspiratorial worldview.[[56]](#footnote-56) This in turn made key institutions such as the Red Army appear more vulnerable to subversion than was true in reality, helping foster a climate in which suspicions could be cast against valuable non-Russian troops. Furthermore, the Cheka had an institutional interest in drumming up cases of ‘espionage’ and ‘subversion’. The more ‘enemies’ discovered, the more resources the organisation was likely to receive.[[57]](#footnote-57) As several senior Bolsheviks had begun to call for the Cheka’s powers to be reined in during the Civil War, this was an increasingly pressing concern.[[58]](#footnote-58) Ultimately, a combination of institutional interest, the heightened sensitivity towards capitalist encirclement, and the regular use of forced confessions, created such an atmosphere that even the most senior non-Russian officers could be falsely incriminated. In July 1919 the Cheka arrested Vatsetis, the Latvian Supreme Commander of the Red Army, for supposedly being a ‘counterrevolutionary’.[[59]](#footnote-59) Vatsetis was released shortly after as the charges fell through, but he never recovered his position. Vatsetis, admittedly, was also a former Imperial officer and distrusted on the basis of his class position, though it cannot be ruled out that his nationality left him doubly compromised.

It is clear that some non-Russian soldiers were mistrusted more than others. We have already seen how an exaggerated spymania helped cast suspicion against European volunteers, but other non-Russian soldiers, notably Muslim troops, were distrusted on the basis of their ethnicity alone. By 1920, approximately 50,000 Muslim soldiers were fighting for the Bolsheviks in the east and a school for training Muslim officers was established in Kazan in August 1919.[[60]](#footnote-60) Despite these numbers, there were more questions surrounding the reliability of Muslim soldiers than other European volunteers. Muslims were more resistant to serving in the Red Army in the first place, and a language barrier created further difficulties, but much of the suspicion stemmed from concerns about rising nationalist sentiments. In February 1918, for instance, the Muslim Commissariat suggested to the Collegium of the People’s Commissariat of Nationalities that Muslim troops should be sent into Muslim regions as military reinforcements. However, the Bolshevik leadership rejected this on the grounds that it could strengthen grassroots nationalism.[[61]](#footnote-61) Other limits were placed on the authority of Muslim units in the Red Army. In April 1920, Trotsky criticised the Central Muslim Collegium for acting like the Political Administration of the Red Army in selecting its own political commissars.[[62]](#footnote-62) The Bolsheviks also typically did not allow Muslims troops to choose their own officers, who were normally Russians, prompting complaints from those who felt they did not have equal status to their Russian comrades.[[63]](#footnote-63) The distrust shown towards Muslims was little different to what it had been before the Revolution. Similar anxieties had played out in the Imperial Army when Muslims had normally been exempt from conscription, partly from a concern about giving them weapons training.[[64]](#footnote-64)

Increasing surveillance of non-Russian soldiers and discharging or arresting any supposed ‘enemies’ were not the only means of trying to maintain the reliability of the national units. Suggestive of how the loyalty of some non-Russian soldiers was believed to be hanging in the balance, the Cheka played a supporting role in ensuring that they were not dissatisfied with everyday life in the Red Army. The Cheka drew attention to mundane problems affecting national units, such as when poor supplies or neglectful commanders threatened to undermine reliability (there are reports that poor supplies prompted some non-Russian soldiers to cross over to the Whites).[[65]](#footnote-65) This monitoring of daily life in the national units was inseparable from the Bolsheviks’ approach to the national question. The Bolsheviks, as we have seen, were attempting to create a distinction between the treatment of minorities in the Red Army and Imperial Army. Not only was a wider range of minorities allowed to serve in the Red Army, but they were also given cultural support. Foreign-language newspapers were disseminated among national units as a means of reinforcing how the Bolsheviks rejected the primacy of Russians and the Russian language. The impact of this cultural support was certainly uneven as literacy levels varied significantly among the national units (Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians had much higher levels of literacy than soldiers from Central Asia).[[66]](#footnote-66) But despite the disparities, using native-language materials to reinforce the reliability of the national units was understood to be an important initiative. Alongside the Political Administration of the Red Army, the Cheka highlighted cases where non-Russian troops were receiving insufficient reading material in native languages.[[67]](#footnote-67) Similarly, Stalin, the People’s Commissar for Nationalities, also found time to flag up incidents where he believed more political work was needed among individual national units.[[68]](#footnote-68)

3. Stalin and the National Composition of the Red Army

That non-Russians continued to be ranked according to perceptions of loyalty and perceived national characteristics during the Civil War was in tune with Stalin’s thinking at this time. Shortly after the end of the Civil War in December 1923, for instance, during a meeting of the Politburo, Stalin made revealing comments suggesting he saw intrinsic differences between nationalities. On the question of whether a possible communist revolution might spark in Germany and how neighbouring countries might respond, Stalin noted down: ‘You can frighten the Latvians, push them against the wall, etc. But you can't do this to the Poles…Isolate the Poles. Buy off (and scare) the Latvians. Buy off the Romanians’.[[69]](#footnote-69) Stalin believed that different nationalities required different approaches. It seems that he believed different nationalities had fixed cultural identities.[[70]](#footnote-70) This type of thinking (not unique to Stalin) is one part of the explanation for why the Bolsheviks were never entirely comfortable with deploying non-Russian soldiers in the Civil War and why there were barriers to their full integration.

However, as People’s Commissar for Nationalities during the Civil War, Stalin also examined national differences in relation to the specific issue of defence. In an interview for *Pravda* given at the end of 1919, Stalin made it clear that having an army made up of a broad range of nationalities was a distinct disadvantage and the Red Army, in this respect, was stronger than the Whites. During the Civil War, the Bolsheviks held Russia’s interior and the industrial centres of Moscow and Petrograd. These were strategically important areas, but for Stalin the territory was also a valuable recruiting pool of ethnic Russians. The Whites by contrast operated on the peripheries and had to rely on a more disparate collection of nationalities, providing less unity as a whole.[[71]](#footnote-71) Stalin commented in late 1919:

What national unity is possible between the national aspirations of Tatars, Bashkirs, Kirgiz (in the east), Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingush, Ukrainians (in the south), on one side, and the truly Russian autocratic control of Kolchak and Denikin on the other?...what class unity is possible between the privileged Cossacks of the Urals, Orenburg, the Don, Kuban, on the one side, and all other populations on the outskirts, not excluding Russian ‘aliens’ (*inogorodnikh*) who, from time immemorial, have been oppressed and exploited by neighbouring Cossacks?[[72]](#footnote-72)

Stalin understood that the long history of discrimination against non-Russians could not be eliminated overnight, even if the Bolsheviks now intended to give more support to national minorities. Indeed, aside from his own tendency to stereotype national groups, deeply entrenched inter-ethnic rivalries could not be immediately overturned by the Revolution. As far as Stalin was concerned, all of this weakened the White’s military strength. In another interview with *Pravda* from May 1920, Stalin criticized the White forces for lacking not only class, but national cohesion. This was apparently why they ‘fell apart’ at the first Soviet strike.[[73]](#footnote-73) Similarly, in July 1919, Stalin criticized the lack of unity among the White forces on the Petrograd Front, describing them as ‘ill-assorted and of different calibres’, containing ‘Serbs, Poles, English, Canadians, groups of Russian officers – White Guards.’[[74]](#footnote-74)

By contrast, in the interior regions of Russia, where Bolshevik power was concentrated, the picture was completely different. Stalin claimed that in these areas ‘…in national relations it is united and soldered, because nine tenths of its population is made up of Great Russians.’[[75]](#footnote-75) The connection between national uniformity and military strength was a theme Stalin would return to. He made similar remarks in March 1920 when contrasting the composition of Kolchak’s and Denikin’s White armies with the Polish Army fighting the Red Army in the Russo-Polish War. According to Stalin, the rear of the Polish Army was ‘uniform and nationally cohesive’ giving it ‘unity and stability’. Moreover, among the Polish troops there was a ‘sense of the motherland’ and this created ‘national cohesion and firmness’. Stalin noted that the Polish Army was still vulnerable to class conflicts, but admitted that ‘If the Polish troops are in regions of Poland proper, it would be, without doubt, difficult to fight with them.’[[76]](#footnote-76) In short, Stalin was making a case that a more homogenous army was more reliable and stronger than a multi-national army. This was in complete alignment with the opinions of the Imperial military leadership who had understood that modern war required military and social mobilisation, which they believed was best achieved without having to coordinate a range of different nationalities.

The connection Stalin made between national and military unity indicates that the later Russification of the Soviet state not only had roots in the Civil War but can also be tied to concerns about military effectiveness. As David Brandenberger has shown, the regime’s gradual shift towards Russification from the late 1920s was geared towards promoting state building, industrialisation, and generating popular support for the regime. The Soviet leadership intended to rally society around a new ‘master narrative’ as Marxist-Leninism had proved ineffective as a mobilising strategy for the Soviet people. By the mid- to late 1930s, these efforts had developed into a wide-ranging populist propaganda campaign promoting Russian myths, heroes, and imagery in Soviet mass culture.[[77]](#footnote-77) Stalin’s views on nationality, uniformity, and military effectiveness in the Civil War hinted at this future shift ten years before he consolidated power. In this sense, Stalin seems to have understood almost immediately after the Revolution, for practical reasons of defence and unity (lessons learnt during the Civil War years), that a multi-national army would not be as effective as a more homogenous force. In the same way that Stalin’s Civil War experience shaped the type of leader he would become in other key respects, it informed the mobilising strategies unleashed by the Stalinist regime in the 1930s.

Stalin’s Civil War views on uniformity and military strength put the future of national units immediately in doubt. National units were not finally eliminated from the Red Army until March 1938, but as we have seen, Stalin had long-expressed doubts about maintaining a multi-national army. By the late 1920s, Russian language was being used for all army paperwork. In 1935 Stalin voiced disapproval of individual national units and ordered Tajik and Uzbek units to be moved to the interior due to doubts about their reliability. The 1930s was a decade of growing concerns about the reliability of non-Russians across the Soviet state and spymania reached its zenith during the Great Terror. Stalin began to argue that the Red Army should speak with one language: Russian.[[78]](#footnote-78)

4. Conclusion

Stalin’s concerns about military uniformity show how the Russian Revolution and Bolshevik seizure of power failed to revolutionise the national question. That the Bolsheviks’ attitude towards non-Russian soldiers soon came to resemble those held by the Imperial military leadership is another example of the strong continuities that existed across the year 1917.[[79]](#footnote-79) In the absence of the world revolution that the Bolsheviks had hoped would provide security for their regime, they were faced with the difficult task of reorganising the former Russian Empire and maintaining control over its vast expanses. Even though non-Russian soldiers proved crucial in keeping the Bolsheviks in power during the Civil War, in the long term Stalin believed that a more homogenous military would more effectively defend the regime. The use of national units thus could only be a short-term measure for an emergency situation. There is a telling contrast to the former imperial officers, the military specialists serving in the Red Army, who were similarly removed from the ranks and replaced by newly trained communist Red Commanders in the 1920s and early 1930s. From occupying thirty per cent of command positions at the end of Civil War, the military specialists were reduced to ten per cent by the end of the 1920s.[[80]](#footnote-80) The Bolsheviks discharged military specialists when the officer corps had accumulated enough military expertise, but in doing so, they also removed the ‘class enemy’ from within. Improving the class basis of the Red Army in the 1920s and 1930s was evidently more important than preserving it as a multi-national force. Upholding a revolutionary national policy in the Red Army quickly became out of step with the defence priorities of the Stalinist regime.

 Despite their short history, national units clearly played an important role in the Red Army in Civil War. Even though the Red Army remained a predominately Russian force, foreign soldiers took on some of the most sensitive tasks associated with the war, including carrying out summary executions and suppressing strikes. Moreover, without these volunteers we can speculate that the regime might have been defeated in the early months of the Civil War when Bolshevik power was at its weakest. At the same time, while the Bolsheviks made a great deal of the notion that national differences were less significant than class position, non-Russian soldiers were never properly integrated into the army. Exaggerated fears about espionage and subversion, stemming primarily from a deeply rooted belief in capitalist encirclement, help cast suspicion against soldiers from outside Russia, and concerns about rising nationalist sentiments cast similar doubts over the reliability of national units composed of minorities under Bolshevik control. Furthermore, certain groups of non-Russian soldiers soon became alienated by the regime’s increasingly autocratic behaviour and withdrew their support during the Civil War. And as we have seen, that a senior Bolshevik such as Stalin had doubts almost immediately about whether an army based on a diverse range of national groups could ever compete with one formed of ethnic Russians suggests that a full integration of national units was an unlikely prospect. Indeed, the connection that Stalin made during the Civil War between military strength and national uniformity was an early sign of how he would eventually tackle the national question once he had consolidated power in the Bolshevik Party and launched a programme of Russification across the Soviet state. This saw the final disbandment of the national units in the late 1930s, but it is clear that their disappearance was not solely a product of Russification and was as much a consequence of long-held concerns about the connection between military strength and uniformity.

Finally, the difficulty of fully integrating foreign soldiers into the Red Army throughout the Civil War helps explain why the Bolsheviks chose to emphasise the metaphor of a family as a binding principle for the Red Army. As Joshua Sanborn notes, the Bolsheviks could neither use class nor national markers exclusively and relied instead upon the image of a family of nations struggling to defend Soviet power.[[81]](#footnote-81) Indeed, the oath taken by volunteers entering the Red Army in 1918 described them as ‘brothers in arms’.[[82]](#footnote-82) Similarly, appeals to foreign soldiers to join the Red Army – such as advertised to Poles during the Russo-Polish war – were framed specifically as entering as brothers in arms.[[83]](#footnote-83) Not long after the end of the Civil War, at the Twelfth Party Congress in 1923, applying the imagery of a brotherhood of nations to the Red Army’s national units was reaffirmed.[[84]](#footnote-84) Choosing this symbolism to manage different nationalities in a single army was similar to the approach taken by the Imperial military leadership. Despite raising class position above nationality, the Bolsheviks had confronted the same problems as their predecessors, yet had failed to resolve the tensions between ensuring military cohesiveness on the one hand and perceptions of ethnic reliability on the other.

1. For recent work on the Soviet approach to the national question, see: J. Smith, *The Bolsheviks and the National Question, 1917-1923*, Basingstoke, 1999; T. Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939*, Ithaca, London, 2001; R. Suny / T. Martin (eds.), *A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin*, Oxford, 2001; D. Brandenberger, *National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian Identity, 1931-*1956, Cambridge/Mass., 2002; F. Hirsch, *Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union*, Ithaca, 2005. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. This framework draws upon Peter Holquist’s work on the intersections behind the origins of Soviet violence. See Holquist, “Violent Russia, Deadly Marxism? Russia in the Epoch of Violence, 1905-1921”, in: *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 4 (2003), 627-652. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. L. J. Daugherty III, “Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Armed Forces: The Plight of Central Asians in a Russian-dominated Military”, in: *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 7 (1994), 155-197, 158. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Hirsch, *Empire*, 1-17. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Ibid., 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Martin, *Affirmative Action*. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. M. Von Hagen, “*The Levée en masse* from Russian Empire to Soviet Union, 1874-1938”, in: D. Morgan / A. Waldron (eds.), *The People in Arms: Military Myth and National Mobilization Since the French Revolution*, New York, 2003, 159-188, 161. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. The Latvian Rifles were formed during the First World War in August 1915. P. Gatrell, *A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia during World War I*, Bloomington/Ind., 2005, 160. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Smith, *Bolsheviks*, 35. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. *Rossiskii gosudarstvennyi voennyi arkhiv* (hereafter RGVA), fond. 9, opis. 8, delo. 74, line. 60. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. I. Volgyes, “Hungarian Prisoners of War in Russia 1916-1919”, in: *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* 14 (1973), 54-85, 66. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. V. Denningkhaus, *V teni “Bol’shogo Brata”: Zapadnye natsional’nye men’shinstva v SSSR 1917-1938 gg.*, Moscow, 2011, 304, 315. This was also the hope for repatriated POWs. See R. Nachtigal, “The Repatriation and Reception of Returning Prisoners of War, 1918-22”, in: *Immigrants & Minorities* 26 (2008), 157-184, 172. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. G. Swain, “The Disillusioning of the Revolution’s Praetorian Guard: The Latvian Riflemen, Summer-Autumn 1918”, in: *Europe-Asia Studies* 51 (1999), 667-686, 674; Volgyes, “Hungarian Prisoners”, 81. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Denningkhaus, *“Bol’shogo Brata”*, 80 (footnote 16). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. S. J. Main, “The Red Army During the Russian Civil War, 1918-1920: The Main Results of the August 1920 Military Census”, in: *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 7 (1994), 800-808, 807. Numbers of other non-Russians minorities of the former Russian Empire serving in the Red Army reached similar proportions. In 1921, Tatars constituted 2.7 per cent and Bashkirs 0.5 per cent of the army. Ukrainians were consistently the largest non-Russian nationality in the army at 10.5 per cent in 1921. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. See the controversy that erupted at the Eighth Party Congress about the employment of military specialists, *Vos’moi s’ezd RKP(b), mart 1919 goda: protokoly.* Moscow, 1919. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. R. Reese, *The Soviet Military Experience: A History of the Soviet Army, 1917-1991*,London, 2000, 22. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. R. Reese, *Red Commanders: A Social History of the Soviet Army Officer Corps, 1918-1991*, Lawrence/Kan., 2005, 19. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. G. Leggett, *The Cheka: Lenin’s Political Police: The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage (December 1917 to February 1922)*, Oxford, 1981, 263. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Ia. P. Krastyn (ed.), *Istoriia Latyshkikh strelkov: 1915-1920*, Riga, 1972, 238. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. L. Trotsky, *The Military Writings and Speeches of Leon Trotsky. Vol. 1: 1918. How the Revolution Armed*, London, 1979, 362. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Ibid., 311-312. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Volgyes, “Hungarian Prisoners”, 84. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Quoted in Leggett, *The Cheka*, 75. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Geoffrey Swain suggests this: “The Disillusioning”, 683. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. H. Carrère d’Encausse, *The Great Challenge: Nationalities and the Bolshevik State, 1917-1930*, New York, London, 1992, p. 104 [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Von Hagen, “*The Levée en masse*”, 165-166. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Smith, *Bolsheviks*, 35. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. See in particular E. Lohr, *Nationalizing the Russian Empire: The Campaign against Enemy Aliens during World War I*, Cambridge/Mass., London, 2003. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. D. L. Hoffmann, “The Conceptual and Practical Origins of Soviet State Violence”, in: J. Harris (ed.), *The Anatomy of Terror: Political Violence Under Stalin*, Oxford, 2013, 89-104, 94. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. V. Brovkin, *Behind the Front Lines of the Civil War: Political Parties and Social Movements in Russia, 1918-1922*, Princeton, 1994, 76; Krastyn, *Istoriia*, 208; Volgyes, “Hungarian Prisoners”, 64-65, 82. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Quoted in Brovkin, *Front Lines*, 111. Another example from February 1920 saw Latvian and Estonian units sent, alongside three rifle divisions, to put down some of Makhno’s peasant bands, see: *Rossiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial’no-politicheskoi istorii* (hereafter RGASPI), f. 558, op. 11, d. 1471, ll. 1-7. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Leggett, *The Cheka*, 264. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. A. A. Plekhanov / A. M. Plekhanov (eds.), ***F.E. Dzerzhinskii – predsedatel’ VChK - OGPU, 1917-1926*,** Moscow, 2007, 35. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Quoted in Brovkin, *Front Lines*, 111. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. O. Figes, “The Red Army and Mass Mobilisation during the Russian Civil War 1918-1920”, in: G. Jenson (ed.), *Warfare in Europe 1919-1938*, Surrey, 2008, 297-340, 328. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. V. P. Butt (ed.), *The Russian Civil War: Documents from the Soviet Archives*, Basingstoke, 1996, 101-102. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. RGVA, f. 39499, op. 1, d. 102, l. 39 and 31. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Swain, “Disillusioning”, 674-676; Swain, “Vacietis: The Enigma of the Red Army’s First Commander”, in: *Revolutionary Russia* 16 (2003), 68-86, 74-75. The Cheka recorded occasions when Latvian units refused to fight, see RGVA, f. 9 op. 28, d. 287, l. 26. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. R. Pipes, *The Russian Revolution*, New York, 1991, 661-2. Geoffrey Swain notes that when Latvian troops returned to Latvia after serving in the Red Army, they were so disenchanted that they declined to support the Latvian Soviet Government that collapsed in May 1919. Swain, “Disillusioning”, 667; Stephen Kotkin, *Stalin: Volume I. Paradoxes of Power. 1878-1928*, New York, 2014, 286. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. For such a refusal from the General Staff and People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs from 19 October 1919, see RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1046, l. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. S. S. Voitikov, *Otechestvennye spetssluzhby i krasnaia armiia, 1917-1921*, Moscow, 2010, 117-118. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. For example ‘espionage’ cases see ibid., 71-77, 164, 289, 313, 362; RGVA, f. 9, op. 28, d. 287, ll. 46-47; d. 297, ll. 38-53. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. V. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, XXXVII, Moscow, 1963, 111-125. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. R. C. Nation, *Black Earth, Red Star: A History of Soviet Security Policy, 1917-1991,* Ithaca, 1992, 32. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Voitikov, *spetssluzhby*, 396. See also V. Chebrikov, *Istoriia sovetskikh organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti: uchebnik,* Moscow, 1977, 16-17. On the regime’s misperception of a conspiracy between the capitalist states, see J. Harris and S. Davies, *Stalin’s World: Dictating the Soviet Order*, New Haven, London, 2014, 59-132. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1180, l. 38. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 5733, l. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 5466, ll. 5-6. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Denningkhaus, *“Bol’shogo Brata”*, 60. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Voitikov, *spetssluzhby*, 263-264. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Ibid., 369-70. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Plekhanov / Plekhanov (eds.), ***Dzerzhinskii***, 172. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Denningkhaus, *“Bol’shogo Brata”*, 66. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. A. A. Zdanovich, *Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti i krasnaia armiia*, Moscow, 2008, 535. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. See J. Harris, “Intelligence and Threat Perception: Defending the Revolution, 1917-1937”, in: Harris (ed.), *Anatomy*, 31. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. On the Cheka’s vested interest in the counterrevolution, see L. Viola, “Popular Resistance in the Stalinist 1930s: Soliloquy of a Devil’s Advocate”, in: *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 1 (2000), 45-69, 53-55. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Chebrikov, *Istoriia,* 21-21; Brovkin, *Front Lines,* 28, 46-48. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. Plekhanov / Plekhanov (eds.), ***Dzerzhinskii***, 130-132. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. McMichael, “National Formations”, 621-622; Smith, *Bolsheviks*, 36. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Carrère d’Encausse, *Challenge*, 104. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. McMichael, “National Formations”, 623; RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1610, l. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. For such a complaint sent to Stalin in 1924 see RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 775, l. 34. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. Daugherty, “Ethnic Minorities”, 156-7. Tatars and Bashkirs had been allowed to serve in the Imperial Army, due to their better integration into the Russian Empire. McMichael, “National Formations”, 621. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. RGVA, f. 9, op. 28, d. 287, l. 24; f. 9, op. 8, d. 147, l. 132. The Political Administration of the Red Army drew attention to similar problems in the national units, see RGVA, f. 9, op. 8, d. 70, l. 153; f. 6, op. 10, d. 116, l. 102; f. 9, op. 8, d. 74, l. 57; f. 9, op. 8, d. 147, l. 26. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. T. Raun “The Estonians”, in: E. C. Thaden (ed.), *Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland*, Princeton, 2014, 287-354, 317. See also A. Plakans, “The Latvians”, 207-286, 224. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. For PUR see RGVA, f. 6, op. 10, d. 6, l. 1; for the Cheka, see RGVA, f. 9, op. 28, d. 297, l. 36. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1001, ll. 1-2. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. RGASPI, f.558, op. 11, d. 25, l. 109. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. See in particular, E. Van Ree, “Heroes and Merchants: Stalin’s Understanding of National Character”, in: *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 8 (2007), 41-65, 51. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1180, ll. 46-47. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. Ibid., l. 48. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. Ibid., ll. 56-57. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. Ibid., l. 37. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. Ibid., l. 48. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. Ibid., l. 57. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. Brandenberger, *National Bolshevism*, 2, 8-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. Martin, *Affirmative Action*, 114, 116, 458. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. For work exploring continuities across 1917, see in particular, P. Holquist, *Making War, Forging Revolution: Russia’s Continuum of Crisis, 1914-1921*, Cambridge/Mass., 2002; D. L. Hoffmann, *Cultivating the Masses: Modern State Practices and Soviet Socialism, 1914-1939*, Ithaca, London, 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. A. G. Kavtaradze, *Voennye spetsialisty na sluzhbe respubliki sovetov, 1917-1920 gg.*, Moscow, 1988,224; R. Harrison, *Russian Way of War: Operational Art, 1904-1940*,Lawrence/Kans., 122. [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. J. Sanborn, “Family, Fraternity, and Nation-Building in Russia, 1905-1925”, in: Suny / Martin (eds.), *State of Nations*, 93-110, 97, 105. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. Ibid., 96. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 1736, ll. 1-3. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 775, l. 34 [↑](#footnote-ref-84)