A longitudinal analysis exploring economic and migratory predictors of race and religious hate crime in London.

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Abstract

Objective: This study aims to develop our understanding of the drivers of race and religious hate crime in Greater London and to ascertain whether the well-established ecological theories of hate crime derived and typically employed in the US are applicable in the UK, these being social disorganisation theory, defended neighbourhood theory and resource threat theories.

Method: This study employs panel regression and draws on longitudinal data provided by the Metropolitan Police Service to capture the number of recorded race and religious hate crimes at borough level over four time-points, between the years 2011 and 2017. Migration, economic, and demographic indicators form this study's independent variables and are drawn from a variety of government and municipality sources; the variables feature time-series data for each year of interest, at borough level.

Findings: Fixed-effects estimations reveal the prevalence of race and religious hate crime in London is likely to intensify in boroughs with greater household incomes, higher proportions of ethnic minorities in employment, and a larger population of foreign-born and non-White-British residents. Where family households receiving benefits constitutes a larger proportion at borough level, hate crimes against ethnic and religious minorities are less likely.

Discussion: There is little evidence to suggest that social disorganisation theory and defended neighbourhood theory form a comprehensive explanation to London's hate crime problem. We find stronger evidence to suggest resource threat theories provides a more robust explanation.

Conclusion: The perceived threat to economic resources posed by ethnic minorities and migrants provides the most robust explanation for London's hate crime.

Key words: Race; Religion; Hate Crime; Resource Threat; Defended Neighbourhood; Social Disorganisation; London

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Abbreviations

APS	Annual Population Survey
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BTP	British Transport Police
CSEW	Crime Survey for England and Wales
DfES	Department for Education and Skills
DWP	Department for Work and Pensions
EAL	English as an Additional Language
EDL	English Defence League
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GLA	Greater London Authority
GLS	Generalised Least Squares
HMICFRS	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services
JSA	Job Seekers Allowance
LAS	London Ambulance Service
MOPAC	Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime
MPS	Metropolitan Police Service
NOMIS	Official Labour Market Statistics
NPIA	National Policing Improvement Agency
NSIR	National Standard for Incident Recording
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares
ONS	Office for National Statistics
PAS	Public Attitude Survey
RRHC	Race and Religious Hate Crime
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States of America

Introduction

> "One afternoon last month I boarded a train in Liverpool en route to Newcastle. I was sitting in a pre-booked seat. Nearby a man was blaring out loud music. I asked if he could turn the volume down as it was giving me a migraine. The man responded with a torrent of racist abuse: "Do you have a British passport? Get back on the banana boat. Paki cunt! Fuck off!" He continued to racially abuse me throughout the journey, berating "strange people" who "come over here on banana boats". I was left feeling violated and emotionally distressed by my abuse. In my victim impact statement, I told of how I had experienced sleep disturbance, nightmares, flashbacks and panic attacks."
>
> Victim of Racial Hate Crime, cited in Sethi (2019)

Criminal acts motivated by prejudice and hostility are more likely to involve excessive brutality than general criminality and typically result in greater levels of depression, anxiety, anger, and symptoms of posttraumatic stress (Herek et al. 1997; Levin and McDevitt, 1993). However, the destructive consequences of hate crime go far beyond the harm caused to the individual victim through sending out a 'terroristic message' of hostility and intolerance to anyone who shares the victim's identity (Iganski, 2001). Such symbolic acts of hate crime can render a sense of fear and vulnerability within whole communities and in turn: (1) corrode social cohesion between communities; (2) reinforce barriers between vulnerable minority groups, thus causing segregation and isolation in the hope of self-protection; and (3) challenge fundamental and deep-rooted values of inclusion, equity, and justice (Perry, 2015).

Hate crime and its deleterious consequences however is regrettably becoming ever more prevalent for many individuals in the United Kingdom. This is no more so than in London

which persistently records the highest levels of race and religious hate crimes compared to any other police force in England and Wales. In order to control and ultimately suppress this social problem, a better understanding of the ecological drivers of hate crime must be sought. A growing body of research examining the links between hate crime and geographical characteristics began to make significant advancements in the United States during the early 1990s. However, it is only in recent years that similar developments have begun to emerge in the United Kingdom. The aim of this study is consequently to develop our existing knowledge encompassing the drivers of hate crime in the UK, namely London, and to ascertain whether the well-established ecological theories of hate crime derived and typically employed in the US are applicable in a UK context, these being social disorganisation theory, defended neighbourhood theory and resource threat theories.

US literature largely suggests racially aggravated crime is most prominent in predominantly White areas experiencing an in-migration of ethnic minorities (Grattet, 2009; Green et al. 1998; Lyons, 2007; Stacey et al. 2011). However, literature exploring hate crime and economic factors on the other hand is more inconclusive (Green et al. 1998; Jacobs and Wood, 1999; Lyons, 2007; Ryan and Leeson, 2011; Stacey et al. 2011). Green et al. (1998) and Stacey et al. (2011) for instance claim that there is little evidence to suggest a relationship between hate crime levels and the area's economic standing. Grattet (2009) however finds hate crimes are increasingly prevalent in economically affluent communities. While Gale et al. (2002) discovers greater disparities between Black and White incomes to be increasingly associated with higher rates of hate crime.

To identify the drivers of race and religious hate crime across Greater London this study employs ordinary least squares (OLS) and feasible generalised least squares (GLS). Longitudinal data provided by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) is used to capture the number of recorded race and religious hate crimes at borough level over a seven-year period,

between 2011 and 2017. The independent variables are drawn from a range of government and municipality sources and provide migration, economic, and demographic indicators for London's thirty-two local authorities; the variables feature time-series data for each year of interest. The Hausman test is applied and reveals fixed effects modelling is more likely to provide consistent results when exploring change over time as opposed to random effects modelling. However, a section of sensitivity checks is provided, highlighting the results generated from both random effects and between effects modelling in addition to the fixed effects results.

This study's findings reveal significant disparities between the various factors driving race and religious hate crimes in the United Kingdom compared to those found in the US. Changes in migration over time for instance consistently reveal to have a statistically insignificant influence on the prevalence of race and religious hate crime and provides the starkest contrast with findings emanating from the United States (Grattet, 2009; Green et al. 1998; Lyons, 2007; Stacey et al. 2011). Employment rates of ethnic minorities, the percentage of population identified as foreign-born and median household income on the other hand consistently display a statistically significant and positive effect on race and religious hate crime. The results also reveal the proportion of family households receiving benefits to have a significant yet negative association with London's hate crime levels. Suggesting boroughs with a larger proportion of family households receiving benefits to experience fewer hate crimes against ethnic and religious minorities.

Contrary to assertions posited by defended neighbourhood and social disorganisation theorists, this study's analysis finds little evidence to suggest that these two theoretical perspectives form a comprehensive explanation to Greater London's hate crime problem. However, we find somewhat stronger evidence that resource threat theory provides a more robust explanation. Through drawing on existing literature, we can draw provisional

interpretations to the reasons behind the findings in this study. This study underlines the importance of reducing the perceived threat held by the public, particularly during periods of economic instability and areas experiencing increased levels of ethnic minorities. In line with existing literature (Looney, 2017; Mahmud, 2021; Morrison, 2019; Tong and Zuo, 2019; Van Der Zwet et al. 2020), we suggest the 'othering' of migrants and ethnic minorities for the UK's economic ills, by a powerful section of Britain's media and political elite, is likely to have played an influential role in framing the public's negative and fearful perception of migrants and ethnic minorities, and in turn helped fuel the rise of hostility towards race and religious minorities.

Literature Review

The Development of Hate Crime

The term *hate crime* was first adopted in the United States during the 1970s following a period of civil rights and victims' rights movements (Iganski, 2010). During the same time, the United Kingdom witnessed a significant shift in government recognition towards criminal behaviour motivated by prejudice and hostility (Bowling, 2003; Gordon, 1993). Shortly after in the early 1980s, the Home Office conducted its first official study into the prevalence of racially motivated attacks and harassment, placing the issue on the political agenda for the first time (Home Office, 1989). However, it was the aftermath of the racist murder of Stephen Lawrence in the 1990s which recharged the political effort in the fight against racial hostility leading to the UK adopting the term hate crime and fundamentally introducing significant improvements in the provisions available to the police to combat such racist violence (Commission for Racial Equality, 2002; Iganski, 2010).

The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 enhanced existing provisions set out under the Public Order Act 1986 through creating a number of specific offences of racially aggravated crime and enhancing sentencing powers for racially and religiously aggravated offences (Commission for Racial Equality, 2002; Crown Prosecution Service, 2020). The Criminal Justice Act 2003 provided further provision to deal with racist violence and harassment through imposing a general duty on criminal courts to treat racially or religiously aggravated cases more seriously and furthermore issue increased sentences for more serious offences (Crown Prosecution Service, 2020). Still, it was not until 2007 that the Criminal Justice System of England and Wales agreed a common definition of racial and religious motivated hate crime (O'Neill, 2017). The most recent definition provided by the Crown Prosecution Service (2017, p. 1) states that a hate crime motivated by race or religion is an "incident/crime which is

perceived by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by hostility or prejudice based on a person's race or religion or perceived race or religion".

The Crown Prosecution Service (2016 and 2019) also highlights that hate crimes can take many forms and can include both violent and non-violent assaults, for instance, damage to property, harassment, theft, physical harm, and bullying (The Crown Prosecution Service, 2016; 2019). However, official figures show that offences against the person are more likely to be prevalent amongst racial and religious motivated hate crimes compared to other strands of hate crime such as those motivated by disability, sexual orientation, and transgender identity. In 2018/19, the Crown Prosecution Service (2019) reported that offences against the person accounted for more than eighty-nine per cent of all racial and religious hate crimes. By contrast disability, and homophobic and transphobic hate crimes where fifty-four per cent and sixty per cent respectively related to offences against the person (*ibid.*).

However, perpetrators may hold intersecting prejudices and victims may have more than one protected identity such as homosexuality and disability (Chakraborti and Garland, 2012; Walters et al. 2016). This can be problematic for the police and other criminal justice system services when establishing what type of hate crime the incident should be classified as (Walters et al. 2016); this consequently raises questions over the effectiveness of existing hate crime legislation. Chakraborti and colleagues (2014) compound such concerns, arguing that fifty per cent of hate crime victims are targeted because of more than one personal characteristic. A more recent study by McBride (2016) supports the findings of Chakraborti et al. (2014), claiming that hate crimes are frequently motivated on the grounds of several identity characteristics. McBride (2016) also emphasises how the complexity encompassing the interconnectivity of race and religion makes it increasingly difficult to establish which identity characteristic was targeted – the victim's race, religion, *or* both. According to the study, intersectionality is all the more problematic for ethnic minorities with a disability due to

additional barriers in reporting incidents of hate crime (*ibid.*). However, despite McBride's vital contributions misconceptions and confusion continue to remain surrounding the multiple and interconnected nature of hate crime victimisation (*ibid.*).

It was due to such concerns surrounding fairness, the effectiveness of current legislation, and the notion of intersectionality at play that the UK government instructed the Law Commission to carry out a comprehensive review on current hate crime legislation in 2018, firmly placing hate crime at the forefront of the political agenda once more (The Law Commission, 2018; 2020). In September 2020, the Law Commission published its consultation paper making a number of observations and proposals for reforming hate crime laws (The Law Commission, 2020). The report highlighted that intersectionality was particularly prevalent in hate crime attacks aimed towards Muslim women, lesbian and trans women and Muslims of a South Asian or Middle Eastern origin (*ibid.*). It emerged that victims of the four mentioned groups were dismayed by the failure of the law to recognise the full extent of their turmoil through focusing on simply one element of hostility (*ibid.*). In response, the Commission identified three key recommendations: (1) each protected characteristic (race, religion, sexual orientation, disability, and transgender identity) are protected equally; (2) the five protected characteristics are expanded to include sex or gender; and (3) the introduction of an alternative approach to prosecution so to allow for the recognition of hostility based on multiple protected characteristics (*ibid.*). However, before the Commission was able to publish its final report, the murder of Sarah Everard in March 2021 reignited long established calls for hate crime laws to incorporate hatred motivated by misogyny (Dathan, 2021). As a result, on March 17, 2021, the government bowed to pressure from campaigners and decided that misogyny should be treated as a hate crime by the police on a temporary basis until the Commission published its final report (Dathan, 2021; Whitehead, 2021). It is evident that hate crime laws in England and Wales have witnessed significant developments over the past three decades. However, it is

also soberingly clear that if further significant reforms are to come to fruition it is likely to only come about through many more lives being irreversibly damaged and an unceasing pressure on political leaders from campaigners and the general public.

The Impacts of Hate Crime

Whilst the loss of life is a real and alarming consequence of hate crime, criminal acts motivated by prejudice and hostility present further potential deleterious consequences for the victim, as victims of hate crimes are likely to experience more acute physical and psychological harm in comparison to non-hate motivated crimes (Herek et al. 1997; Home Office, 2020a; Iganski, 2001; Iganski and Lagou, 2015; Levin and McDevitt, 1993). Levin and McDevitt (1993) claim that hate crimes are more likely to involve excessive brutality than general criminality and therefore typically result in injury and hospitalisation. A study conducted by Herek and colleagues explored victimisation experiences and discovered that hate crime survivors displayed greater levels of "depression, anxiety, anger, and symptoms of posttraumatic stress" compared to non-hate crime victims (Herek et al. 1997, p. 195). The recent Hate Crime Statistical Bulletin for England and Wales supports such claim, arguing that victims of hate crimes were more likely to be "emotionally affected" by the event than victims of other forms of crime (Home Office, 2020a, p. 28). The report further highlighted that hate crime victims were more than twice as likely to experience a loss of confidence or feelings of vulnerability after the incident compared to those impacted by general criminality (Home Office, 2020a).

However, the destructive consequences of hate crime go far beyond the "damage to the individual victim" through sending out a "terroristic message" of hostility and intolerance to anyone who shares the victim's identity both in the local area and elsewhere (Iganski, 2001, p. 635). Such symbolic acts of hate crime render a sense of fear and vulnerability within whole communities and in turn: (1) corrodes social cohesion between communities; (2) reinforces

barriers between vulnerable minority groups, thus causing segregation and isolation in the hope of self-protection; and (3) challenges fundamental and deep-rooted values of inclusion, equity, and justice (Perry, 2015).

However, hate crime does not just include physical and symbolic acts of violence, but is highly interdependent with systematic violence and forms a further dimension of the harms presented by hate crime (Wigerfelt et al. 2013). As part of a qualitative study conducted in Sweden, Wigerfelt et al. (2013) interviewed a Black male who endured physical and demeaning treatment by the border police whilst crossing the Danish and Swedish border. The humiliating experience which included being wrongly accused of illicit drug use whilst driving and unlawful driving, pepper sprayed, forced to the ground, and been tested for HIV caused the victim to feel afraid and stressed whenever he later saw the police (*ibid.*). An explanation to why the victim was required to take a HIV test was never provided, however, the victim believed that the prejudice about Blacks and HIV was the underlying motive (*ibid.*). The study revealed that such violent and aggressive behaviour by the border police was not an isolated incident but regrettably formed more of a pattern (*ibid.*). Through adopting the definition of systematic racism provided by Macpherson's (1999) report on the police response to the murder of Stephen Lawrence, it is clear that such examples of organisational stereotypical assumptions which result in disadvantaging minority ethnic people form a clear example of systematic violence. According to the report, systematic racism reflects:

> "The collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people." Macpherson's (1999, p. 49)

However, Wigerfelt et al. (2013) go further than Macpherson's report and argue that such examples of systematic violence erode human dignity, defy human rights, and place a debilitating fear within victims which in turn limits their lives.

Police Recorded Data and Trigger Events

Despite the progress made since the death of Stephen Lawrence the risk of discrimination through prejudice and racist stereotyping are becoming ever more prominent in the UK and are increasingly prevalent in the lives of many individuals. This is no more so than in London which persistently records the highest rates of hate crime compared to any other police force in England and Wales. Since 2011, London has experienced a dramatic and sobering increase in recorded race and religious hate crime, rising from 8,590 cases in 2011/12 to more than double in 2019/20 with 19,639 cases (Flatley, 2020a; Home Office, 2012). However, this intensification is not unique to London. England and Wales overall have witnessed a significant year-on-year increase in recorded race and religious hate crimes, with 34,407 recorded cases in 2011/12 to almost 83,000 cases in 2019/20 (Flatley, 2020b).

Figure 1: The trend of race and religious hate crime in England and Wales and Greater London, 2011-2020



Author's graph based on data from the Home Office.

Annual statistical bulletins published by the Government claim that most of the increase since 2013 is a result of improvements in police recording and the improved willingness of victims to come forward but also due to recent publicised trigger events such as the murder of Lee Rigby in 2013, the EU Referendum in 2016 and the Manchester and London terror attacks in 2017 (Corcoran and Smith, 2016; Corcoran et al. 2015; Creese and Lader, 2014; Flatley, 2019; O'Neill 2017). More recently however, provisional figures released by the Metropolitan Police Service have led to parallels being identified between the substantial rise in racial hate crimes directed towards those of a Chinese or East Asian background and the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic (Allen et al. 2020). According to newly released data, hate crime victims self-identified as 'Chinese' experienced a three-fold increase of racial hostility between January to March 2020 compared to the same period the previous year (Metropolitan Police Service, 2020a). Whilst victims identified as 'Oriental' experienced a five-fold increase in racial hate crimes in the first three months of 2020 – rising from 20 recorded crimes in January

to 101 recorded crimes in the month of March (Metropolitan Police Service, 2020a). However, a report by the Home Office (2020b) observing provisional trends in racial and religious aggravated offences during Covid-19 restrictions suggests further spikes in hate crime during the summer of 2020 were likely to be connected to the Black Lives Matter protests and counter-protests instigated by far-right groups in England and Wales rather than the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic and increased hostility towards those identified as 'Chinese' or 'Oriental'. The report reveals that racial or religious aggravated offences recorded by the police increased by as a much as a third during the months of June and July, the same time as the Black Lives Matter demonstrations (Home Office, 2020b).

Similar reports have emerged from the United States (Centre for the Study of Hate and Extremism, 2021a and 2021b; Gover et al. 2020). For instance, the Centre for the Study of Hate and Extremism (2021a) at California State University revealed that police recorded anti-Asian hate crime rose 145 per cent across 16 of America's largest cities in 2020. According to the report, the first spike of anti-Asian hate crime occurred when the US began to experience a steep rise in Covid-19 cases during the months of March and April (*ibid.*). This upward trend in hate crime which has been described as 'historic' by the Centre for the Study of Hate and Extremism has continued into 2021, with the latest data showing a 164 per cent increase between the first quarter of 2021 compared to the first quarter in the previous year (Centre for the Study of Hate and Extremism, 2021b).

However, a growing body of research exploring the relationship between the prevalence of hate crime and the media's treatment of Muslim and migrant communities provides a further significant explanation (Frost, 2008; Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010; Hargreaves, 2016). For instance, the University of Exeter's European Muslim Research Centre interviewed former members of London's violent extremist nationalist milieu and discovered tangible relationships between Islamophobia within media discourse and anti-Muslim hate crimes (Githens-Mazer

and Lambert, 2010). More recently, Carr and colleagues (2020) have explored the impact of the Brexit referendum vote on hate crime and discovered suggestive evidence that the media performed a small but significant role in the increase in hate crime. The study found that a 1% increase in hate crime reporting correlated with a 0.04% increase in race and religious hate crime whilst a 1% increase in Brexit reporting correlated with a 0.02% increase in race and religious hate crime (*ibid.*).

These findings are complemented by studies conducted by Berry et al. (2015) and the Council of Europe (2016) which draw attention to the way migrants and Muslims are stereotyped as threats by Britain's right-wing media. These include, but are not limited to, being a strain to the welfare system, a source of criminality and a danger to national security. The national UK tabloid newspaper *The Sun,* for instance, published an article in 2015 titled, "1 in 5 Brit Muslims' sympathy for jihadis", and placed a picture of masked terrorists with a knife (The Sun, as cited in Council of Europe, 2016, p. 18). The Council of Europe refer to the use of such inflammatory and vilifying terminology as hate speech – and argue that the negative rhetoric all so common in some UK tabloid newspapers is particularly worrying because it is often the "first step in the process towards actual violence" (Council of Europe, 2016, p. 18). Studies in Germany and the United States have found similar correlations between the media's negative portrayal of Muslims and migrants and the prevalence of racial and religious motivated hate crime (Council on American-Islamic Relations, 2002; Esser and Brosius, 1996; Koopmans and Olzak, 2004).

The influence of politics and the rise of right-wing, anti-immigrant rhetoric has also witnessed recent significant developments (Carr et al. 2020; Edwards and Rushin, 2019; Jäckle and König, 2017; Müller and Schwarz, 2020; Romarri, 2020). For instance, a study conducted by Romarri (2020) employed data from Italy to explore the relationship between the election of far-right, anti-immigrant leaders and the increase in hate crimes. The study revealed that

the likelihood of hate crimes occurring was significantly higher in areas with an extreme-right mayor and was "particularly strong in the first years of their mandate" (Romarri, 2020, p. 23). Jäckle and König (2017) conducted a similar study in Germany and found that the strength of right-wing parties significantly raised the probability of attacks on refugees in that area. Hopkins (2010) employed panel data to explore the interactions between local and national conditions and discovered hostility towards migrants in the United States was most notable in areas witnessing a significant increase of in-migration at the same time when salient national rhetoric portrayed migrants as a threat.

Donald Trump's political rise in 2017 has also been found to be strongly correlated with the surge in reported hate crimes across the United States (Edwards and Rushin, 2019; Müller and Schwarz, 2020). Edwards and Rushin (2019) for instance discovered that the largest increases in reported hate crimes were committed in counties where Trump secured the largest voting margins. The authors suggest that the finding was ascribable to Donald Trump's election win which subsequently validated the offensive and provocative rhetoric typically employed during the political campaign which in turn fuelled the surge in hate crime (Edwards and Rushin, 2019). This discovery is complemented by a study conducted by Müller and Schwarz (2020) which explored the former President's use of Twitter and discovered that Mr Trump's anti-Muslim related tweets were strong predictors of the "increases in xenophobic tweets by his followers and hate crimes on the following days" (Müller and Schwarz, 2020, p. 1). Similar findings have emerged from the UK in relation to 2016 UK referendum on the membership of the European Union which suggests the decision to leave the EU led to a "re-evaluation of society's tolerance for racism" and decrease in the "expected social costs of committing a hate crime", which in turn led to a significant increase in race and religious hate crimes in the immediate aftermath of the referendum vote (Carr et al. 2020, p. 31).

Typical Demographics of the Perpetrator

Widespread research on hate crime offending in the United Kingdom has found perpetrators to be generally young White men (Chakraborti et al. 2014; Iganski and Smith, 2011; Williams and Tregidga, 2013). For example, a recent study conducted by The Leicester Hate Crime Project engaged with a wide range of communities to investigate victims' experiences of hate and prejudice (Chakraborti et al. 2014). Through face-to-face interviews the study revealed that seventy per cent of victims' most recent experience of hate crime "had been perpetrated by a male offender(s) and a similar proportion had been perpetrated by offender(s) aged 30 or under" (*ibid.*: p. 54). A further study conducted by the All Wales Hate Crime Project discovered similar findings with two thirds of victims stating that the perpetrator was aged thirty or under whilst less than a quarter was perpetrated by a female; with nine in ten reported as being White (Williams and Tregidga, 2013). Similar trends have emerged in other countries. A 2008 study from Sweden found that over forty per cent of suspected hate crime offenders were under the age of twenty (Brå, 2009). Whilst Canada reported that youngsters aged twelve to seventeen years were more likely to be accused of hate crime than any other age group (Dauvergne et al. 2008). However, recent research based on data from England and Wales reveal that hate crimes are committed by a wide range of ages with most perpetrators being between the ages of thirty and fifty whilst only three per cent of accused perpetrators are under the age of eighteen (Walters and Krasodomski-Jones, 2018). This challenges earlier assertions that hate crimes are predominantly perpetrated by young individuals. Nevertheless, the study reaffirmed the widespread understanding that most perpetrators are White men (*ibid.*).

Moreover, hate crime is traditionally regarded as a form of 'stranger danger' whereby the offender(s) and victim(s) are complete strangers to each other (Mason, 2005; Stanko, 2001). However, a detailed analysis conducted by Gail Mason (2005) challenges such notion.

Through exploring the relationship between victim and perpetrator in homophobic and racist attacks in Greater London, Mason (2005, p. 851) revealed that most victims (83 per cent) declared "they knew, or believed, the suspect to be a neighbour or someone who was local to his or her residential area". However, the definition of 'stranger' adopted within the study incorporated a broad meaning and therefore may have given a false impression. For instance, whilst some victims may have had a close social relationship with the perpetrator others may have merely believed the perpetrator lived in the local area. More recent data however provided by the Metropolitan Police Service and adopted by Walters and Krasodomski-Jones (2018) offers a more precise understanding of what is meant by the term 'stranger' and excludes the notion that a victim may know his or her perpetrator through simply believing them to be local. In contrast to Mason's (2005) study it emerged that only twenty-one per cent of victims actually knew their suspect; of which forty-three per cent knew each other as neighbours; thus, supporting the classic portrayal that hate crime is broadly a form of 'stranger danger' (Walters and Krasodomski-Jones, 2018). The study also drew attention to the disparities between the various strands of hate crime. For instance, forty-six per cent of disability hate crime victims stated they knew their offender, whilst only nineteen per cent of race hate crime victims and fourteen per cent of religious hate crime victims declared they knew their offender (*ibid.*).

Geographical Characteristics of Hate Crime Incidents

Beyond the general demographic profiles of hate crime perpetrators, a growing body of research examining the links between hate crime and geographical characteristics is beginning to emerge, particularly in the United States. However, as we soon come to realise during this discussion the space in which hate crimes typically occur has received significantly less attention within the UK. The next section of this discussion is therefore going to explore the current literature encompassing this topic with a particular focus on race and religious hate crime, through firstly studying the concept of territory, a key idea developed by Levin and

McDevitt in the early 1990s, before progressing onto economy and migration, each of which have seen significant developments in the US.

Between 1991 and 1992, Jack Levin and Jack McDevitt analysed the case files of the Boston police department with the aim to articulate a typology of hate crime perpetrators. The study discovered that twenty-five per cent of the cases were described as motivated by the perceived threat to territory or 'turf' by an outside group; ethnic minorities being the main category (Levin and McDevitt, 1993; McDevitt et al. 2000). This perceived threat propels the perpetrator to take up their professed 'obligation' and 'defend' their neighbourhood from the intruder (Levin and McDevitt, 1993, p. 76). Levin and McDevitt (1993) claim that the perceived threat may have economic roots whereby the perpetrator fears losing the opportunity of promotion due to increased competition or that the value of their property may diminish due to the outsider taking up residency. However, Levin and McDevitt (1993) go further to suggest that the threat may be more symbolic whereby the perpetrator fears being 'taken over' or more primitively the loss of 'their' women (*ibid.*: p. 77). Such defensive attacks are intended to communicate a message of 'fear and horror' so to bring about a retreat on the part of the victim (*ibid.*: p. 77). However, if the victim fails to retreat, the perpetrator will release a series of escalated attacks, for example, an instance of graffiti may lead to a broken window which may soon lead to arson. Whilst some critiques draw attention to the age of the data and the limitations of focusing on one single city, the study remains to be influential and highly considered within the enhancement of law enforcement (Hambly et al. 2018; Hamad, 2017; Walters et al. 2016).

The essence of what Levin and McDevitt begin to convey in the early 1990s resonates with a series of studies conducted by Garland and Treadwell (2010; 2011; 2012) two decades later in the UK. The two colleagues conducted a covert ethnography to gain access to the English Defence League (EDL) between 2009 and 2012, a time when the EDL witnessed a

significant rise in support. The study used observation and informal interviews to study three young, White men who regularly used racially and religiously motivated violence. It was apparent that much of the hostility, resentment, and fury within the EDL was predominantly directed at the 'Islamic other' where there was a feeling that Muslim Pakistani immigrants were 'taking over' their territory (Garland and Treadwell, 2010; 2012). Local competition between ethnic groups was also a recurring concern, with the argument that minority ethnic residents, migrants and asylum seekers had been unfairly prioritised in the distribution of limited local resources, such as, benefits and social housing (Garland and Treadwell, 2010; 2012). Garland and Treadwell (2010; 2011; 2012) additionally noted that the threat to 'English, Christian culture' through the perceived absence of spoken English and the alleged resistance of women's and gay rights amongst Muslim and migrant communities was central to their ill-motives. The study furthermore emphasized that much of the support emanated from disadvantaged White working class individuals and was suggested to be a result of the proximity between the two groups at the "bottom of the social ladder" (Garland and Treadwell, 2012, p. 15). Equivalent findings have been identified in further qualitative research by Ray et al. (2003 and 2004) in Greater Manchester.

Drawing on the notion that racially aggravated hate crimes are motivated by the perceived threat of intruders moving into homogenous neighbourhoods as outlined by Levin and McDevitt (1993), Green and colleagues (1998) employed data from the New York Police Department to explore the relationship between racially motivated hate crime and demographic change between 1987 and 1995; a time when New York witnessed a significant rise in multi-ethnic neighbourhoods. The longitudinal study revealed that racially aggravated crime was most prominent in predominantly White neighbourhoods, particularly those that had experienced an in-migration of ethnic minorities (Green et al. 1998). In contrast however where non-Whites had long resided in large numbers it emerged race hate crimes were on the

decline (*ibid.*). The study also revealed no relationship between racially motivated hate crime and macroeconomic factors such as unemployment rates (i*bid.*).

Similar findings have continued to emerge from the US (Grattet, 2009; Lyons, 2007 and 2008; Stacey et al. 2011). For instance, Grattet (2009) examined the neighbourhood characteristics of Sacramento in the 1990s and discovered that hate crime was increasingly prevalent in neighbourhoods with a high percentage of White residents experiencing non-White in-migration. However, in contrast to Green et al. (1998), the study revealed that concentrated economic disadvantage proved to be a key predictor of hate crime. Lyons (2007 and 2008) conducted a similar study in Chicago between 1997 and 2002 and discovered anti-Black hate crimes were similarly more prevalent in homogenous White neighbourhoods undergoing high levels of Black in-migration. However, in contrast to Grattet (2009) it also emerged that anti-Black hate crimes were increasingly predominant in economically affluent communities (Lyons, 2007). Stacey et al. (2011) adopted a slightly different yet effective approach drawing on data from each US State. The study explored Hispanic in-migration and levels of hate crime targeting Hispanics between 2000 and 2004, and the researchers discovered a positive relationship between state-level anti-Hispanic hate crime and recent Hispanic in-migration (*ibid.*). However, there was little evidence to suggest a relationship between anti-Hispanic hate crime and the size of the Hispanic population or economic position (*ibid.*).

The growing body of research specifically supporting the causal relationship between hate crime and economic factors is becoming more established in the United States. Jacobs and Wood (1999) employed city-level data on interracial killings across 165 US cities to determine whether political and economic rivalries explain interracial conflict and homicides. Through analysing the data over a seven-year period the study revealed that cities with a Black mayor and greater economic competition between the different races experienced more White killings of Blacks. Gale et al. (2002) used state-level data between 1992 and 1995 and

discovered that higher rates of hate crime were typically located in areas with greater disparities between Black and White incomes. Similarly, Ryan and Leeson (2011) employed panel data from each US State between 2002 and 2008 and discovered economic hardship to be related to hate crime; however, this finding was solely based on the significant positive relationship between unemployment and hate crime rates.

After an upsurge in racial attacks in the early 1990s, Germany also witnessed a series of studies exploring the link between migration and economy with the prevalence of right-wing violence (Braun and Koopmans, 2010; Brosius and Eps, 1995; Esser and Brosius, 1996; Koopmans, 1996; Krueger and Pischke, 1997; Ohlemacher, 1994; Willems, 1995). However, two recent studies conducted by Entorf and Lange (2019) and Piatkowska et al. (2019) examine anti-foreigner hate crime at county and regional level in the aftermath of the recent 'refugee crisis' in Europe. Whilst Piatkowska and colleagues (2019) chose to employ a larger timescale, both studies discovered that economically deprived regions (i.e. high unemployment) experiencing a sudden inflow of migrants caused by a signal event such as the 'refugee crisis' had a significant impact on anti-foreigner hate crime. However, Entorf and Lange (2019) also discovered that counties with a rapid compositional change of the residential population witnessed the strongest upsurge in hate crime, e.g. areas with previously low shares of foreign-born inhabitants facing large-scale immigration of asylum seekers. Moreover, as Entorf and Lange (2019) analysed the differences between East and West Germany it emerged that the predominance of native-born residents at the local level was the single most important element explaining the sudden upsurge in hate crime. Falk and colleagues (2009) also found a significant relationship between high regional unemployment and right-wing extremist violence in Germany. The evidence suggests that the fear of losing a job, rather than actually being unemployed, increases the prevalence of race hate crime (*ibid.*).

However, a recent study conducted in Australia by Benier et al. (2016) is a reminder that the influence of economic well-being and migration on the prevalence of race hate crime is complex and can differ between countries. In the study, Benier and colleagues (2016) use census and survey data to explore neighbourhood characteristics and the prevalence of self-reported hate crime in Brisbane, a city also currently experiencing a significant change in ethnic diversity. Whilst it emerged that the proportion of people speaking a language other than English proved to be a powerful predictor of incidents, residential mobility and increases of in-migration were not found to be associated with hate victimization (*ibid.*). The study also highlights the limited use of household economic predictors employed in earlier ecological studies of hate crime and subsequently employed additional variables such as housing tenure and household median income so to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the regional economic characteristics of areas predominately affected by racially aggravated crime (*ibid.*). Through broadening their pool of data, the study revealed that living in an area with higher levels of renting and low-income increased the probability of suffering racial hate crime (*ibid.*).

It is only recently that similar studies have begun to emerge from the United Kingdom. A study by Lymperopoulou (2019) for instance, examined attitudes to immigration and perceptions of cohesion to determine the social consequences of immigration in local authorities in England and Wales. The study discovered that less ethnically diverse and economically disadvantaged boroughs with a dominant migrant group were at most risk of experiencing higher pressures on social cohesion (*ibid.*). This finding indicates that in-migration and economic deprivation may have a detrimental impact on the prevalence of racial and religious aggravated hate crimes in the UK. Lymperopoulou (2019) draws attention to the way in which studies emanating from the US place more emphasis on the negative effects of racial diversity on social cohesion compared to studies in Europe, Australia, Canada, and New

Zealand. Studies exploring social cohesion in the UK for instance generally place more emphasis on area deprivation rather than ethnic diversity (*ibid.*). Brimicombe et al. (2001) analysed total racially motivated hate crime over a twelve-month period (1996-97) in the London borough of Newham. The findings revealed no relationship between deprivation (i.e. unemployment, overcrowding and child poverty) and hate crime rates for Newham's twenty-four wards. Nevertheless, Brimicombe et al. (2001) acknowledged that the 1998 Index of Local Deprivation adopted in the study appeared to be insufficiently sensitive at ward level and would be more suitable when exploring national and regional levels, thus regrettably limiting the validity of its findings.

Schilter (2020) provides the most substantial contribution to date through employing machine learning techniques to analyse the relationship between the UK referendum on EU membership in 2016 and the rise of hate crimes in Manchester and London. Whilst the study revealed a 'substantial and transitory' rise in race related hate crimes following the vote, it also revealed that areas witnessing greater increases of hate crime were typified by a larger migrant share and income proxy i.e. share of population with formal qualifications (*ibid.*). However, as has been emphasised by Clifton-Sprigg and Carr (2021) the study neglected the opportunity to focus on the underlying mechanisms at play, for instance, (social) media coverage and voting breakdown. Moreover, through employing cross-sectional data drawn from the 2011 Census to gauge economic and migration trends alongside police continuous data showing hate crime patterns at monthly intervals, the opportunity to study the developmental aspect of the relationship between hate crime rates with that of economic and migratory factors was unfortunately unexploited.

At the same time, a study conducted by Walters and Krasodomski-Jones (2018) analysed data collected from the Metropolitan Police Service to formulate patterns of hate crime. The study drew attention to the variations of hate crime cases between London's

boroughs and claimed such diverging numbers to be possibly linked to the "different demographic makeup of boroughs and other criminogenic factors such as levels of unemployment and poverty" (Walters and Krasodomski-Jones, 2018, p. 36). This claim was owed to data provided by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) which highlighted how neighbouring boroughs of Lambeth and Merton had similar demographics in terms of ethnic groups, yet Lambeth recorded almost four times as many accused perpetrators of hate crime (Walters and Krasodomski-Jones, 2018). The variation was suggested to be due to Lambeth's slightly higher poverty level (*ibid.*). However, the report failed to further explore or provide extensive evidence to support the claim.

Theory and Hypotheses

Main Research Question

A significant proportion of research discussed above, particularly that which emanates from the US, adopts three prominent and recurring ecological theories to explain the prevalence of hate crime: social disorganisation theory; defended neighbourhood theory; and resource threat theories (Entorf and Lange, 2019; Grattet, 2009; Green et al. 1998; Jacobs and Wood, 1999; Lyons, 2007 and 2008; Piatkowska et al. 2019). However, whilst these theoretical perspectives have been rigorously tested within a US context (Grattet, 2009; Green et al. 1998; Jacobs and Wood, 1999; Lyons, 2007 and 2008; Stacey et al. 2011; Van Dyke and Tester, 2014), the same cannot be said for the United Kingdom and would simply be erroneous to suggest that the findings drawn from the US could be simply applied to a UK context. The US has a unique racial history and suffers prominent racial segregation compared to other western societies (Benier et al. 2016; Sydes et al. 2014). The segregation levels of ethnic minority groups in the US, for instance, are considerably higher compared to Great Britain (Iceland and Mateos, 2011). This research project is therefore going to employ and test whether the ecological theories of hate crime derived and typically employed in the United States will find support in a more diverse and ethnically integrated context found in the UK. Moreover, whilst the UK has seen recent progress in research exploring the relationship between hate crime and geographical characteristics, the UK's pool of literature remains negligible and would benefit from generating a more comprehensive and robust examination of the myriad of factors impacting the prevalence of race and religious hate crime. This has clearly been achieved both in the US and Germany through employing a larger range of economic and migratory indictors across a longer time period. It is with this understanding that this research project aims to determine what factors influence the levels of racial and religious motivated hate crime in Greater London.

Social Disorganisation Theory – H1

The notion of *social disorganisation* first emerged from a study conducted by Thomas and Znaniecki (1920) when exploring how immigration formed disorganisation amongst Polish migrant communities in America. However, the concept was brought to the forefront of criminology by Shaw and McKay (1942), who were heavily influenced by the social ecological model developed by Park and Burgess (1924) at the Chicago School of Sociology. Whilst the concept certainly displays elements of ethnocentrism, it forms a prominent ecological theory within criminology. Traditionally, the theory was widely employed to explain general criminality, however it has more recently been adopted to explain the causation of hate crime, as was highlighted earlier (Grattet, 2009; Lyons, 2007; Piatkowska et al. 2019). The theory sets out to explain the variations of general crime between urban communities, through claiming that ecological conditions such as economic deprivation, residential mobility and racial heterogeneity contribute to greater levels of social deviance and criminality (Shaw and McKay, 1942). The premise of Shaw and McKay's argument arises from the notion that neighbourhoods experiencing such ecological features discourage social relationships and in turn prevents the formation of informal social controls and so are unable to regulate unfavourable behaviours such as high levels of crime (Shaw and McKay, 1969).

Shaw and McKay (1942) discovered that social disorganisation was most at play in the innermost zone of the city and declined towards the peripheral areas (Shaw and McKay, 1942). However, through exploring merely urban neighbourhoods, Shaw and McKay's (1942) concept was exposed to concerns over its generalisability; this has recently led scholars to explore whether the concept can explain variations in rural crime rates (Kaylen and Pridemore, 2012; Rogers and Pridemore, 2016). Whilst evidence emerging from this development suggests the theory is generalisable to rural communities (Arthur, 1991; Bouffard and Muftić,

2006; Jobes et al. 2004; Osgood and Chambers, 2000), a comprehensive review conducted by Kaylen and Pridemore (2012) argues the most consistent finding suggests otherwise.

In keeping with the arguments set out in social disorganisation theory, this project hypothesises that hate crime will be increasingly present in boroughs where each of the following key characteristics are detected:

H1a) high residential turnover

H1b) high ethnic diversity

H1c) high economic disadvantage

Defended Neighbourhood Theory – H2

Suttles (1972) provides the most notable contribution to *defended neighbourhood* theory and its advancement, and forms the second element to this study's theoretical framework. Whilst the origins of the concept were once more first expressed by Park and colleagues (1967) at the Chicago School of sociology, Suttles articulates the very components of defended neighbourhood theory. Adapting Suttles's (1972) arguments to the case of hate crime we can assume that hate crimes are more likely to transpire in homogenous communities with greater economic stability, experiencing an in-flow of migrant racial outsiders. A further central component of defended neighbourhood theory is the perceived threat to traditions, informal relations and distinct, cultural identity or values, such as unfamiliar religious practices or spoken language (*ibid.*). Suttles (1972) identifies strictly controlled spaces, acts of vigilantism and militant conservation groups as obvious indications of defended neighbourhood. However, acts of defended neighbourhood can differ depending on the available financial resources (*ibid.*). In contrast to social disorganisation theory, defended neighbourhood theory relies upon a cohesive action and is therefore likely that communities experiencing higher levels of hate crime possess stronger social cohesion and an established

set of informal social controls (Lyons, 2007; Suttles 1972). The stipulation of economic capital is a further key contrast to social disorganisation theory. According to Lyons (2007) a community boasting strong economic capital generates a general understanding amongst the community of self-worth and the rationale for self-protection. Suttles (1972, p. 39) on the other hand argues that such "resistance to residential desegregation grows directly from the fears which surround childhood contacts" and the assumptions that children as a result will have "safe associates". However, consistent with social disorganisation theory, Suttles (1972) claims that defended neighbourhood is very much an urban product limited to inner cities.

In keeping with the arguments set out in defended neighbourhood theory, this project also hypothesises that hate crime will be increasingly present in boroughs where each of the following key characteristics are detected:

H2a) higher level of homogeneity (White-British)

H2b) an increase of migrant ethnic minority group members

H2c) a cultural threat

H2d) a strong economic capital

Resource Threat Theories – H3

Resource threat theories form the third element to this study's theoretical framework and in contrast to the first two concepts focuses on the perceived competition over limited economic resources (Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Jackson, 1993; Quillian, 1995). According to Bobo (1988) scarce economic resources may be tangible, for instance, salary or job availability, or may involve issues of power, for instance political power. Blalock's (1967) racial threat hypothesis which largely corresponds with realistic group conflict theory (Levine and Campbell, 1972, as cited in Lyons, 2008) claims hate crimes will be more prevalent in homogenous neighbourhoods with scarce resources experiencing a large inflow of minority groups members. According to Blalock's (1967) thesis, as the inflow of minority groups

increases and the contact between the majority and minority groups becomes more frequent, the perceived threat to economic well-being intensifies which in turn provides the majority group members with the justification to discriminate against the minority group. The overall aim of such hateful tactics is to maintain their group's privileged status (Van Dyke and Tester, 2014). Sherif and Sherif (1969) provides a further dimension to resource threat theories through exploring the issue of intergroup goals, a relatable yet independent feature to competition of resources. According to their analysis, intergroup relationships are notably positive when goals between groups are complimentary, however when conflicting goals exist relationships are increasingly fractured (*ibid.*).

In keeping with the arguments set out in resource threat theories, this project also hypothesises hate crime will be increasingly present in boroughs where the following key characteristics dominate the local area. It is important to highlight that H2a and H2b are equivalent to H3a and H3b.

H3a) higher level of homogeneity (White-British)

H3b) an increase of ethnic minority group members

H3c) competition of scarce resources

Method and Data

Introduction

This study seeks to identify the drivers of race and religious hate crime (RRHC) in Greater London by drawing on a range of data sources on migration and the economy for London's thirty-two local authorities. Longitudinal data provided by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) was used to capture the number of recorded race and religious hate crimes across four time periods between January 2011 and December 2017 (2011; 2013; 2015; 2017). Further longitudinal data published by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), Office for National Statistics (ONS), Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC), Greater London Authority (GLA), Department for Education and Skills (DfES) and Official Labour Market Statistics (NOMIS) were then used to capture international and domestic migration flows and the economic characteristics of each London borough. Table 1 (appendix 1) provides a breakdown for each variable and its source.

Location of Study: London

London is the fourth largest urban agglomerations in Europe, with an estimated 9.3 million people (Statista, 2020a). This equates to roughly fourteen per cent of the UK's total population (Statista, 2020a and 2020b). According to the 2011 Census, London is the most ethnically diverse region in England and Wales, with roughly forty per cent of its residents identifying as either Asian, Black, Mixed or Other ethnic group (UK Government, 2020). Individuals from the Black (58.4%), Asian (35.9%), Mixed (33.1%) and Other (49.9%) ethnic groups are increasingly likely to reside in Greater London compared to any other region in the UK (*ibid.*). In 2018, thirty-six per cent (3.2 million) of London's population was born overseas with the most frequently recorded countries being India, Bangladesh, Poland, Romania and Italy (Office for National Statistics, 2019d). In addition, twenty-two per cent of London's

population identify a language other than English as their main language (Office for National Statistics, 2013a). The most frequently recorded main languages other than English are Polish, Bengali, Gujarati, French and Urdu (*ibid.*). London also has the largest religious population compared to any other region in the UK, with roughly two thirds identifying as religious compared to fifty-three per cent in the rest of the United Kingdom (Theos, 2020). The most up-to-date official estimates from the Annual Population Survey (APS) reveal the highest proportion of religious minorities reside in London with over fourteen per cent of Muslims, five per cent of Hindus, two per cent of Jews and one per cent of Buddhists and Sikhs living in London (Greater London Authority, 2019). The lowest proportion of people with no religion is also located in London with twenty-nine per cent of residents identifying as having no religion (*ibid.*).

London has a strong economy and labour market, generating twenty-three per cent of the UK's GDP and employing twenty per cent of England's workforce (Christie and Douglass, 2017; Trust for London, 2020). Since 2009, Greater London has seen an eight-percentage point rise in employment, rising from 67.5% in 2009 to 75.6% in 2019 (*ibid.*). Unemployment similarly has seen a significant change, decreasing from its peak in 2009 at 9.6% to 4.3% ten years later (*ibid.*). However, increased access to employment has not resulted in a reduction in poverty levels in the capital. Improved employment rates in London have conversely been linked to a corresponding rise in in-work poverty (*ibid.*). Seventy-six per cent of children in poverty across London (550,000) are in working families, up twenty-four per cent compared to a decade ago (*ibid.*). Similarly, seventy-four per cent of adults in poverty across London (1,050,000) are in working families, up twelve per cent compared to a decade ago (*ibid.*). London has the highest proportion of children living in poverty compared to any other English region and is home to more poor children than Scotland and Wales combined (Child Poverty Action Group, 2021). It is suggested that the capital's "high housing costs, lack of affordable

childcare, low pay and a lack of flexible, part-time jobs" are the main drivers behind such high levels of child poverty (*ibid.*). Poverty and wealth are not spread equally across London's population. For instance, the poverty rate amongst Black and Minority Ethnic groups (38%) in London is nearly double that of their White counterparts at 21% (Trust for London, 2020). Additionally, the inequality of income is far greater than any other region in England (*ibid.*). The poorest ten per cent of Londoners earn roughly two per cent of London's total net income whilst the richest ten per cent of Londoners earn over thirty per cent of London's total net income (*ibid.*). The lack of affordable and adequate housing is a major challenge for many people in London. Fifty-six thousand households for instance are in temporary accommodation, a thirty per cent rise compared to five years ago (*ibid.*). Homelessness is also a major social issue. The latest figures by the UK Government (2021) reveal twenty-seven per cent of all people sleeping rough in England are located in the capital. Outreach workers have recently identified a 165% increase in the number people seen sleeping rough in London during 2018/19 compared to ten years ago (Trust for London, 2020).

Studying one jurisdiction or local law enforcement agency such as London and the Metropolitan Police Service offers a number of advantages. For instance, disparities in police recording are widely recognised between different local law enforcement agencies, subsequently rendering cross-jurisdictional comparisons increasingly difficult (Grattet, 2009). The inconsistencies of crime recording between police forces in England and Wales were made abundantly clear in an inspection conducted by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) in 2013 and 2014 which examined and assessed the integrity of crime data in each police force (HMICFRS, 2014). The inspection was regarded as the most extensive of its kind and revealed that only a few police forces showed 'very good' crime-recording practises whilst other forces were deemed 'unacceptably bad' (HMICFRS, 2014). As of October 2019, thirty-nine of the forty-three police forces in England and Wales

had been inspected or reinspected, twenty of which remained to be rated as either 'inadequate' or 'requires improvement', whilst only nineteen police forces were rated 'good' or 'outstanding' (BBC News, 2019). The most recent Crime Data Integrity inspection for the Metropolitan Police Service revealed overall crime-recording as 'good' (HMICFRS, 2018).

In the US, it has been revealed that some law enforcement agencies demonstrate more awareness and diligence towards hate crime compared to other agencies (Jenness and Grattet, 2001). Studying one jurisdiction has therefore been a method chosen by several hate crime studies in the US simply due to the restrictions posed by large geographical analysis (Grattet, 2009; Green et al. 1998; Lyons, 2008). Lyons (2008, p. 364) for instance suggests "examining communities within one jurisdiction likely provides the most reliable insight into hate crime". However, localised analysis has its own limitations. Iganski (2008) for instance highlights that a localised analysis based on one city can often draw criticism due to its lack of generalisability. Despite this limitation however, focusing on one law enforcement agency such as the Metropolitan Police Service "holds constant a portion of the variation in police handling of bias crime incidents" and is therefore likely to improve the reliability of this study's findings (Grattet, 2009, p. 138). Greater London and its boroughs (excluding the City of London) also boast an extensive pool of readily available panel data on migration flows, economic trends and hate crime figures compared to other municipalities in England and Wales. For instance, the MPS recently publicly released monthly racial and religious hate crime figures for each London borough from 2010 to the present day. This data provides a unique opportunity to explore hate crime trends at borough level.

Dependent Variable: Race and Religious Hate Crime

This study's dependent variable is the total number of recorded race and religious hate crimes at borough level documented by the Metropolitan Police Service over a seven-year period, starting in 2011 and ending in 2017. The MPS apply race and religious hate crime as

the overarching category that totals race hate crime, antisemitic hate crime, Islamophobic hate crime and faith hate crime (Metropolitan Police Service, 2020b) (see Table 2).

Table 2: Definitions of each sub-category of race and religious hate crime
Source: Metropolitan Police Service (2020c)

Category	Definition
Racially targeted Hate Crime	"Any incident that is perceived to be racist by the victim or any other person."
Religiously targeted (Faith) Hate Crime	"Any incident which is perceived to be motivated because of a person's religion or perceived religion or belief."
Antisemitic Hate Crime	"Any incident that is perceived by the victim or any other person to be motivated or aggravated by fear and / or hatred of Jewish people as a religious, racial or ethnic group."
Islamophobic Hate Crime	"Any that is perceived by the victim or any other person to be motivated or aggravated by fear and / or hatred of Islam, Muslim people or Islamic culture."

The pooled data consist of four equally distributed calendar year aggregates (2011; 2013; 2015; 2017) for each of London's thirty-two boroughs.

Jacobs and Wood (1999) and Ryan and Leeson (2011) employed an identical time frame when exploring the drivers of hate crime in the US. Official police statistics collated at national level, by the Home Office for instance, is argued to form the best source of information when examining hate crime trends (McDevitt et al. 2000). However, to suggest that hate crime reporting provides a complete account of hate crime and its prevalence would be inaccurate. As with all police recorded data, the accuracy relies upon the victim or witnesses coming forward and reporting the incident – and furthermore that the law enforcement agency recognises the element of hate crime and documents the incident appropriately (*ibid.*). McDevitt and colleagues (2000) highlight that hate crime victims are often reluctant to report hate crimes to the police due to the fear of retaliatory attacks and/or because they are afraid that the police would fail to take the report seriously. The level of police presence across localities has also been revealed to influence the willingness of victims when reporting crimes

(Schnebly, 2008). Buil-Gil et al. (2021) recently analysed the accuracy of police recorded statistics and found that law enforcement data aggregated at small spatial scales such as at ward level or smaller are increasingly affected by underreporting compared to crime statistics aggregated at larger scales. This subsequently can lead to "underestimating crime in certain places while overestimating it in others" (*ibid.*: p. 1). Brimicombe and colleagues (2001) similarly revealed that poverty indicators aggregated at ward level were insufficiently sensitive when analysing racially motivated hate crimes in the London borough of Newham. It is with this understanding that this study chose to analyse data at borough level.

Until the onset of Covid-19 the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) used face-to-face victimisation surveys to provide a further measure of determining the level of crime experienced by the general population. However, the survey imparts significant limitations: non-resident populations, for example short-term visitors, and those living in group residences, for example student halls of residence, are not included in the survey; the sample size is relatively small which subsequently makes it difficult to detect short term trends; and victim accounts of past events are vulnerable to distortion (Elkin, 2021; Stripe, 2021). Moreover, the Crime Survey is designed to provide accurate estimates of crime primarily at the national level for England and Wales and therefore any analysis at borough level would be of very limited quality (Office for National Statistics, 2019e). This study therefore chose to avert the use of the CSEW and instead employ police recorded crime statistics.

What Constitutes a Hate Crime?

Recent guidelines published by the College of Policing (2021a) stipulate that hate crimes should be treated as priority incidents; in the case where this is not possible then a clear plan of how and when the incident will be responded should be determined and communicated to the victim. The police should then conduct preliminary investigations to formulate an accurate record of the victim's account and emotional response and begin to collect evidence

of hostility, such as the exact words or phrases reported by the victim, recordings of any 999 conversation and/or any substantiative evidence e.g. social media posts (*ibid.*). For hostility to be present the suspect must either have been "motivated, wholly or partially, by hostility" or have "demonstrated such hostility immediately before, during or after the crime was committed" (*ibid.*). Where hostility cannot be evidenced, the incident is not charged or prosecuted as a hate crime and is instead recorded as a non-crime hate incident (College of Policing, 2021b). These incidents are excluded from the police recorded hate crime statistics used in this study's analysis. Police forces should not however dismiss non-crime hate incidents as unimportant as they could "form part of a series of incidents that, together, may constitute a crime, such as harassment" (College of Policing, 2021c). It is then the responsibility of the supervisors and managers to proactively check that reports of hate crime and non-crime hate incidents have been investigated appropriately and in accordance with police guidelines (College of Policing, 2021b).

Improvements in Police Recording

The announcement of the common definition of hate crime by the Criminal Justice System of England and Wales in 2007 enabled the police to provide data on race and religious hate crime for the very first time (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2018). However, despite this significant development, official statistics on hate crime only became regularly available by the Home Office after 2010. Since then, the police have made considerable efforts on improving the accuracy of recording hate crimes (Home Office, 2020a). For instance, the National Standard for Incident Recording (NSIR), issued by the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) in 2011 aimed to ensure that the police record all hate crimes and hate incidents (non-criminal) in a consistent and accurate manner. Furthermore, in 2014, the College of Policing released the Hate Crime Operational Guidance with the aim to provide further guidance on the minimum standards for response of hate crimes including the

reporting and recording of hate crime offences (College of Policing, 2014). The Home Office (2021) also regularly updates the Counting Rules for Recorded Crime to ensure that crimes, including hate crimes, are recorded consistently and accurately. The document provides officers with guidance on the flagging process of hate crime and additional specific instructions for officers handling hate crimes motivated by religion.

Independent Variables

Independent variables were drawn from a range of government and municipality sources which feature time-series data for each year of interest. Whilst data provided by the UK Census forms an essential role in generating some of the data used, for instance, the proportion of White-British population, this study avoids the exclusive use of census data. This is due to two reasons: the UK Census is conducted every ten years and therefore fails to provide year-on-year time-series data and furthermore the data quickly becomes outdated.

Economic

This study's economic variables derive from previous studies exploring the drivers of hate crime (Benier et al. 2016; Brimicombe et al. 2001; Jacobs and Wood, 1999; Piatkowska et al. 2019; Ryan and Leeson, 2011; Schilter, 2018; Stacey et al. 2011). These include social renting, homeownership, GDP per capita, median household income, total employment, employment by ethnicity, all out-of-work benefit claimant households with children and job seekers allowance (JSA) claimants. To this study's knowledge there have been no previous studies that have considered the latter two variables. However, based on reports exploring the increased stigma of welfare claimants and its often prejudicial association with ethnic minorities it is reasonable to consider that the proportion of JSA claimants and all out-of-work benefit claimant households with children might be important predictors of hate crime (Baumberg et al. 2012; Hoggett et al. 2013; Webster, 2019).

Previous studies exploring the relationship between employment by ethnicity and hate crime have typically adopted unemployment rates (Jacobs and Wood 1999; Lyons 2007; Stacey et al. 2011). However, rates of unemployment for ethnic minorities at borough level proved incomplete with numerous estimates highlighted as not available due to the group sample size being zero or disclosive (Office for National Statistics, 2020b). This study therefore chose to use employment rates as they provided a more comprehensive picture at ethnic group level. As the measurement units differed between independent variables, we firstly rescaled several economic predictors, allowing them to be more easily interpretable and comparable. For instance, GDP per capita was transformed to represent £1,000s, by dividing the original figure by 1000. Median household weekly income was transformed to represent £100s, by dividing the original figure by 100; and the total number of JSA claimants was transformed to represent a percentage of population. However, as JSA claimant statistics are released every quarter, the yearly average was first calculated by adding the four quarterly figures and dividing the sum by four. Furthermore, to calculate the percentage of total ethnic minority population in employment, the percentage of UK born ethnic minorities in employment and the percentage of non-UK born ethnic minorities in employment were combined and then divided by two.

Migration

Previous studies often use the share of foreign-born population or the share of population that speak a language other than English as a measure of in-migration of 'outsiders' (Benier et al. 2016; Stacey et al. 2011). The use of such proxies provides a suitable indication of long-term changes however they fail to directly capture short-term fluctuations that are of particular interest to this study's focus (Piatkowska et al. 2019). We have therefore selected predictors that derive from similar research conducted in Germany by Piatkowska et al. (2019). These include total long-term international in-migration, total long-term and short-term international in-migration, and total long-term international out-migration. Whilst the

expression ‘long-term’ implies stays of considerable length, it in effect means “a person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least 12 months” – and therefore provides a suitable measure of migration capable of directly capturing even shorter-term fluctuations (Office for National Statistics, 2021, p. 19). In addition, and in line with social disorganisation theory which suggests residential mobility increases the risk of hate crime, this study has also increased the range of proxies to incorporate measures of domestic migration. These include total domestic in-migration and total domestic out-migration. To align the measurement units with those used to capture economic changes we rescaled each international and domestic migration predictor to represent a percentage of the population. For instance, total domestic in-migration was transformed to represent a share of population, through dividing the figure by the borough’s total population, sourced from Greater London Authority (2018), and multiplying by 100.

This study however has chosen not to categorically disregard linguistic diversity or the share of foreign-born inhabitants. Instead, we have chosen to incorporate these two predictors into the analysis. We consider previous work by Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007) who note, language can be viewed as a cultural threat, a key assumption outlined in defended neighbourhood theory – and therefore the proportion of pupils with English as an additional language (EAL) was chosen as an important avenue of analysis. This predictor is identified as linguistic diversity henceforth. The share of foreign-born inhabitants has also previously shown to drive upsurges in the level of hate crime in Germany and is therefore identified as a further potentially valuable measure of in-migration (Entorf and Lange, 2019). In order to obtain the share of foreign-born inhabitants, the number of foreign-born residents was divided by 1000 to represent per 1000 population.

Following previous research by Piatkowska et al. (2019) we included a measure of social integration drawn from the Public Attitude Survey (PAS) to assist with identifying levels

of social cohesion in London's boroughs. Piatkowska and colleagues (2019) revealed a significant association between lower levels of social cohesion indicated by social integration and higher rates of hate crime. This is in line with social disorganisation theory which claims that lower levels of social integration prevent neighbourhoods in generating informal social controls and so are unable to regulate unfavourable behaviours such as high levels of hate crime (Bursik and Grasmik, 1993).

Demographic

In line with the arguments outlined within the three ecological theories of hate crime (Blalock, 1967; Shaw and McKay, 1942; Suttles, 1972) and previous studies exploring the drivers of racially motivated hate crime (Benier et al. 2016; Gale et al. 2002; Grattet, 2009; Jacobs and Wood 1999; Lyons; 2007; Ryan and Leeson 2011; Schilter 2018) five further demographic indicators that are likely to be associated with increased levels of race and religious hate crime were pooled together. These include total population, total population per square kilometre, White-British population, and religious minority population. The demographic variables were rescaled, allowing them to be more easily interpretable to the study's previous predictors. Total population and total population per square kilometre were transformed to represent per 1000 population. Religious minority population and White-British population were transformed to represent a percentage of population using the boroughs total populations. Non-White-British incorporates all residents that identify themselves as not White-British and religious minorities include all residents that identify themselves as followers of Buddhism, Hinduism, Judaism, Islam, Sikhism, and any 'other' religion, excluding Christianity and atheism.

Method of Analysis

To identify potential relationships between the prevalence of race and religious hate crime and migration, economic, and demographic factors across London's boroughs, we employed ordinary least squares (OLS) and feasible generalised least squares (GLS). Both approaches are appropriate where explanatory variables might hold a certain degree of heteroskedasticity, serial and cross-sectional correlation (Bai et al. 2021). OLS was similarly employed by Falk and colleagues (2009) when exploring unemployment and right-wing extremist crime in Germany and GLS was recently employed by Feinberg (2021) when exploring the factors influencing antisemitic hate crimes at American universities and colleges. The models were implemented in Stata 16.1 using the xtreg routine; GLS is implemented for the random-effects models whilst OLS is implemented for the fixed-effects models.

Before running the linear regression models the variables were transformed to improve interpretability of the results. Figure 2 shows that by log transforming the dependent variable we can generate a more normal distribution and therefore produce more reliable results and achieve a more linear relationship between the variables given that the dependent measures are counts (i.e. incidents of hate crime). Thus, henceforth this study employed a log transformed dependent variable by taking its natural log (Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen, 2016). Poisson regression was also considered, however given that there is non-normality in the dependent variable we chose against this method. All quantitative predictors were then mean centred so to make interpretations of the parameter estimates easier.

Figure 2: Race and religious hate crime cases – original and log-transformed



In line with the hypotheses outlined earlier, five models were established to test whether the central elements of social disorganisation, defended neighbourhood and resource threat theories are significant predictors of race and religious hate crime in London's thirty-two boroughs. Model 1 aimed to specifically test H1 and incorporates the following independent variables: long-term international in-migration; domestic out-migration; non-White-British population; and all out-of-work benefit claimant households with children. Model 2 aimed to specifically test H2 and incorporates the following independent variables: long-term international in-migration; White population; linguistic diversity; median household income; and GDP per capita. Model 3 aimed to specifically test H3 and incorporates the following independent variables: long-term international in-migration; White-British population; foreign-born population; and employment of ethnic-minorities (UK born and not UK born). Model 4 combines and further tests the following key independent variables which emerged to be statistically significant in the first three models: non-White-British population; employment of ethnic-minorities; median household income; GDP per capita. Model 5 tests several

additional variables with the aim to provide further support to the initial findings discovered in Models 1-4. The model incorporates the following independent variables: non-White-British population; all out-of-work benefit claimant households with children; population per square kilometre; total employment; and public perception of social integration.

The Hausman test was then adopted to determine (1) the differences between the fixed, between and random estimators so to decide which one is the most optimal and (2) whether the random-effects estimation is more appropriate than a fixed effects estimation. Once the fixed effects, between effects and random effects were determined through employing the 'xtreg' routine in Stata, the Hausman test was applied and revealed fixed effects modelling is more likely to provide consistent results when exploring change over time compared to random effects modelling. This study is therefore going to focus primarily on fixed effects. However, a section of sensitivity checks highlighting the results generated from both random effects and between effects modelling will be provided once the fixed effects results have been explored in the results chapter.

Findings

Spatial Distribution of Hate Crime in London

This analysis begins with a brief examination of the spatial distribution of total recorded hate crime cases within Greater London. Figure 3 shows the total recorded cases of race and religious hate crime over time illustrates an unambiguous intensification across London's boroughs. A chasm is also clearly visible between 2013 and 2015 indicating a greater surge of hate crimes were recorded in most boroughs between these two time points compared to any other point.

Figure 3: Race and religious hate crime cases by London borough, 2011-2017



However, two boroughs in particular resist the overall trend. Westminster has witnessed a substantial surge of recorded cases of hate crime in 2015 and to a greater extent in 2017. However, despite this notable contrast, Westminster experiences only a slight variation

in reported race and religious hate crime between 2011 and 2013, a trend that is more aligned with the other London boroughs. This finding is confirmed in Figure 4, showing trends of hate crime by year, in which identifies Westminster as an extreme outlier in 2013, 2015 and 2017.

Figure 4: Race and religious hate crime cases in London boroughs by year



Westminster has therefore been removed from this study's main statistical analyses so to avoid erroneous interpretations of the data. The borough of Bromley witnesses a further unique yet less striking disparity through experiencing decreases in reported race and religious hate crime over time. For instance, Bromley recorded fewer hate crimes in 2013 compared to 2011 and similarly in 2017 compared to 2015. Figure 3 further illustrates the spatial distribution of total recorded hate crime cases within Greater London and highlights boroughs in inner London reported the highest levels of race and religious hate crime.

Figure 5: Total recorded race and religious hate crimes between January 2011 and December 2017.



Background to Models 1-5

This analysis incorporates five models; the first three models aim to separately test whether the central elements of social disorganisation, defended neighbourhood and resource threat theories are significant predictors of race and religious hate crime in London's thirty-two boroughs. Model 4 combines and further tests key independent variables which emerged to be statistically significant in the first three models and Model 5 tests several additional variables with the aim to provide further support to the initial findings discovered in Models 1 to 4. Table 3 displays a summary of the statistics employed.

Table 3: Summary statistics

	(1) mean	sd	p50	min	max
London Borough	16.5	9.3	16.5	1.0	32.0
Time	2.5	1.1	2.5	1.0	4.0
Race and Religious Hate Crime Cases (2011/17)	378.0	186.8	350.0	80.0	1284.0
Population 1000s (2011/17)	267.2	58.0	269.3	156.0	391.4
Population 1000s Per Square Kilometre (2011/17)	7.3	3.7	6.0	2.1	15.8
Religious Minority Population % (2011/17)	21.8	13.7	18.3	4.0	51.4
Non-British-White Population % (2011/17)	56.8	15.9	60.3	16.7	86.9
White-British Population % (2011/17)	43.2	15.9	39.7	13.1	83.3
EAL Students in Primary and Secondary Schools % (2011/17)	43.8	16.3	45.5	7.9	74.1
Country of Birth Non-UK Per 1000 Population (2011/17)	97.2	37.0	100.5	22.0	197.0
Children Living in all Out-of-Work Benefit Claimant Households % (2011/17)	17.4	7.0	16.3	5.7	39.8
All Recorded Crime Per 1000 Population (2011/17)	86.4	33.7	78.4	47.8	263.0
Housing Rented from Local Authority or Housing Association % (2011/17)	23.4	10.6	20.3	6.8	45.2
Own Home Outright % (2011/17)	23.3	8.1	23.4	7.6	41.0
Number of Job Seeker Allowance Claimants % (2011/17)	2.5	1.4	2.3	0.3	6.0
Total Employment Rate % (2011/17)	71.0	5.4	71.3	54.4	83.2
Employment Rate - Working Age White UK Born % (2011/17)	75.1	5.9	75.8	55.5	86.1
Employment Rate - Working Age White not UK Born % (2011/17)	78.2	6.8	78.3	55.7	90.2
Employment Rate - Working Age Ethnic Minority UK Born % (2011/17)	63.2	10.1	63.6	37.3	89.5
Employment Rate - Working Age Ethnic Minority not UK Born % (2011/17)	63.8	8.3	64.0	45.2	84.0
Employment Rate - Working Age Ethnic Minority UK and not UK Born % (2011/17)	63.5	7.9	63.5	45.3	81.8
Median Household Weekly Income £100s (2011/17)	5.4	0.8	5.2	3.8	7.9
GDP Per Capita at Current Market Prices £1000s (2011/17)	43.1	44.9	26.5	14.4	282.7
Total Long-Term and Short-Term International In-Migration % (2011/17)	2.8	1.7	2.5	0.4	9.5
Total Long-Term International In-Migration % (2011/17)	2.3	1.4	2.0	0.3	7.8
Total Long-Term International Out-Migration % (2011/17)	1.2	0.7	1.0	0.2	3.6
Domestic In-Migration % (2011/18)	7.0	1.5	6.8	4.4	11.4
Domestic Out-Migration % (2011/18)	7.9	1.8	7.9	4.0	12.0
Perception of Local Social Integration % - PAS (2012/18)	92.9	3.7	94.0	78.0	98.0
Observations	128				

Assessing the Predictive Power of Social Disorganisation Theory

The first model aimed to test whether the central elements of social disorganisation theory are significant predictors of race and religious hate crime (RRHC) in Greater London. Model 1 therefore examined the effect of long-term international in-migration, domestic out-migration, non-White-British population, and children living in all out-of-work benefit claimant households. The results of Model 1 are presented in Table 4. The *N* in Table 4 and subsequent tables refer to borough-year pairs. The inter-class correlation (p = .88748281) shows that 88.7 per cent of the variance in hate crime is due to variation over time (within units).

Table 4: Model 1 fixed effects results

	m0_fe	m1t_fe
International in-migration		-0.101
		(0.0834)
Domestic out-migration		0.0730
		(0.0531)
Non-White-British		0.0387*
		(0.0164)
Benefit households		-0.0425***
		(0.00658)
_cons	5.787***	5.786***
	(0.0350)	(0.0213)
N	124	124
sigma_u .54893865		
sigma_e .19545792		
rho .88748281		

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Long-term international in-migration and domestic out-migration are indicators of high residential turnover and are found statistically insignificant; contrary to what is claimed by social disorganisation, formulated in H1a. In contrast, we see that the share of non-White-British population has a significant influence on race and religious hate crime (b = 0.0387, p = 0.020). We would therefore expect an additional one percentage point increase in non-White-British population to result in a 3.9 per cent increase in recorded race and religious hate crimes. This finding supports the notion set out by social disorganisation theory formulated in H1b,

which expects higher levels of hate crime in areas with greater levels of ethnic diversity. The proportion of children living in all out-of-work benefit claimant households provides an indicator of high economic disadvantage and was found statistically significant yet negatively related to the number of hate crime cases (b = -0.0425, p = 0.000), contradicting the assertion outlined in H1c. Suggesting that an additional one per cent increase of children living in all-out-of work benefit claimant households to roughly result in a four-percentage point increase of reported race and religious hate crime.

Assessing the Predictive Power of Defended Neighbourhood Theory

The second model tests whether the key components of defended neighbourhood theory are present in boroughs subjected to greater levels of RRHC. Table 5 reports the coefficients for recorded race and religious hate crime regressed on long-term international in-migration, White-British population, pupils with English as an additional language, median household income and GDP per capita. The inter-class correlation (p = .97112096) shows that 97.1 per cent of the variance in hate crime is due to variation over time (within units).

Table 5: Model 2 fixed effects results

	m0_fe	m2t_fe
International in-migration		-0.135
		(0.101)
White-British		-0.119***
		(0.0222)
Linguistic diversity		-0.0225
		(0.0209)
Median household income		0.233*
		(0.104)
GDP per capita		0.0142*
		(0.00581)
_cons	5.787***	5.900***
	(0.0350)	(0.0443)
N	124	124
sigma_u 1.3084521		
sigma_e .22563817		
rho .97112096		

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The percentage of population identified as White and British is an indicator of racial homogeneity (White-British) and exhibits a strong significant effect on total recorded race and religious hate crime (b = -0.119, p = 0.000). However, contrary to the arguments suggested by defended neighbourhood and formulated in H2a, the indicator has a negative effect on hate crime, where an additional one percentage point increase in White-British population would roughly result in a twelve per cent decrease of reported race and religious hate crime over time. Equally therefore, an additional one percentage point increase in non-White-British population at borough level would roughly result in a twelve per cent increase of reported race and religious hate crime.

Long-term international in-migration indicates an increased inflow of ethnic minority group members and, similar to Model 1, remains to have an insignificant association with RRHC (b = -0.135, p = 0.183). This contradicts the expectations formulated in H2b. The percentage of primary and secondary school students with English as an additional language (EAL) indicates the threat to culture and identity and is deemed non-significant (y = -0.0225, p = 0.284). The association between increased levels of recorded hate crime and economic advantage appears to be positive and statistically significant, with both measures of economic well-being indicating the prevalence of RRHC over time is more likely to intensify as the economy improves. For instance, median household income (per £100) is significantly related to the increases of RRHC (y = 0.233, p = 0.027). This suggests that a £1000 increase in median household income would result in roughly ten per cent more cases of reported race and religious hate crime over time if all other variables are held constant. In contrast, GDP per capita (per £1000) exhibits a weaker influence yet remains statistically significant (y = 0.0142, p = 0.017). This initial finding supports the idea that economic advantage is increasingly perceptible in areas suffering greater levels of RRHC, a central element of defended neighbourhood theory and outlined in H2d.

Assessing the Predictive Power of Resource Threat Theories

Model 3 examines whether the central components of resource threat theories are ever more noticeable in boroughs with higher levels of race and religious hate crime. In the model we consider the effect of long-term international in-migration, British-White population, foreign born population and the employment rate of ethnic minorities. The results of Model 3 are presented in Table 6. The inter-class correlation (p = .97615586) shows that 97.6 per cent of the variance in hate crime is due to variation over time (within units).

Table 6: Model 3 fixed effects results

	m0_fe	m3t_fe
International in-migration		-0.121
		(0.0929)
White-British		-0.0932***
		(0.0140)
Foreign-born		0.00688*
		(0.00341)
Ethnic minority employment		0.0163***
		(0.00453)
_cons	5.787***	5.804***
	(0.0350)	(0.0240)
N	124	124
sigma_u 1.4300939		
sigma_e .22350943		
rho .97615586		

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The percentage of population identified as White and British is once again an indicator of racial homogeneity (White-British) and similar to Model 2 exhibits a strong significant effect on total recorded race and religious hate crime (b = -0.0932, p = 0.000). However, contrary to the arguments set out by resource threat theorists and formulated in H3a the indicator has a negative effect on hate crime, where an additional one percentage point increase in White-British population would roughly result in a nine per cent decrease of reported race and religious hate crime over time. Once more, the results reveal long-term international in-migration is negative and insignificant (b = -0.121, p = 0.198). The increase of ethnic minority group members forms a central component to resource threat theories. However, this finding

provides no evidence to support this assertion and therefore contradicts the expectation formulated in H3b.

To substantiate these findings the model also incorporated the percentage of foreign-born residents to indicate racial homogeneity (White-British) and revealed that a one percentage point increase in foreign-born residents is roughly associated with a one per cent increase in the number of cases of RRHC over time ($b = 0.00688$, $p = 0.047$). In accordance with the arguments posited by resource threat theorists we would expect higher levels of British born residents to be associated with greater levels of RRHC, nevertheless the findings reveal the opposite, once more contradicting H3a. However, it is reasonable to consider the percentage of foreign-born residents over time to be an indicator of migration and may possibly indicate that in-migration of foreign-born individuals is associated with a statistically significant increase in the number of hate crime cases; this would be coherent with resource threat theories formulated H3b. However, this rationale would contradict Models 1, 2 and 3 which found international in-migration to be negatively insignificant. Then again, international in-migration provides an indication of current immigration rates whilst the percentage of foreign-born residents provides an indication of historic immigration, the total percentage of migrants still residing in each borough. It is whilst holding this rationale that this finding may suggest historic migration provides a predictor of RRHC as opposed to recent migration. However, this finding would only be conditional and therefore an increase in the percentage of foreign-born residents should at best provide an indication of a rise of racial heterogeneity henceforth.

The percentage of ethnic minorities in employment provides an indicator of competition of scarce resources and emerged statistically significant ($b = 0.0163$, $p = 0.001$), consistent with resource threat theories conveyed in H3c. This suggests that a one percentage point

increase in employment of those identified as an ethnic minority would roughly result in a two per cent increase of race and religious hate crime over time.

Reassessing the Predictive Power of Several Significant Independent Variables

Model 4 incorporates several key independent variables which emerged to be statistically significant in the previous three models. Table 7 reports the coefficients for recorded race and religious hate crime regressed against non-White-British population, the employment rate of ethnic minorities, median household income and GDP per capita. The inter-class correlation (p = .96806896) shows that 96.8 per cent of the variance in hate crime is due to variation over time (within units).

Table 7: Model 4 fixed effects results

	m0_fe	m4t_fe
Non-White-British		0.0894***
		(0.0129)
Ethnic minority employment		0.0116*
		(0.00487)
Median household income		0.232*
		(0.102)
GDP per capita		0.0100
		(0.00557)
_cons	5.787***	5.892***
	(0.0350)	(0.0421)
N	124	124
sigma_u 1.2259774		
sigma_e .22265673		
rho .96806896		

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Each indicator with the exception of GDP per capita is found to have a positive and significant association. For instance, a one percentage point increase of non-White-British population is roughly associated nine per cent more cases of reported race and religious hate crimes over time (b = 0.0894, p = 0.000), consistent with H1b. Median household income produced similar results to Model 2, where a ten-unit (£1000) increase is associated with roughly a ten per cent increase of reported RRHC (b = 0.232, p = 0.025), consistent with H2d.

However, in contrast to Model 2, where a positive and significant association between GDP per capita and RRHC was observed, this was no longer the case, with GDP per capita now exhibiting a statistically insignificant influence over time ($b = 0.0100$, $p = 0.076$). Once more, the estimates of ethnic minorities in employment revealed a positive and significant interaction, where a one per cent increase resulted in roughly a one per cent increase of reported RRHC ($b = 0.0116$, $p = 0.020$), consistent with H3c.

Assessing the Predictive Power of Several Supplementary Variables

Model 5, in Table 8 incorporates several additional variables: population per square kilometre, total employment and public perception of social integration. The inter-class correlation ($p = .90307771$) shows that 90.3 per cent of the variance in hate crime is due to variation over time (within units).

Table 8: Model 5 fixed effects results

	m0_fe	m5t_fe
Non-White-British		0.0397*
		(0.0164)
Benefit households		-0.0451***
		(0.0118)
Population per sq km		-0.0516
		(0.104)
Total employment		0.00716
		(0.00882)
Social integration		-0.00259
		(0.00676)
_cons	5.787***	5.789***
	(0.0350)	(0.0244)
N	124	124
sigma_u .61152578		
sigma_e .20033832		
rho .90307771		

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Population per square kilometre ($b = -0.0516$, $p = 0.622$) and public perception of social integration ($b = -0.00259$, $p = 0.702$) both exhibit a negative association with recorded RRHC yet are both deemed statistically insignificant. In contrast to Model 3, which found the

employment rate of ethnic minorities to have a positive and statistically significant association, total employment in Model 5 exhibits an insignificant association with recorded RRHC (b = 0.00882, p = 0.419). Once again, the results show that the share of non-White-British population is statistically significant and positively associated with RRHC, strongly indicating race and religious hate crimes are likely to occur in areas which experience a population increase of ethnic minorities (b = 0.0397, p = 0.018), consistent with H1b. In line with Model 1, children living in all out-of-work benefit claimant households is significantly related with a reduction in the number of recorded hate crimes (b = -0.0451, p = 0.000), where a one percentage point increase is roughly associated with a five per cent decrease of reported RRHC over time. This contradicts the assertion that high economic disadvantage is associated with greater levels of hate crime, as formulated in H1c.

Summary of Fixed Effects

The findings consistently reveal that the level of international long-term immigration has a statistically insignificant influence on the prevalence of RRHC, contradicting the assertions formulated in H1a, H2b and H3b. Similarly, the percentage of primary and secondary school students with English as an additional language shows no indicative effect on total recorded RRHC, contradicting the expectations set out in H2c. Population per square kilometre, public perception of social integration and total employment equally fail to exhibit any statistical significance. In contrast however, the employment of ethnic minorities consistently displays a significant and positive effect on RRHC, in line with H3c. The percentage of population identified as non-White-British exhibits a reliable and significant association with boroughs experiencing higher levels of recorded race and religious hate crime, in keeping with H1b, yet contradictory to H2a and H3a. The percentage of population identified as foreign-born similarly shows a statistically significant association.

The association between increased levels of recorded hate crime and economic advantage is also positive and statistically significant, with median household income consistently indicating the prevalence of RRHC over time is more likely to intensify in boroughs with higher levels of household income, supporting H2d. Whilst GDP per capita initially proved to be significant in Model 2, although at a somewhat weaker level in contrast to median household income, it proves to be insignificant when holding other variables constant in Model 4. Model 4 was generated by replacing international in-migration and linguistic diversity, two proxies consistently deemed insignificant, with ethnic minority employment. This suggests that race and religious hate crime in London is proved to be more sensitive to the share of ethnic minorities in employment than GDP – revealing ethnic minority employment to be a stronger predictive covariate. Consistent with the idea encompassing the presence of economic advantage set out in H2d, the results also reveal that the proportion of children living in all out-of-work benefit claimant households is found statistically significant yet negatively related to the number of hate crime cases, contradicting H1c yet providing further evidence for H2d.

These findings clearly indicate that the three central hypotheses formulated from the adopted theoretical perspectives fail to provide a clear rationalisation to the cause of race and religious hate crime through neglecting to identify each of their distinct elements. However, it is evident that several key components conveyed between social disorganisation, defended neighbourhood and resource threat theories are present in the findings and may provide support when explaining the predictors of hate crime in Greater London. For example, the results clearly indicate that the level of hate crimes are likely to occur in areas which experience a population increase of ethnic minorities, in keeping with social disorganisation theory and formulated in H1b. Secondly, economic advantage is increasingly perceptible in areas suffering greater levels of race and religious hate crime, a central element of defended

neighbourhood theory and outlined in H2d. Whilst indications of racial competition of scarce resources, a key component of resource threat theories and conveyed in H3c, is also to a greater extent evident in areas susceptible to experience higher levels of RRHC.

Random and Between Effects: Sensitivity Checks

Between effects modelling reveal very few significant associations between recorded race and religious hate crimes and the adopted indicators. Nevertheless, Models 1 and 5 reveal that when we disregard the temporal information and only consider the time-average effect of benefits on the time-average number of hate crimes, only then the proportion of children living in all out-of-work benefit claimant households becomes statistically significant and *positively* associated with hate crime. Therefore, suggesting boroughs that record higher levels of all out-of-work households are associated with higher levels of hate crime cases, contradicting the estimations revealed by fixed effects modelling. For instance, Model 5 shows that a one per cent increase is roughly associated with a four per cent increase of reported RRHC over time. ($b = 0.0409$, $p = 0.010$). However, it must be stressed that this finding can only be attributed to average differences between boroughs. GDP per capita and non-White-British population both indicate inconsistent findings. For instance, whilst the share of White-British population is deemed statistically significant in Model 5, this is not revealed in Models 1 and 3.

Table 9: Model 1 results (fixed, between and random effects)

	m0_fe	m0_be	m0_re	m1t_fe	m1t_be	m1t_re
International in-migration				-0.101	0.0653	0.0299
				(0.0834)	(0.0623)	(0.0563)
Domestic out-migration				0.0730	-0.0188	0.104**
				(0.0531)	(0.0369)	(0.0325)
Non-White-British				0.0387*	0.00542	0.0139***
				(0.0164)	(0.00356)	(0.00413)
Benefit households				-0.0425***	0.0362**	-0.0393***
				(0.00658)	(0.0106)	(0.00459)
_cons	5.787***	5.787***	5.787***	5.786***	5.801***	5.796***
	(0.0350)	(0.0637)	(0.0637)	(0.0213)	(0.0439)	(0.0543)
N	124	124	124	124	124	124

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 11: Model 3 results (fixed, between and random effects)

	m0_fe	m0_be	m0_re	m3t_fe	m3t_be	m3t_re
International in-migration				-0.121	0.152	0.117
				(0.0929)	(0.0750)	(0.0616)
White-British				-0.0932***	0.00559	-0.00700
				(0.0140)	(0.00805)	(0.00790)
Foreign-born				0.00688*	0.00579	0.00658*
				(0.00341)	(0.00308)	(0.00288)
Ethnic minority employment				0.0163***	0.00330	0.0312***
				(0.00453)	(0.0150)	(0.00465)
_cons	5.787***	5.787***	5.787***	5.804***	5.810***	5.800***
	(0.0350)	(0.0637)	(0.0637)	(0.0240)	(0.0494)	(0.0622)
N	124	124	124	124	124	124

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 13: Model 5 results (fixed, between and random effects)

	m0_fe	m0_be	m0_re	m5t_fe	m5t_be	m5t_re
Non-White-British				0.0397*	0.00805*	0.0151***
				(0.0164)	(0.00376)	(0.00365)
Benefit households				-0.0451***	0.0409**	-0.0317***
				(0.0118)	(0.0146)	(0.00637)
Population per sq km				-0.0516	0.000362	0.0663***
				(0.104)	(0.0219)	(0.0159)
Total employment				0.00716	0.00810	0.0205*
				(0.00882)	(0.0150)	(0.00834)
Social integration				-0.00259	0.000675	-0.0144*
				(0.00676)	(0.0242)	(0.00714)
_cons	5.787***	5.787***	5.787***	5.789***	5.793***	5.792***
	(0.0350)	(0.0637)	(0.0637)	(0.0244)	(0.0449)	(0.0516)
N	124	124	124	124	124	124

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Random effects modelling on the other hand reveals a large proportion of independent variables are significantly associated with recorded RRHC within boroughs and across boroughs. For instance, the percentage of population identified as foreign born, as an ethnic minority in employment, and non-White-British each exhibit a positive and significant association, this is in line with the results drawn from fixed effects modelling. Moreover, population per square kilometre and total employment now display a positive and significant association. Public perception of social integration and students with English as an additional language are also now deemed significant; however, both have a negative effect on hate crime. For instance, Model 5 in Table 13 shows that an additional one percentage point increase in

public perception of social integration is roughly associated with a one per cent decrease of reported race and religious hate crimes over time (b = -0.0144, p = 0.044). Whilst Model 2 in Table 10 identifies that a one percentage point increase in students with English as an additional language roughly results in a three per cent decrease of recorded cases of hate crime.

Table 10: Model 2 results (fixed, between and random effects)

	m0_fe	m0_be	m0_re	m2t_fe	m2t_be	m2t_re
International in-migration				-0.135	0.0447	-0.222**
				(0.101)	(0.0931)	(0.0817)
White-British				-0.119***	-0.0190	-0.0562***
				(0.0222)	(0.00993)	(0.00983)
Linguistic diversity				-0.0225	-0.0121	-0.0287**
				(0.0209)	(0.00994)	(0.0107)
Median household income				0.233*	-0.0980	0.209**
				(0.104)	(0.0884)	(0.0794)
GDP per capita				0.0142*	0.00706	0.0159***
				(0.00581)	(0.00364)	(0.00334)
_cons	5.787***	5.787***	5.787***	5.900***	5.834***	5.871***
	(0.0350)	(0.0637)	(0.0637)	(0.0443)	(0.0513)	(0.0644)
N	124	124	124	124	124	124

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

International immigration is deemed inconclusive with several models revealing conflicting results. However, Model 1 in Table 9 reveals domestic in-migration shows a statistically significant and positive association (b = 0.104, p = 0.001); again, a finding not revealed in either fixed effect or between effects modelling. The percentage of children living in all out-of-work benefit claimant households is also in line with fixed effects modelling, where Models 1 and 5 in Tables 9 and 13 shows a negative effect and strong significant association with RRHC over time. For instance, Model 5 reveals that a one percentage point increase is roughly associated with a three per cent decrease of RRHC over time (b = -0.0317, p = 0.000).

Random effects modelling also suggests high economic advantage has a clear influence on race and religious hate crime with both measures of economic well-being indicating a statistically significant and positive effect. Whereas fixed effects modelling revealed GDP per

capita to be inconclusive, results drawn from random effects modelling are more consistent; however, the effect size remains to be weak ($b = 0.00694$, $p = 0.004$).

Table 12: Model 4 results (fixed, between and random effects)

	m0_fe	m0_be	m0_re	m4t_fe	m4t_be	m4t_re
Non-White-British				0.0894***	0.00915	0.0251***
				(0.0129)	(0.00469)	(0.00370)
Ethnic minority employment				0.0116*	-0.00356	0.0278***
				(0.00487)	(0.0134)	(0.00425)
Median household income				0.232*	-0.106	0.178*
				(0.102)	(0.0935)	(0.0742)
GDP per capita				0.0100	0.00635*	0.00694**
				(0.00557)	(0.00251)	(0.00241)
_cons	5.787***	5.787***	5.787***	5.892***	5.830***	5.840***
	(0.0350)	(0.0637)	(0.0637)	(0.0421)	(0.0513)	(0.0605)
N	124	124	124	124	124	124

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Results drawn from random effects modelling indicate that the effect signs are to a greater extent consistent with this study's hypothesis compared to those generated from fixed effects modelling. For example, Model 1 in Table 9 reveals domestic out-migration has a positive and significant association, indicating high residential turnover is present, consistent with H1a. Whilst Model 2 reveals the percentage of students with English with additional language is also positively significant; indicating a threat to culture and identity is present, clearly supporting H2c. Model 5, Table 13 also indicates increasingly densely populated areas are ever more susceptible to higher levels of hate crime and whilst this does not form a hypothesis within this study it is consistent with the features of defended neighbourhood and social disorganisation theory (Shaw and McKay, 1942; Suttles, 1972).

Westminster

The borough of Westminster is identified as a clear outlier in this study. The causes of which are likely to be varied and numerous in their nature, however some are clearly intrinsically linked, as this section proceeds to illustrate. Firstly however, it is important to appreciate that hate crime incidents not only reflect those residing in Westminster, but also its

nature as a booming tourist hotspot and the significant proportion of tourists and commuters entering the borough each day. The magnitude of which is highlighted in the 2011 Census which revealed Westminster's resident population to be 176,000 whilst the workday population (not including tourists) was considerably higher at 644,000; a 267 per cent difference (Office for National Statistics, 2013b). Westminster was identified as the top local authority with the most substantial percentage difference between usually resident and workday populations in England and Wales (excluding the City of London). The borough of Camden was ranked second in England and Wales (after removing the City of London), however the difference between the two was considerable. For instance, Camden's resident population was revealed to be 174,000, similar to that of Westminster, however the workday population was 377,000; a 94 per cent difference. The percentage difference between Camden and Westminster's usually resident and workday populations was a marked 173 per cent. Whilst these figures fail to illustrate the tourist element of Westminster's daytime population, the National Health Service (2021) for Central London suggests the total workday population including tourists could be as much as one million.

Table 14: The top twenty local authorities with greatest percentage gains between the usually resident and workday populations aged 16-74, 2011.
Source: Office for National Statistics, 2013b

Rank	Local Authority	Usually resident population age 16-74 (Thousands)	Workday population age 16-74 (Thousands)	Percentage difference
1	City of London	6	358	5580
2	Westminster	176	644	267
3	Camden	174	337	94
4	Tower Hamlets	197	310	58
5	Islington	165	226	37

Table 14 indicates that the top five local authorities with workday populations larger than their usually resident populations were all London boroughs: City of London, Westminster, Camden, Tower Hamlets and Islington. All of which, apart from the City of

London (due to its removal from this study) also consistently experience higher levels of race and religious hate crime, as shown in Figure 2. The Safer Westminster Partnership Strategic Assessment (2018) which aims to identify the key crime, disorder and anti-social behaviour issues affecting Westminster, including those encompassing hate crime, reveals the importance of understanding the borough's transient daytime population and its distinctively high levels of crime. The study revealed that the West End ward, an area which sees the highest volume of people passing through each day experiences the greatest concentration of crime not only in Westminster but across Greater London (Lambillion, 2018). The study also discovers that the level of crime is strongly correlated with transport passenger numbers (*ibid.*). Crime figures provided by the British Transport Police (BTP) reveal Westminster accounts for seventeen per cent of all BTP incidents, the highest in London; twenty-six per cent of which occurred in Victoria Station alone (*ibid.*). It is furthermore clear that Westminster's night-time economy, renowned for being the largest in Europe, is fuelling a large proportion of the borough's criminality. According to the report, most assaults in Westminster occur in the early hours of Saturday and Sunday morning and nearly half of all assaults take place in St James's and West End wards, the top two wards across London (*ibid.*). The report also revealed Westminster experiences the highest volume of London Ambulance Service (LAS) alcohol related incidents, accounting for roughly eight per cent of all (LAS) callouts across London (*ibid.*). Once more the St James's and West End wards are the top two wards accounting for five per cent of all alcohol related incidents in Greater London and accounts for nearly sixty per cent across Westminster (*ibid.*). Lambillion (2018) concludes by suggesting the West End and St James' wards are not only crime hotspots for Westminster but also the entire municipality of London.

Whilst the report fails to specifically explore Westminster's distinctively high level of hate crime, we can reasonably assert that Westminster's thriving nightlife economy is a significant driver. This is owed to a substantial body of research indicating that most hate

crimes, particularly those motivated by religion, are committed by perpetrators who are deemed to be under the influence of alcohol (Davidson, 2016; Franklin, 2000; Hamad, 2017; Hambly et al. 2018; Walters and Krasodomski-Jones, 2018; Williams and Tregidga, 2013). For instance, Williams and Tregidga (2013, p. 49) revealed that many interview participants in their study referred to alcohol and substance abuse as an aggravating factor in their attack and caused them to be "more inclined to act in hostile ways". A recent study by Walters and Krasodomski-Jones (2018) discovered the consumption of alcohol was a factor in roughly twenty-three per cent of all hate crimes in Greater London between 2014 and 2016. This figure increased to twenty-nine per cent when exploring religious hate crime alone (*ibid.*). The study also reveals most hate crimes occur on Fridays and Saturdays, however when each strand is isolated it becomes evident that it is only racist hate crimes that spike on Fridays and Saturdays (*ibid.*). Davidson (2016) explored religiously aggravated offending in Scotland and discovered prominent spikes during weekday evenings with larger peaks during the weekends, particularly on Fridays and Saturdays between 20:00 and 00:00.

At the same time as Westminster being a thriving tourist hotspot it is also an area of great political significance, particularly St James's ward which is home to the Houses of Parliament and departments of state. It is owed to this political importance that it can often become a volatile and politically charged area of London. The potentiality of this precarious and explosive environment was most recently observed during June 2020, after the killing of George Floyd in the US, when protests in support of the Black Lives Matter movement were met by far-right groups in areas of Westminster (Daily Mail, 2020). The convergence of these two groups soon led to fights breaking out between the anti-racists and far-right protestors in Trafalgar Square and other areas of Westminster (Sky News, 2020). The political significance of Westminster undoubtedly attracts those with highly conflicting political views and provides a space in which opposing groups who would not typically encounter each other to converge.

It is clear that Westminster's unique characteristics as a tourist hotspot and significant political standing increases the opportunity of inter-ethnic social contact between the harasser and potential victim and in turn increases the likelihood of race and religious motivated hate crimes to occur. This we believe has caused Westminster to resist hate crime trends typically observed in other London boroughs.

Westminster: Supplementary Statistical Analyses

Although Westminster is found to be an extreme outlier from the outset and thus removed from the main statistical analyses this study chose to replicate Models 1-5 and incorporate data from Westminster. The aim of these supplementary statistical analyses is to determine whether the inclusion of Westminster significantly influences the significance or the size of the effect between the dependent variable (i.e. race and religious hate crime) and the independent variables. Tables 15 to 19 in the appendix provide the results of the additional model specifications. The fixed effects results reveal Westminster in fact only performs a negligible role in effecting this study's original findings. For instance, each of the independent variables that were found to be significantly related to RRHC in this study's earlier models remain to be statistically significant. The size of the effect on the other hand declined for sixty-seven per cent of those significant associations. However, there was only a slight difference between the size of the effect revealed in the original models and the additional models incorporating data from Westminster. For example, when exploring the association between the proportion of foreign-born population and recorded hate crime, there was only 0.0008 difference once Westminster was added (Tables 6 and 17).

Random effects modelling on the other hand reveals the incorporation of Westminster is found to influence the significance and the size of the effect between the dependent variable and some key independent variables to a somewhat larger degree. For instance, where social integration was deemed statistically significant in the original model (Table 13), Table 19 now

reveals the contrary once Westminster is added. The additional model specifications, in terms of random effects, also reveal that median household income has an increased effect on RRHC within boroughs and across boroughs, when Westminster is included. For instance, Table 16 reveals that median household income has a positive and significant association, b = 0.259, p = 0.001, this effect is 0.05 greater in comparison to earlier findings (Table 10) when Westminster was removed from the statistical analyses.

The 2015-17 Spike

Figures 2 and 3 clearly show an intensification of total recorded cases of race and religious hate crime across London between January 2015 and December 2017. Annual statistical bulletins published by the Home Office (2016; 2017; 2018) persistently suggest this surge in hate crime is due to improvements in crime recording by the police following a review conducted by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services in 2014 and the withdrawal of the "designation of police recorded crime as National Statistics" (Home Office, 2018, p. 12). This assertion is strengthened when exploring data provided by the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW), an alternative to police recorded data which is unaffected by changes to recording practices. According to the CSEW as cited by the Home Office (2018), the number of hate crimes suffered by those 16 years and above was thirty-one per cent lower in the three surveys conducted between 2015 and 2018 compared to those conducted between 2009 and 2012, contrary to what we would expect if hate crimes were indeed increasing. However, the sample survey includes a low volume of hate crime incidents and therefore concerns are raised over the robustness of its findings when exploring hate crime trends (Home Office, 2018). Work conducted by the National Police Chiefs' Council published in 2015 however provides further evidence to suggest that the increase of hate crimes has indeed been driven by the renewed attention on the quality of recorded crime. According to the study, there was little change in the number of call outs to violent incidents, however the

number of recorded offenses still increased by twenty-three per cent (National Police Chiefs' Council, 2015). Therefore, as a third of police recorded hate crimes are for violence against the person, any developments in recording violent crimes would inevitably affect hate crime levels (Home Office, 2016).

Whilst the Home Office assigns much of the increase since 2015 to the actions of the police and their improved compliance with the National Crime Recording Standards, there has been a growing and genuine realisation that the surge of hate crime cases is due to a real increase in the number of offences (Home Office, 2017 and 2018). For instance, data employed in the 2016 Hate Crime Statistical Bulletin displays a positive correlation between the Charlie Hebdo shooting in January 2015 and an increase in recorded hate crime offences during the following months in England and Wales (Home Office, 2016). However, the Home Office (2016) discredited the assertion that these two events were related and placed more emphasis on the improvements of police recording. Subsequent reports have however placed more emphasis on similar trigger events, stating short-term surges in hate crime offences have been born from certain events (Home Office, 2016 and 2017). For example, the 2017 Hate Crime Statistical Bulletin states that there was a clear spike in hate crime between the start of the EU referendum campaign in mid-April and the day after the release of the EU referendum result on Friday 24 June. However, the report remained rather hesitant in their assertion, claiming there to be only anecdotal evidence to suggest that there was an increase in xenophobic offences around the time of the EU referendum. However, subsequent studies have empirically revealed that the EU referendum brought about a genuine increase in hate crimes (Carr et al. 2020; Devine, 2018; Schilter, 2018). Devine (2018) for instance discovered the referendum led to a surge in hate crimes of between nineteen and twenty-three per cent. Similarly, Carr et al. (2020) discovered that the EU referendum led to an increase in hate crime by roughly fifteen and twenty-five per cent; with most offences committed in the first quarter after the

referendum. However, contrary to the assertion claimed by the Home Office (2017 and 2018), the study revealed there to be no evidence to suggest the increase in hate crimes was due to changes in police behaviour, or furthermore due to victims' increased willingness to report hate crimes (Carr et al. 2020).

A further spike in race and religious hate crimes was identified following the terrorist attack on Westminster Bridge in March 2017 (Home Office, 2017 and 2018). However, a proportion of this notable increase was linked to the way in which the police record crime on a financial year basis, highlighting the month of March is generally when "police forces reconcile their annual data" (Home Office, 2018). Further terrorist attacks, including Manchester Arena, London Bridge and Finsbury Park, each of which occurred between May 2017 and June 2017 were linked to a sharp rise in hate crimes in the summer of 2017, particularly religious hate crime (Home Office, 2018).

Discussion

Introduction

The central objective of this study is to empirically explore the drivers of race and religious hate crime (RRHC) in Greater London and whether the well-established ecological theories of hate crime derived and typically employed in the United States are applicable in a more diverse and ethnically integrated context found in the UK. Our findings surmise that social disorganisation, defended neighbourhood and resource threat theories may be applicable to a degree, however, it is clear there are significant disparities between the various factors driving race and religious hate crimes in the United Kingdom compared to those found in the US. Changes in migration over time for instance consistently revealed to have a statistically insignificant influence on the prevalence of race and religious hate crime and provides the starkest contrast with findings emanating from the United States (Grattet, 2009; Green et al. 1998; Lyons, 2007 and 2008; Stacey et al. 2011). Through drawing on existing literature there is a real scope to draw provisional interpretations to the reasons behind the findings within this study.

Social Disorganisation – Racial Heterogeneity

Social disorganisation theorists argue that higher levels of social deviance and criminality are generally found in neighbourhoods characterised with greater concentrations of racial heterogeneity, as formulated in H1b, in addition to high levels of economic disadvantage and residential turnover (Shaw and McKay, 1969). Authors in this tradition have described how so-called 'disorganised communities' are less able to generate strong informal social controls so to regulate unfavourable behaviours such as hate crime (*ibid.*). Kornhauser (1978, p. 78) expands upon this claim by suggesting "heterogeneity impedes communication and thus obstructs the quest to solve common problems and reach common goals". A further elaboration

is provided by Kubrin (2012, p. 274) who suggests cultural differences between racial groups, language incompatibility and the rudimental fact that individuals prefer people of their own race results in residents of racially diverse communities to be "less likely to look out for one another, to the same extent as in racially homogeneous communities".

Whilst this study found evidence in support of H1b through revealing a significant and positive association between London's hate crime figures and rates of foreign-born individuals (Model 3) and those who identify as non-White-British (Models 1-5), the findings fail to reveal a statistical relationship between London's hate crime rates and linguistic diversity (Model 2). This causes us to cast our first doubts on whether the prevalence of hate crime is in fact driven by cultural differences and language barriers, as claimed by Kubrin (2012).

Increased levels of inter-ethnic social contact caused by greater racial heterogeneity provides an additional and important perspective which social disorganisation theory neglects to consider when exploring racial diversity. According to Dustmann et al. (2011) the frequency of social contacts between the harasser and potential victim acts as a catalyst, fuelling the upsurge in racial harassment. Laurence and Heath (2008) suggest the frequency of encounters between people of different backgrounds, ethnicity and race are more likely to occur in areas that are increasingly ethnically diverse. Based on this understanding it is therefore plausible to argue that the positive association between the higher rates of ethnic minority populations and the increase of race and religious hate crime identified in our findings may be partly exacerbated by the frequency of social contact between ethnic groups. This avenue of argument is more reasonably aligned with what we would expect to observe in a more diverse municipality such as that of Greater London where individuals from different racial groups interact more frequently.

Barlow and colleagues (2012) support this premise. Through exploring the largely overlooked issue of negative intergroup conflict and increased prejudice, their study reveals

that increase diversity provides an environment for both positive and negative interracial contact. However, whilst the study revealed positive interracial contacts may outnumber negative interracial contacts, the impact of negative contacts on racial bigotry emerged to outweigh the impact of positive contacts. Therefore, it is claimed that "the beneficial effects of numerous positive intergroup encounters" born within increasingly diverse communities "may be counteracted", or arguably be overshadowed, "by the relatively infrequent but powerful effects of negative intergroup encounters" (Barlow et al. 2012, p. 1640).

This study's findings reveal it is abundantly clear that social disorganisation theory fails to provide a robust elucidation to the ecological drivers of hate crime in London. This is mostly the result of a failure to reveal a positive and significant association between London's hate crime figures and high residential turnover or economic disadvantage (Model 1), both of which are central elements to social disorganisation. Economic disadvantage is in fact found to have the opposite effect to what is outlined in social disorganisation literature and was increasingly associated with lower levels of hate crime. This find is in effect more in line with defended neighbourhood theory which assumes that hate crimes are more likely to transpire in communities with greater economic stability as opposed to greater economic disadvantage (Suttles, 1972). Lyons (2007) suggests this occurs when communities with strong economic status generate a general understanding of self-worth and subsequently the rationale for self-protection from so-called 'racial outsiders', an instinct and rational calculation absent from communities experiencing greater economic disadvantage. This disparity naturally draws this study's attention to Howard Becker's rational choice theory; a theory adopted by Dustmann et al. (2011) when exploring racial harassment in Britain during the early 1990s. Becker (1974, p. 9) argues, some people commit crime "not because their basic motivation differs from that of other persons, but because their benefits and costs differ". Therefore, the desire to harass, as a conscious choice may also be determined by the harasser's perceived benefits and costs of

committing a hate crime which involves the possibility of being apprehended, the severity of the punishment and whether such costs exceed the utility of hostility expressed towards the victim (Dustmann et al. 2011). In view of this assumption and this study's findings, we would therefore assume that boroughs with greater economic disadvantage may be increasingly associated with a heightened police presence; a characteristic at borough level which would reasonably increase the expected costs to potential perpetrators, and thus reduce hate crime rates.

A state-level study conducted by Gale et al. (2002) in the United States supports this assumption through revealing that higher hate crime rates were significantly associated with lower law enforcement expenditures, indicating that a smaller police presence may reduce the likelihood of being apprehended and therefore reduce the overall costs identified by the harasser. We therefore chose to conduct a simple bivariate analysis to determine whether police officer numbers at borough level, an indicator of police presence, is associated with greater levels of economic disadvantage. Due to limited data, the average number of police officers for March 2016 and March 2017, at borough level, provided an indication of police presence (Metropolitan Police Service, 2018), whilst the percentage of family households receiving benefits for 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2017 formed an indication of economic disadvantage (Department for Work and Pensions, 2019a). Westminster was removed from the analysis due to being an extreme outlier. Through using the guide that Evans (1996) suggests for the absolute value of r we can reveal that the Pearson's product-moment correlation indicates a strong positive correlation between police officer numbers, $r(29) = .715$, $p = 0.000$, with the percentage of family households receiving benefits (appendix 7). This suggests that increased numbers of police officers are positively associated in boroughs with a greater proportion of family households receiving benefits.

This evidence, tentative though it is, suggests that police numbers may act as a deterrent to potential hate crime perpetrators due to the increased costs associated with being apprehended – subsequently resulting in a statistically significant negative association between lower hate crime levels and economic disadvantage. Future research exploring police presence and its effects on hate crime trends would be beneficial to better understand the complex ecological conditions favourable to lower hate crime levels. The findings might reveal that heightened surveillance provided by an increased police presence may indeed reduce hate crime levels. A recent study by Carr et al. (2020) similarly highlights the importance of Becker's rational choice theory when exploring the surge of hate crimes following the 2016 Brexit vote. Carr et al. (2020, p. 31) suggests the decision to leave the European Union led to a "re-evaluation of society's tolerance for racism", resulting in the "expected social costs of committing a hate crime" to decrease, which in turn led to a significant increase in race and religious hate crimes in the immediate aftermath of the referendum vote (Carr et al. 2020, p. 31).

Resource Threat – Employment and Increase of Ethnic Minorities

The element of inter-ethnic social contact is a theme that repeatedly appears within the resource threat literature (Blalock, 1967; Blau, 1977; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Nagel, 1995; Quillian, 1995). For instance, Blalock's (1967) thesis on racial threat suggests that an increase of minority groups results in social contact between the majority and minority groups to become more frequent, this intensifies the perceived threat to economic well-being and provides the majority group members with the justification to discriminate against the minority group. Blau (1977) also suggests that if interracial frictions are relative to the frequency of interracial encounters, then racial hate crimes should be greater in racially heterogeneous spaces (Blau, 1977, as cited in Green et al. 1998, p. 374). Quillian (1995) provides a further invaluable dimension to racial threat theory by testing population data with survey results on

attitudes towards immigrants and racial minorities. As a result, Quillian (1995, p. 606) was able to explore prejudice as a response to perceived group threat and discovered that the relative size of the immigrant group or racial minority, together with a poor economic situation, for instance a weak job market, can strongly influence the degree of prejudice expressed by a dominant group. Quillian (1995) goes as far as to argue that the individual characteristics alone are not sufficient when explaining variations in prejudice and suggests that the relative size of the minority groups and the economic situation provides a better predictor of prejudice.

Drawing on the insights of Blalock (1967) and Quillian (1995) we can better understand the potential mechanisms at play when exploring the effects of employment. Through adopting this rationale, we can reasonably argue that the positive association between increased levels of race and religious hate crime with higher rates of ethnic minorities in employment is in part owed to the rise of inter-ethnic encounters encompassing the sphere of work which in turn intensifies the perceived threat to the economic well-being of the majority group members, providing support for H3c. Ethnic minorities and those with a migrant background are also more likely to find themselves within precarious employment, such as, zero-hours contracts, low-paid self-employment or agency work (Bowyer and Henderson, 2020; Buckingham et al. 2020). This relatively new form of working arrangement which began to emerge between the mid-1970s and 1980s has become increasingly common since the start of the millennium (Benach et al. 2014; Buckingham et al. 2020; Mayhew and Quinlan, 2002). Recent figures suggest nearly twelve per cent of Britain's workforce are caught in this category of work (Trades Union Congress, 2018). Such examples of insecure and atypical forms of work have been linked to low pay, inability to progress, lack of autonomy *and* vulnerability to increased levels of violence (Mayhew and Quinlan, 2002; Scottish Government, 2021). Mayhew and Quinlan (2002) and Vézina et al. (2011) for instance revealed workers in precarious employment are particularly vulnerable to increased levels of violence, sexual harassment,

bullying and intimidation. Research commissioned by the Australian Council of Trade Unions (2012) found foreign born individuals in precarious work are increasingly vulnerable to workplace violence. It is suggested that the relationship between this form of employment and patterns of occupational friction and violence may be due to increased competition for work or delays to task completion due to other workers (Mayhew and Quinlan, 2002). Considering the risks that precarious employment presents we can furthermore reasonably argue that the increased likelihood of ethnic minorities being trapped in this category of employment, where competition for job security is innate, has positioned them at greater risk of being perceived as a threat to economic well-being by the dominant group and so have become more vulnerable to discrimination and hate crime.

Work by Garland and Treadwell (2010; 2012) supports this notion, arguing that the feelings of competition by the dominant group, at a time of great economic inequality and growth in precarious employment, forms an integral motivation behind the antagonism towards religious and ethnic minorities. The ethnographic study which explored the dynamics of the English Defence League (EDL) and its supporters, draws links between the violence committed by the EDL and the collapse of many industries and the subsequent rise of precarious work (Treadwell, 2012). The research also claimed that much of the hostility, resentment, and fury within the EDL was triggered by the perceived threat to limited local resources in areas of intense economic competition and the proximity between the social class of the typical EDL supporter, namely the marginalised and disenfranchised White working class, and that of the racial and religious minority groups they were targeting, predominantly British Asian Muslims (Garland and Treadwell, 2010 and 2012). It was also apparent that much of the EDL supporters were situated where a large ethnic and religious minority population was found, namely British Asian Muslims (Garland and Treadwell, 2012). We can draw clear parallels between the findings in Garland and Treadwell's (2010 and 2012) ethnographic research and resource threat

literature. For instance, EDL supporters were typically situated in areas with a large ethnic minority population, experiencing significant economic insecurity and maintained there to be a clear threat to economic resources.

The UK's political leaders and popular press were deemed pivotal to the rise of the EDL (Garland and Treadwell, 2012). For instance, the Islamophobic rhetoric adopted by the EDL did not develop within a vacuum but transpired at a time when the political elite adopted an increasingly intolerant approach to multiculturalism at the same time the media increasingly employed discriminatory language towards migrants and Muslims (*ibid.*). It is this increased use of discriminatory language or process of 'othering' within the press that the EDL utilised, allowing them to effectively tap into the "frustrations of a disenfranchised section of the White working class whose grievances arise from a dense tapestry of social, economic and cultural conditions and neglect" (Garland and Treadwell, 2012, p. 6). The scapegoating of migrants and minorities through capitalising on the politics of 'othering', we believe, is an important element to the recent surge in hate crime and is discussed later in more depth.

The study also reveals that the increased visibility of ethnic minorities through the close geographical proximity and proximity to the social class of the EDL supporter, not only increased the threat perceived by the majority group, but also the targetability of the potential victim, which often resulted in hate violence on the streets in these typically inner-city neighbourhoods (*ibid.*). In line with Garland and Treadwell's (2012) insight surrounding the 'availability' factor of the potential victim, a proportion of hate crimes in London might simply be a result of the increased potential for reporting a RRHC in boroughs where there is a higher availability of a potential target population (i.e. ethno-religious minorities). Garland and Treadwell's (2012) textual analysis also provides a scope to draw tentative conclusions to why lower levels of race and religious hate crime typically occur in areas with higher levels of children living in all out-of-work benefit claimant households, as highlighted in Models 1 and

5 of this study. One possible explanation is that unemployment reduces the need for people to leave their homes and the financial ability to enjoy recreational activities, and so the likelihood of interracial encounters is reduced and consequently rates of criminal victimisation.

The data used in this study is unfortunately unable to fully illuminate the racial/religious diversity within London's occupations, preventing this study to accurately assert that the levels of ethnic minorities in employment are aligned with greater levels of inter-ethnic social contact. However, work by Catney and Sabater (2015, p. 72) helps us to draw more closely to this assumption. In their study employing census data to explore ethnic minority disadvantage in the labour market in England and Wales, Catney and Sabater (2015) discovered ethnic minority groups occupied separate economic niches compared to their White counterparts. However, the study revealed that areas with the largest concentrations of ethnic minorities, namely London, experienced lower levels of occupational segregation across major professions (Catney and Sabater, 2015, p. 74). In addition, a contentious report recently released by the Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities (2021, p. 112) also provides an indication that such racial niches are becoming less distinct with most ethnic minorities "now broadly level with the White ethnic group in terms of occupational class". The increased upward social mobility of ethnic minorities which the report emphatically reports is mainly due to the opportunities afforded by the state school system and access to higher education. Farley (1984) found such reduced racial gaps in education and training in the US has enhanced competition for the same jobs. Jacobs and Wood (1999, p. 161) subsequently argues "as one racial group advances economically and obtains more jobs, employment opportunities for the other group must diminish". These findings provide reasonable support for the assumption that greater levels of ethnic minorities in employment provide a reliable indicator of increased levels of workplace racial diversity and inter-ethnic encounters in contemporary London.

A poor economic situation is a further component which determines the degree of prejudice expressed by the dominant group and must be sought if resource threat theory is to form any elucidation to London's hate crime figures (Quillian, 1995, p. 606). Whilst the data employed in this study solely originates from London's thirty-two boroughs, an accurate understanding of the economic climate in the United Kingdom can nevertheless be appreciated through desk-based research. During the time frame of this study the UK was reeling from a global economic crisis caused by the great recession in 2008. As a result, the Conservative-Liberal Democratic coalition government led by former prime minister David Cameron introduced a set of heavily criticised fiscal policies known as austerity measures in 2011 with the aim to reduce government deficit (O'Rourke, 2010). The so-called austerity measures consisted of severe cuts to welfare, housing subsidies and social services (Mueller, 2019) and by 2017 had inflicted a series of profound and life changing impacts on the general public (Breadline Research, 2021; Toynbee and Walker, 2020). The United Kingdom witnessed substantial growths in food insecurity and food bank use between 2008 and 2018 with the UK's largest food bank charity recording a 5,146 per cent increase in emergency food parcels distributions – distributing 1.33 million food parcels in 2018 compared to roughly 26,000 in 2008 (Human Rights Watch, 2019; Stewart, 2021). A report published by the Centre for Cities (2019) provides a comprehensive analysis of the government's austerity policies on UK cities and revealed London was "by far the hardest hit" with the capital accounting for "30 per cent of all cuts in Britain, despite accounting for 16 per cent of the population" (Centre for Cities, 2019, p. 16). Taylor (2015) has described the effects of the austerity measures as a 'vast social cleansing' of inner London where tens of thousands of poor families have been forced to leave their homes for other areas of the capital or even further afield. The opinion piece published in an opposition newspaper suggests cuts in housing benefit, the introduction of the benefit cap and plans to sell off social housing have left "large parts of the capital as the preserve of the

rich" (*ibid.*). During the time period covered by this study the UK was experiencing the consequences of a global economic crisis, which, in line with Quillian's (1995) group threat theory, is likely to increase racial prejudice and levels of hate crime.

The findings of this study also reveal that higher levels of race and religious hate crimes in London are increasingly associated with settled migrants and the children and grandchildren of migrants rather than specifically new migrants, providing support for H3b. This assertion is underpinned in Models 1, 2 and 3 which repeatedly reveal immigration to have no significant association with race and religious hate crime figures and furthermore in Models 1, 4 and 5 which reveal a positive association between higher levels of race and religious hate crime and residents identifying as non-White-British. To appreciate the mechanisms behind this association would require further research, however, work by Haque (2017) enables this study to draw provisional interpretations. According to Haque (2017) the anti-immigration rhetoric driven by political leaders and the media have knowingly blurred the lines between new migrants and established ethnic minority and European populations who have lived in the UK for decades. It is this public discourse which has often been hostile that has meant settled Eastern European and ethnic minority populations have become "victims of anti-immigration resentment against newer migrants" (*ibid.*). This Haque (2017) argues has reflected in the recent surge of racial and religious hate crimes in England and Wales.

In sum, the significant association between hate crime rates with the increase of ethnic minority group members as a proportion of population and as a rate of employment, at a time when the UK was reeling from an economic disaster, provides strong support for the hypotheses set out by resource threat theorists. However, in addition to this finding our study contributes a significant understanding of hate crime causation in the United Kingdom and its relationship with employment figures. Whilst Model 5 revealed no significant association between total employment rates and hate crime figures, a finding very much in line with

previous work by Dustmann et al. (2011) and Schilter (2018), the findings in this study revealed that it is only when we probe further into the data and explore the employment rate of ethnic minorities a significant association becomes apparent. This invaluable insight into hate crime figures in the UK provides a unique understanding to the potential drivers of race and religious hate crime and uncovers an important opportunity for future investigation. However, whilst this discovery provides a unique insight into hate crime in the UK, Jacobs and Wood (1999, p. 177) found comparable results in the United States, revealing racial unemployment ratios provided a significant explanation to interracial killings, whilst total unemployment rates simply did not. The study suggested the findings provide a clear indication that "economic rivalries lead to greater interracial violence" (Jacobs and Wood, 1999, p. 157).

Green and colleagues (1998) on the other hand contradict our findings through revealing no association between anti-black hate crime and race specific employment. However, the authors of the report remain cautious and maintain economic conditions may still be significant predictors of hate crime. They note, "the relationship between economic discontent and intergroup aggression may hinge…on the ways in which political leaders and organisations frame and mobilise such grievances" (Green et al. 1998, p. 89). The claim posited by Green et al. (1998) naturally draws our attention to the 2016 United Kingdom European Union membership referendum and the way in which the leave campaign created scapegoats of migrants and minorities through capitalising on the politics of 'othering' (Baker, 2020; Coulter, 2019; Harmer and Lumsden, 2019; Looney, 2017; Mahmud, 2021). The term 'othering' is a form of discriminatory language which creates an 'us' and 'them' mentality through reducing the so-called inferior group, or 'other', to a few negative characteristics (Baker, 2020; Jensen, 2011; Lister, 2004; Riggins, 1997).

Jensen (2011, p. 65) defines 'othering' as:

> "Discursive processes by which powerful groups, who may or may not make up a numerical majority, define subordinate groups into existence in a reductionist way which ascribe problematic and/or inferior characteristics to these subordinate groups. Such discursive processes affirm the legitimacy and superiority of the powerful and condition identity formation among the subordinate."

The employment of such toxic discriminatory practices was once firmly located at the fringes of UK politics; however, the process of 'othering' is now argued to form an undercurrent in Britain's mainstream political rhetoric and policies (Looney, 2017). This intensification was increasingly visible during the lead up and aftermath of the UK referendum where politicians placed blame on migrants and minorities for the UK's current economic and social problems (Looney, 2017; Mahmud, 2021; Morrison, 2019). The question of Turkey's future membership with the European Union was a surprisingly saliant one with leave campaigners embarking on a process of 'othering' and characterising Turkey and its citizens as an imminent threat to the UK's economy, national security, and identity (Coulter, 2019). Coulter (2019) draws attention to the campaigning material distributed by the leave campaign and its deliberate intention of depicting Turkey's citizens as dangerous, violent, unstable, and culturally inferior. This was partly achieved by drawing an association between Turkey's strong Islamic roots and social disorder through incorporating images of mosques alongside graffiti and a police presence (*ibid.*). Further examples of highly biased material distributed at the time of the EU referendum and highlighted within the study indicated a narrative that professed the mass migration of 'culturally inferior Turkish' citizens would inevitably lead to a significant strain on the UK economy and welfare state (*ibid.*). This exaggerated and

manipulative one-sided attack, only recognising the negative aspects of migration, at a time when Britain was experiencing austerity, signals a 'moral panic' took hold during the UK referendum (Coulter, 2019) and furthermore was able to create an environment that normalised hatred towards migrants, causing whole communities to turn against each other (Haque, 2017).

However, the increased employment of 'othering' was not limited to the political elite but also within a powerful section of Britain's mainstream media (Looney, 2017; Tong and Zuo, 2019; Van Der Zwet et al. 2020). Public discourse within the tabloid media for instance turned increasingly hostile towards Polish migrants in the run up to the UK referendum (Rzepnikowska, 2019). Polish migrants were once constructed by some media as 'desirable' through emphasising their strong work ethics, value for money and thoroughness (*ibid.*). However, a rhetorical shift observed at the time of the economic crisis in 2008 began to construct Polish migrants as a threat to jobs and social services (*ibid.*). This intensification was most noticeable in the run up to the UK referendum with the reporting of migration more than tripling, of which a significant proportion were overwhelmingly negative and directed at Polish migrants (*ibid.*). Rzepnikowska's (2019) study in which interviewed Polish migrant women in Manchester between 2012 and 2018 believed the populist media had successfully constructed Polish nationals as the 'new Other' and subsequently brought about the increased hostility towards Poles during the UK referendum. Van Der Zwet et al. (2020, p. 528) similarly explored the role of the media in relation to 'othering' those of a different background, nationality, or religion during the Brexit referendum and revealed a hostile British media aided and abetted the increase of negative attitudes towards EU nationals through the very process of 'othering'. Tong and Zuo (2019) provides further support a moral panic(s) over EU migrants occurred during the UK referendum through analysing newspaper publications between 2011 and 2016. Their study revealed a section of Britain's right-wing press, namely the Sun and Daily Telegraph, increasingly 'othered' the European Union through constructing moral panics of

EU migrants (Tong and Zuo, 2019). Amnesty International (2017, p. 14) argues such divisive and dehumanizing rhetoric of which casts "collective responsibility for social and economic ills onto particular groups, often ethnic or religious minorities" gives "free rein to discrimination and hate crimes".

Based on the existing literature discussed above there is scope to draw tentative conclusions about the influential role of the media and political elite on the relationship between economic discontent and intergroup aggression observed in Greater London. The process of 'othering' clearly adopted by the leave campaign and a powerful section of the media effectively reduced migrants and minorities to a few negative stereotypes, one evidently being the threat to British jobs, which in turn created an atmosphere of economic discontent within whole communities, ultimately normalising hatred towards racial and religious minorities. The economic crisis and subsequent austerity measures appeared once more to play an important role in influencing the degree of prejudice expressed by the dominant group through aiding political leaders and the media to construct a constant narrative in which sustained the moral panics over migrants, which, in line with Quillian's (1995) group threat theory, is once more likely to increase racial prejudice and levels of hate crime.

This provisional interpretation is bolstered by a recent study by Gavin (2018) who analysed survey data and media coverage of the UK referendum, immigration and the economy to determine the influential role of the media on public attitude. The study revealed that the media can impact attitudinal development, particularly where (1) "the public are dependent on coverage", (2) "have weak partisan predispositions", or (3) "where reporting is uniform or near-uniform across a range of sources" (Gavin, 2018, p. 840). The study also revealed that the media has a powerful ability to reinforce pre-existing attitudes and the capacity to compound public misconceptions (*ibid.*). Therefore, if "reinforcement is the media's only impact" the repercussions can be "consequential, and sometimes profound" (Gavin, 2018, p. 840).

However, studies exploring the influence of the press in altering the attitudes and beliefs of its readers is not a new line of enquiry. Garner et al. (2009) for instance explored the sources of resentment and perceptions of ethnic minorities in England and revealed the anxieties surrounding the perceived competition for resources, such as employment, were exacerbated by the misinformation and unhelpful messages published within the print media. Ladd and Lenz (2009) followed a rather different approach through exploring the influence of the media in the run up to the 1997 UK general election and revealed that the endorsement switch to the Labour Party by several prominent British newspapers had a powerful influence on the political orientation and voting behaviours of their readers.

Defended Neighbourhood – Economic Well-being

Defended neighbourhood theorists assume hate crimes are more likely to transpire in communities with greater economic stability, as formulated in H2d, in addition to higher levels of racial homogeneity and increased in-flows of migrant racial outsiders (Suttles, 1972). According to Lyons (2007) a community boasting strong economic capital generates a general understanding of self-worth which results in the rationale for self-protection. To determine whether high levels of hate crime correlate with boroughs experiencing greater economic stability this study employed two economic indicators: GDP per capita and median household income. Whilst our findings illustrated GDP per capita fails to provide a consistently significant effect on race and religious hate crime in London, Models 2 and 4 demonstrate median household income provides a more reliable indication of the economic conditions conducive to race and religious hate crime. This finding is in line with recent work conducted by Schilter (2018) who found higher income proxies, i.e. the share of people with formal qualifications, to be associated to areas with greater increases of hate crime after the UK referendum vote. It is suggested the strong correlation between wealth and hate crime figures may be due to economic opportunities and assets being more desirable in wealthier areas, and

therefore, are arguably more worthy of defending so to reduce competition (Schilter, 2018, p. 23). It is whilst holding this understanding that Schilter (2018, p. 23) echoes the arguments posited by Mitra & Ray (2014) and suggests "violence against an opposing group is more lucrative in wealthier areas if the objective is to drive immigrants away to obtain access to economic opportunities (e.g. jobs) or assets (e.g. flats)". However, whilst this contribution resonates with sentiments of defended neighbourhood theory the threat to material resources is more consistent with assumptions fostered by resource threat theorists, providing a further sign that resource threat may be performing a significant role in driving London's hate crime. Moreover, the assumption posited by Schilter (2018) is based solely on formal qualifications. We suggest median household income adopted in our study provides a more reliable indicator of economic wealth and affords a robust and significant contribution to Schilter's (2018) existing work.

A further central component of defended neighbourhood theory is the perceived threat to traditions, informal relations and distinct, cultural identity or values, such as unfamiliar religious practices or spoken language (Suttles, 1972). However, in contrast to the assertions set out by defended neighbourhood theory and formulated in H2c, Model 2 reveals no association between linguistic diversity and levels of hate crime. Moreover, Suttles (1972) argues defended neighbourhood is very much a product limited to densely populated and highly transient sections of society. However, Models 1 and 5 reveal no significant association between population per square kilometre or domestic out-migration, once more contradicting these assertions, challenging the idea that defended neighbourhood theory forms a reliable elucidation to London's hate crime figures. This is compounded by the fact migration is recurrently found to have no significant association with racial and religious hostility (Models 1, 2 and 3) and furthermore that race and religious hate crime figures are found to decline in

increasingly homogenous areas, again contradicting the assertions set out by defended neighbourhood theorists (Models 1-5).

International and Domestic Migration

Neither international in-migration nor domestic out-migration show any signs of affecting the prevalence of race and religious hate crime in Greater London. As a result, it is reasonable to suggest recent increases in immigration might not be perceived as a threat to identity or scarce resources to the extent to trigger an increase of hate crime in London as hypothesised by defended neighbourhood and resource threat theory in H2b and H3b. We also contend high residential turnover through greater levels of migration failed to have a detrimental effect on social ties, relationships and informal social controls to the extent London's communities were unable to regulate unfavourable behaviours such as hate crime, as hypothesised by social disorganisation theory and formulated in H1a.

In contrast, we adopt the arguments posited by Lymperopoulou (2019) and suggest a multitude of compositional differences embracing immigration are constantly interacting and evolving which in turn determines an area's levels of social cohesion. For instance, the study discovered heterogeneous areas which have attracted diverse groups of migrants are in general more positive towards immigration and bestow higher levels of social cohesion. According to Lymperopoulou (2019, p. 831) community anxieties attributed to the arrival of migrants can be mitigated "since local agencies and service providers are likely to have experience in dealing with pressures associated with the arrival of new groups and adjust more quickly to the growing demand for services". This pre-existing support and community infrastructure is therefore able to enhance the well-being of newcomers, particularly during the early stages of migration by shielding them from alienation and discrimination (Lymperopoulou, 2019, p. 831).

This line of reasoning is similarly emphasised by Green et al. (2001, p. 490) who claim, as the "familiarity [of migrants] defuses contempt and communities redefine their identity to include new members, the hostility that greeted the first significant group of newcomers gives way to acceptance or indifference, and those prone to violence lose the active encouragement or passive acceptance of their community". It is owed to Lymperopoulou (2019) and Green et al. (2001) that we argue London's long history of welcoming migrants has helped control community tensions encircling the arrival of new migrants we see today, bringing about an element of appreciation and acceptance to the community's new additions. This claim is compounded by a recent study by Wessendorf (2019, p. 15) who studied the reactions of ethnic minorities to newcomers in East London and discovered second generational migrants showed empathy towards the new arrivals due to their understanding of the struggles their parents endured.

The low level of support for Brexit in areas with high proportions of migrants, though tangential, provides further support for this assertion. An article published shortly after the Brexit vote revealed that the lowest Leave votes were mainly in areas with high non UK-born populations (Lawton and Ackrill, 2016). Eight of the top ten districts with the lowest Leave vote and highest percentage of non-UK residents were in London (*ibid.)*. Twenty-five per cent of Haringey for instance voted leave despite nearly forty-five per cent of its residents recorded as having been born abroad (*ibid.)*. Lawton and Ackrill (2016) concludes by suggesting that whilst large populations of migrants were not present in areas which typically voted Leave, they were blamed for the current economic difficulties experienced by many locals. Political commentators since the vote argue that it was the fear of immigration that drove the leave victory – and not immigration itself (Lister, 2016; Travis, 2016).

Our discovery however contradicts recent findings by Schilter (2018) who found a greater recent immigrant share to be related to a larger increase in race and religious hate crime.

However, this disparity we claim is due to the variations in methods. Whereas our study generates a four-point timeseries between 2011 and 2017 for each London borough Schilter (2018) employs census data from the 2011 Census covering a single point in time. We argue the method in which we have employed provides a more accurate and reliable account of the mechanisms at play and therefore disparities between the two findings are likely to be generated.

Summary

In summary, this study's findings reveal that social disorganisation theory (H1) and defended neighbourhood theory (H2) are least applicable when exploring the drivers of race and religious hate crime in Greater London. This is not to suggest however that these ecological theories are completely futile. For instance, all relevant effect signs consistently identify racial heterogeneity to be significantly associated with greater levels of hate crime, supporting H1b. However, despite these findings, linguistic diversity appears to have no statistically significant association with higher levels of hate crime; demonstrating that cultural differences and language incompatibilities are not behind the rise of hate crime in London. Instead, we echo claims by Dustmann et al. (2011) and suggest that the increase of inter-ethnic contacts caused by greater racial heterogeneity acts as a catalyst in driving hostile behaviour. Economic disadvantage forms a central element to social disorganisation theory; however, the findings are more in line with defended neighbourhood theory, and show increased economic disadvantage is in fact associated with fewer cases of hate crime. In light of this finding and a simple bivariate analysis revealing a positive correlation between economic disadvantage and police presence we suggest, though tentatively, that the heightened police presence in increasingly economically disadvantage boroughs may have caused a deterrent to potential perpetrators, subsequently resulting in lower levels of hate crime.

There is also insufficient evidence to suggest defended neighbourhood theory provides a robust and comprehensive explanation to London's alarming hate crime rates. Despite this study revealing a significant and positive association between higher levels of hate crime and greater economic stability, an expectation formulated in H2d, recent literature (Schilter, 2018) suggests this may have been caused by economic opportunities and assets being more desirable in wealthier areas, and therefore, are arguably more worthy of defending so to reduce competition. However, the threat to economic resources as described resonates more with resource threat theory as opposed to defended neighbourhood theory, casting doubts that defended neighbourhood forms any explanation to London's hate crime levels.

Resource threat theory on the other hand provides the most robust explanation to London's hate crime levels. However, the premise assumed by the authors of this tradition once more fails to provide a comprehensive explanation of race and religious hate crime due to H3a not being met. The findings firstly reveal that higher levels of race and religious hate crime in London are increasingly associated with settled migrants and their descendants rather than specifically new migrants. This assertion is partly underpinned by this study's analysis consistently revealing a positive association between higher levels of race and religious hate crime and residents identifying as non-White-British as opposed to in-migration levels, in line with H3b. Here we echo the assumptions by Haque (2017) and tentatively assert that this finding is the result of political leaders and the media knowingly blurring the lines between new migrants and established ethnic minority and European populations through driving anti-immigration rhetoric.

Furthermore, the positive association between increased levels of hate crime with higher rates of ethnic minorities in employment, an indicator of economic competition, we argue is in part owed to the rise of inter-ethnic encounters encompassing the sphere of work, which subsequently intensifies the perceived threat to the economic well-being of the

homogenous group. However, owed to the findings by Garland and Treadwell (2010 and 2012) and others this study also contends that the rise of precarious employment and the increased likelihood of ethnic minorities being trapped in this increasingly common category of employment, where competition for job security is inherent, has placed ethnic minority groups at greater risk of being perceived as an economic threat by the homogenous group and so have become more vulnerable to hate crime.

However, this perceived economic threat posed by migrants and ethnic minorities has not been made within a vacuum, but instead is consistent with the ways in which political leaders and the UK press have increasingly mobilised such grievances through scapegoating migrants for the UK's current economic problems. This study contends that the inflammatory language used by a powerful section of the media and political elite has reduced migrants and minorities to a few negative stereotypes at a time when the UK has been reeling from an economic crisis, creating an atmosphere of economic discontent and ultimately normalising hatred towards ethnic minorities through capitalising on the politics of 'othering'.

International in-migration consistently fails to show any signs of affecting the prevalence of race and religious hate crime in Greater London. In line with arguments posited by Lymperopoulou (2019) and Green et al. (2001) we suggest that London's extensive history of receiving migrants has helped drive down community tensions encircling the arrival of newcomers we see today, bringing about an element of appreciation and acceptance to the community's new additions. This assertion is supported by the 2016 Brexit vote which found areas with higher proportions of migrants generally demonstrated little support for the Leave campaign; a campaign driven by concerns over migration levels and the alleged economic and social threats posed by migration (Lawton and Ackrill, 2016; Lister, 2016; Travis, 2016).

Conclusion

Hate crime is a significant and growing problem in the United Kingdom, with London experiencing the highest numbers of offences than any other region in England and Wales. However, our understanding of the ecological drivers of hate crime is very much in its infancy in comparison to the United States for instance, which began to make important advancements during the early 1990s. The aim of this study is consequently to develop our existing knowledge encompassing the drivers of hate crime in London and to ascertain whether the well-established ecological theories of hate crime derived and typically employed in the US are applicable in a UK context.

Contrary to assertions posited by defended neighbourhood and social disorganisation theorists, this study's analysis finds little evidence to suggest that these two theoretical perspectives form a comprehensive explanation to Greater London's hate crime problem. We find somewhat stronger evidence however that resource threat theory provides a more robust explanation. This study's findings for instance demonstrate that hate crimes are more likely to take place in boroughs where ethnic minorities increasingly constitute a larger proportion of total population and form a larger share of those in employment. This result is consistent with resource threat literature, particularly that of Blalock (1967), which suggests that an increase of minority groups results in more frequent social contact between the majority and minority groups, which in intensifies the perceived threat to economic well-being and provides the homogeneous group with the justification to discriminate against racial minorities. We also contend that the rise of precarious employment since the millennium and the increased likelihood of ethnic minorities being trapped in this increasingly common category of employment, where competition for job security is inherent, places ethnic minorities at greater risk of being perceived as an economic threat by the homogenous group and so become increasingly vulnerable to discrimination and hate crime. Despite these findings, the analysis

fails to reveal a positive association between higher levels of hate crime and increased levels of homogenous (White-British) populations, an expectation assumed by resource threat theorists, nullifying H3a. This prevents resource threat theory forming a comprehensive explanation to London's hate crime problem.

Median household income consistently provides a reliable indication of the economic conditions conducive to higher levels of race and religious hate crime at borough level. However, whilst this finding initially appears to be more consistent with defended neighbourhood theory, recent work by Schilter (2018) causes this study to tentatively draw away from such assertion. Suggesting that the economic opportunities and assets in wealthier areas are more desirable, and therefore, are arguably more worthy of defending from 'outside' economic competitors – a contention however more in line with resource threat theory.

We also find a significant positive linear relationship between race and religious hate crime and the percentage of population identified as foreign-born. However, we find no evidence to suggest recent international in-migration affects the prevalence of hate crimes in Greater London. Here, we consider Lymperopoulou (2019) and Green et al. (2001) and suggest that London's extensive history of receiving migrants has helped control community tensions encircling the arrival of newcomers. We find no evidence to suggest a significant association between London's hate crime levels and linguistic diversity, demonstrating that cultural differences and language incompatibilities are not behind the rise of hate crime in the capital.

Economic disadvantage on the other hand is found to have a significant yet negative relationship with recorded hate crime. Where family households receiving benefits constitutes a larger proportion at borough level, hate crimes against ethnic and religious minorities are less frequent. Though the theoretical framework initially adopted within this study fails to provide any explanation to this finding, Howard Becker's rational choice theory offers some interpretation. In light of Becker's theoretical input and a simple bivariate analysis we suggest,

though tentatively, that the heightened police presence in increasingly economically disadvantaged boroughs may have caused potential perpetrators to reassess the costs of committing a hate crime, subsequently resulting in lower levels of hostility directed towards ethnic and religious minorities. Future improvements in available data encompassing police presence, expenditure and training dedicated to hate crime would enable future studies to substantiate this assertion and enhance our understanding of the social factors driving hate crime across London. Population per square kilometre, public perception of social integration, domestic migration and total employment all fail to exhibit any statistical significance within the fixed effects estimations.

In addition to these key findings, this study yields significant contributions to hate crime literature in the UK. While the findings reveal no significant association between total employment rates and hate crime figures, a finding very much in line with previous work (Dustmann et al. 2011; Schilter, 2018), the analysis reveals that it is only when we probe further into the data and explore the employment rate of ethnic minorities that a significant association becomes apparent. This invaluable insight into hate crime figures in the UK provides a unique understanding to the potential drivers of race and religious hate crime and uncovers an important opportunity for future investigation.

Median household income is a further economic indicator found to be statistically significant and again yields substantial contributions to recent hate crime literature. Schilter (2018) for instance recently found higher income proxies to be similarly associated to areas with greater increases of hate crime, however employed the share of people with formal qualifications as an indicator of wealth. We suggest median household income adopted in this study provides a more reliable indicator of economic wealth and affords a robust and significant contribution to Schilter's (2018) existing work. Our findings combined however challenge the

wide assumption that hate crimes are more likely to occur in areas of deprivation as opposed to economic advantage.

We consider the results within this study to be robust given that ordinary least squares (OLS) and feasible generalised least squares (GLS) guards against inefficient and misleading inferences caused where explanatory variables are likely to hold a degree of heteroskedasticity, serial and cross-sectional correlation. We further consider the employment of fixed effects modelling to provide increasingly reliable results when exploring change over time as opposed to random effects modelling; this was determined by running the Hausman test. This study however does hold some limitations. Immigration rates for instance solely encompasses legal migrants and fails to appreciate the level of undocumented migrants residing in Greater London. Recent estimations suggest roughly four hundred thousand undocumented migrants currently live in London (Jolly, 2020); this equates to approximately one in ten of those born abroad. Due to the shortage of reliable data encompassing this area of immigration, the validity of the findings encompassing in-migration rates is therefore strongly reliant on the basic assumption that undocumented migrants share similar settlement patterns as documented migrants. As the breadth of available data continues to improve, such associations between undocumented migrants and hate crime levels could be established in future research.

Limiting this study to Greater London undoubtably enhances the robustness of the findings. However, consequently we are unfortunately unable to assert the generalisability of the findings to rest of the United Kingdom. It is clear from literature emanating from other countries, namely the US and Germany, that there are no single set of circumstances driving race and religious hate crime; it would therefore be simply erroneous to suggest the drivers of hate crime in London are generalisable to other parts of the country. An important avenue of future research is therefore to expand the study location to incorporate each borough in England

and Wales and establish whether the ecological drivers of hate crime found in London are emulated outside of the capital.

We further suggest that future research incorporates additional independent variables. A rudimentary analysis within this study for instance reveals the level of transient daytime population to be a potential predictor of increased levels of hate crime and should therefore form an additional avenue of future investigation. Moreover, we reasonably argue that the increased likelihood of ethnic minorities being trapped in precarious employment, positions ethnic minorities at greater risk of discrimination and hate crime. We anticipate that the continued improvements in data would enable future research to examine the association between precarious employment and hate crime levels. This would provide a better understanding of the tentative conclusions posited in this study.

In summary, this study shows that the perceived threat to economic resources posed by ethnic minorities and migrants provides the most robust explanation to London's hate crime levels. Whilst the findings fail to meet each hypothesis outlined by resource threat theory the concept provides an important contribution in enhancing our understanding of hate crime and the motivations possessed by hate crime perpetrators. This finding highlights the importance of reducing the perceived threat held by the public, particularly during periods of economic instability and areas experiencing increased levels of ethnic minorities. In line with existing literature discussed in the previous chapter (Looney, 2017; Mahmud, 2021; Morrison, 2019; Tong and Zuo, 2019; Van Der Zwet et al. 2020), we suggest the 'othering' of migrants and ethnic minorities for the UK's economic ills, by a powerful section of Britain's media and political elite, are likely to have played an influential role in fuelling the rise of hostility towards race and religious minorities. This group of persuasive political leaders and organisations should be reminded of their influential position and the potential detrimental effects when framing ethnic minorities and migrants as an economic threat towards the UK's homogeneous

group – grievances which have increasingly consisted of exaggerated, manipulative one-sided attacks, peppered with discriminatory language and negative stereotypes.

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Appendices

Appendix 1

Table 1: List of employed variables

Description	Year	Source
Hate crime: Number of race and religious hate crimes	2020b	Metropolitan Police Service
Population: Total population per 1000 resident population	2018	Greater London Authority
Population: Total population per square kilometre per 1000 resident population	2018	Greater London Authority
Population by ethnicity: Proportion of White-British population	2017	Greater London Authority
Population by ethnicity: Proportion of Non-White-British population	2017	Greater London Authority
Population by religion: Proportion of religious minority population	2019	Greater London Authority
Linguistic diversity: Proportion of pupils with English as an additional language (primary and secondary)	2018	Department for Education and Skills
Country of birth: Non-UK born per 1000 resident population	2019a	Office for National Statistics
Child poverty: Proportion of children living in all out-of-work benefit claimant households (age 0-18)	2019a	Department for Work and Pensions
Benefit claimants: Proportion of population claiming job seekers allowance	2019b	Department for Work and Pensions
Social renting: Proportion of households renting from local authority or housing association	2019b	Office for National Statistics
Homeowner: Proportion of households that own home outright	2019b	Office for National Statistics
Income: Median household weekly income in £100s	2019	Official Labour Market Statistics
Wealth: GDP per capita at current market prices figures per £1000	2019c	Office for National Statistics
Crime: All recorded crime per 1000 resident population	2020d	Metropolitan Police Service
Employment: Proportion of population in employment	2020a	Office for National Statistics
Employment: Proportion of White UK-born population in employment (working age)	2020b	Office for National Statistics
Employment: Proportion of White not UK-born population in employment (working age)	2020b	Office for National Statistics
Employment: Proportion of ethnic minority UK-born population in employment (working age)	2020b	Office for National Statistics
Employment: Proportion of ethnic minority not UK-born population in employment (working age)	2020b	Office for National Statistics
Employment: Proportion of total ethnic minority population in employment (working age)	2020b	Office for National Statistics
International migration: Proportion of total long-term and short-term international in-migration population	2018a 2018b	Office for National Statistics
International migration: Proportion of total long-term international in-migration population	2018b	Office for National Statistics
International migration: Proportion of total long-term international out-migration population	2018b	Office for National Statistics
Domestic migration: Proportion of total domestic in-migration population	2020c	Office for National Statistics
Domestic migration: Proportion of total domestic out-migration population	2020c	Office for National Statistics
Integration: Proportion of population with a positive perception of local social integration	2019	Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime

Appendix 2

Table 15: Model 1 results including Westminster

	m0_fe	m0_be	m0_re	m1t_fe	m1t_be	m1t_re
International in-migration				-0.0525	0.117*	0.0800
				(0.0751)	(0.0471)	(0.0447)
Domestic out-migration				0.0928	-0.0335	0.0978**
				(0.0508)	(0.0352)	(0.0312)
Non-White-British				0.0365*	0.00438	0.0125**
				(0.0165)	(0.00350)	(0.00405)
Benefit households				-0.0408***	0.0345**	-0.0395***
				(0.00640)	(0.0106)	(0.00431)
_cons	5.814***	5.814***	5.814***	5.814***	5.814***	5.814***
	(0.0345)	(0.0674)	(0.0674)	(0.0175)	(0.0431)	(0.0531)
N	128	128	128	128	128	128

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix 3

Table 16: Model 2 results including Westminster

	m0_fe	m0_be	m0_re	m2t_fe	m2t_be	m2t_re
International in-migration				-0.173	0.0769	-0.184*
				(0.0930)	(0.0887)	(0.0801)
White-British				-0.114***	-0.0155	-0.0545***
				(0.0211)	(0.00943)	(0.00959)
Linguistic diversity				-0.0137	-0.00920	-0.0267**
				(0.0199)	(0.00963)	(0.0103)
Median household income				0.229*	-0.0817	0.259**
				(0.0974)	(0.0875)	(0.0788)
GDP per capita				0.0121*	0.00384	0.00891***
				(0.00527)	(0.00219)	(0.00228)
_cons	5.814***	5.814***	5.814***	5.814***	5.814***	5.814***
	(0.0345)	(0.0674)	(0.0674)	(0.0199)	(0.0482)	(0.0628)
N	128	128	128	128	128	128

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix 4

Table 17: Model 3 results including Westminster

	m0_fe	m0_be	m0_re	m3t_fe	m3t_be	m3t_re
International in-migration				-0.0782	0.169*	0.152**
				(0.0800)	(0.0618)	(0.0497)
White-British				-0.0916***	0.00642	-0.00531
				(0.0135)	(0.00769)	(0.00754)
Foreign-born				0.00772*	0.00597	0.00690*
				(0.00330)	(0.00300)	(0.00282)
Ethnic minority employment				0.0163***	0.00427	0.0310***
				(0.00445)	(0.0146)	(0.00458)
_cons	5.814***	5.814***	5.814***	5.814***	5.814***	5.814***
	(0.0345)	(0.0674)	(0.0674)	(0.0196)	(0.0473)	(0.0603)
N	128	128	128	128	128	128

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix 5

Table 18: Model 4 results including Westminster

	m0_fe	m0_be	m0_re	m4t_fe	m4t_be	m4t_re
Non-White-British				0.0921***	0.00906	0.0259***
				(0.0122)	(0.00468)	(0.00368)
Ethnic minority employment				0.0124**	-0.00572	0.0282***
				(0.00466)	(0.0132)	(0.00420)
Median household income				0.219*	-0.0906	0.199**
				(0.0960)	(0.0917)	(0.0725)
GDP per capita				0.00652	0.00445**	0.00428**
				(0.00421)	(0.00144)	(0.00145)
_cons	5.814***	5.814***	5.814***	5.814***	5.814***	5.814***
	(0.0345)	(0.0674)	(0.0674)	(0.0195)	(0.0483)	(0.0578)
N	128	128	128	128	128	128

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix 6

Table 19: Model 5 results including Westminster

	m0_fe	m0_be	m0_re	m5t_fe	m5t_be	m5t_re
Non-White-British				0.0428*	0.00755	0.0156***
				(0.0166)	(0.00413)	(0.00387)
Benefit households				-0.0391**	0.0411*	-0.0332***
				(0.0116)	(0.0160)	(0.00598)
Population per sq km				-0.0164	0.000218	0.0710***
				(0.104)	(0.0240)	(0.0167)
Total employment				0.00932	-0.000870	0.0179*
				(0.00858)	(0.0160)	(0.00812)
Social integration				-0.00479	0.0107	-0.0137
				(0.00671)	(0.0262)	(0.00701)
_cons	5.814***	5.814***	5.814***	5.814***	5.814***	5.814***
	(0.0345)	(0.0674)	(0.0674)	(0.0179)	(0.0484)	(0.0543)
N	128	128	128	128	128	128

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix 7

Table 20: Pearson's product-moment correlation between police numbers and family households receiving out-of-work benefits

Variables	(1)	(2)
(1) Police Numbers	1.000	
(2) Benefit Households	0.715*	1.000
	(0.000)	

**** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1*