Failing to Respond: Yemen's Humanitarian Crisis and the Role of the West

Jessica Ann Davies

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Abstract

This thesis examines the ongoing humanitarian crises in Yemen and seeks to determine if key western powers have any responsibility towards the former. Yemen is currently facing the world's worst humanitarian crisis, which shows no signs of easing. A postcolonial lens is adopted in order to scrutinise the role that key western powers have played in causing these crises and how they are currently failing to fulfil their obligations towards Yemen. The influence of 'Orientalism' on the West's treatment and attitude toward Yemen is emphasised. The role of individual states as well as an array of international organisations is assessed in order to determine whether they have a responsibility to end these humanitarian crises and how it would be best for them to achieve this. A case study approach is adopted and models of political responsibility are applied throughout. The long-term effects of colonialism and 'Orientalist' policies and attitudes towards Yemen have resulted in the current humanitarian crises. Analysis shows that individual states that have historically and contemporarily benefited as a result of the suffering of Yemeni people are responsible for the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Yemen and have a duty to end this suffering.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

9/11 – September 11th Terrorist Attacks

EU – The European Union

ICC – The International Criminal Court

MENA – The Middle East and North Africa

MSF - Médecins Sans Frontières

NLF - National Liberation Front for the Occupied South of Yemen

OCV – Oral Cholera Vaccine

OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OPEC - Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

PDRY – The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen / South Yemen

PPE – Personal Protection Equipment

SEILs – Standard Individual Export Licenses

UAE – United Arab Emirates

UK – The United Kingdom

UN – The United Nations

UNGA – The United Nations General Assembly

UNICEF – The United Nations Children's Fund

UNMHA – United Nations Mission to support the al-Hodeida Agreement

UNOCHA/OCHA – The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

UNSC – The United Nations Security Council

UNVIM – United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism

USA – The United States of America

USSR - The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WASH – Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

WHO – The World Health Organization

YAR – The Yemen Arab Republic / North Yemen

YHRP – Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan

YRRF – The Yemen Relief and Reconstruction Foundation

Introduction

Yemen is facing the world's worst humanitarian crisis (Broder, 2018). This crisis spans several fronts including: famine, the worst cholera epidemic since records began, crippled healthcare infrastructure, widespread internal displacement, and a severe lack of access to safe and clean drinking water. The Civil War has been raging in Yemen in Yemen since late 2014, exacerbating the health challenges faced by many Yemenis. Throughout this thesis the historical context of Yemen, since the British occupation of Aden in 1839 and up until the present day, is examined and analysed through a postcolonial lens in order to deduce as to whether the West has played a significant role in bringing about this humanitarian crisis. This is achieved via analysis of the actions and policies of key western powers including different state actors as well as the activities of different international organisations. I utilise models of political responsibility such as the liability model, the fiduciary model, and the social connection model in order to deduce what responsibility actually entails, and whether these different groups do in fact have a responsibility towards Yemen. An understanding of 'responsibility' is vital in order to recognise how the crises facing the Yemeni people can be brought to an end. Until those that are responsible for these crises acknowledge the role that they have in protracting it, we cannot hope to ease the suffering of the Yemeni people.

This research questions the concept of political responsibility. It aims to show how this responsibility relies upon and changes upon different historical contexts and as a result of varying international power dynamics. Its focus is the role of the West because the West exists within a world in which it has dominance on the international stage and hegemony within the Middle East. The West holds a disproportionate amount of the world's power and wealth (with six out of ten of the world's richest states being western (Rodriguez, 2022)), and this thesis' goal is to demonstrate how those properties result from a system of exploitation and subjugation via colonialism, imperialism and Orientalism.

This thesis' approach is postcolonial in nature. Much of my analysis is inspired by Edward Said's 1978 work 'Orientalism'. This foundational text lays the framework for my research; suggesting that there is a presumption within the 'Occident' (the West) that they have a superiority over the 'Orient' (the East; which in this context is Yemen). There is a suggestion

throughout much of Western culture, a trend seen throughout literature, academia, and popular culture, that the East is a 'backwards' and 'violent' (Said, 2003) (Jervis, 2005). These assumptions about 'Oriental' culture and society are means used by colonial and imperial powers in the West to justify hostility towards Middle Eastern countries and to rationalise inaction in the face of breaches of international humanitarian law. While 'Orientalism' is not a product of colonial rule (Said, 2003), it is evident that 'Orientalist' ideas have been utilised in order to justify and perpetuate colonialism. According to Said, Orientalism has allowed the West to exploit the 'Orient' by removing its autonomy and ability to represent itself on the international stage (Said, 2003). The 'Orient' has become merely a representation of Orientalism to others around the globe (Said, 2003), and therefore the antithesis of the West. The West thus views the 'Orient' as a threat to their own culture and hegemony in the Middle East, and has developed unreceptive views towards it. Said maintains that 'Orientalism' is not an actual representation of the 'Orient' or its peoples, but merely a reflection of the fears and hostilities of the 'Occident' towards a culture and a society that it does not truly understand. For this reason, Said's 'Orientalism' (2003) is useful in understanding the role that the West plays in Yemen's humanitarian crises. It explains why these Western states and organisations may act apathetically towards suffering in Yemen and why they do not respond to humanitarian disasters in the Middle East in the same way as those in the West. For the purpose of this thesis, the West is used interchangeably with the term 'Occident'. While 'the West' is often a difficult concept to explain, when paired with the term 'Occident', it is more clearly defined as a culture of social norms and customs, often strongly linked to colonialism, without basis in empirical fact, but rather the product of a constructed world (Said, 2003).

Yemen is currently suffering the world's worst humanitarian crisis (Broder, 2018). The nature of this situation is ongoing, and therefore, much of the literature surrounding this subject is limited. Most analysis of the humanitarian crisis that examines the role of the West is limited to criticising the western states that have arms deals with members of the Saudi-led Coalition. While this is a crucial aspect of the West's failures towards Yemen, I do not believe it goes far enough to fully understand the extent of the West's non-fulfilment of its obligations. A broader examination including an investigation into the history of Yemen and its relationship with the West is needed to comprehend the scope of its responsibility.

For this reason, this thesis adopts a postcolonial lens and studies the history of British colonialism in Aden and the Federation of South Arabia. Colonialism has long-term effects on colonies long after emancipation is achieved, former colonies have been exploited and require assistance to regain resources lost as a result (Howard-Hassmann and Lombardo, 2008). This thesis suggests that the United Kingdom has not fulfilled its fiduciary responsibility towards Yemen following decolonisation; this has contributed to Yemen's current humanitarian crisis. Even Western states without direct history of colonialism in Yemen have demonstrated Orientalist policies towards the state. The USA's Orientalist venture of hegemony in the Middle East has had a significant and negative impact on Yemen's current situation. Popular culture within the USA has been used to justify the neglect and demonisation of Yemeni people (Little, 2002). Yemen's distinct non-Western culture has been utilised by Orientalists within the USA (Jervis, 2005) to portray the nation as tyrannical, violent, and markedly separate from that of the West. This has resulted in demonisation that is used to validate a lack of care and responsibility that is necessary for ethical living (Raghuram, Madge and Noxolo, 2009). Much analysis of the role of international organisations in Yemen's humanitarian crisis also fails to appreciate the effects of Western dominance within these organisations and the Orientalist views that those Western states often hold. Humanitarian intervention is governed by the national interests of wealthy nations because they are afforded political power that others are not; an example of this being the permanent five members of the UNSC (Marcus, 2002). Many of these states have gained positions of wealth and power as a result of their colonial and imperialist pasts and therefore the exploitation of poorer states. On consideration of all of these factors, the need for a postcolonial analysis of the West's role in Yemen's humanitarian crisis became evident. While there has been research into the long-term effects of colonialism and imperialism on humanitarian crises before, much of this work has focused on the African continent (Griffiths and Binns, 1988) (Msoka, 2007) (Arieff, 2014) (Miller, Toffolutti and Reeves, 2018). This thesis aims to bring much of the same postcolonial analysis into a discussion surrounding a Middle Eastern state, while incorporating an understanding of the impact of Orientalist views of the region.

This research is vital to understanding the extent of the role the West has played in instigating and perpetuating Yemen's humanitarian crisis. By incorporating postcolonial

analysis, the extent of the West's responsibility towards Yemen can be fully appreciated. If the West can be identified as responsible for Yemen, it will be easier to suggest ways in which they can ease the suffering of Yemeni civilians. While the West is unwilling to recognise its part in exacerbating the crisis, it will not be possible to find fair and effective solutions. If the West does not accept its responsibility, it will likely see fit to continue selling arms to the Saudi-led Coalition. If the profit motivations of Western states are allowed to continue to take priority over alleviating the suffering of Yemeni civilians, then the humanitarian crisis is expected to persist (United Nations, 2021). In order to end the Civil War, it is essential that the Houthis and the Coalition come together to negotiate and compromise (Lackner, 2020), however, while the West continues to show support for the Saudi-led Coalition by continuing to supply them with arms, this is unlikely to happen.

By using Yemen as a case study, it is possible to identify patterns of behaviour that have had long-term effects on Yemen and its people. This thesis utilises a case study approach because it is examining a complex phenomenon (Bennett and Elman, 2006). Yemen's humanitarian crisis is occurring in the midst of a civil war, meaning that there are numerous structures and actors that interact with one another across various levels (Bennett and Elman, 2007). Qualitative methods allow for the analysis of complex situations such as civil war. Situations such as the crisis in Yemen are often unstructured and infrequent and this is why a case study approach lends itself best to this thesis.

The first chapter of this thesis provides the historical background for Yemen, and suggests how the events of the past two centuries have led to the current humanitarian crisis. Specifically, it investigates the role that colonialism and imperialism have played in producing these current circumstances. This chapter focuses largely on the role of the United Kingdom, as it occupied Aden and the subsequent Federation of South Arabia until 1967 (The Hampton Institute, 2018), and is chiefly concerned with the long-term effects of that occupation on the current state of Yemen. While the entirety of modern-day Yemen was not under British colonial control, the unified state has faced decades of divisions and difficulties as a result of it. The colonial administration in South Yemen only provided limited access to education (Howard-Hassmann and Lombardo, 2008) (Amshoush, 2022), failed to develop infrastructure outside of Aden (Sills, 2021), and subordinated locals in order to gain control of the majority of capital accumulation in South Arabia (Blumi, 2017). This gave rise

to a population with little means of self-governance, poor national infrastructure, and a lack of wealth extraction regimes. The process of decolonisation in South Yemen was carried out quickly under pressure from the United Nations (Chang, 1972), resulting in a lack of unity amongst the Yemeni people and an autocratic regime headed by the National Liberation Front for the Occupied South of Yemen (NLF). Moreover, during the Cold War period and following the formation of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in 1967, the United Kingdom remained hostile to the new state, refusing to cancel the country's debts and declining to meet with the Yemeni Foreign Secretary (Halliday, 1985). Since the PDRY was a small and uninfluential state, the United Kingdom saw no motivation in pursuing positive diplomatic relations with them (Halliday, 1985). Even following Yemeni unification in 1990, the United Kingdom did little to develop a positive diplomatic connection with the Republic of Yemen, instead opting to pressure Yemeni leadership by linking offers of much needed financial aid to the government's performance in the task of counter-terrorism (Stracke, 2010). At present, the United Kingdom is continuing to sell arms to the Saudi-led Coalition in the Yemeni Civil War (Campaign Against Arms Trade, 2022). There is evidence to suggest that the Saudi-led Coalition has used these weapons in order to commit war crimes against civilians (Nasser, 2022). This indicates that the United Kingdom has broken international humanitarian law (Kessler, 2019). This criterion considered; this thesis suggests that the United Kingdom has responsibility towards Yemen to end the humanitarian crisis.

The role of the United States of America (USA) is also examined throughout this thesis. From its hostile attitude towards the PDRY during the Cold War, its refusal to give the country economic aid following the British withdrawal (Halliday, 1985), the conditionality of aid offers during the US's War on Terror (Stracke, 2010), and the sale of $34 billion USD worth of arms to the Saudi-led Coalition in four years (Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 2021), the USA has had a long record of failures towards the people of Yemen. The USA has repeatedly prioritised their own national foreign relations strategies above the needs of Yemeni civilians in order to pursue their own global hegemony (Altwaji, 2014). They have also failed to donate its proportionate share towards humanitarian organisations and charities that work to ease the health crises facing Yemenis (Cooper, 2020). The principal basis of the USA's responsibility towards Yemen is their continuation of arms sales to

members of the Saudi-led Coalition. Much alike the United Kingdom, the USA has been made aware that the arms they are exporting to the Saudi-led Coalition have been used to commit war crimes (Nasser, 2022). They have continued to make these sales despite calls to end the War in Yemen from within its own government (Shaker, 2022) and international condemnation (Bell, 2022). The liability model is utilised in order to explain why the USA's decision to breach international humanitarian law in this way results in the state becoming morally and legally responsible for the harmful consequences that have befallen the Yemeni people.

The role of international organisations is also scrutinised throughout this thesis, as well as some other key western states. The United Nations has played a significant part in generating Yemen's current political and humanitarian climate, from its part in the decolonisation process (Chang, 1972), the United Nations Security Council's (UNSC) unrepresentative nature (Lia, 1998), to the Council's inability to unify in order pass meaningful Resolutions (*UN Human Rights Council votes to end Yemen probe*, 2021). The United Nations has failed to provide balanced critique of all sides involved in the Civil War for their role in perpetuating the ongoing health crises (World Food Programme, 2018). Moreover, the United Nations reduced food assistance to Yemenis by 50 per cent in 2020 as a result of severe underfunding (Human Rights Watch, 2020). Funding for humanitarian aid fell to a historic low in 2020 (World Health Organisation, 2020) (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2020) (Hashim et al, 2021), meaning delivery of aid became even more arduous. However, such aid donations would not be necessary if the Civil War was brought to an end. The United Nations has been largely unsuccessful in its attempts to ease the humanitarian crises in Yemen, and this research seeks to determine whether these failures constitute any level of responsibility. The possible responsibility of the United Nations is assessed as well as its ability to follow its own mandate. The role of the World Health Organisation (WHO) throughout Yemen's numerous health crises is also explored, as well as its capacity to function within a hostile and fractured environment. France's position as an independent state as well as a leading member of the European Union (EU) is also brought into question, given its continued arms sales to the Saudi-led Coalition (Irish, 2019).

The first chapter of this thesis will lay out the history of colonialism and imperialism in Yemen. It will focus primarily on the South of Yemen, as this region was a British colony until

1967. Key events will be outlined and analysed to access their longstanding impact on modern-day Yemen with explicit reference to western doctrines concerning the 'Orient'. The second chapter of this thesis will specifically focus on the notion of responsibility and how that can be applied to this case study. It will determine which Western states and organisations, if any, do have responsibility towards Yemen by utilising different models of political responsibility and applying them to relevant actions and their consequences. The third and final chapter will explain the nature and scope of Yemen's humanitarian crisis. It will also lay out the ways in which Western states and organisations have approached providing aid to Yemen, and suggest ways in which they could improve upon their methods to end the suffering of Yemeni civilians.

Imperialism and Colonial Legacy: The History of the West and Yemen

From Britain's occupation of Aden in 1839, to reunification in 1990, up to the modern-day Civil War, imperialism and colonialism has had a continuing impact of the state of Yemen. This chapter will examine Yemen's recent history and how it has been affected by colonialism and imperialism. It aims to show how Yemen's current humanitarian crisis has been impacted by said colonialism to a negative effect. The majority of this section will focus on the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen ((PDRY) South Yemen), the port of Aden as the former British colony, as the area of modern-day Yemen that has historically been more substantially affected by colonialism. Meanwhile the Yemen Arab Republic ((YAR) North Yemen) was not a British colony and as a non-socialist state was not affected by the same level of negative treatment by Western states during the 1970s and 1980s in comparison to its southern counterpart. Later in this section, references to 'Yemen' following 1990 will discuss the reunified state of the Republic of Yemen.

The British in Yemen

We start from the inception of British occupation of Aden in 1839. Britain's decision to occupy Aden was profit driven (Abadi, 1995), with the British East India Company wanting to seize control of the coffee trade from the Egyptians in the area. They therefore pressured the British government to interfere with South Arabia (Abadi, 1995). Although they initially only controlled a small area, their influence quickly grew alongside their profit and security protections (Abadi, 1995). The British utilised their expertise and monetary capabilities to grow their influence throughout a larger area of South Arabia. That is not to suggest that Yemenis were content with being ruled over by the newly arrived Western imperialists; Yemen's Muslims were at the forefront of resistance to European capitalists (Blumi, 2018). Blumi makes effort to "avoid the Eurocentric assumption that modern history only begins with the arrival of Europeans," (Blumi, 2018, p. 31) when in actuality wealthy members of the Yemeni diaspora had long been investing their wealth into Yemen to strengthen its resistance to global capitalism. Yemen was by no means underdeveloped, merely not modernised to a European standard. These areas had already refined wealth extraction

regimes in place, but they were unwilling to hand them over to the Europeans (Blumi, 2017). Despite this, the British state used its military strength in order to subordinate locals and henceforth became responsible for the majority of capital accumulation in South Arabia (Blumi, 2017). Moreover, in order to solidify its hegemony over the region's strategic assets, Britain supported the extremist Abdu Aziz ibn Sa'ud in reconquering Riyadh in 1902 in order to upset and undermine the Ottomans. The political and financial class in London were willing to cause untold destruction to the region in order to maintain its long-term presence in South Arabia (Blumi, 2018) with no apparent regard to the negative effects that this would have on the lives of locals. This trend reoccurs frequently throughout Britain's occupation of Aden, and beyond its withdrawal. Britain's involvement with Yemen has been tied to its financial interests for nearly two hundred years. From the East India Company in the nineteenth century, up to its present-day munitions deals with Saudi Arabia, Britain has a long running history of placing its own financial incentives above the needs and safety of colonised and formerly colonised people.

The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) provided for the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples (United Nations, 1960). This declaration proposed that the United Nations should play a significant role in the end of colonialism world-wide. The United Nations suggested that the continued existence of colonialism impedes the social, cultural, and economic development of dependent peoples and goes against United Nations ideals (United Nations, 1960). The United Nations were aware of the common argument for continued colonial presence; that many colonised territories were not sufficiently socially, economically, nor politically prepared for independence. However, the Resolution warned that these were not adequate reasons as to delay independence (United Nations, 1960). Unfortunately, the Resolution did not translate into widespread abandonment of colonial endeavours. This declaration was adopted in December 1960. In the case of the People's Republic of South Yemen, it did not gain independence from the United Kingdom until late 1967. The United Nations was only able to assist in these instances if both the administrative power and any other concerned parties all agreed to realise decolonisation. The United Kingdom was in a position to reject the United Nation's visiting mission to South Yemen in the 1960s; they cited the lack of objectivity of the subcommittee as reason for this (Chang, 1972). Given that the United Kingdom had a

military base in the Federation of South Arabia which was considered to be essential, they were unenthusiastic about the proposition of abandoning it (Chang, 1972). Moreover, the local Yemeni people were themselves divided between different communities*[1] (often referred to as tribes). These divisions made organising and advocating for independence more difficult, as there was no clear choice for successor were the United Kingdom to withdraw. These difficulties maintained the United Kingdom's colonial presence in Southern Yemen for much of the 1960s.

In November 1961, the UN's Special Committee of 24 demanded the rapid transfer of power to the people of the territory in accordance with a democratic process (Special Committee on Decolonization | The United Nations and Decolonization, 2022). Eventually, the United Kingdom did accept some of the UN's suggestions, granting more power to Adenis and working with the traditionalist sheikdoms in the desert hinterland (Chang, 1972). This however, did not help bridge the gaps between many Adenis and more rural communities who feared the continuation of the traditional power structure that had for so long relied on the support and advice of the colonial power (Chang, 1972). The United Kingdom frequently sided with the traditional authorities and labelled the various independence movements as foreign serving terrorists, with loyalties to Egypt and Yemen (Chang, 1972). As a result of the United Kingdom not being willing to cooperate with many independence movements and the schisms between these different sects of Southern Yemeni society, decolonisation was difficult to attain. While many of their violent acts could be labelled as terrorist activities, their aim was to seize power for the native people of Yemen and to reduce the military aptitudes of the occupying forces. Some Adenis committed acts of violence in response to fear that the decolonisation process would lead to the United Kingdom handing power over to the Yemeni communities (Chang, 1972). It is vital to consider the context of the attacks carried out against the British occupiers. The attacks carried out against the British were against military personnel rather than civilians, and the aims of their attacks were to gain

- [1] Much of the literature used throughout my thesis makes frequent reference to 'tribes' and 'tribal communities' native to Yemen. Due to the anti-colonial nature of my thesis, I do not wish to promote nor perpetuate this antiquated and racist term to refer to a myriad of distinct groups. I will therefore be referring to these groups as 'communities'. I do recognise the danger of homogenising these distinct groups, however, given that the vast majority of the literature I have found does this, I am left with little option but to bind these communities together in my own research.

independence rather than to simply cause fear or 'terror'. The British labelled these attacks as terrorist events in a bid to demonise and discredit the Adeni perpetrators. Miller's 2019 article 'Seeing Political Violence through Different Lenses' uses the case study of the 2019 Pulwama attack to offer some perspective on the framing of acts of political violence (Miller, 2019). He proposes that distinctions must be made between terrorism and guerrilla warfare based on the victims, the nature and the purpose of the attack (Miller, 2019). The victims of the Adeni attacks were military personnel of the occupying forces. These acts represented the desperation and determination of the perpetrators, rather than a desire for violence and chaos. They showed a desperation for freedom and autonomy from the British.

The religious context of these attacks is also important; the culprits were often Islamist fighters who had adopted the hadith of martyrdom in Islam (Ezzati, 1986). The lack of recognition for the importance of martyrdom and the protection of your own property in Islam meant that the British could spin these attacks as merely terrorist activities that discredited the local population's ability to self-govern. In response, the United Kingdom turned to robust law and order measures and used these actions to propose that the people of South Yemen were neither politically nor socially capable of handling their own governance (Ezzati, 1986). This is an example of the Orientalist policies of the British, condemning the local population as 'backwards' and 'unruly' for wanting to uphold their own culture and religious values against the rule of the Occident. By continuously portraying local people as 'violent' 'terrorists', it makes it easier to negatively portray Yemen on the international stage and to justify damaging policies against them.

While it is clear that factions within Yemeni society were cause for concern, the United Kingdom's unwillingness to quickly and democratically hand power over to the Yemeni people contravened the measures set out by the UN. While the United Kingdom insisted that it was South Yemen's inability to self-govern that caused their reluctance to withdraw from the region, their actions demonstrated a complete indisposition towards the entire decolonisation process. The United Kingdom viewed itself as a positive force of democracy, law and order, capable and responsible for keeping calm in a territory that had never requested its involvement. While there were active violent attacks occurring in South Yemen at the time, this was largely due to the unrest caused by the decolonisation process. Needless to say, the decolonisation process was only necessary because of the United

Kingdom's continuing presence in the region. That is not to say with any degree of certainty that violence would not have occurred during this time without the involvement of the United Kingdom, but rather that it was likely exacerbated by their presence. The unrest related to the specific violent attacks outlined by Chang was explicitly related to the instability and uncertainty of the future of leadership within Southern Yemen following the possible departure of the United Kingdom in the near future.

The United Nations and decolonisation

The United Nations was a leading force calling for the end to the United Kingdom's colonial presence in South Yemen in the 1960s. The United Nations' Special Committee of 24 and the General Assembly demanded the rapid transfer of power to the people of the territory in accordance with a democratic process (Chang, 1972). Moreover, in 1963, in Resolution 1949 (XVIII) "the General Assembly affirmed the right of the people of the territory to self-determination, expressed the view that the maintenance of the military base in Aden was prejudicial to the security of the region, and stated that it should be removed at an early date. It recommended that the people's right to self-determination be exercised in the form of a popular consultation to be held as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage," (Chang, 1972, p. 45). Despite the adoption of this Resolution, that is not to say that the United Kingdom was bound to accept it. United Nations Resolutions are merely advisory in this context, and still require the consent of the administering power in order to be in any way effective. While it is vital for highly influential international organisations such as the United Nations to be vocal about calls for decolonisation in territories where that would be in the best interest of the dependents, in the context of South Yemen's decolonisation, it is likely that no real retaliation would be possible against the United Kingdom for any failure to comply. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the only United Nations body with the power to issue any binding resolutions on member states (Functions and Powers | United Nations Security Council, 2022). The United Kingdom has had a permanent seat and veto on the UNSC since its formation in 1945, suggesting that it would have been highly unlikely that the Council would have enacted any sanctions on the United Kingdom had they failed to comply with the decolonisation of South Yemen. Once again, the structure of the United Nations was its downfall. Since three out of five permanent members of their security council are (and have been since its 1945 inception) Western powers with colonial

and imperialist leanings, the UNSC is and always was unlikely to be able to adopt any hard-line repercussions from failure to comply with demands from the United Nations' Special Committee of 24.

The United Kingdom went as far as to oppose the United Nations visiting mission to South Yemen (Chang, 1972). They did not believe that the subcommittee would form an objective judgement and were fearful of increased tensions in the territory if the mission was to go forward (Chang, 1972). The United Nations was not in a position to force the mission to go ahead as they required the consent of the administrative power in order to do so. The real force for decolonisation in South Yemen seems to be a combination of increased levels of hostility, political violence, and to a lesser degree, the effects of domestic British politics on international policy. In December 1963, there was an assassination attempt on the British High Commissioner and therefore a state of emergency was declared in South Yemen (Chang, 1972). Another incident that sparked fear for the British administrators in Aden was Black Tuesday of 1967. A mutiny broke out on 20th June 1967 involving soldiers and police officers in which nine British soldiers were shot and killed by Arab guerrilla fighters (Edwards, 2017). In the Crater district, a reconnaissance patrol was ambushed; three soldiers were shot, tortured and their bodies were mutilated and burnt (Edwards, 2017). While the British Labour government at the time maintained that the Black Tuesday attacks were the result of 'internal tribal jealousies', it is believed that this was a reaction to Britain's ongoing colonial presence in the area (Edwards, 2017). It seems more than coincidental that Black Tuesday occurred just five months before the United Kingdom's ultimate withdrawal from Aden. Moreover, the support that the Yemeni insurgent groups were receiving from Egypt's Colonel Nasser in the form of munitions and troops (Mumford, 2009) ensured that the British could not be certain of their ability to contain the unrest in the territory.

The 1963 general election in the United Kingdom saw a change in government from the Conservative governments of Harold Macmillan and Sir Alec Douglas-Home to the Labour government of Harold Wilson. One result of this change in government was that the planned second conference of the Southern Arabian governments to set a date for independence did not take place (Chang, 1972). However, the new Labour government were more sympathetic towards the Adeni independence movements in comparison to

their Conservative predecessors (Chang, 1972). Nevertheless, Harold Wilson maintained that there was a need to maintain Aden and that it was an indispensable base for the British, but he was however against the idea of keeping the base against the wishes of the local population (Abadi, 1995). Additionally, there were excessive costs related to performing colonial duties within the Protectorate (Dockrill, 2022), and the Ministry of Defence were pressuring the Foreign Office to reduce costs by reducing overseas commitments. The combination of a government that was uneasy with the concept of ruling a territory against the wishes of the local people, the expense of maintaining an overseas territory (Dockrill, 2002), constant attacks against their military, a loss of confidence and feelings of shame over the Empire (Abadi, 1995), as well as the excessive costs related to maintaining the base (Chang, 1972) (Dockrill, 2002) seemed to be more influential reasons for the United Kingdom's withdrawal from Aden than any encouragement from the United Nations. The United Kingdom failed to show a real willingness or desire to withdraw from Aden at any point in favour for their own interests. Following the Second World War, they believed that having territories in the Middle East was necessary for oil (Abadi, 1995) and they maintained that the base was necessary for security. However, other European countries secured their oil without a Middle Eastern base (Chang, 1972). Aden itself posed a security risk to the United Kingdom, so the legitimacy of this claim was brought into question. While the political context of the United Kingdom sheds some light on their reasoning behind the eventual withdrawal from Aden in late 1967, it does not necessarily explain why the withdrawal had such negative effects for the Yemeni people in the long term.

Following the British withdrawal from the Federation of South Arabia in 1967, the country became known as the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen was a socialist state that existed between 1967 and 1990. The existence of such a state in the Middle East at that time was unusual; they relied heavily on the USSR and other communist and socialist states worldwide. The vast majority of aid and financial assistance given to PDRY came from said communist and socialist, non-Western states. PDRY had a scarcity of resources; only 0.2 per cent of the land was cultivable, no mineral or oil deposits, the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967 decimated the port of Aden, and the withdrawal of the British military lowered general income (Birks and

Sinclair, 1982). Most Yemeni's were agriculturists and fishermen who were illiterate and living in predominantly rural areas (Birks and Sinclair, 1982). This left the country is an especially vulnerable position, requiring international aid and financial assistance in order to survive. While PDRY was likely to become a socialist state following the British withdrawal, their financial vulnerability left them particularly susceptible to political manipulation in the quest for financial assistance. The USSR gave financial help to PDRY in order to build up their fishing industry without the need for repayment, the German Democratic Republic granted the PDRY $7 million without repayment, Romania gave them $13.5 million for the construction of irrigation systems and the building of a cement factory, Cuba provided vital equipment and goods without reimbursement and Poland provided equipment and $37 million in a non-repayable aid grant (Al Khadat and Vale, 1985). While France and Sweden did provide some limited economic aid (Halliday, 1985) there is no such evidence for similar amounts of aid given by the majority of Western states at this time. This aid gave a chance of economic prosperity to PDRY that otherwise would have been unattainable. That is not to say that the PDRY experienced a period of financial prosperity during this time, but rather that the possibility for some growth was given by those communist and socialist states after the withdrawal of the British military in 1967. This was the period of the Cold War, therefore the aid given by the USSR and other members of the Soviet Eastern bloc was not without political motivations and repercussions. It is likely that the West's lack of financial support for the PDRY was somewhat motivated by their close relationship with the USSR and their adoption of socialism after 1967. Even Algeria granted the PDRY a credit of $4 million for oil deposits during this time, and OPEC granted less developed Arab countries credit for capital totalling $37.2 billion (Birks and Sinclair, 1982). Algeria, also became a socialist country following independence from France. The support given to the PDRY during this time (by both communist/socialist and OPEC states) placed them at an even further distance from the West.

The PDRY's international relations following the British withdrawal of 1967 were influenced by anti-Western and pro-Soviet sentiment. That is not to say that they completely ceased relations with all Western states; they conducted the vast majority of their trade with OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) states and maintained diplomatic relations with most of them (Halliday, 1985). The OECD states at the time

included France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America (amongst others) which were all prominent Western world leaders. The United Kingdom's reluctance to donate aid to the PDRY following their withdrawal created tension in the region. While it is not possible to attain the exact figures of the amount given to the PDRY from the United Kingdom at this time, estimates are from as high as £3.25 million to as low as £250,000 (Halliday, 1985). Following this, aid talks with Britain were ended in May 1968. Moreover, in the same year, several officials who had been accused of collaborating with the British were put on trial, sentenced to life imprisonment and in some cases, put to death (Halliday, 1985). These trials angered the British government and led them to believe the PDRY to be a hostile state (Halliday, 1985). It is unsurprising that in this context, the British were pleased when the PDRY expelled British experts on service from their country (Halliday, 1985). The events of the Dhofar Rebellion only exacerbated clashes between the United Kingdom and the PDRY. Given that the said objective of the liberation movement supported by the PDRY was to free "all of the Gulf from British imperialism," (Halliday, 2002, pp. 320-321), it is evident why they supported this side in the rebellion given their history as a British colonial protectorate. Nonetheless, the United Kingdom did not cease all diplomatic relations with the PDRY in the way that the United States of America did (Halliday, 1985). This could be due to the nation's crucial proximity to the Arabian Gulf states, which were proving to be politically and economically increasingly important at the time. Moreover, the predominant viewpoint from the West when concerning the PDRY was that the country "was a small and poor state unable to offer any major economic benefit to Britain, whatever the political regime," (Halliday, 1985). Now that the United Kingdom did not have a military base in the country and their service experts had been expelled, they had no reasons to build relations with the PDRY. Their lack of resources and limited capacity for economic growth would have left little to be desired from pursuing a relationship with a state so hostile towards the United Kingdom. The accusations of the PDRY having aided terrorism in the mid-1970s (Halliday, 1985) would have only exaggerated the perilous consequences were the United Kingdom's government seen to be aiding this state in any way. When considered once again alongside the PDRY's close relationship and reliance on the USSR at a time when Soviet and Western relations were so tense, it is to be expected that relations between the United Kingdom and the PDRY were to remain hostile and stagnant throughout the post-1967 period. The effects of British colonialism did not cease with their withdrawal in 1967, the

former colonial administrator still held power over the PDRY and was able to influence and limit their ability for economic growth by withholding much needed aid and financial assistance. Even throughout changes of British government throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the PDRY was considered too high a risk state with too small an economy and influence for the United Kingdom's government to risk establishing a greater relationship with. Much like the attitude of the current United Kingdom's government when donating aid to the unified Yemen in their ongoing humanitarian crisis, the concept of sacrificing their own economic position in favour for supporting civilians who are in dire financial situations as a result of their foreign policy is not considered to be a priority. Where there is a possibility for the United Kingdom to grow their own economy at the expense of the survival and prosperity of those in 'third world' states, the British have a tendency to choose the former.

Some hostility and difficulty in relations remained towards the United Kingdom from the pre-independence years, however. It was rather, the United States of America that clashed predominantly with the PDRY following the British withdrawal. Again, the context of the Cold War is relevant in this case. With the PDRY being in receipt of financial aid and support from the USSR, Cuba and other communist/socialist states that stood at odds with the USA and the West throughout the Cold War (Birks and Sinclair, 1982). The USA had the opportunity to play a more substantial role in the affairs of the Arabian Peninsula following the United Kingdom's withdrawal; where the United Kingdom and Egypt had once played the most significant role in the region, this was no longer the case (Halliday, 1985). Similarly, the PDRY chose to direct the majority of its foreign policy towards the USA at this time, as opposed to the United Kingdom (Halliday, 1985) as was the case previously. The relations between the PDRY and the USA remained almost constantly hostile throughout the entirety of the PDRY's existence over the following issues: "the Arab-Israeli issue: the Rogers Plan of 1970 and the range of US initiatives from the Kissinger shuttle of 1974 onwards, through Camp David in 1978 and the Reagan initiative in 1982," (Halliday, 1985, p. 105). The USA was viewed by the PDRY as a new-age imperialist force for its constant interventions in the Arabian Peninsula; interventions driven by the quest for securitising oil in the region (Lewis, 2001). The USA declined to give any economic aid to the PDRY despite the economic devastation caused by the British withdrawal and the eight-year closure of the Suez Canal

(Halliday, 1985). Much alike the United Kingdom's reasoning, the USA saw little benefit in sending aid to such a poor and uninfluential state despite their calls for help. Similarly, to how the PDRY had expelled the British service staff, they ordered American service staff to leave their embassy in October 1969 following dispute over American-Israeli citizens fighting on behalf of Israel; they also ceased all diplomatic relations with the USA at this time (Halliday, 1985). The Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) had previously ceased diplomatic relations with the USA as a result of the Arab-Israeli conflict in June 1967 (Y.S. -Yemen Relations, 2007). This proved that the contentious issue of the establishment of the Israeli state, often viewed by some Arabic people as an act of Western imperialism, was an ongoing source of disagreement that transcended the borders of the two Yemens. While the existence of Israel did not threaten either Yemeni state directly, they viewed it as a threat to Arabs throughout the Middle East that allowed Western Imperial powers to remove an Arab state in favour of one that may have a greater Western influence, culture, and military backing. Even when the existence of Israel as a Jewish state in the Middle East was not brought into question, the close US-Israeli relationship was perceived as a way for the USA to establish a strategic space in the region from which they can seek to hegemonize the surrounding Arab states (Kadri, 2014). Given the PDRY's experience under a Western colonial power, and their Marxist political leanings, it is understandable as to why the Arab-Israeli conflict would have intensified feelings of distrust towards the West. While The YAR had not experienced the same colonial rule as the South, they still feared the growing presence of the USA in the region that had occurred after Britain's withdrawal in 1967, and continued to prioritise the autonomy of Arabs in the region over what they perceived to be the growing presence of Western powers. That is not to dismiss or downplay the influence that any anti-Semitism may have contributed towards the attitudes of the two Yemens during this conflict and beyond, but merely to show how imperialism (or perceived imperialism) continued to play a role in anti-Western sentiment in Yemen beyond Britain's withdrawal from Aden.

The PDRY viewed the USA as a menacing international actor that stood at odds with them on almost all political factors. Nonetheless, they were not blind to their own position; the PDRY "had broken relations to align itself with these countries (Arab nations opposing the USA), now found itself without major assets: it had little economic attraction, it was not a major actor in the diplomatic arena, and it pursued policies that antagonised Washington

and its more influential regional allies," (Halliday, 1985, p. 108). Despite wanting to re-engage with the USA, the PDRY was clear in its stance on the US government, placing blame on them for suffering and damage caused to their own country and towards other Arab causes (Halliday, 1985), and as a result, relations between the two stances did not improve. The 1978 crises in the two Yemens halted the diplomatic mission sent to Aden, once again ceasing any hope of improved diplomatic relations (Halliday, 1985). While it is obvious that the USA would not want to place its diplomats in any danger by sending them to a country that was experiencing and perpetuating violence, it seems unusual that the execution of Ahmad al-Ghashmi and Salim Rubai Ali (Gueyras and Shehadi, 1979) was sufficient to cease the possibility of all diplomatic relations between the USA and the PDRY when the PDRY was still keen to extend the invitation of a visiting mission.

The threat of terrorism once again became significant in the difficult diplomatic relations with the USA. In May 1977, the PDRY was accused by the US government of having aided terrorism in recent years, alongside Iraq, Somalia, and Libya (Halliday, 1985). However, unlike other states that had been accused of aiding terrorism, such as Libya and Iraq, the USA used this as reasoning to not pursue diplomatic relations with the PDRY (Halliday, 1985). A possible reason for this was that the PDRY was not perceived to have sufficient resources to entice the USA into engaging with the state; the PDRY did not discover their modest oil reserves until the mid-1980s (Maxwell Sharp, 2010). In contrast, Iraq and Libya were OPEC countries since 1960 and 1962 respectively (OPEC, 2022), suggesting that there was financial incentive for the USA to overlook their similar accusations. This supports the concept that for the USA, "the principal significance of the Middle East lay in the interrelation between oil and geopolitics," (Callinicos, 2005, p. 599). By 1981, the PDRY no longer displayed desire to hold any diplomatic relations with the USA (Halliday, 1985), meanwhile Washington maintained that the PDRY was both too hostile and insignificant to pursue relations with (Halliday, 1985). This unequal treatment of the PDRY when compared to other Middle Eastern countries could explain any longstanding distrust of the USA by South Yemeni people.

Post-Cold War and 9/11

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990-1991 left the PDRY without the support and financial assistance that they had so heavily relied on (Prados, 2005). The Cold War had encapsulated the battle between the East and the West for over forty years; the collapse of the USSR represented the end of the existence of Marxism in the Middle East. Just as the PDRY had been vulnerable to the Soviets after the British withdrawal in 1967, the PDRY was now facing the collapse of its entire state in the absence of Soviet backing. They had been neglected by many Western nations who were wary of their close relationship to communist states, and therefore had become reliant on the USSR for survival. Without the possibility of their support, they were unable to endure. The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union pushed the YAR and the PDRY together in a way which may not have occurred if the PDRY was still able to rely on the USSR as it had for the previous two decades. The YAR was more affluent than the PDRY (Carapico, 1993) and had worked closely with a broader range of nations. That is not to say that the YAR had completely rejected Soviet relations; while the USA had supported the YAR in the Yemenite War of 1979, Sana'a had relied on the USSR for the majority of its new equipment (Chang, 1979). However, the YAR's favourable international perception was a significant cause for reunification in 1990. It could be argued that the Cold War and the West's treatment of communist states during this time was a key reason for Yemeni reunification; a reunification that may have been premature and not necessarily desired by the wide range of different and opposing Yemeni communities. If it is accepted that the PDRY was effectively forced to reunify as a result of their own economic collapse, this is likely to have impacted internal relations and public mood within Yemen. If reunification was a necessity rather than something which was chosen by the people, it is unsurprising that tensions within the state grew and extremist factions (especially in the South) became more influential throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s.

Moving onto the period following reunification in May 1990. Quickly following this reunification Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990; both the Yemeni government and people refused to support any Western intervention to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait (Prados, 2005). This led to the expulsion of nearly one million Yemeni workers from surrounding Gulf nations (Ibrahim, 1990), and a significant reduction of funding and presence from donor nations (Prados, 2005). While Yemen was no longer considered a Soviet proxy as it was during the Cold War, it was rejected now instead for its stance during

Operation Desert Storm (Prados, 2005). When paired with the USA's decision to continually reduce its aid to Yemen following reunification, Yemen was left in a fragile position (Prados, 2005). It is therefore unsurprising that an Islamist network local to Yemen set up its own school system, Salafism gained many new followers, and terrorist cells infiltrated the country (Prados, 2005). Once again Yemen had been neglected by Western states, and without the possibility of support from the now dissolved USSR, extremism was given ample chance to flourish. Extremism has the opportunity to thrive under conditions of economic inequality and exclusion (United States Institute of Peace, 2019), and this seems to be the case for Yemen in the 1990s. During this period, religious conservative values replaced many of the more progressive advancements that had taken place in South Yemen under the Marxist regime (Prados, 2005).

It was not until the September 11 attacks in 2001 that the USA seemed to regain interest in Yemen; President Ali Abdullah Saleh purported to support the USA's War on Terror (Prados, 2005). This was vital for US-Yemeni relations as Yemen's rural areas had become home to many Al-Qaeda cells and many Afghan Yemenis were being held in Guantanamo Bay (Prados, 2005). In 2002 the organisation carried out a major attack against a French oil tanker in Yemeni waters (Stracke, 2010). In 2003 USAID re-established their mission in Yemen (it had previously been fully closed in 2000) focusing on healthcare, education, security and democratisation of the region (Prados, 2005). During the period of 2001-2004 the USA became Yemen's largest national development provider (Prados, 2005). It was not merely the USA that utilised aid in their 'War on Terror'; many European states also adopted this method in order to curb terrorist activities in Yemen (Stracke, 2010). This financial assistance was purely conditional on the Yemeni government's ability to counter terrorist activities originating from Yemen (Stracke, 2010). This provisional aid is problematic for a myriad of factors. The actors responsible for terrorist activities are members of the terrorist group Al Qaeda are critics of the Yemeni government, labelling the government as un-Islamic, "agents of the US," and President Saleh as a "Zionist agent," (Stracke, 2010). Since any withdrawal of aid would likely reflect negatively on the Yemeni government rather than having any real impact on the public appeal of Al- Qaeda, it seems futile to the ends of the US government. Moreover, the needs of the Yemeni people who require this aid would once again not be fulfilled if these conditions could not be met. As mentioned above, those who

are experiencing economic instability and exclusion are more likely to turn to extremism, so it could be said that the failure to supply this much needed aid could have had the opposite intended effect, and instead turned desperate Yemeni people over to extremist groups such as Al Qaeda. Given the economic weight of fighting such an advanced and wide spanning group, it seems that the Yemeni government was incapable of doing so (Stracke, 2010) and therefore the issue of not receiving such aid was always doomed to continue. Moreover, given that Yemen's government under President Saleh was widely considered to be autocratic (Lackner, 2017), any aid given to the regime was unlikely to be put to intended use. It seems that development aid given to autocratic regimes fails to promote necessary development, more often being given to the military rather than to the intended recipients (Kono and Montinola, 2013).

Therefore, even if the government were able to cease Al Qaeda activities within Yemen, the delivery of this aid may not go towards creating a better living situation for the people of Yemen, thus continuing the cycle of economic exclusion and extremity in the region. Furthermore, the intension behind any given aid ought to be scrutinised. The main purpose behind this aid was to curb Al Qaeda activities throughout Yemen. While the impact of this, if completed successfully, would reach Yemeni people as well as Westerners; the fact that this was only proposed after the 9/11 attacks and the declaration of a 'War on Terror' by the USA and its allies is key. Mhango's 2018 work proposed that aid should only be given when humanity and the recipients are the main concerns (Mhango, 2018). Rather than to further the military strategies of the USA, the main concern for the donors should have been the wellbeing of the Yemeni people who would benefit from improvements in education, healthcare and securitisation regardless of their governments ability to counter terrorism. Much as how, "democracy and enhancing human rights are used as a cover for American military existence in the region," (Altwaji, 2014) in reference to the invasion of Iraq, these Western progressive dog whistles are used as justification for cruel policies in Yemen. These policies could be considered to be neo-Orientalist. While classic Orientalism originally served European colonial powers and their endeavours, neo-Orientalism serves the political hegemony and neo-colonial interests of those who need to represent images of aggression and terrorism on the targeted state (Altwaji, 2014). The pre-existing perception of those in the Middle East, laid down by generations of Orientalist policy and depictions throughout

popular Western culture, made the USA's 'War on Terror' the ideal way to secure such hegemony. By labelling Yemen as a country with close ties to Islamic extremism and terrorism, the USA was able to insert themselves easily into the growth and development of the nation, with the survival of the Yemeni people at the will of US development aid policy.

In conclusion, Yemen has a long and complex history with colonialism and imperialism. It has been established that the British occupation of Aden was a driven by profit motivations, it an attempt to exert and grow their influence throughout the Middle East and the Arabian Peninsula. These profit motivations and the desire for their own securitisation of the region were the key driving factors behind the United Kingdom's reluctance to withdraw throughout the 1960s. Commercial profit being a chief motivation for colonial expansion (Göttsche, 2013), it is evident that the British occupation was a colonial endeavour and their unwillingness to leave was an attempt to retain an element of Empire and hegemony in the region. While the following factors did hold some influence over Britain's withdrawal, the withdrawal was ultimately not caused by shame over the Empire, or even pressure from international organisations such as the United Nations (Abadi, 1995), but rather the fear of continuous violent attacks from local guerrilla fighters and the expense of maintaining their military base (Chang, 1972). Following the withdrawal, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen became reliant on the Soviet Union and other communist states, becoming embroiled in the ongoing Cold War by lack of economic autonomy. This placed greater distance between Yemen and the West, resulting in deeper mistrust on both sides. Moreover, the United States of America came to play a greater role in the region following the withdrawal, and used anti-communist sentiment as justification for ceasing aid donations and diplomatic relations with the PDRY, once again exacerbating tensions between Yemen and Western powers. Even following Yemeni unification in 1990, aid was continually reduced by the USA, partially as a result of their refusal back condemn Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait (Prados, 2005); this left Yemen in a delicate state. Not until the September 11th terrorist attacks did the USA make real strides to have relations with the unified Yemen. However, it could be suggested that these relations and aid proposals were simply offered to Yemen as a way for the USA to gain hegemony over the region rather than with the intention of reducing harm and supporting improved living conditions for the Yemeni people. It is evident that Yemen, both separated and unified, has been negatively

impacted by the colonial and imperial endeavours of Western states over the course over the last century. Continuously, the economic and security wants of these Western nations has taken priority over the lives of local people in their policy towards Yemen. They have chosen to demonise native people and label them as 'extremists' and 'terrorists' in a bid to delegitimise their own calls for sovereignty and autonomy. Western states have repeatedly used Yemen's position as a poor and fragile state against them; using the possibility of the distribution and withdrawal of vital development aid in order to control Yemen's own internal government policies. This has created a cycle of dependence on Western intervention, as well as anti-Western sentiments. Poverty and extremism have been allowed to thrive in Yemen as a result of this financial neglect and threatening Western behaviour. This has ultimately resulted in the delicate state as it exists in the present; suffering through a violent civil war fought by various factions in the poorest nation in the Middle East, experiencing the greatest humanitarian disaster in the world. The following chapter will address how neglect from the West and an abandonment of their commitments towards Yemen have resulted in their responsibility for the humanitarian disaster.

The West's Responsibility for Conflict and Human Rights

This chapter is concerned with outlining key Western power's responsibilities for the conflict and humanitarian failures in Yemen. It aims to pull on postcolonial theory in order to analyse the failures of Western states to sufficiently aid Yemenis that have experienced the long-term negative effects of orientalist policies and treatment. Human geography will be utilised throughout this chapter in order to outline the concept of responsibility and care on a global scale, while questioning the ethical concept of 'obligation' in order to question whether the West does indeed have any form of responsibility towards Yemen and other nations that have historically (and contemporarily) been viewed as part of the Orient. It will also go on to question the effectiveness and appropriateness of development aid in a postcolonial world. It will also discuss the history of US foreign policy in Yemen and the Middle East more generally, and how that continuing impact may give the USA some level of responsibility with aiding a modern Yemen in their ongoing humanitarian crisis. The effectiveness and intentions of international organisations are also brought into question; with the United Nation's decision not to renew the Group of Eminent Experts in October 2021 (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2022) following a vigorous campaign from Saudi Arabia (Human Rights Watch, 2022b), and whether this constitutes a failure to take responsibility for the humanitarian crisis. The notion of reparations being paid to formerly colonised territories is also explored throughout this chapter, stemming from similar calls in African states; whether the failure of the United Kingdom to compensate its former colony has led to or exacerbated current economic and political crises in Yemen. Models of political responsibility will be examined to assess their use in determining what 'responsibility' the West has towards Yemen.

Theory

The first segment of this section will discuss the different theories of political responsibility. It will show how these theories differ and how they can be applied to the question of whether the West does indeed have some form of responsibility towards the people of Yemen and the ongoing humanitarian crisis occurring there. It will also go onto demonstrate how some accepted theories of political responsibility and global justice are not appropriate

to use within postcolonial study and do not do well to appreciate the nuance of the long-term effects of imperialism, colonialism and Orientalism on those who have been subjected to them.

It is vital to understand the concept of responsibility for this chapter. Human geographers Raghuram, Madge, and Noxolo theorised the concept of 'responsibility' and care' in their 2009 work, 'Rethinking responsibility and care for a postcolonial world' (Raghuram, Madge, and Noxolo, 2009). Their work highlights the reality of relational interdependence in the new globalising world (Raghuram, Madge, and Noxolo, 2009), stressing the interconnected nature of the modern world and how states cannot function in absence of relations with other states. It is key however, to acknowledge that from a postcolonial perspective, power relations greatly impact these interdependent relations (Raghuram, Madge, and Noxolo, 2009). This suggestion brings into question much of Western policy towards Yemen over the course of the last century. When considering the USA's failure to consistently maintain diplomatic relations with the PDRY throughout much of the Cold War period, and the United Kingdom's unwillingness to interact with the PDRY's Foreign Secretary in the 1970s, it is unsurprising that the PDRY struggled politically as a result of this relationship breakdown. Even when the PDRY wanted to re-establish diplomatic relations with the USA in early 1974, the USA was unwilling to concede to the PDRY's calls to do so (Halliday, 1985). Following Yemen's reunification, much Western policy towards the state only aimed to deliver aid when it was politically convenient and advantageous for said Western powers (Altwaji, 2014). Raghuram, Madge and Noxolo go onto propose that 'responsibility' and 'care' are necessary for ethical living (Raghuram, Madge, and Noxolo, 2009). Geographies of responsibility advise that linking the actions of the privileged to the negative effects those actions have on others will lead to a greater sense of political responsibility (Raghuram, Madge, and Noxolo, 2009).

Orientalism is a key concept for understanding the lack of a sense of responsibility towards Yemeni people. Geographies of care assumes that privileged people do not care about distant strangers (Raghuram, Madge, and Noxolo, 2009). Orientalism throughout Western culture and policy has portrayed Middle Eastern people as such 'distant strangers' (Said, 2003) and therefore this could explain any absence of 'care' for the Yemeni people by Westerners. Orientalism aims to depict those within the Orient as 'backwards fanatics'

(Said, 1980). Said went as far as to suggest that the USA views Muslims and Arabs as either oil suppliers or potential terrorists (Said, 1980). Difference in cultural values, whether real or imagined, places the Orient (in this case Yemen), and the Occident (in this case the USA) at vehemently opposed positions to one another. If Raghuram, Madge, and Noxolo's hypothesis is to be believed, then it is unsurprising that the USA displays little care for the people of Yemen. Brock seconds this hypothesis and suggests that we have stronger ties with those whom which we share common beliefs with and therefore believe that we have a stronger sense of obligation towards those people (Brock, 2005).

It is vital to understand the concept of global justice in order to attribute responsibility to any Western states and organisations. David Miller's book 'National Responsibility and Global Justice' is useful in examining the existing interpretations of responsibility on both the national and global scale. Miller, a respected Professor of Political Theory at Nuffield College, Oxford, aims to understand and explain the disparities between achieving global justice and the importance of national responsibility. Throughout his work, he maintains that global justice is built upon the principle of promoting the universal protection of basic human rights such as freedom of movement, freedom of expression, means of subsistence, basic healthcare etc (Miller, 2008). However, he questions whether it is possible to justify universal basic human rights in a way that is truly universal (Miller, 2008). By prioritising the concept of national responsibility towards those with which we share common culture and common language, global justice is therefore unachievable (Miller, 2008). Significance is instead placed upon those existing within one nation state to demonstrate their own self-determination and be "responsible for their own destinies," (Miller, 2008). This position is in direct opposition to global egalitarianism. It does not take issue with one society flourishing while another is suffering. While Miller's position could bear some weight in certain global contexts, where one state is experiencing prosperity and another is suffering when both started with identical resources and possibilities for economic and societal growth, it does not bear any weight under the historical context of former colonial societies. Miller argues that simply because one society is suffering, it is not another society's responsibility to redistribute its resources in order to aid them (Miller, 2011). Miller proposes multiple issues that could arise if prosperous societies are compelled to be responsible for those who are suffering; chiefly that the protection of universal basic human rights may be costly and

therefore have a negative impact on members of the prosperous society (Miller, 2008). Once again, Miller seems to be more concerned about the possibility of the more prosperous state and its people suffering. While it is true that intervention overseas can result in both a monetary cost and a cost to human life for prosperous nation states, Miller offers no justification for allowing the distress of those suffering to continue. Miller also fails to criticise those who are merely inactive in the face of violations of basic human rights. He states that "mere inaction, standing by and doing nothing, may be reprehensible, but does not constitute injustice,", but rather that only those actively choosing to violate human rights are committing injustices and are therefore responsible for these actions (Miller, 2008, p. 392). Within the context of a former colony and its coloniser, this concept of global justice does not prevail. In the case of the United Kingdom, they colonised Aden 1839; the people responsible for this colonisation are no longer alive in order to claim responsibility for any violations of basic human rights that may have occurred during this time. Even the decolonisation of Aden took place 55 years ago, so those responsible for injustices that occurred during that time are likely unable to face repercussions. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom has and continues to benefit as a result of those injustices. Therefore, under Miller's model for global justice, there is no one who is responsible for the suffering of the Yemeni people. It would suggest that the United Kingdom is at no fault for failing to intervene in Yemen to support the provision of basic human rights and prevent the world's worst humanitarian crisis (Broder, 2018). It does not hold the beneficiaries of colonialism accountable for allowing injustices to occur, and places no responsibility for rectifying this situation upon them. This model for global justice is therefore incompatible with postcolonial theory and ought to be replaced with one that allows for a more nuanced historical and contextual understanding of modern-day global justice and responsibility.

It is difficult to separate the notion of responsibility towards these 'distant strangers' and the sovereignty of formerly colonised peoples. It is clear that Western states have benefitted as a result of their colonial and imperialist endeavours in Yemen. However, in order to deduce whether the West has a form of responsibility towards Yemen, it is important to appreciate how political responsibility can be understood and applied through a postcolonial lens. Iris Marion Young's model for political responsibility is the social connection model. She is critical of David Miller's view of global justice and responsibility,

labelling at as overly narrow (Young, 2006). Young's model works particularly well within postcolonial frameworks. Her focus is on structural injustice, which she believes exists as a result of social processes that involve large groups of people being placed under systematic threat of domination or deprivation of the means to progress and exercise their freedoms, all the while enabling others to dominate or access an expansive variety of opportunities for their own development and exercising their own freedoms (Young, 2010). Young argues that "Most of us contribute to a greater or lesser degree to the production and reproduction of structural injustice precisely because we follow the accepted and expected rules and conventions of the communities in which we live," (Young, 2003). This model does not erase the burden of responsibility from those who have not played an active role in the creation of the injustices (Williams, 2013); rather that by being passive within a society that allows these injustices to continue and to silently benefit from them, one also becomes culpable and responsible. For this reason, this model can be best applied to postcolonial study. As referenced throughout William's analysis, colonial domination occurs over a prolonged timescale via a range of institutions, often supported by an unconscious set of norms over a span of many generations (Williams, 2013). Under Young's social connection model, this is an injustice and those benefitting from it, even if they did not actively participate, would be responsible (Young, 2010). While Raghuram, Madge and Noxolo emphasise that the actions of privileged people have negative effects on the less privileged (Raghuram, Madge, and Noxolo, 2009), they do not place enough importance on the effects that passive privileged people play within a society. In a world where many people who are removed from politics and decision making do indeed benefit as a result of colonialism and imperialist international policies without having any intent to do so, their responsibility towards the lesser people must be investigated. It is not sufficient to merely accept that one society may benefit as a result of others' misfortunes without any form of culpability. Ignorance towards the plight of 'distant strangers' does not remove responsibility for aiding them. For this reason, my thesis aims to explain that Western people do indeed have responsibility towards the people of Yemen, with special consideration for the long-term effects of colonialism and imperialism.

My thesis intends to explain how the West has a collective responsibility towards the people of Yemen; epistemic obligations are key to understanding this concept of collective

responsibility. Epistemic obligations "amount to obligations to do certain things that will or might result in an improved epistemic position with respect to one thing or another," (Miller, 2016). Here I intend to explain that we have an epistemic obligation towards the people of Yemen as a collective (that collective society being 'the West') despite any group-based ignorance that we might have of the ongoing situation within Yemen. Schwenkenbecher suggests that our epistemic obligations do not simply relate to our own knowledge and principles, but those of others as well (Schwenkenbecher, 2021). Moreover, under circumstance where epistemic tasks cannot be performed by individuals, then epistemic obligations must be held collectively in order to produce epistemic goods (Schwenkenbecher, 2021). Therefore, it is sufficient to suggest that although not all members of western society may have knowledge or believe that they have responsibility for the actions and policies of western states and institutions towards Yemen; that they in fact do have some form of responsibility. It is evident that Western governments are aware of their failures towards the Yemeni people. The United Kingdom has faced scrutiny from the UK Court of Appeal (Kessler, 2019), France has faced legal action by French non-governmental organisations (Amnesty International, 2019), and President Biden has even stressed the importance of ending the war in Yemen (Shaker, 2022). Thus, if utilising Schwenkenbecher's theory surrounding epistemic obligations, given that some members of the collective do have the knowledge surrounding the injustices facing Yemen, and how they are culpable for those injustices, that the collective as a whole has a responsibility to produce the epistemic good of easing the suffering of the Yemeni people. Furthermore, given the scale and unwillingness of many in positions of power within western governments to take action to ease Yemeni suffering, it logically concludes that the task of ending such suffering cannot be undertaken by individuals and therefore falls upon the wider collective. If only one western state or organisation was to fully commit to their responsibility to aid Yemen adequately, it would be insufficient in ending the humanitarian disaster. It would take a collective unifying stance from the western community against the suffering of Yemeni people in order to enact meaningful change and improve the lives of Yemenis on the ground. If only one western state were to refuse to sell arms to the Saudi-led Coalition, that would not be enough to stop airstrikes in Yemen in their entirety. Moreover, if only the United Nations were to propose an increase in funding for humanitarian aid in Yemen, it would be a hollow commitment in the absence of a unifying

stance from all western states that would have to pledge that funding initially. For this reason, it becomes apparent that it is the West as a collective that has the responsibility to aid the Yemeni people in ending the humanitarian crisis that they are experiencing.

It is also important to understand whether any form of intervention in Yemen would be welcomed. There are two clear lines of intervention that Western states could pursue in the case of Yemen if they do accept responsibility; sending humanitarian aid to Yemeni people on the ground in order to ease the effects of their humanitarian crisis, and alternatively engaging politically in order to bring an end to the Civil War that is perpetuating the conditions causing the crisis. Firstly, we will examine the humanitarian aid route. Again, an appreciation for the history of humanitarianism is vital here. There are clear links between liberal humanitarianism and racial colonial violence (Rao and Pierce, 2006). Some consider humanitarianism to be an extension of the colonialism of the past. While humanitarianism's alleged intension is to 'do good', it is built upon foundations of racial superiority and the colonisers presumed 'right to rule' (Kelm, 1999). It relies upon the native peoples' inability to self-govern and self-preserve in order to exist. If the dangerous circumstances in which those in need of humanitarian intervention did not exist, then the interveners would have no cause to exist within that sphere. The absence of need for humanitarian intervention would diminish any external claims to power in the region as their involvement and guidance would not be needed. Yemen's continued reliance on the United Kingdom and other Western powers for humanitarian aid perpetuates its role as a form of modern-day colony. They continue to be viewed as dependent on the generosity and supervision of their former colonial power and its allies in order to survive, bringing the epistemological sovereignty of the Yemeni people into question (Laqueur, 1989). The ability of the Yemeni people to rely upon their own faculties, rather than those of the colonisers and Westerners, is removed if they are to become dependent on liberal humanitarian intervention and aid; an aspect of their autonomy is removed. Edmonds and Johnston suggest that humanitarian intervention is often used as a means to 'pacify' native peoples in order to make them easier to govern and control (Edmonds and Johnston, 2016) while the donors maintain a 'morally good' position. For this reason, in the context of supplying aid to a former colony, it is important to navigate the situation carefully in order to attempt to uphold the sovereignty of the formerly colonised population. Consequently, it could be argued that the

preferable course of action that should be pursued by western states and organisations seeking to end the humanitarian crisis in Yemen would be to engage politically in order to bring an end to the Civil War.

The liability model for political responsibility is valuable for the analysis of Western states' decision to breach international humanitarian law. "This model holds people morally or legally responsible for the harmful consequences of their actions when there is a specific and identifiable casual connection between their actions and those consequences," and can be used individually and collectively (Williams, 2013, p. 87). Unlike other models of political responsibility, this model requires actors to have performed their actions voluntarily and with adequate knowledge of the situation (Williams, 2013). The liability model usually operates within the frameworks of legal order, assigning responsibility on the basis of breaches of the law (Williams, 2013). For this reason, it is useful to apply to the case of Western states' arms sales to the Saudi-led Coalition. The sale of arms to states that are likely to use them to break international humanitarian law is against European Union law (which the United Kingdom was a member of until late January 2020), British law (Kessler, 2019), and the Geneva convention (European Commission, 2022). The International Committee of the Red Cross provides guidelines for the application of the Geneva convention, suggesting that "all national and international standards for arms transfers should include a requirement to assess the recipient's likely respect for international humanitarian law and not to authorize transfers if there is a clear risk that the arms will be used to commit serious violations of this law," (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2007). Taking into account these guiding principles, it is evident that these conditions have not been met by states authorising arms sales to the Saudi-led Coalition. Therefore, the liability model can be used to place responsibility on those Western states and to require some form of accountability for wrongdoings because those actions are in direct breach of the law. For instances of 'wrongs' committed within the parameters of the law, this model can be more difficult to apply. 'Wrongdoings' during colonial times were often committed within the constraints of the law as it was at the time (Williams, 2013). This makes attributing responsibility via the liability model difficult. However, the model does make suggestions on how responsibility and accountability should be made under situations where wrongdoings were committed within a historically legal context; for stable

democracies such as the United Kingdom, France and the USA, apologies and reparations for historical wrongdoings that caused significant harm (even if not technically illegal) can lay the foundation of repairing the international community (Williams, 2013). This suggestion could be applied to the United Kingdom in particular in reference to their historical colonisation in Aden and the Federation of South Arabia. It is questionable however, to utilise this model in order to justify payments of reparations when this could in turn negatively impact civilians of the former colonial state. This model relies heavily on the "direct interaction between the wrong-doer and the wronged party" (Williams, 2013) which in the case of colonisation, does not usually account for the role of the typical citizen of a colonising state. Since a requirement for the liability model is for the party being held responsible to have adequate knowledge of the situation, some may argue that it would be unfair to burden the average citizen with the burden of paying towards reparations to a formerly colonised state. Therefore, it may be more suitable to apply the liability model to western states who have sold arms to the Saudi-led Coalition, but not suitable to apply it to historical instances of injustices towards Yemen that were enacted within the law. Therefore, it is difficult to promote the use of the liability model of political responsibility to be used for a postcolonial approach to western responsibility towards Yemen.

The United States of America

This section will examine in particular the alleged responsibility of the USA towards Yemen. Popular culture plays a significant role in the development and maintenance of Orientalist sentiment in the West. Due to countless negative portrayals of Middle Easterners within US popular culture, such as the 1986 film 'Delta Force', and the 1996 film 'Executive Decision', it is understandable that US perceptions of Middle Easterners are as 'backwards', 'fanatical', and 'violent' (Jervis, 2005). Even the Disney film 'Aladdin' from 1992 has been accused of being an Orientalist piece of media, stoking up anti Arabian hatred. The content of this film is often condemned as racist for its portrayal of Arabs as 'barbaric' and violent (Fox, 1993). A 2015 survey found that 30 per cent of US Republicans and 19 per cent of Democrats were in support of bombing 'Agrabah', the fictive country in which Aladdin in set (Bullock and Zhou, 2017). It is therefore unsurprising that a film so popular within the USA and the West more generally, beloved to the extent that it was remade in 2019, has influenced the attitudes of many. When paired with Rawls' concept of justice and responsibility, where people within a

nation-state are bound by a common set of social institutions and a common national identity and that is what dictates their responsibility towards one another (Rawls, 1971), it becomes evident as to why many US citizens may not believe that they have any responsibility towards Middle Easterners. It is possible to conceive that since such media has influenced Western people to such a drastic extent as to support state sponsored violence in a fictitious nation, that the same could be said for state sponsored violence in the real region more generally. Beyond merely television and film, even the respected American magazine 'National Geographic' published an article in 1948 belittling Middle Eastern people, noting that "their pay is a pittance and their food is poor… they are cheerful," (Little, 2002). This publication by 'National Geographic' suggests that while living conditions are poor for Middle Easterners, that they are content with this way of life and have no will to change it. In 1964, in specific reference to Yemen, National Geographic described the country as "wracked by civil war, an ancient Arabian land struggles to find its place in the world of the twentieth century," (Little, 2002). The use of language within this piece creates a sense of mystery around the people of Yemen, once again portraying them as 'distant strangers' who are 'backwards' and deeply different to Westerners. These two representations within 'National Geographic' present Middle Easterners as less developed than Westerners, satisfied with the lower quality of life that colonialism and negative policies towards the region may have caused. This places significant distance between those in the Middle East and those in the West; suggesting that they are culturally too distinct from one another to warrant any redistribution between the two societies.

This is a classic form of 'Orientalism', representing Middle Easterners as backwards, utilising negative caricatures of Arab culture. This removes any need for care or responsibility from the privileged people within the US who would be in the position to change the circumstances of those suffering. Through this frequent demonisation and removal of responsibility for changing these circumstances, the rift between East and West is broadened. This Orientalist portrayal of Middle Easterners and Yemenis in particular is not limited to the distant past, therefore allowing these beliefs to transcend generations who are continually being fed these Orientalist concepts well into the 21st century. It is the existence and propagation of these Orientalist aspects of Western culture that allows Westerners to rid themselves of notions of responsibility towards the Yemeni people on a

humanitarian front. As stated by Brock, those with which we share little culturally with, we feel little obligation towards (Brock, 2005). To that end, by continuing to portray Middle Easterners as culturally distinct and reprehensible, the lack of humanitarian assistance becomes morally justified in the eyes of those within the Occident. Given such removed sentiments towards Yemenis and Middle Easterners in need, it is possible to draw correlation between these sentiments and the reduction in aid towards Yemen over recent years (BBC News, 2021) and the longstanding tense relationship between the West and Yemen.

It is not solely the United Kingdom's in its colonisation of Aden and the Federation of South Arabia that bears a colonial legacy over Yemen; western liberal humanitarianism also has colonial elements. The linear timeline of colonial violence towards humanitarian assistance throughout history is important to consider here; the outcomes of both have the same intentions but rely on different methods of achieving them. While colonial violence was used as a means to 'civilise' colonised populations, humanitarianism is used for much the same ends. The major change between these two Western endeavours is the growth in infrastructural power from times of colonial violence to times favouring humanitarian intervention. The focus and means move away from physical punishment and terror to that of bureaucracy, law and governmental policy (Douglas and Finnane, 2012). Since humanitarianism's inception in the 19th century, its concern has laid with maintenance of its own security (Reid-Henry, 2013). It allows the continuation poverty and suffering of those 'distant strangers', while also preserving the wealth and privileges of Westerners (Reid-Henry, 2013). Western states can be perceived to be carrying out acts of 'good-will' towards those distant strangers, while forcing them to assimilate to their own state's interests and disregard the actions that those very states may have taken that have led to their current predicament. An example of this within Yemen was the USA's offer of conditional aid in the early 2000s. The USA became Yemen's largest national development provider during this time (Prados, 2005). However, this was purely conditional on their government's decision to support the USA during their War on Terror. These conditions were exploited by President Saleh in order to silence internal opposition and to give disproportionate numbers of government positions in Aden to northern politicians (Prados, 2005). Here humanitarian aid was utilised by the USA in order to create a political environment within Yemen that better

reflected the ideals of the USA. The USA was a supporter of President Saleh, and despite his autocratic regime, his maintenance and Yemen's continued weakness better served US interests in the Middle East (Prados, 2005). This encapsulates how humanitarian aid can be abused by those distributing it to fit their own political agenda and brings into question the morality of Western led humanitarian aid. That is not to say that humanitarianism is inextricably tied to an exploitative Western agenda of perpetuating suffering in order to fulfil their own political will (Reid-Henry, 2013). Rather, that this possibility needs to be explored and understood in order to determine whether the delivery of humanitarian aid is the correct way for the West to fulfil any obligation towards the Yemeni people. For a state already damaged by the effects of colonialism and Western interference, it is questionable that the means of easing this suffering be one so marred by colonial history and integral to the colonial project as it has developed (Kelm, 1999).

When humanitarian aid is delivered by a state or group that has a political and/or economic interest in the outcome, the intentions of that intervention must be brought into question. Given that many Western states have an interest in holding a sphere of influence over areas within the Middle East, one must be dubious of their intentions if it seems that their interventions are not improving the humanitarian crisis. For example, the USA's relations with Saudi Arabia are dictated by their need for Saudi oil and their wish to maintain their own form of stability in the region (Shaker, 2022). They fear democratic uprisings in the Middle East out of concern for their own hegemony in the region, and the emergence of democratic governments which may not reflect US ideals (Shaker, 2022). They therefore support the Saudi-led Coalition's aggressive campaign in Yemen, in order to pursue the status quo. They do not wish to sanction or impede the Saudis and their allies financially as this would therefore have a negative impact on the US weapons makers that bring jobs and political contributions to congressional districts (Shaker, 2022). The US economy relies heavily on OPEC members for their oil imports and on Saudi Arabia for their purchases of American-made arms (Shaker, 2022). Their decision to continue supply humanitarian aid and funding to Yemen throughout their humanitarian crisis does not counteract their continuation to sell arms and promote Saudi-US relations. Yemeni civilians have made claims to Human Rights Watch that the USA has directly contributed to "antagonism, pain and resentment" as a result of their weapons being used in targeted attacks against them

(Nasser, 2022). While it is not possible to say with any absolute certainty that these Western states do have negative intentions for the citizens of Yemen, their decisions to reduce aid at a time when over 20 million Yemenis are in need and leave the United Nations with a $357.2 million funding gap (UNICEF, 2022), paired with their continued friendly relations with and weapons supply to members of the Saudi-led Coalition could be considered to be morally dubious.

Since the early days of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the USA has shown resentment towards the court. The USA came under particular scrutiny for its disregard for crimes against humanity. US government officials have been predominantly critical of the ICC. The George W. Bush administration pressured governments across the world to agree not to surrender US nationals to the ICC (Human Rights Watch, 2022a). John Bolton, a US national security advisor, stated that the Trump administration "would 'fight back' and impose sanctions – even seeking to criminally prosecute the ICC officials – if the court formally proceeded with opening an investigation into alleged war crimes committed by US military and intelligence staff… or pursued any investigation into Israel or other US allies," (Bowcott, Holmes and Durkin, 2018). The International Criminal Court's mandate is to investigate and try "individuals charged with the gravest crimes of concern to the international community: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression," (International Criminal Court, 2022). By labelling this court as "illegitimate" and questioning their right to investigate the USA (Bowcott, Holmes and Durkin, 2018) the USA seeks to place itself above scrutiny on the international stage. Moreover, the US would seek to place all of its allies on a pedestal above scrutiny by the court. While the USA has close diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, it is not a formal ally. However, in the same address, Bolton refers explicitly to Israel as one of the US's allies that the ICC must not investigate. Israel, alike Saudi Arabia, has close relations with the USA but does not meet the formal definition of a country that America has made a treaty commitment to defend in case of attack (Ford and Goldgeier, 2019) and therefore it is not technically an 'ally'. Bolton's sweeping statement and inclusion of Israel as an ally of the USA suggests that the administration also believes that their other informal allies be exempt from investigation by the ICC. While this specific statement was in reference to the ICC's intention to investigate alleged war crimes committed in Afghanistan, it is clear that the ambiguity of this statement

could be interpreted to reference an investigation into any breaches of international humanitarian law by the US and its allies. This shows an intention to disregard any responsibility that the USA and its allies would have to comply by international humanitarian law. The purpose of the ICC is to "hold those responsible accountable for their crimes and to help prevent these crimes from happening again," (International Criminal Court, 2022). If the USA is unwilling to let the ICC perform these duties in relation to themselves and their allies, then it is evident that they either do not believe that they are responsible, or they do not believe that they should be held accountable. It is worth noting that the US government's stance on the ICC has changed dependent on the government administration at the time. In 2013 during the Obama administration, the US Congress offered to provide rewards to people supplying information to enable the arrest of foreign individuals sought by any international criminal court or tribunal, including the ICC (Q&A: The International Criminal Court and the United States, 2022). The frequent change in administration between the Republican Party and the Democratic Party means that the US's view of the ICC and their acknowledgement of the importance of accountability and responsibility in regards to international humanitarian law has the capacity to recurrently change and therefore be unstable. It cannot be expected that the USA only be accountable for any human rights violations when there is a certain political party in administration.

It is vital for the purpose of this thesis to comprehend that the western states supplying the Saudi-led Coalition with arms can reasonably be expected to know that their weapons are being used in Yemen to commit war crimes. Although it is not possible to prove that in all cases, specific weapons are being used to commit specific crimes, the mere distribution of these weapons to the Saudi-led Coalition constitutes the 'actus reus' standard in Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Statute (Bryk & Saage-Maaß, 2019). Under Article 25(3)(c) of the ICC Statute, both tangible and intangible assistance of an accessorial actor towards a principal actor (in this case, the accessorial actor would be western states who have sold arms to the Saudi-led Coalition and the principal actor would be the Saudi-led Coalition) that has an effect on the crime committed, means that they should be held as liable for that crime (Bryk & Saage-Maaß, 2019). One historical criminal case that is helpful to explain this is that of Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda v. The Prosecutor (Appeal Judgement). This ruling held that "even if the weapons that were distributed by the Appellant had not been used at all, their mere

distribution amounts to psychological assistance, as it was an act of encouragement that contributed substantially to the massacre, thus amounting to abetting if not aiding," (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 2005). Given the historical success of international court cases in ruling against those that have supplied weapons that may be used in committing war crimes, it is reasonable to suggest that the western states that have provided weapons to the Saudi-led Coalition are responsible for breaking international law. Therefore, it is also reasonable to expect those western states to be held accountable for those breaches of the law and be held responsible for alleviating the suffering of Yemenis that have been affected by the sale of these weapons. It is then unreasonable to accept that the USA and its allies not be investigated by the ICC and other international courts for these illegal activities.

The United Kingdom and the aftermath of its withdrawal

The legacy of colonialism in Yemen has continued far beyond the British withdrawal in 1967. To reflect properly on the responsibility of former colonial powers, in this case the United Kingdom, one must consider the purpose and design of colonialism. During colonial times, natives were discouraged from independence or developing their own sense of responsibility for their own nation (Johnstone, 1961). On the contrary, colonised peoples were often discouraged from developing a sense of nationhood and taught to believe that their own culture and ways of life were inferior in comparison to those of their colonisers (Nunning and Nunning, 2015). As a result of decades of colonial rule, the ability to form a functioning and/or democratic nation following freedom from colonial rule is stifled (Johnstone, 1961). This is of course by the very design of the colonial administration themselves; they required the population of the occupied state to become wholly reliant upon them for survival. To allow the population to become educated or self-sufficient would bring the need to the colonial administration into question and therefore too, their security in the region. It seems to be no coincidence that education was limited in Aden, with lessons being taught in English and secondary education mostly being taught in mission and government schools (Amshoush, 2022). As a result, the states left behind by colonial administrations after securing freedom are often ill equipped to self-govern. They have often spent time planning on how to attain freedom from the former colonial administrators with little chance to prepare on how to govern once this has been achieved.

By controlling the education system and conducting education in the language of the colonisers, the opportunity for native people to organise is stunted. As was the case of the PDRY in 1967, newly freed states are often "confronted by complex economic, political, and social problems," (Johnstone, 1961) stemming from years of reliance and security provided by the former colonial administrators.

The PDRY's independence was achieved at a time where the battle between East and West, communism and capitalism, was at perhaps its most fraught. For a new state to be coming into existence at this time, following over 100 years of British occupation in Aden, the difficulties in accomplishing peace and stability were wide spanning. Before their final withdrawal in 1967, the British had made efforts to place power in the hands of traditional Yemeni rulers, against the wishes of many Yemeni people. In 1963, the Aden became the twelfth federation of the Federation of the Amirites of the South, becoming known as the Federation of South Arabia (Chang, 1972). Throughout this period the British went to great lengths in order to work with the traditionalist sheikdoms in the desert hinterland (Chang, 1972). Although the purpose of this Federation was stated to be in the interest of handing more power over to the native people, it became clear that the true purpose was to preserve the traditional power structure of the territory, still reliant on the support and advice of the colonial power (Chang, 1972). Power was given to those who were relatively conservative and the Federation took the view that independence movements were terrorists serving foreign interests (Chang, 1972). This is often the case when there is a change in government between a colony becoming an independent state. Given the complex state of affairs that often accompany the newly attained freedom, the leaders of these new states see little option other than to concentrate the newly found power in the hands of the few (Johnstone, 1961). This often results in a system that is largely reminiscent of the colonial administration. While they are no longer ruled over by colonisers, there is little actual change in the political arrangement of these new states. This does little to reflect the interests of the wide-ranging Yemeni society that sought freedom from colonial rule; once again power was placed in the hands of an unrepresentative and small group of leaders.

Moreover, the prospect of 'opposition' in the politics of newly freed states is also fraught with postcolonial worries. Those who now hold power often have little ability to unify a

newly freed state. The unity that they previously experienced during the fight for liberation does not translate automatically into a form of national unity (Johnstone, 1961). Parties which may have fought for freedom alongside one another do not necessarily share other political desires and ideals, and those in power may not represent the aspirations of the entire nation (Schneider, 2006). For this reason, authoritarianism often follows on from colonialism within these states (Johnstone, 1961). 'Opposition' more generally is feared and labelled as the 'colonial enemy', beginning a trend towards intolerance and vilification (Schneider, 2006). After years of colonial rule and a fight towards freedom from colonisers, the concept of political opposition becomes tied to the concept of colonialism. Politics is viewed as a Manichean struggle between good and evil, with any opposition towards the new leadership portrayed under the same negative light as the previous colonial administration (Schneider, 2006). This was the political experience of colonised peoples for many years prior to freedom; politics was that of the colonised versus the colonisers. When paired with the difficulties of governing on the international stage, it is evident that the complexities of facing opposition from within your own state often leads to an authoritarian government where opposition is not handled democratically. In the case of the PDRY, this is especially true. Following the British withdrawal, there were many factions present throughout Yemeni society that sought to hold power, with the NLF eventually becoming the only permitted political party following November 1967 (Chang, 1972).

The United Nations, keen to end all forms of colonisation, was unable to secure decolonisation through democracy and all political power was handed over to prominent members of the NLF and their leader Qahtan as-Shaabi (Chang, 1972). Again, the difficulties of years of colonial rule become evident here. There was no time for unification and democracy when the task of decolonisation became so urgent. Both the United Nations and the people of South Arabia were keen to decolonise as soon as possible, but perhaps without the foresight to predict the difficulties that would follow in creating a functioning and democratic state within the PDRY. The divisions amongst the people were stark and the boundaries upon which the country was built were previously determined by the colonial administrators, binding people with little in terms of religion, culture and identity in common together (Johnstone, 1961). It seems apparent therefore, that these divisions, which continue throughout to the present day, were deepened by the tumultuous events of

decolonisation in Aden and South Yemen. The PDRY and modern-day Yemen, suffer as a result of the factions and disunions that immediately followed Britain's withdrawal in 1967. While it is difficult to place the blame for Yemen's current political climate entirely on the effects of colonisation and the decolonisation process of the Federation of South Arabia, it is clear that it has been exacerbated by these events. The discontent and disunity surrounding leadership within the PDRY followed directly on from Britain's withdrawal. The colonial nature of the administration in Aden and the Federation of South Arabia did not allow Yemenis the opportunity to organise and peacefully transition into a democratic nation following their independence. The entire occupation was driven by profit motives (Abadi, 1995). From the British East India Company's wish to take over control of the coffee trade in South Arabia from Egypt, to keeping education levels low in order to create a workforce for their own ends; the United Kingdom developed more economically and on the global stage as a result of their Aden colony/Protectorate with little concern for the lives and well-beings of the native peoples. The long-term implications for the political and economic security of Yemen as a whole cannot be understated; with the 1994 Civil War being fought on the basis of unfair treatment towards Southern Yemenis following unification (Das, 2020). The South had experienced economic disparity and international hostility in comparison to the north (Das, 2020) as a result of its time as a communist state with close ties to the Soviet Union. These divisions stem from the uneasy period of decolonisation and the transition of government following the British withdrawal, leading to political tensions that are represented in Yemen's current Civil War. The United Kingdom decided to distance itself from responsibilities towards the Adeni people it had controlled for over 100 years when it withdrew in 1967 (Kelly, 1980). It seems evident that the British occupation of Aden and Southern Arabia has significant effects on the current hostilities within Yemen which have created the world's worst humanitarian crisis (Broder, 2018). With the Aden Colony being one of the highest per head revenue earners amongst Britain's smaller colonies (The Times, 1956), it is evident that the British state benefitted from this occupation at the expense of colonised Adenis. This could suggest that the United Kingdom has some form of responsibility for its role in the creation of the circumstances in which this humanitarian crisis is taking place.

Here I will analyse the British position through models of political responsibility. The fiduciary model discusses a relationship of trusteeship in which the trustee has power or control over the resources which they are obligated to exercise in the interests of the other party (Williams, 2013). This model is often applied to areas that have been colonised. It suggests that the trustee has an obligation to care for and reduce harm to the indigenous population of that territory; that a state "is in clear violation of its fiduciary responsibility when it separates people from the means of their economic survival, exposes them to disease, or fails to provide adequately for the basic conditions of existence (housing, medical care, education, water)," (Williams, 2013). This can be applied to the United Kingdom in relation to its historical colonialism in Aden and the Federation of South Arabia. As a result of this colonisation and the decolonisation process, as referenced earlier in this section, the Yemeni people have suffered political violence and subsequent humanitarian crises. If my earlier analysis of Britain's role in Yemen is accepted, their failure to allow the Yemeni people to organise or be properly educated created circumstances in the present day that has left Yemenis suffering in the world's worst humanitarian crisis (Broder, 2018). It suggests that Britain had a responsibility towards the people of Yemen as a result of them being the trustee in the colonial relationship. The fiduciary model also proposes that because colonialism systematically averts native people from thriving both politically and economically, the colonising state cannot abandon its fiduciary duties if the native government has not yet recovered from the effects of colonialism (Williams, 2013). By this logic, the United Kingdom would still have a fiduciary responsibility towards the people of modern-day Yemen due to its past colonial activities in the south of the state. The United Kingdom's untimely withdrawal from and decolonisation of Aden had resulted in the two nations becoming distanced from each other (Bariagaber, 1989). Given the fiduciary model, the United Kingdom has not fulfilled its obligations towards the Yemeni people that it had once colonised, and still owes them a debt of responsibility.

That is not to say that all responsibility that the United Kingdom may have to Yemen is solely linked to their colonial past. Even in the present day, the United Kingdom continues to act in a way that damages Yemen. Between 2010 and 2019, the United Kingdom was the second largest exporter of arms transfers to Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia was the largest importer of arms from the United Kingdom; totalling around forty per cent of the United Kingdom's

total arms export volume (Brook-Holland and Smith, 2021). Even in 2020, 89 permanent Standard Individual Export Licenses (SEILs) were issued for the export of military goods from the United Kingdom to Saudi Arabia with a total value of £1.47 billion (Harding and Dempsey, 2021). It is evident that the economy of the United Kingdom benefits significantly as a result of its arms deals with Saudi Arabia. It is also clear that the United Kingdom is aware of the catastrophic repercussions that the Yemeni people face as a result of these weapons being used against them by the Saudi-led Coalition. In 2019 the UK Court of Appeal stated that the United Kingdom's government had failed to adequately scrutinise whether Saudi Arabia and its allies were abiding with international humanitarian law during their campaign in Yemen and therefore were in breach of the law of both the United Kingdom and the European Union (Kessler, 2019). The court went on to direct the government to change their practice moving forward and to properly assess the situation in the future; however, they did not place a ban on any arms transfers (Kessler, 2019). The United Kingdom was made aware of their failures by their own Court of Appeal, and yet still choose to continue their arms sales to the Saudi-led Coalition. This decision shows a lack of care for the lives of Yemeni people. This is in direct contradiction to the theory of geographies of responsibility, which suggests that care is necessary for ethical living (Raghuram, Madge and Noxolo, 2009). The Court's decision to condemn the government's failures shows a notion of responsibility towards Yemen and its citizens; but their inability to place a ban on arms transfers shows a lack of political power in order to enact real change. This ruling supposes that if a country is aware, or ought to be aware, of violations of international humanitarian law, then it has the duty to act in a way that will end any suffering. Even after these findings, International Trade Secretary at the time Liz Truss announced that the United Kingdom would resume granting licenses for export to Saudi Arabia and maintained that "there is not a clear risk that the export of arms and military equipment to Saudi Arabia might be used in the commission of a serious violation of international humanitarian law," (Brook-Holland and Smith, 2021, p. 3). This is despite evidence that weapon remnants that have been used against Yemeni civilians have been manufactured in Western countries such as the United Kingdom and the USA (Nasser, 2022). This shows a clear wish to distance the United Kingdom from any notion of responsibility towards the ongoing humanitarian crisis and subsequent breaches of international humanitarian law that are occurring in Yemen. It is evident however, despite the claims of the British government, that the United Kingdom

does have, at least in a legal sense, a duty towards the Yemeni people as a result of their continuation of arms sales to the Saudi-led Coalition.

International and Intergovernmental Organisations

Moving onto the role of the United Nations and their responsibility towards easing the humanitarian crisis in Yemen. As previously acknowledged throughout my thesis, it would be wrong to label the United Nations as a purely Western organisation. It is, of course, a supranational organisation, representing peoples around the globe, transcending state boundaries. My thesis unfortunately does not have the scope to investigate the actions of all of the United Nation's many branches, and therefore I will focus my attention of the United Nations Security Council and the Special Envoy's office. The United Nations Security Council is however, Western dominated. With its five permanent members being the United Kingdom, the USA, France, Russia and China (Marcus, 2002); three out of five are Western states. It has been suggested, through analysis of their voting and vetoing record, that the Permanent Five members in particular, prioritise their national foreign relations strategies over the welfare of humanity (Lackner, 2020). All three Western members of the Permanent Five continue to sell arms to the Saudi-led coalition throughout the Yemen conflict (Taves, 2019) (Moghadam, 2018) (Halliday, 1985). This has caused difficulty in passing United Nations Resolutions that may aid the Yemeni people by ending the ongoing War. Despite the Permanent Five being able to veto any Resolution, Resolutions can otherwise be approved by a majority (Lackner, 2020). Nevertheless, all Press and Presidential statements have to be approved by all fifteen members of the United Nations Security Council, and therefore, any opposition from the Permanent Five can still make these statements difficult to draft and therefore deliver (Lackner, 2020). These difficulties are exacerbated by pressure being placed from Saudi Arabia to the Security Council. Press statements released by the UNSC rarely openly criticise members of the Saudi-led Coalition in the same manner that they do the Houthis (United Nations, 2022). The United Nations Security Council was forced to remove Saudi Arabia from its list of perpetrators in the participation of children in conflict in 2017 when they threatened to cut funding for United Nations activities (Lackner, 2020). Moreover, both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) hold a strong influence over the United Nations Security Council due to the presence of Kuwait on the Security Council in 2019 (Members of the Security Council in 2019, 2022) (Lackner, 2020), and of

course the three Permanent Five members with which it has arms deals. As wealthy states, they have the ability to use financial threats against the United Nations as a means to manipulate them. This is a fundamental flaw with the United Nations as an organisation. It cannot function independently without donations from its member states, and therefore has the ability to be manipulated. The Saudi-led Coalition is unwilling to compromise and negotiate on issues regarding the Yemeni conflict that would place blame on themselves. Moreover, the Coalition has gone to lengths to obstruct the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM) established by the United Nations in order to facilitate the delivery of basic necessities to Yemen (Lackner, 2020). This would suggest that they have little interest in easing the suffering of the Yemeni people, and more interest in prolonging this war and the resulting humanitarian crisis.

Despite calls for an end to the war and suffering in Yemen from within the United Nations, it seems powerless to create real change. On March 22nd 2015, a Presidential Statement was issued saying it "supports the legitimacy of the President of Yemen, Abdurabbo Mansour Hadi, the unity and integrity of Yemen, condemns Houthi actions and reiterates that the solution … is through a peaceful, inclusive, orderly and Yemeni-led political transition process that meets the legitimate demands and aspirations of the Yemeni people for peaceful change and meaning political, economic and social reform," (United Nations Security Council, 2015). Nonetheless, statements do not hold the same authority as actual Resolutions do, and therefore the release of this statement is futile without the backing of the majority of the members of the United Nations Security Council. Countless bureaucratic obstacles continue to obstruct the United Nations from being able to operate successfully within Yemen; they are able to establish institutions such as the United Nations Mission to support the al-Hodeida Agreement (UNMHA) with the intention of avoiding humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen, however the realities of their existence allow them to monitor the ceasefire at al-Hodeida and little else (Lackner, 2020). The United Nations Security Council has become paralysed by its own structure, and is therefore unable to fulfil any responsibility it may have towards the Yemeni people. For as long as it is reliant on the Coalition countries and their allies, it is unable to act fully independently and without bias. Whatever the intentions of the President of the United Nations Security Council and other members, by perpetuating the existence of the Permanent Five members and by allowing

finances to be used as a means to hold influence over members of the Council, the United Nations Security Council is effectively defunct. It cannot claim to be an independent 'suprastate' organisation while being swayed so heavily by the political and economic whims of certain wealthier and more powerful states. For this reason, the United Nations Security Council, while being symbolically representative of the entire world, functions as a Western led organisation, working against states with little material power and influence. It does not work as an organisation that can independently hold Western states and their allies to account for any crimes against humanity that they may commit. Once again, due to the make-up of the United Nations Security Council, it is simultaneously able to distance itself from any responsibility towards situations such as the Yemeni humanitarian crisis, and is held to a high degree of responsibility by others which it is not able to fulfil. The United Nations Security Council's own website states that it "has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security… the Security Council can resort to imposing sanctions or even authorise the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security," (United Nations Security Council, 2022). By its own definition, it would appear that the United Nations Security Council has a responsibility to the people of Yemen. Given this definition, it would suggest that the United Nations Security Council has powers that could be utilised in order to bring an end to the Yemeni Civil War and the Yemeni humanitarian crisis that is has chosen not to use. In actuality, the existence of the Permanent Five members subordinates the role of the United Nations, and gives these states and their allies a higher level of authority than the institution itself. Under these circumstances, it becomes evident that regardless of any commitments or intentions of individuals within the United Nations, it is unable to achieve anything of real substance in regards to ending the War or humanitarian crisis until both the Houthis and the Saudi-led Coalition decide to come together and compromise (Lackner, 2020). Once this has been achieved, the UN will be more able to fulfil its responsibilities towards the people of Yemen and actualise its intention of maintaining international peace and security. Until the Saudi-led Coalition and its allies decide to place the lives of the Yemeni people above their own wishes for hegemony in the region and economic growth, the United Nations is powerless to intervene. If both sides are unwilling to meet a compromise, drastic solutions such as the abolition of the Permanent Five members seems to be the only way to ensure a greater level of accountability towards the perpetrators of this war. This would act as a

decolonisation of the United Nations (Ryder, Baisch and Eguegu, 2020), by ceasing to allow wealthy and powerful states with records of colonialism and imperialism to exert disproportionate levels of influence over the organisation. This could contribute to a more representative form of the UNSC, with a wider range of states from around the globe being represented at any given point. It would also alleviate accusations of Western or imperialist biases towards the UNSC. By removing the power of veto from these five states, it would be easier to pass valuable Resolutions that could ease the suffering of the Yemeni people that currently are being blocked by Permanent Five members. Nevertheless, there will always be states with seats on the United Nations Security Council with national foreign relations strategies that are deemed immoral or counterintuitive to attaining peace and security. To expect a truly independent Council to exist while its members are representing individual states is misguided. It seems evident therefore that we cannot expect the United Nations to be autonomously responsible towards the situation in Yemen when it only exists within the parameters of the states that it represents. Its only major failure in this instance is that it claims to be something that it cannot be.

The European Union is a western organisation that has taken steps to help ease the humanitarian crisis in Yemen. In 2018, a number of European countries ended or confirmed the continuation of a cessation of arms sales to Saudi Arabia as a result of their use in Yemen (Abramson, 2018). This resulted in a number of European countries and regions ceasing or reiterating their cessation of arms sales to Saudi Arabia. These included; Germany, Norway, the Walloon region of Belgium (Abramson, 2018). Reasons for this cessation of arms sales most predominantly cited “risks of… weapons being turned against civilians in Yemen,” (Abramson, 2018, p. 34). The recognition of this possibility by the European Union once again differs to that of the United Kingdom, which as referenced earlier, proposed that there was no clear risk of exported arms and military equipment to Saudi Arabia being used to violate international humanitarian law (Brook-Holland and Smith, 2021). This decisions by many European Union countries did not occur as a consequence of lack of profit as a result of arms deals with Saudi Arabia. In 2016 Germany had authorised licenses for the export of ‘war weapons’ to Saudi Arabia for 21 million euros, and to the United Arab Emirates for 13 million euros (Abramson, 2018). Their decision to cease these arms trade deals would have an impact on the German economy and their ability to import

oil from the region. Norway had also sold defence material worth over 41 million kroner to Saudi Arabia in 2017 (The Defense Post, 2018). This decision to lose substantial amounts of income from arms sales demonstrates an acknowledgement of responsibility from Western countries towards the people of Yemen.

While the amount of profit lost by Norway and Germany and many other European Union members is less than that of the United Kingdom, the USA, and France, the notion of responsibility should not differ. The basis of why these European Union states have chosen to cease all arms trade with Saudi Arabia does not change in relation to profit margins. Regardless of their profit margins, European Union law does not change and their pledge to end violations of international humanitarian law is unchanging. That is not to say that several European Union countries have not failed to uphold their obligations under the Arms Trade Treaty and European Union Common Position on Arms Exports since 2018. In 2019, the Saudi Arabia state shipping company's vessel, the Bhari Yanbu, docked at various European ports including those in: Belgium, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Italy (Amnesty International, 2019). This vessel was likely carrying arms that would be used in the war with Yemen, meaning that any of the states that allowed the Bhari Yanbu to dock at their ports were complicit in authorising the transit of arms that risked being used to violate international humanitarian law (Amnesty International, 2019). While it is vital to welcome the decision of European Union states to cease arms sales with Saudi Arabia, it is also important that we do not disregard the choice to allow the Bhari Yanbu to dock at their ports. This decision represents a failure to acknowledge the responsibility that these states have towards the people of Yemen. It was possible for those states to refuse the vessel from docking in their ports. The Bhari Yanbu was scheduled to dock at the French port of Le Havre in order to receive additional arms; following amplified public scrutiny and legal action from French non-governmental organisations the voyage did not dock at the port (Amnesty International, 2019). Therefore, it is apparent that states did have the means to stop the docking and therefore remove themselves from culpability towards the transit and transfer of these arms but instead chose not to do so. While the cessation of arms sales by European Union states is a positive development in Western policy regarding responsibility towards the Yemeni people, failures such as the docking of the Bhari Yanbu still show a lack of acknowledgement to the full extent of Western obligation towards Yemen.

France is another Western state that has faced criticism for its role in perpetuating the humanitarian crisis in Yemen. Alike the United Kingdom and the USA, France has sold significant amounts of arms to Saudi Arabia and other members of the Coalition. In 2018 France sold approximately 1 billion euros worth of arms to Saudi Arabia (Irish, 2019). The main item that the French have sold to Saudi Arabia has been patrol boats that are likely to have been used by the Saudi-led Coalition to create a partial naval blockade of Yemeni ports controlled by the Houthis (Irish, 2019). The blockade of Houthi controlled ports by the Saudi-led Coalition has been widely criticised for worsening the humanitarian crisis in Yemen by restricting economic activity and the flow of humanitarian aid to these areas (Mundy and Sowers, 2018). France is an outlier within the European Union for its decision to continue to sell arms to members of the Saudi-led Coalition. Although the United Kingdom did mirror France in its refusal to comply with the European Union on arms exports of Saudi Arabia, as it is no longer a member, it is no longer bound by the same rules. Although individual member states retain the right to decide over all individual transactions in relation to arms exports, there is a legal base for a common arms export policy within the European Union (Vision of Humanity, 2021). The French government maintains that its arms deal with the Saudi-led Coalition are in line with international treaties, with their Armed Forces Minister stating that their priority is preserving economic relations with countries within that region in order to protect their security interests and energy supplies (Irish, 2019). This is in clear contradiction with European Union lawmakers' calls to make "EU and its member states… use all tools at their disposal to hold all perpetrators of severe human rights violations to account," (Cam, 2021). France holds the importance of its own national foreign relations strategy above the right of the Yemeni people to not be subjected to human rights violations. While it is understandable for France to wish to be able to access energy supplies from the Middle East, that should not come at the cost of Yemenis suffering. Under the liability model of political responsibility, the French government would be held both legally and morally responsible for the harmful consequences of their actions given that they have wilfully exported arms to the Saudi-led Coalition despite their knowledge that these actions have damaging effects of Yemeni civilians. France has faced legal action from non-governmental organisations within its own country alongside amplified public scrutiny (Amnesty International, 2019) in reference to their dealings with Saudi Arabia; confirming that they are aware of the illegality and controversy of their

actions. It therefore falls that France does have responsibility towards the Yemeni people as it is intractably causing these harms to befall Yemenis despite their knowledge of these damaging effects.

Conclusion

There is a myriad of Western institutions that have responsibility towards Yemen. This section explains the historical contexts of why each of these institutions have a responsibility to Yemen and which actions constitute to different forms of responsibility. The United Kingdom's responsibility towards Yemen differs to that of other western states as a result of its colonial occupation of Aden. Although many of the United Kingdom's actions and policies in the Aden Protectorate were enacted within the legal frameworks of the time, under Young's social connection model they are still to be held responsible for the long-term harm that has been caused due to the structural injustices that the colonial administration instigated (Young, 2010). Young's model works particularly well with postcolonial study for this reason. The liability model has proven more useful is assessing the responsibility of other western institutions and states who do not have a colonial past in Yemen. The responsibility of the USA and France stems from their continuation to sell arms to the Saudi-led Coalition and their consistent pandering to the Coalition's wills on the international stage. The United Kingdom also has responsibility for Yemen for the same reasons, but with the added grounds of their colonial past in the country. They recurrently refuse to condemn the Saudi-led Coalition's actions during the Yemeni Civil War. A key example of this is in the United Nations' attempts to conduct an international enquiry into potential breaches of international humanitarian law by the Saudi-led Coalition; the USA and the UK amongst others have vetoed this (Bells, 2022). These western states have acted illegally by continuing to sell illegal arms (Broder, 2018) to the Saudi-led Coalition despite evidence of those weapons being used to commit war crimes (Kessler, 2019). As a result of their actions being directly and identifiably connected to the negative consequences for Yemeni people, they are responsible for the Yemeni people under the liability model for political responsibility.

The United Nations does not have the same level of responsibility towards Yemen because of its limited power scope. While the organisation does claim that it "has primary

responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security," (The United Nations Security Council, 2022), its inability to function without the support of independent states within its Council does diminish the amount of responsibility it can have. The UNSC is paralysed without the cooperation of Council members and their continued funding of United Nations projects. While the United Nations is a useful framework and organisation to provide aid and assistance to those in need in theory, we cannot hold them to account for failures to do so because they can only operate within the strictures that the organisation itself exists within. For this reason, there are a range of Western states that are responsible for and that have a duty to help end the humanitarian crisis in Yemen. Furthermore, it is important to consider the limitations of international organisations who rely on funding from these states to feasibly rectify the situation and to enact real positive change. Therefore, it is not possible to place responsibility to ease Yemen's humanitarian crisis on the United Nations or any organisation that relies on individual states in order to function. The following chapter will discuss and analyse the impact of the ongoing conflict on the numerous health crises that are currently facing the Yemeni people. It will detail an array of different health crises such as the cholera epidemic, famine, and lack of access to safe and clean drinking water. By understanding the range of health struggles impacting Yemen, and the ways in which the West has attempted to provide aid in relation to those health crises, it is possible to appreciate the successes and failures of their approach and how this relates to their attributed 'responsibility'

Yemen's Health Crises and the Response of the International Community

Yemen is facing a health crisis on numerous fronts, including the worst cholera epidemic since records began (World Health Organisation, 2017), widespread famine (Waiting to declare famine 'will be too late for Yemenis on brink of starvation', 2021) as well as millions of internally displaced civilians (Broder, 2018) living in crowded and unsanitary conditions (Kennedy, Harmer and McCoy, 2017). Ms Maysaa Abdulrahman Shujaa AlDeen, Fellow at the Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, labelled Yemen's situation as "not only one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world; it is also one of the worst international responses to a humanitarian crisis," (United Nations Security Council, 2021). The first section of this chapter aims to address the Global Health response to the various crises impacting the Yemeni people, while the second section seeks to understand and critique the politics of humanitarian aid. It will detail the intricacies of the cholera outbreak alongside outbreaks of other infectious diseases, and the ways in which the Civil War has exacerbated the health challenges faced by the Yemeni people. The second section will then go on to discuss the myriad of non-governmental organisations, international organisations, and state actors who were responsible for the prevention and treatment of these health emergencies, as well as their successes and failures in doing so.

The Cholera Outbreak

The outbreak of cholera in Yemen has been raging since the autumn of 2016. This ongoing outbreak is the largest and fastest spreading epidemic of the disease in modern times (Broder, 2018), with the total number of suspected cholera cases reported in Yemen between October 2016 and April 2021 totalling 2,538,677 (World Health Organization - Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean, 2021). The national attack rate (the number of people who will become ill or die from the disease) for cholera in Yemen is 892.11 per 10,000 (World Health Organization - Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean, 2021). That is not to say that all areas of Yemen are affected by cholera in the same way. Governorates with the highest collective attack rate are often those controlled by (or close

to areas controlled by) the Houthis, including Amran, Sana'a, Al Mahwit, Al Bayda, and Al Hudayah (The European Council on Foreign Relations, 2019). Moreover, certain demographics appear to be more widely affected by the disease, primarily younger males (World Health Organization - Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean, 2021). However, given that Yemen's demographic does have a higher ratio of men to women (*Hajjah*, 2022), this is expected.

Cholera is transmitted faecal-orally via contaminated food or water and is exacerbated by poverty, overcrowding, poor hygiene and lack of sanitation and safe drinking water (Dureab et al, 2018) (Toze, 1997). Even prior to the 2016 cholera outbreak in Yemen, the country had experienced widespread infections consisting of diarrhoea and gastroenteritis, with 421,078 in 2011 alone (Al-Gheethi et al, 2018). We are unable to identify which of these cases can be specifically contributed to cholera due to the lack of reporting on outbreaks of cholera in Yemen for the past few decades, much alike other areas of the Middle East. Between 2007 and 2017, there were 61 articles published on cholera outbreaks, in which none of the studies were conducted in Yemen (Al-Gheethi et al., 2018). This makes studying the timelines and causes of the 2016 outbreak more difficult. The sheer volume of infections involving diarrhoea and gastroenteritis in Yemen makes the lack of articles and investigations remarkable. However, the factions throughout Yemen, which became evermore visible following the 2011 uprising, may have impeded the collection and analysis of this data.

A 2015 article studying the dangerously poor sewage effluent quality in Yemen suggested that dangerous pathogens were likely to cause disease outbreaks within the region. This article predates the 2016 outbreak that Yemen is currently experiencing and alludes to possible outbreaks of a plethora of diarrhoeal diseases in the region in the near future. The article identifies Vibrio cholera amongst other pathogenic bacteria such as Escherichia coli and Salmonella typhimurium (Al-Gheethi et al, 2015) as being present in Yemeni sewage effluents. Yemen's management of wastewater and solid waste remains the least developed in the Middle East, with information on the subject being scarce. In the time since many of Yemen's waste management plants were built, the population has grown by 25 per cent, meaning that said plants are being forced to deal with far greater levels of waste than they were designed to do, negatively impacting their efficiency. Moreover, this growth in

population has meant that the so called ‘official open dump sites’ which are used to dispose of clinical waste and solid garbage are now far closer to communities (Al-Gheethi et al., 2018). Naturally, people who are now closer than ever to these ‘official open dump sites’, filled with dangerous pathogens and bacteria, are more vulnerable than ever to increased infection levels.

From an epidemiological standpoint, the spread of the disease could be attributed to a natural, or rather, environmental phenomenon known as El Niño winds. In Paz’s 2019 article, he suggests that climate change and the El Niño regional winds are likely to have contributed to the spread of the outbreak. Paz’s research indicates that the unusually warm sea temperatures in the tropical pacific alongside the southwestern winds over the Gulf of Aden throughout the summer of 2016 caused the disease to spread from the Horn of Africa to Yemen, carried by aeroplankton carrying the cholera bacteria from one body of water to another (Paz, 2019) (Paz and Broza, 2007). McGregor and Ebi’s research into the El Niño winds and their impact on the spread of disease throughout Africa can also be applied to the situation in Yemen. They discovered that during El Niño years for East Africa that there were approximately 50,000 more cases of cholera (McGregor and Ebi, 2018). They also identified that rainy seasons in Africa accompanied spikes in confirmed cholera cases. It so happens that 2016 represented an El Niño year for East Africa, and that when combined with the southwestern winds over the Gulf of Aden, ideal conditions for cholera to spread beyond the African continent were created. Furthermore, Gormley also identified spikes in confirmed cholera cases in Yemen during the rainy seasons (Gormley, 2018). The spring rainy season in fact triggered the large second wave of cholera in Yemen in late April 2017 (Camacho et al, 2018), mimicking McGregor and Ebi’s research in Africa, suggesting that the outbreak is occurring under similar ecological conditions in both regions.

The impact of the Civil War

Moving away from the purely epidemiological overview of the cholera epidemic, the Yemeni Civil War is a constant factor throughout this outbreak. The Civil War has been ongoing since late 2014. With the Houthi rebels taking over Sana’a in 2015 came the suspension of workers involved in the management of solid waste (Al-Gheethi et al., 2018). The suspension of these workers has inevitably led to a breakdown in the way in which solid

waste is managed in these areas. In mountainous cities such as Sana'a (an area which is under Houthi control), wastewater and other sewage is routinely disposed of into the valleys. Meanwhile in the villages, sewage is pumped directly into the drainage systems which is then used for the irrigation of crops (Al-Gheethi et al, 2015). It is the natural conclusion that the flawed management of waste in the region has fuelled and extended the cholera epidemic in Yemen.

It is no coincidence that areas controlled by the Houthi rebels are more severely impacted by the outbreak than others. The majority of Yemenis, 67.1 per cent, live in governorates that are controlled by the Houthis, whereas only 22.7 per cent live in government-controlled governorates (Kennedy, Harmer and McCoy, 2017). As of 2017, 80.7 per cent of cholera deaths occurred in Houthi controlled governorates. In 2017, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health Organisation (WHO) released a statement declaring that Yemen was facing the worst cholera outbreak in the world, with cases reaching 200,000 (World Health Organization, 2017). With consideration to the political detriments that could be caused by such organisations opting to skew blame to either side of the ongoing conflict, this statement took a neutral outlook to the outbreak, neglecting to place blame. Despite this, it is evident by the statistics referenced earlier in this piece, that the civilians living under Houthi control are more severely affected by the outbreak. This is unsurprising since the Yemeni government is supported by the Saudi led Coalition. Therefore, the government-controlled areas have superior access to resources than their Houthi counterparts, explaining the discrepancy.

The Saudi led Coalition and its Western allies have played a vital part in the downfall of health, water and sanitation systems in rebel-controlled zones. The Saudi led Coalition's airstrikes have destroyed vital infrastructure including hospitals and public water systems, hit civilian areas and displaced people into crowded and unsanitary conditions There are numerous examples of Saudi led Coalition airstrikes targeting Yemeni hospitals; In January 2016 a hospital supported by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in Sana'a was bombed, killing four people and injuring ten (*MSF-supported hospital bombed in northern Yemen, killing patients and injuring staff*, 2021), and in March 2019 a hospital supported by Save the Children was bombed killing at least seven people (Gladstone, 2019). Under these conditions, it is unsurprising that Houthi controlled areas of Yemen are suffering the brunt

of the Yemen's humanitarian crisis. Following the early months of the aerial bombardment, the Coalition changed its strategy from attacking principally military targets to areas vital to Yemen's economic and agricultural infrastructure such as agricultural land, fishing boats and offices of the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (Mundy, 2018). Moreover, most civilian casualties (as of 2018) were caused by Saudi led Coalition airstrikes (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 2018). Not all Saudi led Coalition's airstrikes target civilians directly; in January 2016 they targeted Ras Isa, Yemen's key oil export terminal (Kennedy, 2016). The impact of targeting a vital export site is felt throughout Yemen, most specifically by the most vulnerable people because of the devastating economic repercussions. The flow of food, fuel and medicines are dramatically restricted as a result of the port's blockade and destruction.

Furthermore, the Saudi-led Coalition imposed a blockade shortly after the airstrikes began on 26 March 2015 (Security Council Report, 2016). The Saudi enforced blockade of imports has caused shortages of food, medical supplies, fuel, and chlorine as well as restricting humanitarian access (Kennedy, Harmer and McCoy, 2017). Despite this widespread destruction, the Saudi Arabian government inexplicably donated $67 million US dollars to aid the cholera response in Yemen in 2017 (Kennedy, Harmer and McCoy, 2017). This donation does little to undo the damage caused on the part of Saudi Arabia and their allies.

Response from the international community

Cholera outbreaks are not uncommon throughout the global south. Lonappan, Golecha and Balakrish Nair's 2020 work 'Contrasts, contradictions and control of cholera' compare the spread and impact of different cholera outbreaks across the globe. While they maintain that cholera outbreaks are usually unprecedented and difficult to predict, they suggest that Yemen's epidemic has been treated differently to many others around the world. The authors reference the poor levels of sanitation and lack of access to clean water mentioned earlier in this piece, but also offer a comparison to the parallel conditions faced during the Rohingya refugee crisis in Bangladesh. While similar conditions were evident in Bangladesh, the Rohingya's have not fallen victim to the same outcomes due to the roll out of an Oral Cholera Vaccine (OCV) campaign (Lonappan, Golecha and Balakrish Nair, 2020). Initial roll outs of the Oral Cholera Vaccine did occur in Yemen, although not until sixteen months into

the outbreak (Federspiel and Ali, 2018). Throughout the cholera outbreak in Yemen, plans for the roll out of cholera vaccines were abandoned. The World Health Organization's reasoning behind this included inadequate supply of vaccines, inability to provide access to all areas equally and myths that vaccines have no impact once an outbreak has started (von Seidlein, 2017). The World Health Organization instead chose to focus on "scaling up access to clean water and sanitation, treatment to people affected and working with communities to promote hygiene, sanitation and cholera prevention," (von Seidlein, 2017); a strategy which seems illogical when these unsanitary conditions are often out of control of the communities that live under them and are being exacerbated continuously by the Civil War.

To press for WASH (water sanitation and hygiene) to be achieved without the implementation of an OCV programme alongside it, overlooks the theory of both being complementary to one another (Clemens and Holmgren, 2014). Nevertheless, though it may seem impractical or at the least difficult to attain WASH under the current context in Yemen, it is obvious why this is an important goal when tackling any cholera epidemic. However, the significance of a roll out of an OVC campaign alongside it cannot be understated. Model analyses were conducted for an outbreak of cholera in Haiti that showed that if only 30 per cent of the high-risk population were vaccinated shortly after the recognition of the epidemic alongside a small 10 per cent improvement in hygiene, then a 55 per cent reduction in all cholera cases would have occurred (Chao, Halloran and Longini, 2011). It seems unlikely that communities can be 'promoted' into living in hygienic and sanitary conditions when they are being routinely subjected to air strikes at the hands of the Saudi-led Coalition which are directly targeting public water systems. Furthermore, when these air strikes are targeting hospitals, the World Health Organization's plan to treat those already affected by cholera in these areas seems unfounded. While it is of course important for international organisations to promote treatment for those affected as well as attempting to improve access to clean water, the abandonment of the Oral Cholera Vaccine (OCV) seems irrational and does not accurately grasp the reality of the situation facing the Yemeni people. Nonetheless, the World Health Organization and other non-governmental organisations are not wholly responsible for their inability to ease the epidemic in Yemen. As referenced above, Saudi Arabia's blockade of Yemen has halted humanitarian aid from reaching civilians, meaning that the roll out of these vaccines alongside other health related

assistance has become near impossible regardless of the intentions of any would be aid givers.

It is vital to understand the exact role of the World Health Organisation in order to fully appreciate its actions throughout Yemen's cholera outbreak and the state's other health crises. The World Health Organisation is the United Nation's only agency which focuses solely on health. It is unsurprising therefore, that they fall under significant scrutiny when health crises such as Yemen's occur and remain unresolved for long periods of time. The Ebola outbreak in West Africa from 2013 – 2016 acts as a case study in order to understand the inner workings of the World Health Organisation and why it therefore can fail to produce the results often expected by the international community. The World Health Organisation's constitution clearly outlines their functions and responsibilities concerning global health; they are the directing a coordinating authority in international health work, they have a central and historic responsibility to the management of the global regime for the control of the international spread of the disease (Wenham, 2017) (Constitution of the World Health Organisation, 2022). The failures in relation to West Africa's Ebola outbreak pinpoint the discrepancies between the normative leadership offered by the organisation and its lack of effective operational response (Wenham, 2017). The World Health Organisation is often expected to provide far more during a global health emergency than they have the funds, organisational capacity, nor mandate to do (Wenham, 2017).

During the Ebola outbreak for instance, the World Health Organisation did publish technical guidance documents, host meetings on vaccines, amongst completing other administrative duties (McInnes, 2015). However, they failed to provide direct patient care nor control the infection in the way the outbreak necessitated (McInnes, 2015) and much of this work fell to other groups such as Médecins Sans Frontières and even domestic and international militaries (Kamradt-Scott et al, 2015). The World Health Organisation's General, Margaret Chan, when addressing the supposed failures of the institution in regard to the Ebola outbreak stated that "It was a fantasy to think of the WHO as a first responder ready to lead the fight against a deadly outbreak," (Fink, 2014). The World Health Organisation requires states and their governments to protect and fulfil the health needs of their peoples, as outlined in their constitution (Constitution of the World Health Organisation, 2022). It is therefore unsurprising that within a complex political setting, such as that in Guinea and

Sierra Leone during the Ebola outbreak (Reddy, 2021), or indeed the political fractions of the Civil War in Yemen, that the World Health Organisation is unable to fulfil its mandate and provide a swift and effective end to such an outbreak.

Yemen is the poorest state in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) (The World Bank in Yemen, 2021), with a severely underfunded healthcare system. Such underfunded systems are often the key reason as to why the World Health Organisation is unable to effectively bring such states out of health crises. The World Health Organisation's constitution maintains that it is each state and individual's own primary responsibility to promote peace and security in order to preserve the health of all (Constitution of the World Health Organisation, 2022). The lack of peace and security in Yemen brought about by the Civil War means that the state cannot deliver effective healthcare nor disease control and neither can the World Health Organisation. Moreover, the lack of funding given to the World Health Organisation (Bloom, 2011) means that organisations such as Médecins Sans Frontières may be better prepared to tackle specific 'on the ground' issues during times of global health crises. Therefore, it may be unwise to label the World Health Organisation as such a significant failure during times of global health crises. Their constitution must be fully understood alongside their realistically limited mandate. The World Health Organisation can only work alongside states in order to promote the health of their citizens. If a state has deteriorated into factions that are unrecognised and unwilling to cooperate with international organisations, then the effectiveness of such organisations is severely limited. It seems clear once again that peace talks and an end to the Civil War is a necessity in order to bring about the end to any health crises facing the Yemeni people.

Other diseases and the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic

The dengue virus, alongside other mosquito borne diseases, is commonly found in places affected during times of war and conflict (Alghazali et al, 2019). Dengue is generally found in areas suffering from ecological disruption, displaced populations, as well as high volumes of susceptible military personnel (Sabin, 1952), such as is currently impacting many governorates throughout Yemen. The ongoing Civil War in Yemen has led directly to these conditions being present, and therefore the re-emergence of mosquito borne diseases. The damaged infrastructure of governorates such as Taiz as well as their poor hygiene conditions

led to an extreme spike in dengue cases in August 2015, the first summer of the civil war (Alghazali et al., 2019). In 2013, before the Civil War began, there were 54 cases of dengue reported in Yemen across a four-week period. During that same four-week period in 2015, there were 1,178 reported cases (Alghazali et al, 2019). Moreover, in 2020, data gathered suggests that there were as many as 6777 suspected cases of dengue (Alsabri et al, 2021). In the capital city of Aden, both dengue and malaria (both mosquito-borne diseases) rampantly spread and approximately 65,250 civilians were affected by just August 2016 (Sallami et al, 2017). This alarmingly sharp increase can be attributed to the ongoing Civil War. Alghazali's research goes on to suggest that the dengue outbreak in Yemen will only go onto worsen if the Civil War is to continue.

Diphtheria is a toxic disease spread via coughing and sneezing through water droplets. Between October 2017 and August 2018, 2,203 probable diphtheria cases including 116 deaths were reported in Yemen (Dureab et al, 2019). As a result of the ongoing conflict in the region, approximately 16.4 million Yemenis have no access to basic healthcare and therefore vaccination against diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus has shrunk gradually over the last 3 years (Dureab et al, 2019). Unsurprising 69 per cent of deaths from diphtheria were among the unvaccinated population (Dureab et al, 2019). As a result of the scarcity of functioning health facilities in Yemen, immunisation is near impossible, especially amongst displaced peoples. When combined with the World Health Organisation's resistance to begin vaccination programmes during outbreaks, it is likely that outbreaks such as these will continue to worsen.

Yemen entered the Covid-19 pandemic at a time when they were already experiencing the world's worst humanitarian crisis. From the Civil War to the ongoing cholera epidemic as well as the widespread food insecurity, Covid-19 is yet another health crisis that the Yemeni people are unequipped to deal with. The figures emerging from Yemen are relatively low, with just 6750 confirmed cases (COVID-19 Map - Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center, 2021). However, with over 1320 Covid-19 related deaths (COVID-19 Map - Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center, 2021), the supposed death rate from Covid-19 would be 20 per cent in Yemen, far higher than that of other nations. It is likely that this is a statistical error due to the difficulty of extracting accurate information and statistics from Yemen due to the ongoing conflict situation. Nevertheless, nutritional stress from lack of

food security has likely caused weakened immune systems for many Yemeni people (Cole et al., 2021), meaning that it is possible that the Covid-19 virus could have a more severe impact on the Yemeni people compared to other populations across the globe.

The divisions across Yemen have made many of the strategies used to help deal with the Covid-19 pandemic elsewhere impossible to implement. Personal protection equipment (PPE) is near impossible to attain, and there is no capacity for Covid-19 screening or contact tracing (Cole et al, 2021). While of course, the Covid-19 pandemic is still very much alive across the globe, the absence of accurate information on the pandemic's status in Yemen leaves both Yemen and the international community vulnerable. We are unable to fully realise the true grip that Covid-19 may have on the nation, or at least many over its governorates. Thus far, only eleven out of twenty-two Yemeni governorates have any recorded Covid-19 cases (Cole et al, 2021), which is almost certainly inaccurate. Moreover, countries surrounding Yemen have high Covid-19 case numbers (Cole et al, 2021), once again signifying the imprecision of the existing Yemeni figures.

Much of the effort to eradicate Covid-19 has been done on an international basis. While it is vital that the international community comes together on this issue, special consideration should also be brought into consideration when it comes to the pandemic's progression in Yemen specifically. Yemen relies on imports for all its medical drugs (Pritchard, Colliers, Mundenga and Bartels, 2020) and the blockade by Saudi Arabia and its allies has made securing drugs that could be used to treat the virus extremely difficult. Moreover, vaccination efforts across Yemen have been largely unsuccessful for the Covid-19 pandemic, much like vaccination efforts for other diseases such as cholera and polio. This inability to vaccinate means that there seems to be little end in sight for Covid-19 in Yemen, making the nation a global threat to health security. It is vital that the international community and the West responds with caution to this struggle. While the United Nations and its partners are urgently attempting to expand hospital capacity and are establishing twenty-one new ICUs (Cole et al, 2021), the virus cannot be brought under control without further intervention and local compliancy and expertise.

Malnutrition and famine

In excess of 20 million Yemenis are suffering from food insecurities and preventable diseases including severe malnutrition (Graham, 2020). Approximately 2.2 million children in Yemen are acutely malnourished (Dureab et al, 2019). Undernutrition in Yemen contributes to the high mortality associated with infectious diseases because those experiencing nutritional stress often have weakened immune systems that make them more susceptible to said diseases (Cole et al, 2021). This high volume of malnourished children could explain why 65 per cent of diphtheria cases affected those under 15 years of age and the exceptionally high fatality rate for under 5s (Dureab et al, 2019).

This famine shows no sign of easing with the added burden of the Covid-19 pandemic. The lockdowns and stay at home orders placed on Yemen have had a severe socioeconomic impact; people cannot leave home or travel in order to find work to feed themselves (UN News, 2021). Even prior to the pandemic, Yemen relied on imports for a staggering 90 per cent of its food (Pritchard, Collier, Mundenga and Bartels, 2020), however, due to the restrictions placed on Yemen as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, food imports decreased by 43 per cent in March 2020 (Hashim et al, 2021). This rapid decline in food imports has exacerbated the extent of food scarcity throughout Yemen, and therefore, malnutrition and famine. The Covid-19 pandemic has led to a reduced availability of imported items, decreased global demand of said items, and additional checkpoints throughout the supply chain, making it all the more difficult for Yemenis to acquire goods that they desperately need to survive.

As referenced earlier in this chapter, roughly 80 per cent of Yemenis were reliant on humanitarian aid before the pandemic (AlKarim, Abbara and Attal, 2021). The Covid-19 pandemic has had a global socio-economic impact and the levels of humanitarian aid donated by wealthier nations has therefore decreased. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) the 2020 funding for humanitarian aid was a notable low point (*Yemen sees return,* 2020) with the United Nation's appeal only being 25 per cent funded (as of September 2020). In June 2020, a donor conference for Yemen saw donation pledges from international governments fall over $1 billion short of the $2.41 billion target set by the United Nations (Cooper, 2020). The United Nations have had to halve food assistance for over nine million Yemenis as a result of this withdrawal of funding (Human Rights Watch, 2020).

It is important to consider the reasoning of the international governments behind this; countries across the world are facing financial hardship as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic. However, Western nations who are complicit in the ongoing bombardment of Yemen by the Saudi-led Coalition ought to contemplate the responsibility they have to the Yemeni people. France, a nation responsible for selling arms to Saudi Arabia that have been used against civilians in Yemen (Kaptan, 2021) has only donated 14 per cent of their 'fair share' to the Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan (YHRP) (Cooper, 2020). This shockingly low figure does not reflect a willingness to help overcome the damage done unto Yemen by the French government's dealings with the Saudi led coalition. Further afield, the United States of America, while remaining the world's largest donator, has suspended most of its funding for northern Yemen and has still only donated 39 per cent of its YHRP 'fair share' (Cooper, 2020). The USA is another country that has sold arms to Saudi Arabia that have been used against Yemeni civilians (Kaptan, 2021). It is vital that these powerful and wealthy Western nations do not abandon their responsibilities to Yemen in favour of profitable arms deals with the Saudi-led Coalition.

The Houthis have faced international scrutiny for their interference with aid being sent to Yemen since before the Covid-19 pandemic (World Food Programme, 2018). This interference has continued alongside the Covid-19 pandemic and has been labelled as a key reason for donor support to the United Nations collapsing in June 2020 (Hashim et al, 2021). It is vital to note that not only the Houthis are responsible for diverting and abusing aid from penurious Yemenis (AlKarim, Abbara and Attal, 2021). By solely blaming the Houthis and using their interference as a motive to cease aid donations to Yemen wilfully overlooks the offences committed by the Saudis and Yemeni government and fails to apply pressure to the other sides to terminate their abuse. Many international organisations have pressured local Yemeni authorities to join forces in address the pressures of the Covid-19 pandemic by limiting their interferences with humanitarian assistance (Hashim et al, 2021). However, these international organisations need to acknowledge the roles of Western nations in the Middle East. These Western nations usually make the largest contributions to humanitarian aid donations, nevertheless, since they are often the very same countries that are profiting from the destruction of Yemen through arms sales, then their donations are futile and could be considered as merely performative. Moreover, these Western nations and international

organisations must do more to apply pressure on the Saudi led coalition to ease blockades on Yemen to once again allow them to import necessary goods such as food to end food scarcity.

Working with local communities: A solution?

Yemen is a country of many factions: the Houthis, the official Government, the Southern Transitional Council, many other tribes. It can be considered a nation in all but name. As a result of these various factions, local Yemeni people find it difficult to trust any party involved with perpetuating the crises to intervene and help (Cole et al, 2021). This lack of trust impedes attempts to vaccinate and deliver aid, especially by international organisations. It is vital that these local communities are liaised with by these organisations in order to gain enough trust to make a meaningful and effective impact on the health of these populations. The Yemen Relief and Reconstruction Foundation (YRRF) is a charitable organisation registered in both the United States of America (USA) and Yemen (Yemen Relief and Reconstruction Foundation, 2021). This organisation utilises local Yemeni people as volunteers and has a Yemeni American as its President. The President's own family have lived in Sana'a for generations and her relationship with the local community aims to overcome the challenges faced by other organisations attempting to aid Yemen through its public health crisis (Kimball and Jumaan, 2020). By having a positive reputation in local groups, societal trust is built. An issue often faced by non-local charities and organisations is a lack of familiarity and sensitivity to the resident culture (Kimball and Jumaan, 2020). This distrust likely stems from centuries of Western Eurocentric prejudice against Arab people (Said, 2003). Following decades of colonialism under the British, and the following decades of hostility from a range of Western states and organisations, Yemenis have learned to be fearful of Western intervention. Non-governmental organisations have little hope of implementing meaningful change and distributing much needed aid if they are unwilling to cater to the cultural needs of the local community and to work with them in order to overcome entrenched resistance to and distrust of Western involvement. To not attempt to draw on local expertise is simply another form of colonial disrespect to the Yemeni people. By working with local people and charities, an attempt to decolonise humanitarian intervention is made.

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) adopted the principle of 'community engagement' in order to overcome issues such as those listed above. The aims of 'community engagement' are to work closely with local community members and experts in order to share essential information with them and to deliver a more effective form of humanitarian response (OCHA, 2015). They utilise a range of media forms in order to ensure efficiency and to best communicate with affected communities who are often able to provide a unique and vital viewpoint of from within the situation (OCHA on Message: Community Engagement, 2015). This approach offers a collaborative response to the health crisis in Yemen from both Western organisations and native Yemenis. This allows Western organisations to intervene, providing essential funding and international aid workers while also using the advantage of local people with indispensable knowledge and a right to be involved in work within their own communities. By being appreciative and acknowledging the crucial insight of locals, this organisation avoids the often-imperialistic pitfalls of many Western organisations when delivering aid to non-Western nations.

International Organisations and the Politics of Humanitarian Aid

As referenced earlier in this chapter, international organisations such as the United Nations are struggling to provide the necessary aid to Yemen in order to combat the health crisis facing the Yemeni people, with them halving food assistance for over 9 million Yemenis in 2020 alone (Human Rights Watch, 2020). However, these international organisations are placing too much pressure onto local organisations and authorities in order to amend these problems (Hashim et al, 2021), when their access to resources in order to end the crisis pales in comparison to that of the United Nations. Small local authorities are the victim of a power imbalance under their current circumstances; they are under a blockade by the Saudi-led Coalition that may be responsible for their diversion of aid to the Yemeni people. If a global organisation such as the United Nations is not able to understand that progress cannot be achieved by applying pressure to small groups rather than nation states, then the health crisis and indeed the war in Yemen is set to continue indefinitely.

International organisations providing humanitarian intervention/aid is always accompanied by the risk of political motivation. The United Nations is a leading force behind humanitarian

intervention. It is no coincidence that the United Nations, although technically a global organisation, is considered a largely Western creation. Its five permanent Security Council members are France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Russia, and China. While not all five members are Western nations, they evidently represent the majority. These states have their positions because they are wealthy and therefore powerful (Marcus, 2002), often so in that position as a result of historical (and continued) imperialism and abuse of less wealthy, non-Western nations (Ryder, Baisch and Eguegu, 2020). By permitting these nations to lead an organisation that can control humanitarian intervention and aid, once again imperial nations can impede the territorial integrity of individual sovereign states (Marcus, 2002). Given that even though not strictly Western, Russia and China could both also be considered imperial powers, the existence of the permanent Security Council members becomes unjustifiable if the aim is to deliver true peace without consideration of colonial interests. However, as addressed in the previous chapter of my thesis, it is vital to remember that the United Nations cannot function against the wishes of these permanent members due to their vast influence and vetoing powers (Lackner, 2020). The financial control that wealth and powerful states have over the organisation means that it can have little independent autonomy.

Organisations responsible for modern development and humanitarian aid often hold an attitude of 'poverty-as-degeneracy' in its attempts to distribute aid to less economically developed nations such as Yemen (Biccum, 2009). This attitude echoes Said's 'Orientalism' in that it patronises the Yemeni people. Western organisations and states that are responsible for humanitarian development and aid are typically wealthy; the disparity between them and the poverty-stricken Yemen is used to portray the state as the ultimate 'alter ego' of the West (Said, 2003). It uses this perspective as a means to justify a new age of imperialism, as demonstrated by the recolonisation of the Middle East (Biccum, 2009) (Marx, 2004), as demonstrated by the USA in its fight for hegemony in the region since the Second World War. Many Western nations such as the United States of America have donated vast amounts of aid to support Yemen throughout its cholera outbreak and other health challenges, while perpetuating the war that is creating the conditions which are prime for the disease to spread. In this example, the United States of America is using its

position as a powerful imperial nation to both prolong the health crisis in Yemen while stripping Yemen's sovereignty via its aid programme (Bonhomme, 2019).

It may be beneficial to trace back to the origins of humanitarian governance and intervention. Lester and Dussart are critical of the commonly held analysis of humanitarian governance as a relatively new phenomenon of the Clinton administration and the Tony Blair years (Lester and Dussart, 2014). They instead identify the amelioration of slavery in the Caribbean in the 1820s as a likely origin of humanitarian governance, where so-called protectors were given the new role of improving the morals and status of the previously enslaved people (Lester and Dussart, 2014). The governance of these colonial spaces was framed as a morally correct act; a concept echoed throughout 'humanitarianism' as a concept (Lester and Dussart, 2014). They recognise that 'humanitarianism' places privileged people on a pedestal and underprivileged peoples in need of assistance as somehow less-than. An array of postcolonial scholars have made the link between 'liberal humanitarianism' and racial colonial violence, enslavement, and government control (Rao and Pierce, 2006). Murdocca goes as far as to suggest that the violence that accompanies the fundamental domination of Western colonialism is integral to practices which are necessary for liberal humanitarianism (Murdocca, 2020). Both the concept of humanitarianism and colonial capitalist expansion happened simultaneously (Murdocca, 2020), it is unlikely that this is coincidental. Asad's 2015 work 'Reflections on Violence, Law, and Humanitarianism' suggests that humanitarianism is intrinsically intertwined with Christian doctrine despite being transformed by Enlightenment thinking (Asad, 2015) (Hunter and Kügler, 2016). This is apparently demonstrated by the interlinking 'benevolence' and 'violence' with an air of moral superiority. As a result, humanitarianism allows Western states and organisations to overrule or call into question the sovereignty of individual states (Belloni, 2007) with the justification of being morally superior to those involved in any local dispute or crisis.

Conclusion

This chapter addressed the main health crises facing the Yemeni people, with primary focus on the ongoing cholera epidemic. By going into detail about the myriad of issues facing the Yemeni people, the true scope of the health crisis is understood. As echoed throughout my

thesis, it is evident that the largest factor halting any attempt to deliver effective humanitarian aid or to ease the burden of such health emergencies is the failure to end the Civil War. Further exacerbating this is the failure of western nations to donate their fair share to organisations responsible for delivering aid such as the Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan (YHRP). However, such donations would not be strictly necessary if those same Western states (France, the United Kingdom, the USA) put humanitarian causes before a desire for profits and ceased arms sales to Saudi Arabia and its allies. My research has concluded that the origins of humanitarian aid cannot be easily separated from the legacy of colonialism and therefore to put such aid on a morally superior pedestal is questionable. International organisations should take lead from organisations such as the Yemen Relief and Reconstruction Foundation (YRRF) who work closely with the Yemeni people in order to give them some level of control over their own aid and relief. This avoids the white saviourism often attributed to other humanitarian aid organisations. A deeper understanding and review into the role of the World Health Organisation is also needed in order to fully appreciate the limited role and capabilities that it possesses in order to avoid unfair levels of blame being attributed to the group when it fails to live up to the unrealistic expectations of the international community. Unfortunately, this thesis does not have the scope to be able to evaluate the role of every international organisation in relation to this crisis, but future research could be completed in order to assess the responsibility of a wider range of organisations. To summarise briefly, many Western states have failed to prevent or swiftly end the health crises facing the Yemeni people because of their unwillingness to end arms sales to aggressors involved in the Civil war and their decision to reduce the amount of aid provided to Yemen over the course of the past few years. This is a failure to recognise and fulfil their responsibility towards Yemen and its people. Some international organisations have attempted to address the humanitarian crises ongoing in Yemen but have been unable to meet their full potential due to their restrictive structure. For this reason, it is unfair to attribute blame and demand a fulfilment of obligations of the international organisations, and pressure would be better placed on the states that are limiting the capacities of these organisations.

Conclusion

This thesis has proposed that the West has played a significant role in creating and perpetuating Yemen's current humanitarian crisis. It has determined that the United Kingdom has a responsibility towards Yemen as a result of its history of colonialism in Aden and the Federation of South Arabia. The colonial administration has had a long-lasting effect on Yemen that has resulted in repercussions that are still being felt by Yemeni civilians in the present day. Moreover, the United Kingdom's approach towards decolonisation in the Federation of South Arabia, via its initial unwillingness to engage with the process, only intensified and complicated an already difficult procedure. The United Kingdom's reluctance to withdraw from Aden in the hopes of maintaining its strategic military base within the Gulf, had disastrous effects for the Yemeni people in so far as it allowed an autocratic regime to take its place, alienating the PDRY from the international community. By means of the fiduciary model of political responsibility, I have construed that the United Kingdom has failed to acknowledge the responsibility it has towards Yemen as the site of a former colony. Moreover, Young's social connection model helps to identify the obligations of the United Kingdom as a former colonial administration and how it has failed to meet those obligations. My analysis via her framework suggests that there are structural injustices facing the Yemeni people as a result of their systematic oppression while under colonial rule. Yemenis were left unable to access an extensive range of opportunities for development, while the United Kingdom was able to profit and grow their international influence as a result of their occupation.

By reviewing the legality of a range of states' arms sales to the Saudi-led Coalition, I have postulated via the liability model that they are responsible towards the welfare of the Yemeni people. These states include the USA, the United Kingdom, and France primarily. They have failed to meet their responsibilities thus far, by continuing to make substantial profits from the sales of weapons which have likely been used to commit war crimes., despite their knowledge of these breaches of international humanitarian law. The United Kingdom and France have both violated European Union law, while all three have violated aspects of the Geneva Convention. In the case of the United Kingdom, they have also

breached British law. There is an identifiable link between the sale of these arms as well as the approval of arms transfers throughout their nations, and the consequence of violations of international humanitarian law. This has caused suffering amongst Yemeni civilians. For this reason, these states are responsible for the suffering of these Yemenis and have a responsibility to ease this suffering. This thesis proposes that a possible solution to this issue would be the cessation of arms sales to the Saudi-led Coalition. While these states make substantial levels of profit from these arms deal, I advise that the benefits they receive do not outweigh nor justify the suffering faced by Yemeni people.

The role of the United Nations is also examined by scrutinising the UNSC. The inference is that the UNSC is unable to operate effectively as a result of its structural restriction. The UNSC's permanent five members and their power of veto prevents the UNSC from being able to pass Resolutions that may prevent breaches of international humanitarian law. Three out of five permanent members of the Council being Western states have records of arms deals with the Saudi-led Coalition and have worked with the Coalition in order to veto Resolutions that they do not agree with. This manipulation of the UNSC is only possible because of the nature of the permanent five members. The existence of the permanent five does not allow the United Nations to function autonomously and to pass Resolutions that could benefit the Yemeni people. Nations such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are wealthy enough to be able to influence the UNSC. They have the ability to financially threaten the United Nations with withdrawal of vital funding if they impose sanctions against them. The United Nations is wholly reliant on funding from the countries that it represents, and is therefore open to manipulation by these wealthy states. Therefore, the United Nations is incapable of acting outside of the wills of wealthy states, especially those represented on the UNSC and the permanent five members. For this reason, it is not possible to label the United Nations as responsible for the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, nor expect it to effectively ease the current suffering of Yemeni people.

The final chapter of this thesis discusses the numerous health crises that are currently impacting Yemen. It addresses the severity and scope of these crises in order to illustrate the gravity of the situation facing Yemeni people. The roles of a variety of states and international organisations in failing to effectively bring an end to these crises are investigated and critiqued. It also identifies a deep-rooted distrust that Yemeni people have

towards Western intervention as a result of centuries of 'Orientalism' towards the Middle East. This hinders the efficiency of Western intervention that may have the capacity to end real terms suffering. Western intervention in Yemen faces difficulties as a result of historical treatment of Yemen and the Middle East more generally. Moreover, Yemenis are aware of how the West is supplying arms to the Saudi-led Coalition which are being used to kill civilians (Nasser, 2022), further ingraining long-held anti-Western sentiments. This research proposes solutions to decolonise the way in which humanitarian aid is delivered, such as working with local people and organisations. This could in turn allow the West to fulfil obligations that they have towards Yemen without continuing with harmful intervention tactics that only entrench imperialist practices. This chapter determines that the continuation of the Civil War is the most significant factor in prolonging the health and humanitarian crises affecting Yemen. Proportionate funding contributions towards organisations responsible for delivering aid (primarily local organisations such as the YHRP) constitutes the minimum fulfilment of Western obligations towards Yemen. In order to fully realise their responsibility towards Yemen, steps must be taken in order to bring an end to the Civil War. The conditions that are protracting the health crises can be directly linked to the Civil War. Therefore, in order to ease these crises and acknowledge their responsibility towards Yemen, the West must make every effort to end the Civil War. This must come from a willingness to place the lives of the Yemeni people above profit motivations. Members of the Saudi-led Coalition must not be allowed to use their wealth and influence in order to hinder efforts to ease the suffering of Yemeni civilians. This crisis is fated to continue until this transpires.

I have utilised Edward Said's work 'Orientalism' (2003) throughout my thesis and analysis. His theory has been useful in analysing the foundational relationship between the 'Orient' and the 'occident that I believe holds significant influence over Western treatment of Yemen. The presumed superiority of the 'Occident' over the 'Orient' is used by Western states to justify their perception of Yemen as 'backwards', 'extremist', 'fanatical', and less developed. It is easier for the West to defend their treatment of Yemen whilst holding these perceptions. They are able to justify the poor conditions that Yemenis live under through media representation of Middle Easterners as satisfied with a lower quality of life. Negative portrayals of Middle Easterners throughout Western media and literature creates a culture

that normalises a of distrust of and a mystification of the region. They produce caricatures of Arab and Islamic culture in order to create the notion of the 'Orient' as the antithesis of the West. This dichotomy between East and West has historically been used to justify colonialism by portraying colonies as primitive and reliant on the coloniser; which becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Those who are colonised suffer long-term injustices as a result of colonial occupation through restricted access to education and the stifling of political organisation and autonomy. It is important to remember that 'Orientalism' is not a product of colonial rule, but rather than it has been used to justify and reaffirm to pursual of colonialism and imperialist policies against the 'Orient'. It is evident that 'Orientalism' has impacted the treatment of Yemen by the West. From Aden and South Arabia's existence as a colony for over a century, the demonisation of the PDRY during the Cold War period, the manipulation of the Yemeni government during the War on Terror, to Western states' decision to understate their role in allowing human rights violations to transpire as a result of their arms deals, the West has continued to portray Yemen as the opposite to the West and has treated them poorly as a result. 'Orientalism' is used in order to minimise the West's responsibility for Yemen's current humanitarian crisis. By continuing to portray Middle Easterners negatively, sympathy towards Yemeni civilians is contained and curtailed.

This research has challenged those perpetuating and profiting from the suffering of Yemeni civilians. It utilises postcolonial theory in order to create an original analysis of Yemen's ongoing crises. There is a lack of existing research into the impact of imperialism and colonialism on Yemen, a perspective usually applied to countries experiencing similar situations on the African continent. It is vital to appreciate the long-lasting impact of colonial administrations and decolonisation processes on former colonies beyond the point of liberation in order to effectively attribute responsibility. Without acknowledging the culture of 'Orientalism' across the West, it is not possible to successfully explain how and why these crises have been allowed to continue for so long. Nor it is possible to connect the failures of Western institutions in successfully aiding Yemen to their responsibility towards the state without the application of a postcolonial lens. This research adds much needed nuance to the current debate regarding Yemen's humanitarian crises and can be used to apply pressure to groups that have been identified as being responsible.

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