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Abstract

John Macmurray (1891-1976) was born in Scotland and began his philosophical education in a Scottish university. As an academic philosopher, following in the footsteps of Caird’s Scottish idealism - a reaction against the debate between Hume’s scepticism and Reid’s ‘commonsense’ – Macmurray holds that a university education in moral philosophy is essential for producing virtuous citizens. Consequently, Macmurray’s philosophy of human nature includes a ‘thick’ description of the person, which is more holistic that Cartesianism and emphasizes the relation of persons. Hence, Macmurray focuses on community, but, as this chapter reveals, he is not a communitarian in the contemporary sense; rather, he shares Caird’s focus on philosophy as the means to living well. Thus, he opposes increasing specialization in university education and highlights the limits of science, which, Davie notes, is representative of the Scottish metaphysic of Macmurray’s era. Macmurray is the last in this line of the Scottish philosophical tradition.

Keywords

agency, education, emotion, idealism, Macmurray, personalism

Introduction
John Macmurray (1891-1976) was born into a Scottish Calvinist family. After a school education in Aberdeen, he studied Classics and Geology at Glasgow University, where the focus was on Descartes, Kant and Hegel. Upon his graduation in 1913 Macmurray moved to Oxford, having obtained a place to study Greats at Balliol College, where he was tutored by A. D. Lindsay, a former student of Edward Caird (see Costello, 2002, pp. 58-9). Although Macmurray’s studies were interrupted by the First World War, he subsequently completed the course and embarked on his philosophical career, staying in Balliol as John Locke Scholar in Mental Philosophy. Over the next ten years Macmurray obtained a succession of posts in the University of Manchester, the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa and a second post at Balliol College, Oxford before he settled for sixteen years as Grote Professor of Mind and Logic at University College, London (preceeding A. J. Ayer and the turn to linguistic philosophy). During his time in London, Macmurray’s engagement in left-wing politics brings him into contact with John Middleton Murry and Karl Polanyi (Costello, 2002, pp. 240-44). It is not until 1944 that Macmurray returned to Scotland to take up the post of Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh (succeeding A. E. Taylor to work alongside Norman Kemp-Smith), where he remained until his retirement in 1958 and became personally acquainted with Gabriel Marcel and Martin Buber (Costello, 2002, p. 322).

Between the 1920s and the 1970s, Macmurray published a fairly large number of articles and monographs, the majority appearing in print between 1930 and 1960. During the 1930s he also gave a number of popular radio broadcasts, with the intention of expressing philosophy in terms that the general public could comprehend, on the grounds that philosophy is borne out of ‘common human experience’ (Macmurray, 1932, p. 68). Of more academic interest, however, are the Gifford lectures that Macmurray was invited to deliver at Glasgow University in 1953 and 1954. These lectures, originally entitled ‘The Form of the
Personal’ and published a few years later as the two volumes *The Self as Agent* (1957) and *Persons in Relation* (1961), are Macmurray’s most well-known works (and have been reissued several times, most recently in 1995).

**The Function of Education**

From this brief biography, we can see that Macmurray spent most of his philosophical career in England; nevertheless, he maintained a pride in his Scottishness and a belief that his formative years in Scotland had imbued in him a Scottish mindset that was distinct from that of his English contemporaries (Costello, 2002, pp. 104-5). However, in the midst of the Second World War, Macmurray is clear that nationalism is dangerous, since it breeds exclusivity and a lack of tolerance (1941a, pp. 471-2). Instead, he praises the Commonwealth in so far as it has produced political cohesion across diverse nations, stating: ‘By fostering the differences of national culture and combining them, we enrich the common life’ (1941a, p. 472). In fact, it is perhaps Macmurray’s concern to produce a philosophy that enriches life that links him most closely with the Scottish philosophical tradition that precedes him.

Historically, philosophy was an integral part of the curriculum in Scottish universities for several hundred years (see Graham, 2007). In addition, in contrast with English universities, as Walker explains, higher education in Scotland was democratic rather than elitist, formed on a principle of offering a generalist rather than (or at least before) a specialist education, in which philosophy had a central role (1994, ch. 2). At the root of the compulsory study of philosophy in Scottish universities was a respect for intellectual inquiry as a means to living life well: the study of philosophy was seen as a means to improving character by increasing wisdom, producing reflective and virtuous citizens.

In fact, as Hamilton and Turner explain, Edward Caird and A. D. Lindsay, who tutored Macmurray, modernized adult education on the basis of their belief that admirable
citizens require a good higher education (2006, pp. 195-209). In accordance with the inference that universities can improve the welfare of society, Caird and Lindsay held that adult education should be democratic - open to all regardless of financial capacity – and that non-vocational education (which includes the study of philosophy) should be state-funded.

Moreover, Macmurray holds onto this notion of the university against a rising tide of university expansion and increasing specialization. He maintains that ‘A university is primarily a centre of cultural life and cultural progress’ (1944a, p. 278). Consequently, he contends that a university education is distinct from school education in that it combines education with an application of knowledge in service to the community, by means of which culture is sustained and developed. Hence, he insists that a university ‘must be a place where knowledge is unified, and not merely a common house for disjointed specialisms’ (1944a, p. 279, emphasis in original). In other words, Macmurray holds that specialization without a broader knowledge base creates an imbalance; a university should ‘combine a balanced general education with specialized training in some particular department of study’ (1944a, p. 283). To prevent such an imbalance, according to Macmurray, universities must, in addition to teaching undergraduate students, maintain an active presence within the society in which they exist and increase knowledge through research. For Macmurray, these three aspects of a university’s function are inseparable and grounded ‘in the perennial needs of human nature and human society’ (1944a, p. 284).

Macmurray’s emphasis on the cultural significance of universities is both in keeping with that of the Glasgow idealists who influenced him and borne out in his written and practical work in the field of education. Although Macmurray’s collection of papers on education remained unpublished, his work in promoting accessible and holistic education is well attested. During the 1940s Macmurray, together with Kenneth Barnes, founded the Wennington School in Lancashire. Based on the belief that play is a significant tool in a
child’s formal education, the school survived on limited finances for over thirty years and was commended for its results (see Costello, 2002, pp. 196 and 374). In addition, during his time in Edinburgh Macmurray campaigned successfully, on behalf of mature students, to re-open their college, Newbattle Abbey, and he was instrumental in establishing Britain’s first university courses for nurses (Costello, 2002, p. 347).

From Idealism to Agency

At the heart of Macmurray’s approach to education is both his connection with the Glasgow idealists and his critique of idealism. Writing for the fortieth anniversary of the publication British Weekly, Macmurray acknowledges that British thought has been ‘overborne by the impulse of . . . German Romanticism’ (1926, p. 164). In particular, he notes that this is ‘represented on its philosophical side by Caird’s great work on the Critical Philosophy of Kant, and by the foundation of the Oxford School of Idealism under the leadership of T. H. Green’ (1926, p. 165). Macmurray was clearly familiar with Caird’s work and his own work returns to Kant repeatedly. However, Macmurray is equally aware of the limitations of philosophical idealism and claims that it:

raises afresh the problem of Personality, but at a new level - a level where philosophy feels the need of setting the religious, the scientific, the artistic, and the practical and social activities of the human spirit side by side on a common level of validity, and of creating categories of thought which will enable us to grasp them together as functions of one self-conscious personal life (1926, p. 165).
In Macmurray’s work the idealists’ notion of Absolute Mind is replaced with an emphasis on agency. Macmurray is dissatisfied with the persistence of elements of Cartesian mind-body dualism in Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception. That is, while Kant’s distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal makes room for sense perception, the emphasis on pure reason relies on a concept of mind that is abstracted from its relation to matter. For Macmurray, this philosophical emphasis on the mind is inadequate, given that the common experience of human beings is the interaction of mind and body. A comprehensive conception of the person must account for our experience of mind and body. Hence, Macmurray states: ‘I cannot both be a body and have a body, nor can I be a mind and have a mind’ (1935b, p. 272).

By taking embodied experience as a given, Macmurray makes no attempt either to prove or to explain the interaction between the mental and the physical. According to Macmurray, thought is one of the activities of the human person and, thus, it implies the existence of the self as agent, which, in turn, implies the existence of the physical body. Hence, he states: ‘we should substitute the ‘I do’ for the ‘I think’ as our starting point and centre of reference’ (1957, p. 84). Macmurray is not denying that thought is a mental activity, rather he is insisting that thinking and acting are activities of the same indivisible self, even though action employs mind and body more than thought. Not only does action require a body, it also requires the existence of that which is other than the self. Thus, from the standpoint of agency the material self and the material world are a given, since, Macmurray explains: ‘When I act I modify the world’ (1957, p. 91).

Thought, then, occurs as reflection on what we know from immediate experience, in order that we might know it better; that is, we retreat from immediate experience into reflection when action is thwarted in some way. Reflection, therefore, engages with our memory of previous experiences and makes inferences concerning the likely outcome of an
act given the similarity of circumstances to previous actions. Macmurray insists, however, that the purpose of thought is to ‘enable us to resume the concrete activity of life’ (1933b, p. 38). To put it another way, the conclusions of our thoughts need to be put to the test in practical activity in order that they be either verified or refuted.

Action is irreversible; it cannot be undone. Thus, to act is to choose one option out of the available range of options: ‘a choice of one possibility which negates the possibility of all others’ (1957, p. 139). Moreover, the reason for acting in a certain way is underpinned by the agent’s intention, which might not be entirely conscious but will have the possibility of being expressed verbally. At the same, action is made possible by a whole host of physical activity which we have learnt previously and can carry out without concentration. Consequently, Macmurray distinguishes between habitual activity, which he equates with motive, and deliberate action, which he equates with intentional activity. He states that habit is the ‘aspect of our action, without which the action could not take place. It is integrated and subservient to the positive aspect of deliberate purpose in terms of which the action must be defined’ (1957, pp. 161-2). It is through the limitation of attention, then, that the agent is able to focus on the intention and not on the habitual activity.

There is, in Macmurray’s theory then, a ‘rhythm of withdrawal and return’ (1957, p. 181) whereby the agent ceases acting for the purpose of focusing on mental activity that will enable more effective future action. In this respect, Macmurray’s notion of the self as agent unifies our mental and physical properties in a continuous pendulum of mental and physical activity. At its heart, Macmurray’s agency theory has an empirical basis that requires and confirms the existence of the material world – that which is acted upon – by taking seriously our experience of ourselves as embodied minds.¹

¹ Macmurray’s theory of agency could be supported by Strawson, for example, and has proved useful to feminist theology. (See Strawson, 1987; Parsons, 2002).
Rationality and the Emotions

In addition, Macmurray’s attempt to balance the relation of mind and body includes an emphasis on the whole self that takes account of the emotions. It is the emotions that underpin our choices in action. On this basis Macmurray contends that, as agents: ‘What we feel and how we feel is far more important than what we think and how we think’ (1932, p. 142). As with thought, it is action that determines whether or not our emotions concerning an object are accurate or not. In this respect, Macmurray holds that an appropriate emotion is tied to the nature of the object. Macmurray suggests that fear of something that cannot hurt us is inappropriate, whereas appropriate emotion ‘grasps the value of what is not ourselves and enjoys it or disapproves it’ (1932, p. 147).

A significant corollary of Macmurray’s account of the emotions is his radical interpretation of reason in relation to them. He contends that: ‘Whatever is a characteristic and essential expression of human nature must be an expression of reason’ (1935c, p. 7). Contrary to the view that the emotions are chaotic and irrational and need to be subordinated to cognitive reason in order that action be rational and unemotional, Macmurray maintains not only that the emotions are essential to action but also that the emotions have the capacity for rationality. Emotions, he states, ‘can be rational or irrational in precisely the same way as thoughts, through the correctness or incorrectness of their reference to reality’ (1935c, p. 11).2 In other words, both thought and emotion are rational when they relate accurately to the nature of the object. However, Macmurray is quick to point out that the educational system has favoured the intellect over the emotions to the extent that the development of rational

2 Macmurray’s account of rational emotion is supported by what de Sousa terms ‘axiological rationality’ (see de Sousa, 1987, p. 171 ff.).
thought has not been matched by a corresponding development in rational emotion, with the effect that inappropriate emotions are a common occurrence.

To increase the rationality of emotion, Macmurray holds, we need to match the educational emphasis on the intellect with education in emotion, through training in ‘sensibility’, which is ‘the capacity to enjoy organic experience, to enjoy the satisfaction of the senses’ (1935c, p. 19). According to Macmurray, an education in sensory-awareness will enable the appreciation of the intrinsic worth of objects as opposed to merely valuing that which is of use. In other words, the intellect gives us knowledge of an object’s instrumental value, but this Macmurray argues is ‘knowledge about things, not knowledge of them. It does not reveal knowledge of the world as it is. Only emotional knowledge can do that’ (1935c, p. 22, emphasis in original). Admittedly, while our capacity for experiencing pleasure would increase with emotional education, so would our capacity for experiencing pain. Yet, Macmurray claims, it is much better to life a life full of capacity than to shy aware from the risks that accompany it. He states:

We must choose between a life that is thin and narrow, uncreative and mechanical, with the assurance that even if it is not very exciting it will not be intolerably painful; and a life in which the increase in its fullness and creativeness brings a vast increase in delight, but also in pain and hurt (1935c, p. 25).³

Thus, Macmurray’s account of the rationality of emotion and its capacity for education is reminiscent of Aristotle’s work on the passions in The Nicomachean Ethics. Both Macmurray and Aristotle insist on the potential rationality of the emotions through

³ Hence, Macmurray holds that the utilitarian attempt to increase pleasure and decrease pain is conceptually flawed.
training that encourages properly directed emotions. Moreover, Macmurray asserts that this does not mean dictating correct emotion and squashing negative emotions, rather, it is the development of mature recognition and discrimination of the range of emotions. Hence, he states: ‘Emotional education should be, therefore, a considered effort to teach children to feel for themselves; in the same sense that their intellectual training should be an effort to teach them to think for themselves’ (1935c, p. 39). To be successful, such an education will have to overcome an inculturation that subordinates emotions to the intellect in favour of re-integrating body and mind, reason and emotion. Significantly, therefore, while an intellectual education has productive and profitable citizens as its goal, emotional education focuses on living well and thereby improves the quality of life.

Admittedly, Macmurray’s account of emotional education and its benefits can sound idealistic, and yet his own efforts with the Wennington School (mentioned above) are testament to its practicability and its potential for success. Moreover, contemporary neurological and physiological investigation now provides a scientific basis from which to support Macmurray’s claims and more widespread emotional education. Daniel Goleman, for example, in his 1995 book *Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Matter More Than IQ*, uses brain science and longitudinal studies to confirm the significance of our emotional brain, revealing that our ‘emotional intelligence’ is a better indicator of success than our IQ. Success here refers to the integration into society and happiness in adulthood, measured by factors such as the ability to retain employment and sustain long-term relationships, rather than materialistic excess or celebrity status; what Macmurray would refer to as living well and is more commonly referred to in contemporary studies as well-being. To have a high emotional intelligence, Goleman explains, is to be ‘able to motivate oneself and persist in the face of frustrations; to control impulse and delay gratification; to regulate one’s moods and keep distress from swamping the ability to think; to empathize and to hope’ (1995, p. 34).
While schools adopting emotional education focus on each of the above mentioned areas, empathy is a key focus for improving interpersonal skills and has been found to reduce bullying and increasing community spirit; the other factors, Goleman attests, have been effective at reducing depression and violent outbursts, and, significantly, improving academic grades (1995, pp. 229-87). I suspect that the ability to control impulse and delay gratification might be useful in reducing financial debt too. For Macmurray, emotional maturity would enable the maintenance of the quality of relationships rather expecting the institutions of family and marriage to sustain them (see Macmurray, 1935c, p. 75).

The Limits of Science

It is worth noting that Macmurray’s understanding of the importance of educating the emotions has implications for art; it is a ‘training in artistry’ (Macmurray, 1935c, p. 42). That is, while an intellectual education provides scientific knowledge of the instrumental worth of objects and, therefore, of the means the agent might employ to realize an intention, the emotions enable discernment of the intrinsic worth of objects and, hence, of a desirable end of an action, which is, for Macmurray, closely connected to artistic reflection (see Macmurray, 1961b). Yet, Macmurray is concerned that the educational system with which familiar places much greater emphasis on scientific investigation than artistic creativity, thereby providing little guidance as to the desirable application of scientific knowledge. In this respect he alleges that ‘science is out of bounds’ (1961b, p. 23; see also Macmurray, 1939). That is, in Macmurray’s opinion, the value judgements concerning the use to which science is put are external to science itself and involve a different sort of knowledge. For Macmurray, science is primarily concerned with matters of fact, whereas art is concerned
with matters of value; in other words, valuable ends are determined by the emotional life and
the sort of artistic reflection that grasps the intrinsic worth of an object.\textsuperscript{4}

If we were to take this aspect of Macmurray’s argument seriously, then, the pursuit of
art and the development of an aesthetic appreciation, while often regarded as a luxury, would
be given an educational status equivalent to that of science, on the grounds that it is vital in
choosing between possible ends and, therefore, in the effort to live well. However, Macmurray’s
main criticism of the changes afoot within British universities in the 1940s is
that ‘the development of science and its applications has disturbed the balance of traditional
university life’ (Macmurray, 1944a, p. 277). As we discussed earlier, Macmurray maintains
that universities are places for cultural progress and yet he fears that the encroaching sciences
are being studied in isolation from other aspects of the traditional curriculum. Not only does
Macmurray view the separation of scientific study as a demise in the ‘older and more
important functions’ (Macmurray, 1944a, p. 278) of a university - namely equipping students
to live well – he also blames this shift for increasing tension between science and religion, or,
rather, a conflict between science and the aspects of culture that maintain social cohesion
(Macmurray, 1944a, p. 280). Thus, as Walker holds, while Oxbridge is focused on ‘how can
we know’ - the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, Macmurray is concerned with ‘how
can we know what we should do’ – the pursuit of knowledge in order that our action might be
more effective (Walker, 1994, pp. 139-40).

Moreover, George Davie equates Macmurray’s concern with the boundaries of
science as a characteristic of a Scottish metaphysic of the period, in which the central focus is
the relation of mind to matter. He notes that the spread of philosophy of science from
Oxbridge to Scotland ‘put over the view that philosophy, when it functioned properly, was
the handmaiden of the sciences, and not as men like Kemp Smith, Campbell and MacMurray

\textsuperscript{4} A work of art, then, is a representation of an artist’s aesthetic appreciation of its subject.
had maintained, their metaphysical critic’ (1986, p. 164). For Davie, it is his view of science that marks Macmurray as the last in a particular line of Scottish philosophers.5

From Agency to Relationality

Macmurray’s theory of the self as agent rejects the notion of the solitary self and postulates the necessity of relation. Action requires that which resists and supports the action; hence, the agent exists in relation to that which is other than the self. He states: ‘We know existence by participating in existence. This participation is action . . . Existence then is the primary datum . . . What is given is the existence of the world in which we participate’ (1961a, p. 17). Moreover, that which is other than the self includes the material, organic and personal worlds; in acting to realize an intention, the agent encounters resistance from other agents who have conflicting intentions. Hence, Macmurray states: ‘‘I’ exist only as one element in the complex ‘You and I’’ (1961a, p. 24).

Relational existence is a permanent feature of humanity, Macmurray argues, from birth. Thus, he opposes the Aristotelian portrayal of human infants as animalistic, but with the potential for adult rationality. On the contrary, Macmurray argues that human infants are ill-adapted to survival and exhibit few of the animalistic instincts exhibited by other species. The extent of a newborn baby’s adaptation to the environment consists of the ability to relay ‘feelings of comfort or discomfort; of satisfaction and dissatisfaction’ (Macmurray, 1961a, p. 48). In comparison with other animals, the human infant is totally dependent upon adults for her or his survival for a surprisingly long time. An adult carer has to interpret the infant’s cries of distress by a process of trial and error; when the child stops crying, the adult will be reassured that the child’s needs have been met. Nevertheless, in addition to crying to

5 He notes, however, that Macmurray’s influence shifted to psychology and was rediscovered in philosophy in the late twentieth century (see Davie, 1986, p. 170).
communicate a need, a human infant also makes happy, gurgling noises when she or he sees a familiar face or hears a familiar voice, which go beyond those necessary to reinforce the relationship on which they depend for survival. According to Macmurray: ‘This is evidence that the infant has a need which is not simply biological but personal, a need to be in touch with the mother; and in conscious perceptual relation with her’ (1961a, p. 49). More than employing biological drives for survival then, a human baby is born with an impulse to communicate with other humans.

It is undeniable that human babies enjoy contact with other humans and suffer negative effects if they are denied physical intimacy, and, moreover, that their survival is dependent upon the knowledge, thoughts and actions of their carers’. In addition, as the child gains physical control and attains mobility, rather than becoming adapted to survival the child is at greater risk of harm. As learned skills become habitual and further skills are acquired, it is up to the carer to direct the child towards their appropriate use. In effect, therefore, the child is encouraged to make distinctions between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ behaviour and to cooperate with the carer. Hence, rather than learning self-sufficiency and survival in nature, the human infant learns ‘to submit to reason’ (Macmurray, 1961a, p. 59). Yet positive relations amongst humans are so much more than this. Inasmuch as the child rewards the carer with unnecessary smiles and giggles, carers talk to, play with and cuddle their children to an extent that goes far beyond the biologically necessary. In Macmurray’s words: ‘These gestures symbolize a mutual delight in the relation which unites them in a common life: they are expressions of affection through which each communicates to the other their delight in the relationship, and they represent, for its own sake, a consciousness of communicating’ (1961a, p. 6).

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6 This view is supported by psychoanalysis (see, for example, Guntrip, 1961).

7 Macmurray acknowledges that this does not need to be the biological mother, but any carer, male or female.
p. 63). Significantly, then, human relations are more than mere matter of fact; they contain an intentional element. Moreover, the intention to sustain human relations through communication is a much more inclusive account of humanity than one which relies on cognitive capacity and excludes the profoundly disabled (see Swinton & McIntosh, 2000).

Growth to Adulthood

During the early stages of human life, the carer is motivated in acting to satisfy the child’s needs by love for the child and fear for the child’s safety. Similarly, Macmurray holds, the child’s cries of distress and smiles of contentment are expressions of embryonic forms of these motives (see Macmurray, 1961a, p. 62). These motives persist into adulthood, since humans do not mature into independent beings but into mutually interdependent ones. It is through this germinal awareness of belonging with and existing in opposition to the carer that the child’s awareness of both self and other grows, and leads, in time, to empathy. In addition, as the child learns to distinguish between carers, he or she becomes aware of being a member of a wider circle of humans and the child’s behaviour towards those other human beings will be connected to how much care they provide.

Initially, the young child sees all objects as animate and has to learn to discriminate between the animate and the inanimate. This discrimination is a practical one; it is through active relation with the various others that the child discovers which sorts of action are appropriate to the nature of the specific other. Despite the temptation towards dualism here, the discrimination of the different categories of other is threefold, since, in addition to human beings and inanimate objects, the child will become aware of the category of animals as others that do not care for the child but do respond and are not of purely instrumental value to humans. During the process of discrimination the child also becomes acquainted with the notion of possession, learning to associate objects with their owners. In this respect,
Macmurray explains: ‘‘My body’ continues to occupy an ambiguous position in relation to me. From one point of view it is me or part of me; from another it is an object which I ‘have’ or ‘own’ or ‘possess’, as I possess my clothes or my fountain-pen’ (1961a, p. 81, emphasis in original).

It is essential for the child’s development that the pattern of contact with the carer follows a ‘rhythm of withdrawal and return’ (Macmurray, 1961a, p. 76). While the carer is absent, the child is anxious for her or his survival and for the continuation of the relationship if which she or he depends for survival. During the withdrawal phase then, the child’s actions are motivated by fear for the self, and, in this respect, can be referred to as ‘egocentric’ (Macmurray, 1961a, p. 89). Nevertheless, the successful growth from childhood to adulthood is not measured so much by the acquisition of skills during the withdrawal phase, Macmurray contends, as by the child’s attitude to the carer’s return. In other words, growth to maturity requires that the child learns to cooperate and mutual affection persists. However, if the child refuses to engage in a cooperative relationship with the carer, she or he has two options: ‘either run away or fight’ (Macmurray, 1961a, p. 103). According to Macmurray, a child who ‘runs away’ from the carer’s attempts at cooperation becomes submissive and fantasizes about an imaginary carer who does not require cooperation, while a child who ‘fights’ against cooperation uses aggression in an attempt to force the carer to bend to the child’s demands. Submission and aggression are interchangeable modes of interaction stemming from the defensive motive of fear for the self; although these modes of relating can persist into adult relations, the frequency of the rhythm of withdrawal and return provides multiple opportunities for the motive of love to establish the cooperation necessary for successful adult relations.

Object-relations theories provide support for Macmurray’s theory of child development and the essential nature of carer-child relation. As Winnicott states: ‘if you set
out to describe a baby, you will find you are describing a *baby and someone*’ (1962, p. 137, emphasis in original). Moreover, psychoanalytic theories agree that reciprocal human relations do not simply serve biological functions or childhood; rather, human relations are craved for their own sake and are of the utmost importance to human beings throughout adulthood, having a profound effect on mental health (see Guntrip, 1971, pp. 137-57). As a philosopher and not a psychologist, Macmurray demonstrates a intelligible and incisive account of human relations and child development, which, according to Jones, ‘provides a philosophical justification for the relational psychoanalytic theories’ (1996, p. 26).

**Politics and Society**

Macmurray’s account of human beings as agents ‘constituted by their mutual relation to one another’ (Macmurray, 1961a, p. 24) has wide ranging political and moral implications. As mentioned above, when faced with an agent who requires cooperation, the child responds with love, aggression or submission. These three attitudes are not entirely distinct and separable; actions can contain elements of more than one disposition, in the same way that the dominant motive of love or fear contains and subordinates the opposing motive. However, since actions in relation have effects on other agents in the relation, there is an inherent moral aspect to action. A child, as we have seen, might act cooperatively so as to aid the carer in action, or the child might act with the intention of preventing cooperation and ultimately aiming to prevent the carer from pursuing his or her intended course of action. Hence, Macmurray states: ‘The moral problematic of all action – the possibility that any action may be morally right or wrong – arises from the conflict of wills, and morality, in any mode, is the effort to resolve this conflict’ (1961a, p. 116).

Since the attitudes prevalent in the child-carer relation persist into adulthood, Macmurray’s theory is both descriptive and normative. Children and adults express their
human nature through reciprocal relations. Humans who adopt a submissive or an aggression attitude in their relations with others will frustrate their own ability to exercise their nature by preventing mutual cooperation. Thus, we have to acknowledge that our actions can limit the freedom of others to act to achieve their intentions and, similarly, our freedom to act is bound up with the intentions and actions of other agents. For Macmurray, then, ‘Every individual agent is therefore responsible to all other agents for his [or her] actions. Freedom and responsibility are, then, aspects of one fact’ (Macmurray, 1961a, p. 119). We are responsible, as members of groups, for the effects that our actions have in supporting and strengthening or opposing and weakening the relations in that group. Nevertheless, responsibility in action is limited by the available knowledge and the intention behind the action; an agent cannot be responsible for the unintended consequences of an action.

Macmurray’s account of the morality of action extends beyond familial relations to society in general; it applies to the relations among families, social groups and across nations. At the national level, Macmurray contends that the submissive, aggressive and loving attitudes of the child can be detected on a wider scale as pragmatic, contemplative and communal nations. No one nation will operate exclusively from one of these ‘categories of apperception’ (Macmurray, 1961a, p. 110), but at times the overriding dominance of one or other of the modes will be detectable. On the one hand, a nation that is dominated by contemplative concerns valorizes the spiritual over the material and functions in accordance with an aesthetic vision of good practice. On the other hand, a nation that is dominated by pragmatic concerns valorizes the material over the spiritual and functions on the basis of technical merit and regulations. Pragmatic and contemplative modes are egocentric, concerned respectively with power and intuition, whereas the communal mode is concerned with positive relations amongst agents; it is, according to Macmurray, ‘heterocentric’ (1961a, p. 122).
In support of his categorization, Macmurray claims that: ‘Thomas Hobbes, the father of modern political theory, provides an almost perfect example of an analysis of society in the pragmatic mode of apperception’ (1961a, p. 134). Even though Hobbes’ makes no attempt to give an historical account of social interaction, his portrayal of humans as solitary, fearful and aggressive does fit the pragmatic mode as described by Macmurray. In Hobbes’ logical analysis, members of society recognize the need for cooperation, but cooperate only if sufficiently fearful of the law (Hobbes, 1991, p. 121). Hence, the state exists as a pragmatic tool for ensuring the stability of social unity, by force. Macmurray holds that Hobbes perception of humanity is at fault, since, for Hobbes, it is human reason as opposed to human nature that gives rise to positive inter-human relations. On the contrary, Macmurray insists:

People enjoy being together and working together, quite apart from any calculation of self-interest, and even at times against their private interests. The war of all against all is at best an abnormal state of affairs, and a man [or woman] with no interests whatever in the fortunes of his [or her] fellows is a freak of nature, and hardly human (1961a, p. 139).

As the antithesis to Hobbes’ pragmatic apperception, but with a similar separation of human nature and reason, Macmurray cites Rousseau. According to Macmurray, while Hobbes’ views human nature as the cause of enmity and reason as the grounds for social cooperation, Rousseau views reason as the source of conflict and human nature as the grounds of social unity (1961a, p. 140). For Rousseau, humans have the capacity for self-improvement, but seeking it results in both virtuous action and corruption; hence, the need for a social contract
Macmurray claims that Rousseau’s conception of society fits Macmurray’s description of the contemplative mode of apperception, since satisfaction in the present is to be found through identifying ‘ourselves with the ideal end’ and identifying ‘our individual wills with the general will of society’ (Macmurray, 1961a, p. 141). In other words, Rousseau’s social contract bears similarities to Macmurray’s description of the child in flight, who imagines an ideal carer as a mechanism for submitting to rather than resisting the carer.

**Social Bonds**

Thus, social bonds are determined by the dispositions of the members of a group. If humans act from a negative motive of fear, social bonds will be maintained either by force or consent. Yet, Macmurray argues that humans, by their nature, require positive relations with their fellows for the growth and the full expression of that nature. In short, ‘I need you to be myself’ (Macmurray, 1961a, p. 150). Hence, the relations in groups with negative motives might be described as impersonal, in contrast with groups that act from the positive motive of love and might be described as personal. Macmurray emphasizes the distinction between these two types of groups by referring to the former as ‘societies’ and the latter as ‘communities’ (1961a, p. 145). While, therefore, the term ‘society’ can be applied to any group of related humans, Macmurray highlights the differences between ‘groups which consist of people co-operating for certain specific purposes, like trade unions, or cricket clubs, or co-operative societies’ and ‘groups which are bound together by something deeper than any purpose – by the sharing of a common life’ (Macmurray, 1941b, p. 22).

In other words, it is the kind of unity that holds a group together that is of primary importance for Macmurray. Nevertheless, this does not mean that societies and communities are mutually exclusive; on the contrary, there will be degrees of society within a community and vice versa. Societies are formed and bound by a particular function, and are therefore a
means to an end (even though communal bonds might develop among the members of a society). Communities are formed spontaneously as ends-in-themselves, fulfilling the human need for companionship (although some operations of the community will involve cooperating at a functional level). Thus, Macmurray states: ‘The members of a community are in communion with one another, and their association is a fellowship’ (1961a, p. 146).

Crucial to this aspect of Macmurray’s theory is the contention that the relations among people in a society are based on their functions in the group, whereas the relations among people in a community are based on their intrinsic worth. When we recognize the intrinsic worth of another human being, we relate to them as a person rather than as a useful object; it is only in communities, therefore, that we relate to one another as persons. Consequently, Macmurray argues that societies are necessary for and justified by their reference to communities. He states: ‘The functional life is for the personal life; the personal life is through the functional life’ (1941f, p. 822, emphasis in original). If we were to translate this into more contemporary terminology we might say that our working life supports our family life and that our family life is possible because of our working life. In fact, Macmurray argues for what is now referred to as ‘work-life balance’ insisting that the functional life and its concerns with efficiency and resources must not override the personal life and its capacity for mutual enjoyment and shared experience. Such a balance, Macmurray contends, will require that state exercise justice in running the economy; he states: ‘maintaining, improving and adjusting the indirect or economic relations of persons is the sphere of politics’ (1961a, p. 188).

**Justice and the State**

Justice is the least that is required of any moral action and essential to the morality of apparently virtuous acts. Justice represents both basic fairness and the standard by which acts
of care, for example, retain their moral character and avoid either smothering an individual or neglecting other actions. On the one hand, Macmurray explains, justice ‘expresses the minimum of reciprocity and interest in the other . . . what can rightly be exacted’ and, on the other hand, ‘justice seems to be the sine qua non of all morality, the very essence of righteousness, in a sense the whole of morality’ (1961a, p. 188). In a society, where human beings are functionally related to one another and affected by the actions of others with whom they are indirectly related, morality is maintained by exercising justice in cooperative activities. In this respect Macmurray advocates a minimalist state arguing for state intervention in the relations of citizens only when the trust necessary for social cooperation is lacking. Nevertheless, if the law is either too extensive or too minimalist, some groups will experience injustice and revolt. Hence, the aim of the law is to achieve justice as efficiently as possible, which, Macmurray holds, means exercising ‘the minimum of interference with the practical freedom of the individual which is necessary to keep the peace’. (1961a, p. 194).

At the same time, however, he recognizes that large societies or societies comprised of groups with diverging customs will require greater state intervention for ensuring cooperation. In particular, global trade has produced a global economic network of interdependent relations of cooperation, in contrast with the historical self-sufficiency of cities or nations, increasing competition across former boundaries and requiring extensive regulation to avoid exploitation. However, Macmurray warns that we must guard against personification of the state by remembering that it is an instrument of justice. To erroneously idolize the state, he argues, is to expect the state to create community, but, as we have noted, there is a distinction in Macmurray’s work between society and community; societies can be organized into existence, communities cannot.

To overlook the utility value of the state, he asserts, by ascribing to it an intrinsic value ‘is to make power the supreme good’ and ‘to invert the logical relation between means
and ends’ (1961a, p. 199). While there are some circumstances in which means can be accumulated rationally in advance of deciding on the ends to which those means will be put to use, in the case of the state, Macmurray argues, the accumulation of power can become an end in itself. If the state is amassing power for its own sake, it will value its citizens only in so far as they make the state powerful; that is, only in so far as they are economically valuable to the state. In such a situation, Macmurray states: ‘Law becomes not the means to justice but the criterion of justice’ (1961a, p. 200), with the effect that the interests of state power override the interests of justice.

For justice to be served, the law cannot be the standard of justice but must intend justice by limiting the power that individuals, nations and corporations have over others. We are obliged to abide by the limitations imposed by law, then, inasmuch as the law enforces such limitations in order that our actions do not have unjust consequences for others. Morality in action, therefore, is bound up with the intention to create and sustain justice; in Macmurray’s words: ‘Justice is an aspect of morality; it is a restriction which I impose on my own power for the sake of others’ (1961a, p. 201).

Macmurray’s understanding of justice is a demanding one; not only does it require that we limit our power to act in order that we do not limit another’s ability to act, it also requires that we revolt if the laws set by the state are failing to achieve justice. Moreover, given the reality of global trade, Macmurray suggests that justice cannot be served in the absence of a global law that prevents nations from competing for power and special privilege. Nations will come into conflict with one another if their intentions clash; hence, Macmurray insists that the fair distribution of resources requires that: ‘There must be a compatibility of ends. Our intentions must not merely be possible. They must be compossible with those of all others’ (1950, p. 50). In keeping with the emphasis on social cooperation and compossibility, Macmurray is opposed to nationalism and in favour of international unity. While not denying
the possibility of national pride within international relations, Macmurray is opposed to nationalism as a political policy on the grounds that it is spurious and divisive (see Macmurray, 1933a, p. 70). Furthermore, Macmurray believes that the political union of Great Britain is evidence of the possibility of uniting nations and overcoming nationalism (see Macmurray, 1943, p. 10). He would, therefore, presumably be opposed to the movements for the independence of Scotland, Wales and Cornwall from the rest of England, but not necessarily opposed to devolution, and in favour of greater unity with the rest of Europe. In addition, Macmurray does not discuss the difficulties in reaching agreement across diverse nations (which we have witnessed over environmental policies, for example). Nevertheless, we have to acknowledge that the wealthier nations have contributed to the sharing of resources when poorer nations have been struck by natural disasters, such as tsunamis and earthquakes, and that the United Nations represents a form of international political cohesion and an intention to increase international justice, despite debates over its effectiveness.

Types of Government
Understandably, Macmurray’s work on international unity stems from his experience of and involvement in world war, which convinced him that democratic institutions represent the only solutions to fascism. Moreover, he insists that the freedom and equality entailed in democracy will be realized only if the state exercises the minimum of interference necessary to maintain social cohesion without allowing particular groups to obtain special advantage. In other words, the key distinction between a totalitarian state and a democratic one is that the former controls all areas of life, whereas the latter is limited in the areas of life that it controls. He states:
There are reaches of human life – and these the most essential, the most human – which in the nature of things lie outside the proper scope of political control. The moment we lose hold of this central issue – the limitation of political authority – democracy is lost, however seemingly ‘democratic’ the institutions may be which remain (1941b, pp. 9-10).

Again Macmurray expects the citizen to be proactive in its relations with the state, remembering that politicians exist to serve the populous and not vice versa. He insists that it is up to the citizens to set the limits of political control and establish the manner in which certain areas of human life will remain free of political interference.

Macmurray refers to a government whose political power is limited in the interests of democratic freedom as a ‘positive government’, which he contrasts with the notion of a ‘negative government’ (1943, p. 7, emphasis in original). In a negative democracy, he suggests, the government exercises limited control over the culture or the economy. It is essential to democracy that cultural freedoms – freedom of conscience, thought, speech – remain outside of governmental jurisdiction, but the reverse is true of economic freedom. That is, the free trade of a capitalist economy benefits only those with capital and prevents the government from sharing the nation’s economic resources equitably. Twentieth century liberal democracy in Britain, however, maintained both cultural freedom and economic freedom, operating thereby as a negative democracy. Consequently, the progress of democracy is limited by the nation’s economic inequalities. If we want to increase democracy, we have to realize, Macmurray asserts, that ‘whereas cultural freedom grows as democracy advances, economic freedom decreases’ (1943, p. 15). In a negative democracy the government is forced to intervene to prevent riots and exploitation between those with labour and those with capital; it might also subsidize struggling business to prevent economic
collapse, but it cannot act positively to redistribute the nation’s wealth equitably. In economic
terms then, a negative democracy produces more of an oligarchy, where the wealthy few have
considerable power and influence, as opposed to producing equality of status and opportunity
for the less wealthy majority.

Macmurray insists, therefore, that more expansive democracy, a positive democracy,
would be produced by giving the government greater control of the nation’s economy. While
we might be anxious that losing economic freedom would compromise democracy,
Macmurray contends that this would not be the case so long as cultural freedom was retained.
He states: ‘we can remove the ban on government control of the economic field and still
remain a democracy, provided always that the cultural field remains outside the competence
of political authority and we devise the machinery to enforce this limitation upon the
government’ (1943, p. 17).

In this respect Macmurray is clearly influenced by the rising socialist movement of
the 1940s; nevertheless, he does not retract this opinion even after the realities of Soviet
Russia are revealed. It seems that Macmurray’s belief in the benefits of socialism outweigh
his disappointment with the corrupt forms that came about. He remains committed to
economic equality on the grounds that ‘The means of life are also the means of a good life’
(Macmurray, 1943, p. 21). In other words, cultural freedom becomes an unrealistic ideal for
those who do not have the financial means to enjoy it, and this situation is exacerbated by the
capitalist system and its free market economy. In fact, Macmurray is sufficiently convinced
of the inevitability of socialism in Britain that he focuses his discussion on the means for
retaining cultural freedom in the absence of economic freedom. While Macmurray’s efforts
to guard against totalitarianism are understandable given the era in which he is writing, he
was mistaken about the predictability of socialism; indeed, throughout the 1980s and 1990s
Britain has seen a decrease in state control of the means of production and an increase in their
privatization. Thus, even though he did not foresee the current economic crisis, Macmurray suggests that:

the powerful economic interests . . . could, if they were prepared to do so, disrupt the economic system upon which we all depend for our livelihood. The threat of an economic dictatorship is already present in negative democracy, and in a crisis it might become actual. In such circumstances it becomes a question whether an economic dictatorship in the hands of government is not a lesser evil than an economic dictatorship in the hands of an association of private citizens (1943, p. 28).

Macmurray is not advocating economic dictatorship, but he is advocating a government that is somehow under public control and able to utilize the economic resources of the nation for the benefit of all its citizens, according to their needs. Hence, Macmurray promotes extensive decentralization of government that will allow local decisions to be made regarding the economic needs and most beneficial use of resources for local citizens. Greater equality in the distribution of resources, however, is heavily reliant on the commitment of civil servants to increasing democracy for all citizens.

*Marxism and Communism*

Clearly Macmurray’s high regard for socialist principles and his understanding of the relation between those with capital and those with labour stems from his understanding of Marxism. Macmurray is quick to separate Marxism from communism however, given his religious underpinnings, which we will analyse in due course (see Macmurray, 1933c). Moreover, while the adoption of Marxist realism takes Macmurray beyond the idealism of the Scottish
philosophy that he inherited, his use of Marxism to argue for socialism is in keeping with the
democratic principles of the Scottish universities.

Macmurray is particularly interested in the fact that Marx’s analysis of society is
undertaken from an economic standpoint. Furthermore, Macmurray emphasizes the fact that
‘the relation between capital and labour really means the relation between the people who
won’t starve if they don’t work, and the people who will starve if they don’t work’ (1933c, p.
47, emphasis added). In other words, while Macmurray is not in entire agreement with
Marxism, he is concerned with the economic relations of groups of people. He maintains that
changes in economic circumstances with have a great impact on societal relations; that is,
groups of people related to one another on instrumental grounds in their economic lives.
Nevertheless, he suggests that communities – groups of people related to one another on the
basis of companionship – can withstand economic variation without necessarily being
drastically altered. At first it seems that Macmurray underestimates the impact of poverty on
communities. Yet, his point is that not all relations are bound up with the economic
arrangements of a society and, therefore, while Marxism offers a helpful critique of the
labour market, it does not account for the relations of persons as persons. In as much as
relations between persons transcend their economic circumstances and their functions in
society, they are, Macmurray claims, ‘superorganic’ (1933c, p. 67).

Macmurray acknowledges that human societies appear to be organic and confined by
their economic status. He admits that societies struggle to amass and control the means of
production, and that in capitalist societies there is class division with the majority being
economically controlled by a few. Moreover, such a situation frustrates the relation of
persons as persons, encouraging competition for profit rather than cooperation and the
meeting of equals. Nevertheless, Macmurray realizes that a government enforced system of
economic equality will not be a just one; instead of eliminating class division, it will
introduce dictators. Justice, for Macmurray, involves the eradication of economic privilege, but, at the same time, the state has to remain a servant of the people. A planned economy and democracy can only coexist, he argues, when individuality is overcome by communal bonds that are strong enough for cooperation to be voluntary, which ‘indeed, is the real need of all human nature’ (Macmurray, 1933c, p. 95).

With the passing of time, Macmurray’s references to communism become less pronounced. Obviously the dictatorships that existed in communist countries weakened its plausibility, while the anti-communist sentiment in the west made it a dangerous proposal. In addition, Macmurray is critical of Marx’s account of society on the grounds that it is based on an entirely organic conception of human relations, which, according to Macmurray, represents a weakness, an incompleteness, in its interpretation of human relationality. However, Macmurray retains his dissatisfaction with capitalism and his belief in the state ownership of industry and finance, alongside a strong sense of community for the creation of a democratic, classless society. In fact, Macmurray’s claim that democracy requires socialism and that socialism can avoid totalitarianism if it maintains democracy has been supported by contemporary democrats and socialists (see Gamble, 1991, pp. 18-31). This is a far cry, however, from New Labour’s private-public partnerships.8

Equality and Freedom

Despite the historical failures of socialism, Macmurray’s belief in the need for societal reform (rather than violent revolution) persists, because it is founded on concepts of freedom and equality that are contained within his understanding of the human need for relationality. Here

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8 That is, despite former British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s claims to have been influenced by Macmurray. For further analysis of the disjunction between Macmurray and Blair, see McIntosh, 2007b.
Macmurray’s emphasis on economic equality is clarified, since equality of opportunity requires financial means; nevertheless, Macmurray’s primary concern is with equality of value and consideration, whereby, all humans are given valued equally and their voice counts equally in society. Freedom, for Macmurray, is bound up with human nature; it refers to the freedom to act in accordance with human nature, which, as we have seen, involves engaging in relationships of equality. In other words, freedom and equality are mutually inclusive categories; freedom of expression is made possible through the relations of equals and being equal involves having the freedom to act in accordance with one’s nature.

Nevertheless, freedom is paradoxical; ‘It is at once the Alpha and Omega of our humanity’ (Macmurray, 1950, p. 18). More controversially, Macmurray claims that it not just economic factors and unequal relations that prevent people from exercising freedom; we are, he contends, afraid of freedom. Rather, we are afraid of the responsibility that accompanies freedom, craving the safety of security instead. While ‘Fear is an essential element in our make-up, without which we should not be human’ (Macmurray, 1950, p. 28), preventing reckless action, too much fear will leave us paralysed in the face of action and unable to choose which course of action to pursue. As a result of our awareness that we cannot predict all the consequences of our actions and that we could have chosen otherwise, we seek to increase our defences against those consequences. However, each defence only reveals a further area of vulnerability, thereby increasing our fear and hampering our freedom to act. Thus, Macmurray argues that we are only free in our actions, if we overcome our fear by accepting responsibility for the consequences, instead of seeking security.

Our freedom to act is maximized if our means are consonant with our ends. In the west, however, Macmurray suggests that desire has outstripped resource with the effect that freedom is decreased. Hence, he states that ‘Humility is the handmaid of freedom’(1950, p. 24). Furthermore, the maintenance of relations of equals means not using one’s freedom to
act to prevent another from acting; hence ‘the freedom of each of us is relative to that of the
others’ (Macmurray, 1950, p. 24). It is, therefore, futile to attempt to obtain greater freedom
for oneself, since we are interdependent beings whose freedom can be restricted by others. At
best, we can aim not to curtail the freedom of others in the hope that others will do likewise;
we increase our freedom to act through cooperation rather than individualism. Thus, our
freedom is conditional upon sustaining positively motivated relations with our fellows. In
Macmurray’s words: ‘The primary condition of freedom, to which all other conditions are
related, lies in the character and the quality of human relations’ (1950, p. 26).

Where relations are indirect, such as in the global market place, it is the role of
governments to ensure the fair distribution of means; Macmurray refers to this as the
‘socialization of means’ within and across societies (1950, p. 31). Yet the state cannot control
the ‘socialization of ends’ (Macmurray, 1950, p. 31) also necessary for increased freedom in
action; this is the realm of community and the relations therein. Freedom in society is,
Kirkpatrick holds, ‘atomistic/contractarian’ (1985, p. 568); fear of the other is suppressed by
legal restraints and the appearance of cooperation is sustained through legal obligation.
Likewise, equality of value is a fiction, since societal relations measure worth according to
instrumental value. Political organizations, therefore, create and maintain loyalty and provide
the opportunity for communities to grow, but they cannot create community. According to
Macmurray, cultural freedom, which includes religious freedom, is essential for developing
communal bonds.

Church and State

[S]ocial unity is not a luxury or an ideal but a desperate necessity for each of us . .
. it can be achieved in two ways. It may be achieved freely, from within, by
sharing a common way of life, based upon common values. If this fails then it must be achieved by conformity to external laws which we keep under the threat of penalties. The unity of the social order may be maintained, in other words, either by affection of by force (Macmurray, 1941b, p. 26).

We see here a parallel between Macmurray’s description of the child-carer relation and his perception of adult relations; the motives which underpin those relations are fear and love. Politically organized societies rely on the motive of fear to sustain cooperation among citizens, whereas, Macmurray holds, the cooperative activities of religious communities are motivated by love for one another. Thus, avoiding totalitarianism requires that politics is subordinated to religion; however, if religion is weak and is failing to sustain communal bonds, political power will increase, eventually resulting in a loss of democratic freedom and equality. On this basis, Macmurray portrays the state and the church as having distinct but interrelated roles in procuring a good life for humans.

In the 1940s though, Macmurray’s assessment of Britain is of a society in which a weakened religion has accompanied the rise of individualism and the belief that human value depends upon an individual’s contribution to society; in turn this creates a hierarchy of workers. This situation, he holds, rests on a functional perception of human life, which is false. Rather, many aspects of human life are ‘more-than-functional’ (Macmurray, 1941d, p. 787). While we can eat and drink to satisfy hunger and thirst, we also eat and drink as celebration and for fellowship; on such occasions inequalities in the workplace can be overcome and community enjoyed.

In reality though, human beings engage in the functional and the more-than-functional aspects of life simultaneously, such that one or other will be dominant at any particular time. Yet, as we have noted above, Macmurray insists that ‘The functional life is for the personal
life; the personal life is *through* the functional life’ (1941f, p. 844, emphasis in original).

Thus, while that which is more-than-functional is enabled by the working life, the regulation of the working life by the state is for the purpose of supporting, providing the means by which, the life of communal relations can exist. In short, ‘the State is *for* the community; the community is *through* the State’ (Macmurray, 1941c, p. 856, emphasis in original). In reference to church and state, then, they relate to different spheres of life, the former being concerned with ends of the good life and the latter creating the means for the good life. Moreover, this implies that the church cannot exist independently of the state; it requires the material means for its existence. Similarly, the state needs the church to sustain communal bonds; a common purpose is weak in the absence of community, and communal bonds are weak if not expressed through common purpose. Consequently, Macmurray argues both that church and state are interrelated and that the latter needs to be subordinate to the former; stating: ‘The proper relation of religion and politics is the unresolved problem of our civilization’ (1941e).9

Macmurray’s attempt to keep politics focused on justice and to give religion a positive function that guards against the temptation of expecting the government to be responsible for all facets of the good life is commendable. Nevertheless, in addition to leaving the manner in which the economy is to be redistributed from rich to poor an open question, his account of religion - as subordinating politics and being motivated by love - is widely at odds with secularization and with religions that operate on the basis of fear. He acknowledges that European religion does little to limit governmental jurisdiction and is frequently a private pursuit rather than a communal one. Yet, his concept of religion is somewhat different from the notion of individual spirituality that is prevalent in European

9 For a more detailed discussion of Macmurray’s relation of church and state, see McIntosh, 2007b.
society. He states: ‘individualism is incompatible with religion because it is incompatible with social unity’ (1941b, p. 16). For Macmurray, religion expresses the human need for relationality.

Rejecting Institutionalized Religion For the Sake of Community

It is Macmurray’s account of religion that most clearly displays his criticism of the influence of Hegelian idealism on Scottish philosophy through his critique of Marx’s view of religion as idealist. Macmurray argues that, while many forms of religion are idealist, religion is not idealist per se (see Macmurray, 1944b, p. 6). Likewise, Macmurray accepts Freud’s analysis of religion as reflecting the familial relations, but he denies Freud’s conclusion that religion is mere childish fantasy. He states that it is our relation with another human being that ‘finds expression in religion . . . but there is nothing illusory about this’ (1961a, p. 154). Four essential features of religion, according to Macmurray, are: religion has its roots in the universal experience of human relationality; religion is a peculiarly human phenomenon; religion is culturally pervasive; religion is inherently inclusive (1961a, pp. 156-7). He states: ‘Religion is the primary manifestation of the social character of human nature, and it is concerned with society, not with the individual’ (1941b, p. 17).

Even though western individualism has led to the increased privatization of religion, often removing from the public arena, Macmurray emphasizes the persistence of religious ritual as communal activity. Not only is religion a fundamentally social pursuit, far from being illusory, it addresses the primary experiences of humanity; such as, fear and relationships. While certain aspects of the field of empirical data will lend themselves to religious consideration more readily than others, whether or not an experience holds religious significance essentially depends on a particular attitude of mind; in Macmurray’s words, the religious person ‘comes to worship, the artist to admire, the scientist to observe’ (1936, p.
We can limit our attention to any one of these attitudes, but it is likely that we will employ a mixture of all three. Since religion is, according to Macmurray, primarily concerned with relationships, people are its field of data ‘both as the source of valuation and as the object of valuation’ (1936, p. 37). We exist as observers on the world and dependents in the world; in our relations with other humans we exist as judge and judged. As Macmurray points out, if we regarded all other people as means to be put to use, we would all be acting as masters; yet, if we regarded all other people solely as ends in themselves, we would all be acting as servants. For cooperative action to occur then, we need to recognize both the utility and the intrinsic value of our fellow humans, while recognizing that we also have both utility and intrinsic value. In other words, cooperative action requires relationships that are mutually beneficial and respectful, which Macmurray refers to as ‘fellowship’ (1936, p. 43).

At the centre of Macmurray’s definition of religion then lies the conviction that religion is a primarily practical activity; relations with other people require direct action. Consequently, Macmurray asserts that religion in its reflective aspect has actual rather than ideal communities as its focus; it ‘expresses the consciousness of community . . . religion is the celebration of communion’ (1961a, p. 162). As celebration, religion employs a symbolic representation of membership and enjoyment of the community to which it refers, thereby making factual relations intentional; that is, through reflection on past and present relations, future relations can be improved. In Macmurray’s words ‘the task of religion is the maintenance and extension of community’ (1936, p. 63). There is a sense in which maintaining community might be viewed as the negative dimension in comparison with community growth, which could be viewed more positively. Further, the extension of a community has ‘both a quantitative and a qualitative side’ (Macmurray, 1936, p. 74); that is, a community can grow by adding to its numbers or by deepening the relations of the existing
members. A community that seeks to avoid stagnation will need to grow in numbers and in depth.

Consequently, the quantitative extension of community gives rise, Macmurray suggests, to the concept of God, as a symbol of that which connects large numbers of people. He states:

The necessity is not primarily for a ruler, but for a ritual head, a representative of the unity of the community as a personal reality, so that each member can think his [or her] membership of the community through his [or her] relation to this person, who represents and embodies the intention which constitutes the general fellowship (1961a, p. 164).

Similarly, ancestor worship can be seen as maintaining continuity between past and present members. Thus, it is the sense of belonging to a community that extends backwards and forwards in time that is, for Macmurray, the foundation of religious experience.

Moreover, Macmurray argues that the quantitative extension of community is unlimited; the intention behind the growth of community is inclusive and universal, although the quality of communal relations is under threat the larger a community becomes. In principle, community is based upon the mutually rewarding relation of equals; it is, therefore, the relation of persons as persons, based solely on their common humanity. Hence, the notion of an exclusive community is irrational and irreligious. Macmurray states: ‘The primary religious assertion is that all . . . are equal, and that fellowship is the only relation between persons which is fully rational, or fully appropriate to their nature as persons. In this assertion the whole nature of religion is bound up’ (1935c, p. 124). Nevertheless, a religious person
fitting Macmurray’s description might find that s/he is at odds with an institutionalized religion that has exclusive criteria attached to membership.

Religion and Science

Thus, inasmuch as Macmurray equates science and art with the means and ends of action, he equates religion with the morality of an act; as we have noted, a moral action is one which intends community and, for Macmurray, community is synonymous with religion. In keeping with Macmurray’s critique of mind-body dualism and his positive view of the rationality of emotion, he is opposed to the view of science and religion as antagonistic. That is, the traditional division between intellect and emotion often regards scientific pursuit as the former and religious activity as the latter, giving each a separate field of data – giving science the material world and confining religion to spiritual matters – and holding them to be incompatible. If religion were a set of beliefs about the spiritual world, it would be in conflict with science; yet, Macmurray holds: ‘This is surely a misconception’ (1935c, p. 107). Science and religion cannot be assigned to different arenas, since these areas are not separable in practice; they are encountered by humans simultaneously. Science and religion have the same world as their empirical data.

Macmurray also discounts a number of proposals for rendering science and religion compatible (see Macmurray, 1935c, pp. 108-110). In addition to dismissing the notion that science and religion have different fields of data, he dismisses the argument that religion and science employ different methods – namely, qualitative and quantitative – as false in relation to biology and psychology, for example. Further, Macmurray disputes the claim that science is concerned with how the world works but religion is concerned with why the world is here, on the grounds that evolutionary theory is a scientific account of teleology in the world. Finally, Macmurray suggests that a view of science as an attitude of inquiry and religion as
an attitude of worship is more fruitful, but still inadequate, since worship without the pursuit of knowledge of that which is worshipped is merely an activity of superstition and imagination.

Yet, he claims that: ‘It is only through confusion . . . that the validity of religion can be doubted’ (1961b, p. 9). In essence, scientific method involves abstraction and is primarily concerned with matters of fact and utility, whereas religion reflects on the whole of reality and looks for intrinsic value therein. In short: ‘Science is impersonal; religion is personal’ (Macmurray, 1935c, p. 114, emphasis in original). Science and art, he argues, provide knowledge about people, but to actually know a person is to engage in religious activity; that is: ‘Religious knowledge . . . universalizes the problem of personal relationship, and seeks an understanding of personal relationship as such’ (Macmurray, 1961a, p. 168). In other words, we can gain knowledge about people from observation and investigation as a scientist or an artist, such as identifying their blood group and the shape of their features, but we cannot claim to know them, since we do not discover the true nature of a person as an onlooker. People reveal their natures through communication; we can only claim to know a person if we have a relationship with them. Moreover, communication has to be mutual, since it is through the process of revelation that humans come to know themselves. Thus, Macmurray states: ‘if Peter knows Patrick, then Patrick knows Peter . . . all interpersonal knowledge is by revelation. I can only know you if you reveal yourself to me, and you can reveal yourself to me only in so far as I am prepared to do the same’ (1961b, p. 56).

Macmurray uses the structure of language to provide an analogy of relationships and the knowledge they provide (see Macmurray, 1935c, pp. 86-93; Macmurray, 1961a, pp. 178-83). In the type of communal relationship that Macmurray characterizes as religious, he suggests that ‘I’ speak to ‘you’ about ‘it’, with first and second persons being interchangeable while the third person, the subject, remains constant. Artists limit their attention to the first
and third persons in the dialogue; that is, at the time of making the work of art the relationship between the first person, the artists, and the third person, the object focused upon, overrides the relationship with the audience who will access the work of art following its completion. Scientists limit their attention to the third person, inasmuch as they focus on the object under investigation in a manner that minimizes the influence of the observing scientist (first person) and those who will make use of the results in the future (second persons). Further, the results of a scientific experiment are, in theory, the same for each experimenter, whereas aesthetic appreciation of an object is as varied as the artists and their creations inspired by it. According to Macmurray, therefore, while science deals primarily with matters of fact, it is art rather than religion that deliberates on matters of value, and, therefore, science that is borne of the intellect and art that is borne of emotion.

Clearly people can relate to each other in any of the ways described, but, whereas since science and art involve a deliberate limitation of the attention as detailed above, relations among persons need not. When two friends converse on a particular subject, at the same time as sharing information, they are expressing the interest that they have in each other; they are enjoying fellowship. In other words, there is a reciprocity involved in person-to-person relations that is lacking in the artistic and the scientific modes of relating. Whereas scientists amass technological means through observation and artists find satisfactory ends through contemplation, it is in person-to-person relations that we engage in active cooperation. Thus, Macmurray states: ‘Religion . . . is the knowledge which must inform all action for the achievement of community, and therefore the ground of all really efficient and really satisfactory action whatever’ (1961a, p. 185).

*Reality in Religion*
Admittedly, the form of religion exhibits artistic and scientific attitudes respectively in its ritual and doctrine; yet, for Macmurray, the validity of these aspects is to be found in their integration in action (see Macmurray, 1961a, p. 174). Consequently, an essential part of Macmurray’s definition of religion is the distinction between what he refers to as ‘real’ and ‘unreal’ religion (1961a, p. 170). He contends that ‘Real religion is heterocentric’ (1961a, p. 170), engaging in communal relations for the purpose of caring for other, whereas unreal religion exhibits egocentric tendencies, focusing either on material power or on spiritual immortality by instituting dualism. Hence, Macmurray is interested in whether religious ideas refer accurately or inaccurately to reality, or whether they refer to another world as a substitute for referring to reality. In the latter case, Macmurray agrees with Marx that religion which operates as an ‘opium for the people’, by focusing on an afterlife instead of engaging in action towards a more free and equal society, is to be rejected.

Yet, Macmurray demarcates two differing responses to fear found in religion. In the first case, religion states: ‘Fear not, trust in God and He will see that none of the things you fear will happen to you’ (Macmurray, 1961a, p. 171), but this, Macmurray argues, is unreal or ‘pseudo-religion’ (1935a, p. 48). The second case represents real religion, which deals with fear by stating: ‘Fear not; the things you are afraid of are quite likely to happen to you, but they are nothing to be afraid of’ (Macmurray, 1961a, p. 171). In other words, since death is an inevitable part of life, a religion that seeks to offer security against death can do so only be constructing an imaginary world of immortality. Thus, belief in immortality is an example of religious idealism; belief in an ideal world that distracts from the real world and judges it to be insufficient. Proponents of immortality might claim to be acting in a manner that seeks to bring the ideal world into existence, but this, Macmurray explains, ‘is a blind and vain hope’ (1944b, p. 16), since action is necessarily constrained by the realities of the actual world. In the idealist religion then, the spiritual life is valorized over the material life, with
the effect that adherents maintain a belief in miracles without expecting to see any. To persist in a belief in the illusion of ideal world, the believer must engage in self-deception, denying the reality of death in the actual world. In order to maintain the illusion, therefore, an idealist religion is likely to be retrospective, favouring tradition over progress. Marx is rightly critical of such a religion, but, Macmurray holds, real religion can be ‘a creative force in material human life’ (1935a, p. 57).

Nevertheless, despite his criticism of belief in immortality, Macmurray does not entirely dismiss belief in God. He does, however, declare that belief in God is shown to be an illusion if it does not result in heterocentric action; that is, if there is a god, giving the world a purpose, then believers in that god would have a confidence in the teleology of life that enabled them to give up fears for self in favour of other-centred community. He states: ‘Belief in God is properly an attitude to life which expresses itself in our ways of behaving’ (1935a, p. 19). Thus, a real religion will be less concerned with the possible nature and existence of God and more concerned with the human fellowship as a religious experience. Similarly, a real religion will not focus on refining its doctrine, since its primary concern will be action to increase freedom and equality.

*Christianity as Real Religion*

In keeping with his era Macmurray assumes the validity of Christianity and is faced with the challenge of having to salvage from its various forms something that fits his description of a real religion. Consequently, he looks to the roots of Christianity, as found in the reported actions more than the reported sayings of Jesus of Nazareth, rather than to its expression in post-war Britain, stating that: ‘Christianity is primarily the movement that Jesus founded rather than the doctrines that he taught’ (Macmurray, 1938, p. 4). In so doing, Macmurray emphasizes that fact that Jesus heritage is Jewish; hence, clues as to Jesus’ intention (if this is
discernible at all) are to be found in the culture of the ancient Hebrews. According to Macmurray, the ancient Hebrews were a religious society as opposed to having a religion; their religion was not a separate sphere activity but pervaded all activities. In other words, they avoided a dualistic interpretation of the material and the spiritual by retaining a religious consciousness. Most significantly considering Macmurray’s criticism of idealism in religion, he claims that the ancient Hebrews have ‘no unambiguous trace in the whole of their classical literature of a belief in another world or in a life after death’ (1938, p. 20).

Macmurray does not address the fact that the Hebrew Bible is a deliberately theological rather than historical portrayal of the ancient Hebrews, nor does he resolve the conflict between the theocracy of the ancient Hebrews and his rather different account of the roles of church and state. Nevertheless, the purpose of his account of the ancient Hebrews is to serve as insight into the background and culture of Jesus of Nazareth, especially in reference to religious idealism and practical activity.

It is from an examination of the material in the New Testament Gospels that Macmurray constructs his view of Jesus life and action. During this endeavour, Macmurray deliberately avoids engagement with the Pauline material and the centuries of tradition that have followed it, so as to minimize the influence of distortions and conflicting interpretations. Underlying Macmurray’s investigation into the Gospel narratives is the premise that Jesus is ‘the culmination of Jewish prophecy and the source of Christianity’ (Macmurray, 1938, p. 42). In accordance with Macmurray’s account of the ancient Hebrews, therefore, he insists that Jesus has a religious consciousness. He claims that the period of temptation in which Jesus declines the use of miracles is evidence of his rejection of material-spiritual dualism (see Mt. 4:1-11 and Lk. 4:1-13 KJV; cf. Macmurray, 1938, pp. 46-8 and Macmurray, 1935a, p. 64). However, the ethical and apocalyptic elements of Jesus’ reported sayings have often been interpreted dualistically as idealism and symbolism. On the contrary, Macmurray argues
that Jesus’ sayings offer insight into the means for achieving a purpose and the conviction that the intended purpose will be realized; they depict life as it is and could be, but they do not state what ought to be so.

Furthermore, Macmurray is most interested in the aspects of Jesus’ life and action that go beyond the tenets and expectation of his Jewish heritage. Jesus’ mission, Macmurray holds, is the extension of human community, which he starts by choosing disciples and continues beyond the boundaries of the Judaism (see Macmurray, 1938, pp. 54-5). In particular, the parable of the Good Samaritan advocates person-to-person community regardless of race (Lk. 10:30-37 KJV; cf. Macmurray, 1935a, p. 65).

Moreover and in support of his own view of humanity, Macmurray finds that Jesus’ sayings regard fear as a stumbling block in to human community. In the New Testament narrative Jesus repeatedly asks ‘why are ye fearful’, adding ‘O ye of little faith’ (see, for example, Mt. 8:26 KJV). Thus, Macmurray claims, Jesus is contrasting fear with faith, because an attitude of trust is required for reciprocal relations. In addition, he finds in the Gospels evidence for the claim that fear is overcome by love, which is in agreement with Macmurray’s portrayal of loving communal relations. Jesus states ‘love thy neighbour as thyself’ (see, for example, Lev. 19:18 KJV) suggesting that love is the basis of human community, and he adds ‘Love your enemies’ (see, for example, Mt. 5:44 and Lk. 6:27 KJV),10 thereby advocating the creation of community where there is none. It is of primary importance for Macmurray that Jesus’ command to love is not ideal, but practical, since fear prevents both action and positive relations. If we pretended to love someone, we would be engaging in fantasy or sentimentality and any such relationships would be based on a false premise. Rather, Macmurray asserts that Jesus renders the command to love plausible by

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10 In accordance with his Jewish heritage, Jesus also relays the command to love God (Deut. 6:5).
example; hence, Jesus states: ‘love one another as I have loved you’ (Jn 15:12 KJV). In essence, therefore, the commands to love are, according to Macmurray, concerned with living well; that is, fulfilling human nature through positive relationships (see Macmurray, 1973, p. 11).

In contrast with many traditional accounts of sin and salvation that are bound up with the breaking of moral codes and striving for immortality, Macmurray contends that Jesus’ concern is with salvation from fear and the sin of negative relationships (see Macmurray, 1935a, pp. 110-11). Accordingly, rather than punishment or revenge, Jesus urges his disciples to forgive one another ‘seventy times seven’ (Mt. 18:22 KJV), since it is forgiveness that can restore broken relationships.

In addition, Macmurray stresses Jesus’ promotion of equality in relationships through sayings such as ‘whosoever will be chief among you, let him be your servant’ (Mt. 20:27 KJV); through Jesus’ own example of washing the disciples’ feet; as well as through his attention to the socially deprived and his criticisms of the wealthy. In fact, Macmurray regards the use of the term ‘disciple’ to be especially significant, since it means ‘friend’ rather than servant. Again in contrast with traditional interpretations in Christianity that promote self-sacrifice and servanthood, Macmurray insists that friendship, not service, is the foundation of community and at the heart of Jesus’ message (see Macmurray, 1964, p. 4). He justifies his position by interpreting the statement ‘No one has greater love than this, to lay down one’s life for one’s friends’ (Jn 15:13 NRSV) as a commentary on the value of human life as opposed to praise of martyrdom. Likewise, he asserts that the statement; ‘He that findeth his life shall lose it: and he that loseth his life . . . shall find it’ (Mt. 10:39 KJV) is preferencing heterocentric action and self-revelation over defensive egocentricity (1964, p. 5).
Overall, therefore, Macmurray is suggesting that Jesus, as a religious exemplar, teaches and practices friendship as the essence of a good human life. Such a suggestion is in sharp contrast to much institutionalized Christianity, which concentrates on doctrine and the condemnation of alternative points of view. Yet, Macmurray’s interpretation is in agreement with the analysis from Harvey. Harvey criticises traditions that portray Jesus as a moralist, instead arguing that Jesus’ invites the rejection of victimhood in favour of living life to the full, by striving to realize one’s potential despite setbacks and hardship (see Harvey, 1991).

On the grounds of his interpretation of Jesus’ understanding of humanity, Macmurray refines his perception of real religion by claiming that Jesus brings a dimension of maturity to religion. A mature religion, Macmurray holds, comprehends the means of creating and extending community. Immediately after Jesus’ death, his followers took the mission of extending community seriously; however, they lost the impetus for social equality when they became the official religion of the Roman Empire. Hence, Christianity becomes an instrument of the state, working for the government rather than the citizens. Thus, by accepting the power offered by the Roman authorities, Christianity adopted the dualism of secular and spiritual. Furthermore, the practical problems that the dualism gives rise to have led to a number of schisms, especially that between the east and west. According to Macmurray, the Greek Orthodox Church prioritizes the spiritual, engaging in a contemplative form of religion that elevates the aesthetic and apocalyptic elements, whereas the Roman Church exhibits a more pragmatic form of religion that focuses on duty-ethics (see Macmurray, 1938, pp. 153-4). Thereafter, institutionalized Christianity is largely a conservative rather than a creative force, which, in spite of a few notable exceptions such as liberation theology, maintains the status quo more than it increases equality (see Macmurray, 1938, p. 121). In addition, the manner in which Christianity has developed has led to greater focus on belief than on social action, with the effect that those who are serious about
extending community find themselves criticizing (and being criticized by) the official churches. Yet, Macmurray states: ‘there is religious irrationality in the limitation of community to a particular group. There is nothing in the relations of persons that demands, or even permits, of such limitations’ (1961b, p. 60).

Hence, Macmurray contends that the persistence of material-spiritual dualism in Christianity is an explanation for its decline in membership and its lack of credibility in society. He boldly claims that the disjunction between Jesus’ social action and that of institutionalized Christianity is ‘pious fraud’, in which the church has been alternately afraid and feared (1941b, p. 50). For Christianity to be a vital force in the extension of community, it needs to reject dogmatism, conservatism, hierarchy and privilege, and embrace creativity and equality, supporting the most marginalized members of society rather than the authorities.

In this respect, Macmurray’s stress on common humanity over religious doctrine leads him to make a distinction between belief and faith; belief is assenting to creedal statements, whereas faith is an attitude of mind. A religious person could, therefore, have faith without belief. Doctrine, Macmurray argues, is rooted in the dualism of intellect and emotion and operates as a static method of ensuring unity, whereas rituals are more fluid and a more practical means for sustaining community (see 1961b, pp. 71-2).

**Personalism**

As we have seen then, Macmurray’s work is in continuity with the Scottish philosophical tradition in the sense that he retains deeply held democratic principles and a belief in the notion of virtuous citizens. In addition, he adapts the idealism of his predecessors to fit the changing social circumstances of a post-war generation, primarily by abandoning Hegel’s concept of Absolute Mind in favour of a ‘thick’ concept of the person, which is both
descriptive and evaluative, bound up with the notion of community. As Bevir and O’Brien note, something like Macmurray’s perception of community can be found in the contemporary works of communitarians, such as Walzer, Sandel, MacIntyre and Taylor, who agree that justice and the good are found in a shared life; that is, not by separating self and society, but by forming communities of friends (2003, pp. 322-4). However, Macmurray is not strictly a communitarian.

Macmurray’s description of community has much in common with an Aristotelian perception of friendship. Both Macmurray and Aristotle describe friendship as a relationship based on love that is essential to human flourishing (see Aristotle, 1934, 8.1.1 and 9.9.5-7). Aristotle distinguishes between different types of friendship, according to whether certain properties of a person are highly regarded or whether it is the person her/himself; this latter type, which Aristotle refers to as ‘perfect’ or ‘primary’ friendship (cf. Aristotle, 1934, 8.3.6 and Aristotle, 1952, 7.2.38), fits Macmurray’s description of friendship as grasping the intrinsic worth of a person.

Clearly then Macmurray is not a liberal individualist, yet he also guards against the communitarian emphasis on community over and above that of the individual. Macmurray critiques individualism and promotes community, but he does not tie individual rights and benefits to the exercising of obligations to the community. Not only were New Labour policies more communitarian than Macmurray in their emphasis on the individual’s duties, they were less socialist and they eroded Macmurray’s distinction between societies and communities (see McIntosh, 2007b). In fact, it seems that Macmurray’s account of the significance of human relationality and the emotions might have more in common with David Brooks’ 2011 book, The Social Animal, in which it is argued that contemporary brain science reveals social connections and emotional maturity to have a greater impact on human decision-making than rationality or IQ.
Macmurray is a religious socialist, with the qualification that his definition of ‘religion’ is broad. In fact, his criticisms of institutionalized Christianity, especially the concept of self-sacrifice have proved useful to feminist theology, and his concept of the person presents a philosophical underpinning for the notion of embodiment found in feminism (see McIntosh, 2007a). Consequently, while Macmurray’s concept of the person has much in common with thinkers outside the Scottish philosophical tradition, such as the relational theory of Levinas (see Wright et al., 1998) and the description of the I-Thou relation found in Buber’s work (see Buber, 1959); his very interest in the human person is rooted in the Scottish intellectual tradition. Indeed, as Beveridge and Turnbull state: ‘a strong case could be made that what is most representative of modern Scottish thought is a position which combines a critique of naturalism with the development of personalist ideas – a movement represented by, among others, Macmurray, MacQuarrie and R. D. Laing’ (1997, p. 120).

Conclusion

If Cowley is right when he suggests that: ‘Ignorance of the intellectual background from which he sprang has become a barrier to the reception of Macmurray’s thought’ (2004, p. 5), then Macmurray’s place in the Scottish philosophical tradition is of paramount importance. It is significant, then, that Macmurray was concerned to write his philosophy in a vernacular rather than a specialist language with the express purpose of reaching a broad audience, and that he held that the purpose of philosophy was to make sense of everyday struggles. In other words, Macmurray values philosophy as a subject in its own right and believes that it is of benefit to all people, not just those with a specialized education. Hence, in so far as Macmurray’s philosophy strives to explain the human condition and the means to live well, it is entirely consonant with the Scottish philosophy that preceded him. Similarly, Macmurray’s
understanding of the role of emotion has more in common with the Scottish philosophy he was taught at Glasgow than with the emphasis on rationalism found in high Cartesianism. Moreover, Macmurray’s naturalistic explanation of the existence, development and persistence of religion has much in common with the account given by Hume, who undoubtedly ranks as the most studied Scottish philosopher.

Nevertheless, it is also the case that Macmurray comes after and does not engage directly with the most famous tension in Scottish philosophy, namely the Enlightenment debate between Hume’s scepticism and Reid’s ‘School of Commonsense’, in which Reid maintains that the senses give us direct awareness of world against Hume’s insistence that we cannot trust the senses. However, it is the reaction against this debate that sees the rise of Scottish idealism, which, through Caird, promotes the educational role of moral philosophy that informs Macmurray’s ideas on the subject. It is apparent that Macmurray shares Caird’s view of the function of philosophy as producing virtuous citizens, and this view persists in the Scottish universities until the rise of logical positivism and the revival of Humean thought in the twentieth century. Consequently, in an effort to maintain the Scottish conception of humane philosophy, Macmurray attempts to hold out against linguist philosophy, opposing the appointment of A. J. Ayer at University College London. In this respect Macmurray could be seen as the last of a certain breed of Scottish philosopher; yet, the person-centred focus of his philosophy and the Scottish philosophers who came before him has been far-reaching. One of Macmurray’s better known phrases is this: ‘All meaningful knowledge is for the sake of action, and all meaningful action for the sake of friendship’ (1957, p. 15) and,

11 Macmurray suggested George Davie or D. D. Raphael for the post. Ayer was appointed in any case, but did not mention Macmurray in his augural lecture (see Costello, 2002, pp. 307-8).
according to Craig, the heterocentricity at the heart of this quotation ‘lies behind much of modern Scottish writing’ (1999, p. 114).

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*Other Relevant Works*


*Further Reading*

