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Reconsidering the Presuppositions of the Student-Teacher Selection Process

A Series of Philosophical Investigations

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Submitted in accordance with the requirements for
the degree of Professional Doctorate (EdD)

York St John University

School of Education, Language and Psychology

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Abstract

The Student Teacher selection interview is grounded in a deterministic and reductionist view of teachers and teaching. It attempts to construct statements of judgement about the professional suitability of prospective teachers based on delineated sets of hermetically sealed, abstract teacher attributes and associated demonstrable processes. Via a series of philosophical investigations, I attempt to elucidate interactions between multiple vectors of activity which reveal the intersecting processes of language, thought, and being a teacher. I express doubt in the reliability of any attribution of character traits and in presuppositions that these can be expressed as predictive of behaviour in ways that are consistent across variations in situation and everyday practice. This traceable genetic blueprint is representative of modernity's desire for unitary, totalising truths, stability and system. It classifies and grades and in doing so assumes its authority. Its attempt at rational analysis seeks to predict and in so doing to ultimately control the profession. This excludes moral complexity, ambiguity and contingency within the process, and places a limit on possibility. I propose that our mistake is to construe Being-a-Teacher as consisting mental substances, innate capacities of thought, which determine the physical actions of the teacher. Methods of interview presuppose that those private tendencies are made observable 'out loud'. The narrative this error constructs, of a simplified way of speaking about cognition and behaviour, of naïve self-conceptions, of subjectivity and consciousness is only a partial description and conceals more than it discloses. Above all it resists easy inscription into a common language, the primary mode of delivery and interpretation at interview. The meaning-cargos of propositions at interview are problematic. Like the candidate themselves, their language has no fixed essence, but instead consists in a teeming sea of language games. I propose dispositional constructs in understanding teacher behaviour are therefore unnecessary and unreliable.

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Introduction: Opening Remarks

This thesis is concerned with outlining a challenge to any method of selection interview which makes its claims based on identifying a set of character attributes, or on objective predictions of professional suitability. Scrutiny is focused on one particular technology of interview, the Multiple Mini Interview, used in the selection of candidates for programmes of Initial Teacher Training or Education (ITT/ITE). I shall claim that this approach, or any of the other more established and traditional forms of teacher selection, is grounded in an unavoidably deterministic and reductionist view of teachers and teaching. Through its processes and methodology, the selection interview attempts to construct statements of judgement about the world of the candidate and their fit with the world of the teaching profession based on a predetermined set of teacher attributes. In this regard it reflects many of the standards-based reforms within contemporary education in the United Kingdom, which favour forms of teacher professional activity concerned with stability and rigour. These have become tied to pre-occupations with standardisation and pre-determined, measurable outcomes aimed at maximising efficiency (Hartley, 2007). But this suggests presuppositions of constancy that have come to impose themselves uniformly on all teachers and increasingly on all candidates for teaching. At the heart of such presuppositions lies its inherent weakness. It assumes *a priori* that judgements of objective knowledge about our candidate also constitute a description of what is known about education, teaching and suitability. These assumptions beg the question, how can we know our candidate and how have those presuppositions we have about what we know arisen?

I express doubt in the reliability of attributions of character traits to our candidates for teaching and in the presupposition that the traits teachers do have can be expressed as predictive of their behaviour in ways that are consistent across variations in situation and everyday practice. I propose that our mistake is to construe Being-a-Teacher as consisting attributes, mental substances, and innate capacities of thought which determine the physical actions of the teacher. The narrative this error constructs, of a simplified way of speaking about cognition and behaviour, of naïve self-conceptions, of subjectivity and consciousness is only a partial description. It conceals more than it discloses. Above all it resists easy inscription into a common language, the primary mode of delivery and interpretation at interview. And, if “there is no essential, natural or inevitable way of grouping or classifying people,” (Tamboukou, 1999, p208) it therefore becomes thankless to attempt to look behind the processes and institutional practices of selection to find a simple unity of function.

The investigations of the instrumental nature of processes of student/teacher selection and the underlying and overlooked presuppositions in which it is grounded are the central concern of this thesis. Yet it also sees the emergence of a symmetry between three primary conceptions of what I shall term ‘use over time’. These theories seemingly run on parallel tracks – those of language use as dependent

on situation; of the realisation of character traits, attributes and dispositions being dependent on situation; and of the understanding of Being as dependent on situation and across time. I rely heavily, though not exclusively, on the work of three figures of twentieth century philosophy: Ludwig Wittgenstein's analysis of logical uses of language and his well-known later concept of language games to describe resemblances between language and its use which are dependent on differences of context; Gilbert Ryle's critique of established traditional conceptions of the inner workings of the mind as a driver for observable behaviour; and Martin Heidegger's dealings with everyday Being (Dasein) and temporality as situated in the world of the ordinary.

I tentatively propose that the snapshot of language, character, and Being (in the world of teaching) perceived at interview tells us little of use. In fact, rather than producing an image which reveals, it obscures, and clouds any easy possibility of definition of the humans at the heart of the teaching profession.

*

Where to begin in an original investigation of the interview process is the first problem. Traditionally the most commonly used apparatus to determine and select admissions to programmes of Initial Teacher Training (ITT) in England, a suitable path from any given starting point is difficult to trace – overgrown as it is by often implicit presuppositions to be cleared away prior to the first footstep. Procedures employed by programmes of Initial Teacher Education for the selection of candidates vary extensively (Klassen, Bardach et al., 2021). Few universities utilise what could be described as rigorous tests or screening; there has become an over-reliance on the traditional semi-structured interview or simplistic points allocations based on examinations prior to commencement for undergraduate routes, or by degree classification for Postgraduate entry. It would seem reasonable that these cognitive abilities or intellectual capacity (Kunter et al, 2013) would play an important role in teachers' classroom performances. In systematic review of studies into the role of teachers' cognitive abilities and their relation to teacher 'effectiveness' however, Bardach and Klassen (2020) found limited statistically significant effect on student achievement. Recently there have been recommendations for more comprehensive methods of appraisal (Bowles et al, 2014). These include models which comprise not only the assessment of previous academic achievement, but tests of reasoning and aptitude, intellectual capability and, arguably the most important of all teacher attributes, the ability to communicate clearly and interact with others - to transmit. Although, again, studies which have explored the relationship between the verbal ability or communication skills of teachers and effectiveness demonstrate very weak effect (Aloe and Becker, 2009). While we might argue that the interview exchange itself provides evidence of the latter, the complexities embodied within the externalisation of the internal and the corresponding interpretation of intention inherent within these encounters add layers of difficulty to what is seemingly at heart a relatively simple undertaking – borrowing from Deleuze's idea of

philosophical reasoning as a circle (2004, p165), the “question of rediscovering at the end what was there at the beginning.” Instead, however, the interview brings instability to the messy business of accumulating the valid and reliable data on which institutions make their decisions of who should – and, by implication, who should not – make up the next generation of teachers. It is this instability which forms the essence of this study.

The Multiple Mini Interview

Until recently untested and scarcely implemented within the field of education, Multiple Mini Interviews are one such ‘leading-edge selection method’ designed to replace the personal one-to-one or panel interview (Klassen et al., 2020). The model represents a supposedly more objective, highly structured format where components of character or personal attributes are assessed, beyond those associated with purely cognitive ability. Candidates are asked to rotate through a series of timed ‘stations’ and respond to questions relating to a specific scenario. Scenarios are not designed to measure pedagogical knowledge, but rather a set of prioritised non-cognitive attributes. Questions and scenarios are designed to assess attributes that best meet the programme of training and the requirements of ‘effective teachers.’ This presupposes the identification of attributes associated with teaching success. The range of non-cognitive attributes targeted at selection is wide, and includes factors considered indicative of professional competence, such as self-efficacy, integrity, motivation, resilience and ‘interpersonal skills’ (Davies et al., 2016; Donaldson, 2011; Klassen and Kim, 2017). They contain the potential to demonstrate the candidate’s reasoning and communication and which assess these attributes in candidates (Klassen and Kim, 2021). Its underlying assumption is that a more wide-ranging sampling of behaviours provides more information about the suitability of the candidate and therefore increases the reliability of the process. While Multiple Mini Interviews seem moderately reliable (Rahim and Yusoff, 2016; Kelly et al., 2014) and are favourably perceived by candidates and interviewers (Eva et al., 2004; 2009); the inevitable subjective nature of interviews in general involves a welter of heterogeneous concepts which become entangled around problems of perception and the conditions which govern the way things appear to us - how they seem - to both the candidate *and* the interviewer. Technologies of interview in general, and the Multiple Mini Interview in particular, rest on rafts of unquestioned presuppositions which “leaves (its) own foundations unthematized and simply presupposes these foundations dogmatically,” (Zahavi, 2001). The greatest hindrance to understanding of the candidate, as human entity, lies in “the impossibility of accounting for it by the enumeration of its properties” (Maturana, 1980, p.5). Instead, being should be understood as a unity, and our systems of interview do not respond to questions around ‘how has this unity in front of me arisen?’ or, ‘in what *sense* are the component attributes I am seeking part of this candidate?’

Selection interviews are often minimally structured, characterised as unreliable and laced with illusions. Dana et al. (2013, p512) describe the “persistence of an illusion” of interviewers’ confidence in their ability to detect potential for teaching. The illusion of understanding (Kahneman, 2011) and unreliability of human abilities of prediction (Meehl, 1954) persist, but the Multiple Mini Interview offers one solution to supposed problems of reliability, validity and fairness (Eva et al., 2004). Like most human beings, interviewers may form swift first impressions and engage in specific behaviours in pursuit of a preferred interview of outcomes or solutions (Wilhelmy et al., 2016). During their interactions with the candidate, interviewers use shortcuts of judgement or employ theories designed to simplify their evaluations and decision. For instance, they may rely on *perceptions* and interpretations of readily available cues (for example the demographic data) or proxies that are incorrectly perceived to be predictive of job performance. Arguably, whenever the data required for making a decision are subjective in nature (for example the candidate’s responses to questioning), the tendency to use judgmental shortcuts, such as cues, heuristics, and biases, will be more pronounced (Highhouse, 2008; Macan, 2009).

This approach to interview offers a simplified objective of the process: to come to a reckoning of the complex social realities of the candidate and to expose what Gadamer (1989) believed to be the basic phenomena of existence: understanding. That is, to better understand the object (the candidate considered for a place on the University programme of Initial teacher Education as student teacher) one must have a prior idea of its whole meaning and this can only occur by knowing the meaning of its component parts. It takes the disparate elements of character and hopes to disentangle them to create a complete vision of the whole – in this way its aim is a systematic method to explicate human action. I locate this systematicity and attempts at greater certainty within the concept of modernity in the first of my investigations. Its distinguishing features are its claims that it is objective and highly structured; each station is brief, lasting between four to 8 minutes; each station is independent, offering a fresh start and each interviewer is blind to the candidate’s performance at alternative stations; there are multiple stations, each targeting a single non-cognitive attribute determined by its design and requirement; candidate performance is then converted to a score by each interviewer and collated at the end of the process; detailed scoring guides, lists of specific questions and prompts, and a rubric of positive and negative indicators are all provided for interviewers. On the surface, it seeks technical precision and definite outcomes rather than meaning and its mode of inquiry is pragmatic, in search of solutions, and calculative rather than meditative. It aims to become unhitched from the lines and traces of subjectivity and prejudice, and to be an essentially technical affair of ascertaining the nature of its object (the candidate body) and its use-value.

Within this thesis, I do not wish to ascertain the value or virtues of this specific approach. I do not wish to find myself at loggerheads with researchers from various fields whose on-going and

extensive work finds some association between specific attributes and character traits and ‘teacher effectiveness’, nor those who may find evidence via effect-size, however grand or modest, supporting their use. To seek rival answers to these questions or seek discrepancies would simply involve talking at cross-purposes. Nor do I suppose to provide one competing theory as a rebuttal of another, to settle one claim or another, or to subvert the process. The object of what follows is to make intelligible and conceptualise the conditions (Koopman, 2013) of this technology of selection. I trace lines of thought amongst ideas which derive from the logical trickiness found amongst the technical, philosophical and everyday concepts of language and understanding. There is no wish to overturn the sets of values and virtues of this or any other technology of interview and selection; I seek instead to investigate and problematise the complex and often overlooked nature of their assumptions and the host of presuppositions on which they are grounded. While it is true to say that I might question the credence of this approach, I do not come to a moment of belief, or certainty. Perplexity has its place.

In his discussions of phenomenology, Zahavi (2018) explains that our investigations should turn toward the *givenness* or *appearance* of reality, its aspect as perceived. In order therefore that occasional realities of the interview process might disclose some aspect of their true nature the method selected in what we have already begun and in what follows is a careful description of our mundane ways of thinking and talking about the process, to remind us of what we know already but rarely think of - to select and describe the everyday and the overlooked, the inconspicuous and banal presuppositions, the overlooked preconditions and grounds on which we think that might be found at the heart of its process. An analysis or even interested examination of a series of conceptual markers along the way proves frustratingly impossible, the discernible concepts proving so abundant and entangled that they block our route and force the paths and streams available to us to lead in multiple and complex criss-crossing theoretical directions. We therefore do better by avoiding the theorising which has become one hallmark of Education’s modernity and centre our thinking instead on the fact that en-route we find within the premisses of the university ITT selection interview a collision. This collision occurs between the natural view, and a challenge to this natural view. The first, natural view states that there exists some valorised ideal nature of the effective primary school teacher, able to service the educational requirements of the children in their care in an optimal manner due to a specific set of readily delineated and observable personal attributes, powers, capabilities and behaviours and the interview’s purpose is to seek out those candidates in whom these essences reside. The challenge, the collision, comes from an altogether more challenging view - that we cannot identify, isolate and catch hold of these attributes, nor measure their presence and volume and that at the heart of the process exists a complex milieu of various assemblages of consciousness, properties, existential angst and language. This collision does not occur when we think of what Gilbert Ryle (1969, p55) describes as “our everyday, ground-floor level uses of...familiar notions.” These are the ‘simple ideas’ and uses which emerge from the ‘gist’ of impressions and notions, and which coagulate into more complex ideas of

truth and abstract concepts when we employ the word ‘about’ – for example, ‘Tell me about...your motives.’ For my investigations this ground-floor thinking also consists in the familiar nature of the framework of ideas and terms regarding the question and answer, the experienced ‘expert’ interviewer assessing the less-experienced ‘novice’ candidate, those notions of such generality or *doxa* with which most of us are entirely familiar and therefore comfortable. Thinkers such as Heidegger and Wittgenstein in particular have taught us to see the language we use in thinking and speaking about these everyday encounters as comparable to a worldview. Instead, collision occurs when we reach “the first-floor level of thinking,” on which we attempt to work out *when, how, or if* at all the interviewer *can* or *should* arrive at their conclusion of suitability or person-to-vocation-fit for the teaching profession by procedures of judgement and calculation which are of such a general application. This is a collision which brings into question political and institutional thinking so long a part of the modern scaffolding, its concerns being to demarcate truth, or truth-likeness, from what is merely reasonable; seemingly rational and persuasive to those ordinary levels of thinking. Within such a scaffold, the movements of the thought should be only logical and principled, calculative and unemotional. And yet outside of the institutionalisation of modernity and its search for intelligible certainty, the rational and stable human has been shown the door and *self-command* replaced by freedoms to express *self-doubt* (Toulmin,1990). While confessions of confusion and anxiety, the ambiguity of feelings, and the inexactness of worth are encouraged everywhere; for the selection process, as well as practices of teaching, we have a creeping demand for precision, what works definitively and a scorn for ambiguity and uncertainty. We only need look at notions of accountability culture and inspection to see these demands in all their questionable glory.

There are a number of pivot-concepts involved in my investigations - each on which a substantial focus might dwell. Take the underlying taken-for-granted concepts of the interview as event or encounter itself; of the candidate’s before and after, their experience (always private and always inscrutable), knowledge and truth, causality, necessity, perception, belief and choice. At each point of the conversations which constitute the interview a certain amount is presupposed – both parties ‘take it and its meaning for granted’. For example, that it will proceed via a series of questions and responses; that the response must correspond to the object of the question; that satisfactory responses equate to success and acceptance, and that acceptability presupposes adherence to rule-governed structures and criteria for success.

These may be concepts of the everyday, terms we feel that we know our way about perfectly well, but each requires considerable expansion to ensure that we do not talk at cross purposes, and although we see none as particularly troubling, trouble does indeed arise out of the interplay between them all. By the term ‘concept’, one which we shall meet many times when we consider the grouping of ideas within the interview exchange, I take Frege’s argument that this term signifies what a group of

similar things have in common – and that concepts cannot become available to us without language. This things-in-common to define a thing extends to the use of Attributes and dispositions-in-common which define the concept of our candidate’s suitability. Here is the first meeting with our interview’s dehumanising nature; that it seeks a ‘concept’ just as much as it seeks a human.

Although those conceptual notions listed above do not belong to one technical unit of terms, they overlap and intermingle until the multiple knotted strings of each entwine in one impossibly complex entanglement. I hope to begin the job of disentanglement here. But any attempt to untie each philosophical knot logically proves even more difficult than that of the regiments of more functional technical terms we encounter. Take for example the illustrative example of the concept of the event of the interview, mentioned above, and for which its exemplification will establish a foundation for my later thought. An event is a happening, an occurrence, an occasion, or a phenomenon (Whitehead, 1964). Events happen and disappear, and conceptual abstractions are constructed to account for them by those who have witnessed or participated. The abstractions of time and space emerge from the extensive relation of one event over another, resulting in misunderstandings of both. Our candidates’ thoughts, reflections and recollections in the present event become entangled and are placed and ordered ‘in time’, and, as Whitehead observes, time therefore appears to have deeper roots in reality than has any sense of the nature of what was experienced there. They immerse themselves in understanding the complexities of the nature of self and education from which they emerge and are a part, and invalidate the split between a causal, objective nature, and a nature which they perceive - of sights and sound, values, and emotion. Nietzsche (1990) understood the Event as a glimpse into the yet to come, a particularly pertinent aspect of our admissions interview and its hopeful location of existent dispositions; as is Deleuze’s description of the event (2001, p.170) as not what occurs, “it is rather inside what occurs...what must be understood, willed and represented in that which occurs.” The event sticks out from the ordinary, it marks historical discontinuities (Tamboukou, 2019) and opens the future of our candidate to a series of differentiations and their own possibility.

The Guiding Presuppositions Which Establish the Selection Interview

The interview process seems to rest on two seemingly innocent and arguably unquestioned propositions. These propositions have become so embedded in matters of educational practice (or indeed any professional personnel selection practices) that they form the justification for the interview’s very existence. So common is general understanding of these propositions that we cannot and should not bestow upon them any signifier as grand as ‘theory’. These are, firstly, that the ‘world’ of tomorrow – here educational, and therefore encompassing teaching and the practices of those inhabitants of the profession in years to come - can be shaped by what already exists. While bordering on the purely

fatalist argument that what *is* true today and what *will be* true tomorrow *was* true and had its antecedence in the past and could somehow be predicted, as if the course of events can be likened to the continuous unrolling of time's scroll, I do not suggest any argument for predestination. But we can reinterpret this principle into a first presupposition: that before something happened, before our candidate becomes a teacher, someone, our interviewer, could foresee that this would happen; they could divine (*be* divine) the pre-existence of the truth of our candidate's teacher-self in the future, and foretell it. They are able to possess foreknowledge of this fact, and entertain the expectation that our candidate will be and already contains that 'effective' teacher. This principle becomes worrying only when we presuppose the fatalist premiss in its extremes: that it was true before our candidate became a teacher that they would become a teacher with or without our interviewer making that prediction. Furthermore, we accept that if our interviewer makes such a prediction, that our candidate then looks back to the event of the interview from their first classroom, then the interviewer was correct, their prediction was true. But of course, we understand that it is not the case that the interviewer's actual prediction came true, but merely that they made a conceivable prediction, based on *beliefs*, which came true. And this is where any trust in the interview process resides – in the might be, or for those candidates who do not go on to enter the teaching profession, the might-have-been predictions. The empirical source of these social and professional predictions, or forecasts, are primarily historical and perspectival in their attempt to foretell the future and to engineer a group. It is therefore an example of a science of things to come (Popper, 1983), and is constructive in its aims: it predicts that if our candidate is to withstand the demands of their teacher education and the teaching profession, and perform as the profession demands, they must be constructed in a certain way – they must be made of the 'right stuff.' Our interview processes therefore play the same language-games as science – its dialectical arguments end in a denotative statement and statements of supposed truth-value, such as "this candidate is suitably altruistic," or, "their attributes are not dispositionally the right stuff." But of course, it is unable to produce verifiable or falsifiable statements about its referents which are accessible to experts - one criteria of scientific pragmatism suggested by Lyotard (1991) - despite playing their language-game, that of social bond (albeit rather badly, as we shall see).

The second embedded and presupposed proposition on which our interview rests, perhaps even providing us with its *causa finalis*, its end and its reason for being, is that we can and should secure that only certain things happen (or are allowed to happen), and that other things do not happen (or are not allowed to happen). This second proposition has become a platitude, that some candidates for teaching are good, are suitable, do fit, are made for the profession (all of which refer us back to the first proposition, above, that they will prove effective teachers in the future), and so should be allowed entry to the profession, and so on. That other candidates are not and should not - that "selecting the 'right' teachers [those] who make a difference to student outcomes...underscores the need for reliable and valid selection practices," (Klassen and Kim, 2021, p6). These issues appear to us as having a simple

yet sharp edge. Does this candidate meet our expectation *now* of one we believe possesses what it takes to behave in a determined way *in future*, or do they fail to meet this criterion? Should this candidate's entry to the profession be welcomed, or be averted? In the language of the everyday, those at the centre of the encounter are pulled only from North and South so to speak, but so long as the technology of our interview process can measure the conduct of our candidate by means of our imposed standard we are able to arrange these ideas and well-worn platitudes into a neat, familiar framework of ideas. A system, or structure. We are not, at this level of thinking, perplexed by the notions of *effectiveness, choice, knowledge, assessment, judgement* or *belief* at work here and make use of these every-day, ground-floor, familiar notions of suitability readily. But when we consider the multiple overlapping fields of discourse, for example the complexity involved in comparing the appeals of different candidates; attempting to hitch the theoretical harnesses of character, personality, nature and those possible attributes associated with teaching success onto our interview process we are attributing the scientific to the social intersubjective milieu. We see that we are talking instead of a general programme of the construction of a dynamic theory of social and human conduct: a grammar of interview. For Sartre (1946, p9), it is within this *inter*-subjectivity that the act of unconcealment or revelation of the self and the other occurs, claiming that other people are "essential" to one's existence:

He recognises that he cannot be anything (in the sense in which one says one is spiritual, or that one is wicked or jealous) unless others recognise him as such. I cannot obtain any truth whatsoever about myself, except through the mediation of another... At once, we find ourselves in a world which is, let us say, that of "inter-subjectivity." It is in this world that man has to decide what he is and what others are.

Within such a grammar of interview the motions of thought and the beings who encounter one another there have come to be considered calculable. For this to occur the intensities of those attributes and capacities of the individual under scrutiny must be made measurable and the composition of the relevant forces must be analysed into component parts for their occurrence to be recordable as part of a description of the candidate's conduct. This has entailed a utilitarian division of being. But by this division and the presupposition that teacher effectiveness and future behaviour can be taken as the sum of its parts taken together, like Zeno's paradox made human we may have as many component parts as we fancy, yet at no stage are we able to say that we have captured all of the components of being; we may slice off five or fifty for our scrutiny at interview, but there forever remains five or fifty more.

On The Architecture of the Interview – A Structure to Measure a Supposed Structure: Seeking Order

As the technique of design and build – as opposed to the engineering of the construction itself – the term ‘architecture’ serves well to describe both the practical and expressive requirements of the mode of interview. In England, strategies to support teacher recruitment and retention have led to there having arisen a need to serve both a utilitarian and an aesthetic purpose to meet governmental demands to improve both “the recruitment pipeline” and the applicant experience for those who would make “potentially great teachers,” (Department for Education, 2019). The concept of structure captures both the constrained functioning of each of the elements of the Multiple Mini Interview and the dynamical interplay between these elements in function of the structural whole. The elements do not function freely or randomly, but instead obey principles related to the structural organisation: its whole has been separated into a series of time-limited exchanges, events, or divisions – each with its own point of focus, a particular teacher attribute, and terminus, a score. It is also true that the introduction of a discursive centre or a point of fixation naturally accompanies this classically structuralist viewpoint. The centre-point in any architecture is the point that equilibrates, orients and organizes a structure and for us the centre of our structure is the unique point of presence that reveals the historical meaning of the process, its origins and telos. Within a physical space such as a concert hall, this suggests the space within which the sound makes possible its very purpose. It is this space in which our participants meet which grounds our structure, and which commands it. It is within the space that the event occurs, and the point at which ‘being’ comes into presence and is situated; in Husserl’s concept of evidence as dependent upon the instrument of intuition, and in that of Descartes as ‘seeing’ something without any doubt (Oktem, 2009). And for both, in the impossible search for certainty.

Our interview is essentialist and structuralist in its nature. It strives for the construction of the teacher human via a system of differences: equations of attributes, pluses or minuses, analyses, and an arrangement of signs or labels and propositions which ultimately compose worthiness and supposed adequacy necessary to identify the teacher as such. Teacherliness has hereby become explainable; the transcendental being is limited to one of pattern and fit, reducible to a structure of traits which affect thought, behaviours, motives and values. We analyse the structures underlying the candidate’s overt actions and try to explain teacher efficacy via reductions to an essence, or separable component parts. In this construction, it *deconstructs* by placing characteristics or attributes of each individual within a closed hierarchy of validity sealing off any alternative path to knowledge of the individual. Gutierrez (2007, in Bezerra, 2021) considers methods of categorisation such as this “exclusive” and “classifying,” epistemologically violent even, whose ultimate orientation is dogmatic and which results in assumed hierarchies of worth. These sort, and in the sorting make different and separate. The knowledge produced in this model is categorisable as information used in the decision making, therefore the means

of control over the self, over others and over the profession. Gutierrez (ibid) prefers instead that we declassify to unveil and understand operations as open categories whose ultimate tendency is logical, cultural, social or cognitive pluralism: declassifying adds, rather than divides; it gathers rather than separates and in so doing installs multiple possibilities in the ways in which we relate to knowledge, identity and the other.

The capability of differentiation, identifying and distinguishing one ‘thing’ from ‘everything else but this thing,’ *partes extra partes*, is recognised by Spencer-Brown (1972), influenced in his philosophies of form and mathematics by Wittgenstein and Russell, as the very root of cognition. The attributes in question within our system are treated as separate, existing alongside one another, beyond one another, exterior to one another, with little or no interdependency. He denotes drawing of distinctions as signifying the act of drawing a boundary around a thing, thereby separating it from all else. This boundary then becomes a crossing – from one side to the other: from the unmarked state (the void, the absence, nothing) to the marked state (the identified, the ‘it’, the thing made cognisant). This implies action on the part of the cognitive entity, the thinking being. Take this thinking being in the first instance to be the architects of our process: To begin, the architect must admit or allow there to be a potential for distinction (between individuals, between attributes, between suitabilities); next they find the distinction and isolate it, and in so doing they see it; they then describe the distinction. We shall return to this notion of boundary and its crossing in our later investigations.

In the logic of attributes represented within the Multiple Mini Interview the distinct attributes, reified as commodities, signified and isolated within its new boundary become equivalent to an atomic formula in mathematics – teacherliness has been reduced to essences: its formula contains no logical connectives or sub-formula. Attribute A (Commitment, for example) and its magnitude or absence; B (curiosity or the absence of curiosity); C (the ability to reflect and an inability to reflect) etc. This drawing of distinctions between these abstract forms deconstructs the candidate in what is a primitive act of logic: it extracts the candidate from the domain of the potential Teacher/teacher candidate; it undergoes the creative acts of observation and interpretation; it then reconstructs the individual in order to re-enter the domain, but this time the process (exemplifying the concept of a ‘crossing’) has granted a new identity, that of suitable teacher, crossing from one side of the boundary to the other. Our interview would therefore be, for Lyotard (1991), a mode of production, whose structures are open to examination, and capable of education’s social and cultural formation. Our teacher/candidate becomes a product and commodity.

A Means of Bringing Order to Complexity

A description of the term complexity and its structures and organisations within the context of our interview is difficult; a sign of our times, complexity's components are entangled (Urry, 2006), bringing flux to the cultural, intellectual and political dimensions of contemporary society (Hartley, 2000). Multiple intersecting vectors of temporality, language, and being result in emerging 'structures of feeling,' particularly enhanced at interview by the need for contingent openness towards people, the institution, its technologies and societies. Melucci, (1996, p2) states that "A world that lives by complexity and difference cannot escape uncertainty, and it demands from individuals the capacity to change form," but this creates anxiety. Despite this, the Multiple Mini Interview prizes its efficiency, organisation, clarity and precision in its procedure as a means of therapy for this un-situatedness.

While facts relative to these vectors themselves are not emotional, when facts are assembled to form a structure which becomes theory, then emotions are generated based upon what Friesen (2019; 2021) describes as order-within complexity. Put simply, when items come together in a simple or elegant manner it feels good. Conversely, it feels bad or dissonant when there are exceptions to some 'general' rule and the harmony of easy meaning-making is disrupted. Finding this order-within-complexity generates affective theoretical emotion and make a clear fit with classical conceptions of Ideal Form, even beauty, which "rallies confusion into co-operation...and made the sum one harmonious coherence – for the idea is a unity and what it moulds must come into unity as far as multiplicity may" (Plotinus, 22 [Ennead I, 6]).

An order-within-complexity can be seen in the structures – its symmetry, repeated pattern, and the coordinated movement - the unity - of the MMI. Freisen (2021, p2) writes that "a theory that brings order to a complexity of situations creates theoretical emotion, but so does a bureaucracy that brings order to a complexity of people." The labelling and collecting together of the attributes of the ideal teacher brings an order to the complexity of professional identity and practice. Theoretical emotion, the 'feelings' of comfort and satisfaction derived from a sense of order-within-complexity, is generated by neat categorisation, an ideal form compiled from sweeping, or basic, statements regarding causality, or identity of the ideal teacher. The assemblage of responses which sufficiently aligns with stated attributes allowing the expression of positive judgement does likewise. Any number of sweeping statements are frequent responses within the interview process. For example, in response to the opening "Tell me why you would like to be a teacher," the satisfactory comfort of, "Because I have always wanted to teach," results from the order brought to a complexity of situations and may even ignore facts. But the task of determining whether this statement is valid involves a factual analysis – involving a lack of emotion – on the part of the interviewer. Freisen goes as far as to suggest that such factual analysis may well be

actively avoided if it seems likely to reveal an exception or error to the sweeping statement; the theoretical pleasure replaced by a theoretical discomfort being much less desirable. Emotion then plays an unavoidably affective part in the interview process and in the candidate's expressed summary of being and self. For example, the student who attests to a diagnosis of Dyslexia, of ADHD, of anxiety, finds an order to the complexity of associated symptoms, this theoretical emotion is made positive by the labelling and enunciation of the condition despite its being generated from an array of potentially unpleasant or disturbing personal experiences.

We attach emotional labels to experiences and states of affairs created by many kinds of elegance, from visual beauty, music, morality, and mathematics, so much so that we may regard beauty itself as an emotion (Zeki, 2018). Although these emotions are cognitively natural (Friesen, 2021) they require education: only those educated in mathematics experience the beauty of mathematical formulae; classical art or music may only be experienced by those educated to appreciate such work; and the order brought to the complexity of a foundational set of beliefs by ideology provides coherence to the beliefs of a group (Van Dijk, 2006). The candidates have acquired the basic elements of ideologies of education (indeed, of religion, politics, gender and so on) by growing up, experiencing and participating in education in the respective social groups of which they are a member. The experience has been explicitly shaped or even institutionalised in a way which teaches the candidate's early emerging educational ideologies of the group to its members (*ibid*). The preferred events, and ways of 'being' that people seek and act by stem from the stories and customs we first encounter, and the other techniques of socialisation deployed in our early years "pretty well fix the values people hold until death. These values become the things people think with, not the things they think about," (Egan, 2008)

The 'lightbulb moment' of a child's sudden comprehension, cited by many as a key motivator in their desire to become teachers, also stems in part from an order brought out from complexity – illumination on the heels of lengthy, initially fruitless but intentional effort. Theoretical emotion is generated when the orderliness of realisation (the "Aha!" or "I get it now!" moment) emerges from the confusion of complexity. Both the child's pleasure in understanding where once there resided only the displeasure of confusion or frustration, and the candidate's own satisfaction in establishing this as a sufficient driver in the midst of the complexity of possible diverse responses demonstrate the emotional response to theory.

The perception and contemplation of the idea of an object produces pleasure or pain – hence our reactions to beauty, defined within the word itself as, "the idea raised in us," and its sense as, "our power of receiving this idea." Our sense is the reception of an object, pleasant or unpleasant, even painful. These ideas of beauty are necessarily pleasant and immediate. But in the interview any sense of beauty (or agreeableness) on the part of the interviewer can only be comparative, not dissimilar to a painting of a natural scene: comparative beauty is founded on conformity, or a kind of unity between

an original and a copy. For the interviewer, the ‘original’ is enclosed as an idea of the perfect teacher and the candidate is compared – to what extent does the notional teacher before them resemble, or imitate, this original. In his 1738 *Inquiry Concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design*, Hutcheson proposed “uniformity amidst variety” as the primary quality which produces the idea of beauty. So, in the same way that a square is more beautiful than a triangle because it has greater variety, more sides, in uniformity, equal length of sides. This general foundation of beauty can be applied to mathematics, nature, dress, art, universal truths, and by extension to organisations, bureaucracy (McGregor, 2010), and for us, human character. For judgement the interviewer rallies uniformity, via the supposed likeness to attribute amidst the variety and complexity of possible hermeneutic interpretation.

Both theoretical and aesthetic beauty exhibits its existence dependent upon the receiver, the interviewer – ideas of beauty and harmony resemble objective qualities more so than ideas such as cold or warmth. It is dependent upon a perceiving mind. Their properties are possessed objectively, but they cannot be judged suitable for teaching without appreciation by the interviewer. The existence of teacher-likeness depends upon their possibility of being responded to in an appropriate way, exactly as a work of art or piece of music. In the same way that the Mona Lisa becomes nothing more than a painted canvas in a frame in Lamarques’s (2002) *Doomsday Scenario* which seeks the survival conditions of art in the event of human beings becoming extinct, only in the moment of the interview do these properties exist. Once the interview ends however, the material objects of their teacher-likeness disappears. In the *Doomsday scenario*, objects survive, but ‘art’ – and other objects whose properties are dependent upon a receiver, do not. The being of the candidate-as-teacher is real, but cannot exist in the absence of its perception, which brings us neatly back to our earlier consideration of Sartre (1946) and notions of the inter-subjective recognition by the other.

However, on the account I am attempting to develop here, any order which we encounter in the world of our candidate arises from the complex interconnection and relation to properties and a professional potential which in turn arises from the interaction between assemblages of private experience, language and their environment, not from any transcendent laws regarding teacher identity, suitability or fit. The structures of both the interview and of the dispositional properties of our candidate, their essences should instead be understood as assemblages of powers, relations and mechanism (Rutzou, 2015). I take the term ‘powers’ over ‘attributes’ to unite the two, powers being understood within our spheres as tendencies which relate to the essences of our structures, human and technological. Such an account has power as a natural action of things by virtue of them being the kind of things they are – a technology of selection located within an event constituted by an exchange of language, or a Being-in-the-world. As such it marks a momentous phenomenological instant: its event is an integration of signs, acts and structures, and the point of difference between two worlds.

Contribution To Knowledge – What Follows

The four philosophical investigations which follow contribute to thinking in the field of teacher education, teacher selection processes and teacher attributes. They will do this by their repositioning of the relation between a historically conceived, supposedly unchanging professional nature of the effective student-teacher on the one hand and the modes of production and measurement which presuppose that these natures are communicable, prescriptive and enforceable on the other. As such the investigations become critical tools with which we might map those non-localisable relations between the forces inherent in the student teacher selection process. Here then lies the central contribution of this thesis: An underlying logic of existent, enduring and discoverable essences revealable by an analysis of candidates' language and representations of world assumes a mutually nourishing and inseparable parallelism. Both the language in use and the professional being of our candidate are conceptualised as functionally composite units that depend on the nature of their parts. But without a semantic, logically understandable content and language-in-common the composite unit of our ideal teacher cannot be revealed; without clearly defined and hermetically sealed units of attribute our use of language at interview is redundant. In what follows I shall attempt to describe how neither sense of these two conceptual lines of revealable essence, in language and its associated thought, nor in Being, are reliable.

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Within this space, or clearing, we might discover 'the world of details' of thought which have conditioned multiple presuppositions of the selection interview's method and purpose. To begin a philosophical consideration of the technology of interview, a genealogical starting point which strips away all of these implicit presuppositions might be that there are no final 'truths' about human nature and teachers, nor norms of reasoning in language in their selection. Instead, my aim is to look closely at the institutional practice of interview and the forms of authority it presupposes, and the norms and truths about candidates and teachers it attempts to construct. To do this we should study configurations that have come to determine the ways teachers and teacher attributes have become classified in a language game (language games after all being what this is all about) as a means to constitute a knowledge of those applying for training to become teachers, and their Being.

To structure this investigation, I have chosen to present a series of thematic contentions, each overlapping and proposition laden. This thesis is structured as follows. First, the notion of those desirable teacher attributes under scrutiny and at the heart of teacher selection is examined. These universal traits are seen to delineate and circumscribe the idealised teacher in one particular way, but at the expense of difference. Next, we investigate the questionable logic which stands behind interpretations of perceptions as a reliable method of making judgements about individual Being and a

suitability or fit for teaching. Following this we consider the concept which unifies the entire event of the interview – Language and its use, as a means of revealing the nature of thought by picturing the world and its use within very specific and problematic language-games, often played outside of language-in-common. The final investigation regards the inherent difficulty of one person understanding the thoughts of the other; the interview does this by systematising within a normative model as a means of coping. Finally, some conclusions are made which are grounded in a scepticism of attempts to form judgements about the humans at the heart of the teaching profession from the perspective of rationalism or universal principles, both of which Toulmin (1990) asserts have become idealised in the modern era.

The established twentieth century philosophical hypotheses of Language games and their use, and Dasein as a way of being there, in the world, have not previously been applied to the context of teacher selection and teacher attributes. The problematisation of this method of discerning mental predicates which supposedly predict teacher effectiveness offers a previously unused method of philosophical investigation. This makes apparent what has previously been taken for granted, inconspicuous and the way things are; namely the presuppositions which enframe the conditions of the teacher selection interview and delineate the nature of being a teacher.

Chapter 1: On Attributes, Essences and Dispositions

This first chapter becomes a specific investigation into the notion of attributes and how these might be classified as essences which come to define and differentiate the human. I draw parallels between the essences of our candidate and the essences of our interview itself – how do they come into presence and how might they be isolated for scrutiny? I begin with a discussion of the nebulous term ‘attributes’ itself, and how education has become classified as an increasingly moral practice. I consider how reducing processes of selection and interpretation to heavily structured practices and emotionally satisfying products predicated on ‘theory’ and ‘evidence’ essentially destroys acknowledgement of the complex relationships amidst and between inherent dispositions to act and what Karen Barad (2007) terms the intra-active nature and inseparability of essences of action. I demonstrate how the primary tension is one between parts (and these *partes extra partes*, existing alongside and exterior to each other) and whole. The emphasis on the parts might be called mechanistic and reductionist and as the process becomes more that of a natural selection, there emerges in that conceptualisation an indifference to the human. This essentialist view of the definition of teacher and candidate for teaching is potentially damaging and we can begin to see the inherent vagueness of the words which describe universal features and the inscrutable nature of being which we continue in more depth in Chapter Two, On Being, and Chapter Three, On Language.

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As observers of an objective reality, external to ourselves and independent of us (and not therefore determined by it) we are able to perceive and cognise; we use the information obtained by our perception, by seeing or noticing, to compute a response or behaviour which is adequate to the situation (Maturana, 1980). We make our judgement. And as observers the basic cognitive function we perform is the operation of distinction. By distinction we specify a unity – an entity which is distinct from its background, a marked separation, or Deleuze’s “true philosophical beginning, Difference,” (2004, p164), alike to drawing lines between stars to discern shape, which separates this constellation from its firmament. We characterise both the unity and the background with properties which the operation of distinction bestows upon them. For us, these properties (and the linguistic signifiers of character we variously identify as attributes, traits, essences or dispositions) delineate the difference – between the unity and its background. I use these terms associated with characterisation interchangeably in what follows, but acknowledge the complexities inherent in the terms discerning those excellences of

character, a term used by Aristotle in *Nicomachean Ethics* Book II, which can be attributed to our candidates for teaching.

Insofar as those excellences of character include our candidate's emotions and feelings, not just their actions, there are seemingly impossible distinctions to be drawn between acting virtuously and carrying out a suitably virtuous action. Merely *doing* the right thing is not sufficient to be 'categorised' (a term I use specifically) as possessing those moral excellences. The premisses of our interview are that one must *be* the right sort of individual or *have* the right sort of character.

Character and attribution then are the means by which we differentiate and make separate our applicants. Our attributes are a set of distinctive traits, described by Harman (1999, p317) as "relatively long-term stable dispositions to act in distinctive ways," by which one thing is distinguished from others. Psychologist Lawrence Pervin defines a trait as "a disposition to behave expressing itself in consistent patterns of functioning across a range of situations" (Pervin 1994, p108). But even among such traits, some do not appear to be morally relevant. For instance, Teacher A's disposition to drink coffee rather than tea during their lunch break. We therefore need a way to differentiate these traits which are relevant from those which are not, particularly because philosophy and psychology tend to use the term "character trait" in slightly different ways. Philosophers typically think that moral character traits, unlike other personality or psychological traits, have an irreducibly evaluative dimension; that is, they involve a normative judgment. The evaluative dimension is directly related to the idea that the agent is morally responsible for having the trait itself, for example behaving with integrity, or for the outcome of that trait. Our candidate is held responsible and accountable for the educational outcomes of their traits, from the moment of their interview and throughout their professional career.

This distinction then deconstructs the form of our candidate and defines through its properties the space in which it exists and its interactions with others. These are the conditions of the deconstruction of being upon which the process of Multiple Mini Interview has harnessed its approach. Recursive application of this operation of distinction to a unity respecifies it as a composite unity (Maturana, 1980). The specified properties of its components are what has come to distinguish the interview's notion of teacher-candidate fit. Our composite teacher can exist only in the space defined by these components of predetermined attributes which denote its system. Our component attributes are viewed only in relation to the part they play in the unity and this is why so little is able to be said about the properties of the component attributes themselves other than their part in realising the way our unity (the candidate) is organised. The interplay of these properties and the relations holding between them have come to realise the systematised candidate as a suitable member of a class of composite unities – those suitable for teaching. These structures of being and component attributes have become abstracted and organised by our observation and have come to "specify the class identity of a system, [which] must remain invariant for the class identity of the system to remain invariant," (Maturana and Varela, 1980,

p.20). Yet here biology, psychology, and natural social systems of humans within a linguistic and cognitive domain have been necessarily simplified and remain essentially conservative. Modelled on a developmentally linear understanding of causality, composition and process this conceals “the impossibility to long-term prediction for non-linear systems, since the task of prediction would require knowledge of initial conditions of impossibly high accuracy.” (Tsoukas, 1998, p. 229).

I maintain throughout each forthcoming investigation here that when we characterise the candidate and the teaching profession by mental predicates we cannot make inferences to states occurring in their *consciousness* which can be stated out loud. Instead, we are describing ways that they conduct their public professional *behaviour* out loud. Acknowledging the non-linearity of complex social and natural systems questions the conceptualisation of our candidate seemingly based on a Cartesian-Newtonian mechanical framework (Styhre, 2002). This sees causes of professional and educational success as linear and derived from one single source of stable, unified and predetermined teacher type. I hope to replace this with what Lyotard (1991) might term a pragmatics of language particles.

1.1 Education as Moral Practice

If we are to argue that education itself is a moral practice, then that “practice” should be in the hands of moral educators who themselves should manifest the signs of moral development (Pring, 2001), rather than in the hands of managers, trainers, or deliverers of curriculum. The actual practices of education however, its rituals of daily units of schooling, rules and regulation, its purposes served, and the acceptance of outside pressures of accountability have become detached from a moral humanistic perspective, while the concept of Educationalisation has maintained its purpose, that of social amelioration and therapeutic intervention (Fendler, 2018), aligning it with a scientification of society. The intensification of accountability of normative educational practices has now been extended to character. It is now established belief that in order to be a good or ‘great’ teacher, one needs to be or become a certain kind of person: a person of good character who also exemplifies commitment to the value of what they teach (Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, 2012). By representing our candidates and classroom teachers in atomistic, composite terms of predetermined epithets, those listed here, our description of them denotes an ability to do certain things – these things become their credentials, carried with them daily, and denote their social and professional utility. This can be witnessed through such public-facing and recruitment-related functions of policy documents which focus upon, “getting great people to the schools that need them most,” from *Britain at the Crossroads: what will it take to provide the teachers our children need?* (Sundorph, 2018, p3). Even titles of this nature suggest a moral imperative and demand utility from prospective future teachers.

By presenting this bounded definition of Being-as-a-teacher as sets of cognitive (or intellectual) and non-cognitive processes there entails an articulation of ground-floor notions of those nebulous *attributes* (itself used as an uncertain ‘umbrella-term’ for dispositions, tendencies, capabilities, abilities or capacities) of the desirable or effective teacher. These might include, for example, the commitment to teaching, motivation, prudence, wisdom and intelligence, altruism, resilience, passion, problem-solving, reflection or creativity. Whether we classify these alternatively as traits, qualities, tendencies, virtues, competencies, cognitive flexibilities, intellectual capacities, abilities or dispositions, such notions must be able to be reflected upon autobiographically by candidates and biographically by interviewers. These are presented as basic forces and the emotional springs for human action (and therefore at odds with the rationality of thinking demanded of their expression or judgement) which explain the choices and intentions of our participants. As such, following Frege (1891) logical pure thought cannot acknowledge these as concepts without determined boundaries on which to hang our candidate’s responses and our interviewer’s judgement. Conversely, if we do know how to think autobiographically and biographically about those attributes, we do not yet have the means by which such generalisations of thought might be theorised or realistically systematised - our projected dynamic theory only exists as a theory of “universals” whereby each candidate must contain ‘in-common’ essences whose natures are non-disjunctive and unitary. This satisfies what Ludwig Wittgenstein (1969, p17) considered the “craving for generality,” which applies simplistic laws and blinds us to such complex heterogeneous language terms as identity, consciousness, perception, cognition, and behaviour. It also serves as a method of social reproduction, if we take the teaching profession to be a society of teachers. Success in teaching becomes a matter of adopting a certain ‘style’ of being, demanding durable behavioural and dispositional habits, ways of exhibiting being and modes of conduct which belong to general and expected ways of existence and habitus (Flint and Peim, 2012). In so doing it turns away from the view Aristotle recommends in his *Nicomachean Ethics* regarding The Good, which, he said, “has no universal form, regardless of the subject matter or situation: sound judgement always respects the detailed circumstances of specific kinds of cases,” and towards modernity’s view of abstract theory divorced from concrete problems of practice which assumes that the Good (teacher) and the Just (processes of teaching) conform to timeless and universal principles. In so doing the right is prioritised over the good, dissonance is eliminated and the possibility of a co-existence or plurality, which has come to be seen as a threat to social life, is denied (Biesta, 2006). These principles have become inscribed within practices and theory which are so institutionalised that we have unwittingly succumbed to such practices of selection which work on the very condition of this particular section of the professional population.

We presuppose that having and using a set of personal qualities and practical dispositions which are not reducible to those of merely academic or cognitive ability enhances professional effectiveness (Carr, 2007.) It is no less important for teachers and novice teachers than a mastery of subject knowledge

and instructional techniques (Kim, Jorg and Klassen, 2019). This is why, we assume, teachers should not only exemplify positive character traits to their pupils, but also help the pupils to reflect on their own character strengths and weaknesses. The model of interview under particular scrutiny within this thesis, the Multiple Mini Interview, is directed towards consideration and judgements of the qualities possessed by teachers believed to have such a formative impact on their pupils (Klassen and Kim, 2021). Its principal suppositions respond to the questions of what makes, or constitutes, a good teacher? What kind of person must they be? It is not only the content of that which a teacher teaches directly, but the humanity of the teacher (Lickona, 2005), what they model or exemplify in practice, which is important.

Firstly, it may benefit us in what is to come to consider what sorts of personal qualities and dispositions we should consider as professionally significant, which are of present concern and why they should be considered professionally significant. While an exhaustive list of terms and labels which denote teacher-attributes is problematic, Tomlinson and Little (2000) identified eleven principles fundamental to good or professionally acceptable teaching worthy of consideration, amongst others, as a foundation of the philosophical investigations to come: Intellectual and Vocational integrity; Moral courage; Altruism; Impartiality; Insight; Responsibility for their influence; Humility; Collegiality; Capacities for partnership; and Vigilance concerning professional responsibilities, and aspirations. These suggest not only the elemental attributes of our teaching profession, but also some of the obligations of teachers, particularly their moral obligations, with an emphasis on courage, altruism, humility, and integrity. Those related to the intellectual nature of professionalism, such as criticality and conscientious thought are described as epistemic virtues; a candidate or teacher who is critical, a conscientious thinker, one who is open-minded and intellectually curious about teaching and its practices, could also be described as epistemically virtuous. Usually, philosophy also considers honesty and the following characteristics to be epistemic virtues: attentiveness, benevolence (principles of charity), creativity, discernment, humility, objectivity, parsimony, studiousness, understanding, warranty, and wisdom (Pigliucci, 2017).

We consider virtues as characteristics of moral excellence, and do not assume that the teaching profession has any monopoly on these. Intellectual virtues are those characteristics that promote intellectual flourishing, or which make for an excellent cogniser (Turri et al, 2019). We might suggest that ideally, teachers should also be attentive, careful, thorough, impartial, open, willing to exchange ideas yet always aware of their own fallibility, but we might just as easily argue that these are traits shared with researchers, scientists, bank managers or professional musicians (ibid). These traits, when attributed to a candidate for teaching, might serve as a preventative measure for academic or professional misconduct or other behaviours detrimental to ethical educational practice, both in University and beyond, in the subsequent professional sphere.

However, that a candidate be labelled altruistic, for example, is not made certain for us at interview by any constant characteristic we can discern in the term altruism or in their *being* altruistic, nor does this value consist in this characteristic. In the event of the interview a single response or occurrence is all that is needed, indeed all that is available, to grasp the ‘essence’ of this value within this candidate. This essence, judged by some as necessary of the effective teacher, becomes universal coming to the fore in a plurality of otherwise different individuals as an identical essence. In this language of essences our individual is not regarded as something unique, but instead is constituted thus and with, to paraphrase and borrow from Husserl (in Hallett, 1991, p8), their own supply of essential predicables which qualify them. Each teacher/candidate has an essential nature and universal meaning-essence of ‘teacher in general,’ (we might alternatively call it ‘teacher-type’), biographically intuited through comparison with others as a ‘common element which pervades all teachers. Crucially, we have through ideation adequately utilitarian essences of teacher character in general, of teacher-actions, as their social interactions as a type, and so on. Whether satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily sourced is moot, and whether these things have ever been given in actual teacher experience or not is a matter of relative indifference. This method of contemplating teachers and teacher-candidates detaches the human from its context, and breaks up or lifts out predetermined attributes from their context. Heidegger (2000, p73) calls this “explanation through dismemberment,” and the living and breathing world of the individual is made to “dwindle to an unrecognisable fragment.” Each attribute is isolated from that which makes it significant – no matter where the candidate/teacher is, no matter how they feel, no matter what surrounds them, or the situation they find themselves acting within, they are either altruistic or they are not and the affirmation of such, through the propositions in play, are simply deemed either true or false and acceptable or unacceptable.

Whatever the place may be of notions such as our identified attributes within a description of the behaviours and conduct of the effective moral teacher, there is a general point to be made. Each must offer an effect or a result, originating from itself as an identifiable source; they must be understood as a *cause* – that which brings something about. Taking ‘motivation’ as an example, the candidate’s autobiographical presentation of their motivations to *be* a teacher are the effect of historical or temporal triggers and should be the cause of certain actions which compose witnessable effectiveness. Effectiveness must be considered as indebted to each attribute in some way, and each must be responsible for bringing something, some element of effective teaching, into appearance. These triggers might be articulated logically and simplistically (though entirely unnaturally) as “When such and such, then motivations,” and, “When motivation, then such and such.” We have assumed that each stipulated attribute is distinguishable as a phenomenon and recordable as an occurrence. We shall move to consider the feasibility of this aspect of the conditional nature of dispositions to act later within this chapter, but in the meantime we could say that the thunder of motivation must be presented and recorded as the effect of its accompanying although rarely synchronous lightning; whether these occurrences

result in the rainfall of effective teaching for us is moot; not because it is irrelevant but because at *interview* it remains unknowable.

Our interview process conducts its business of selection perfectly well via the language, those ever-ready verbs, of ‘ask,’ ‘answer,’ ‘demonstrate,’ ‘choose,’ ‘describe,’ or even ‘reflect’ and ‘remember;’ yet the business of its content of essences or attributes of abstract nouns is one of unavoidable and uncomfortable generality. We know what we can say about asking, reflecting and describing, but we rely on the persuasive coercion of science, folk psychology and educational positivism which says in its general terms that motivation stands to what gives it as effective teaching stands to motivation to teach. It is very much one thing to use the concepts of motivation suitably, in context and with utility, but another to describe that motivation’s practicality. And besides, the world of the candidate and their assorted characteristics are there before either they or the interviewer begins to experience it, and as Merleau-Ponty (2012) reminds us, it exists far beyond the limits of what is perceptible to either – the existence of what we perceive does not depend on our perceiving it.

1.2 Autobiography and Memory

We have mentioned several times above the notion of autobiography and biography. If who we are is determined by who we think we are in many crucial ways, then our interview determines who our candidate is by who someone else thinks we are. While the scope of this thesis does not cross the boundary into the complex territory of psychological theories of identity and memory, we can nevertheless look over its fence to locate related aspects of the autobiographical nature of recall which satisfy the interview process’s demand for evidence. This demand presupposes a traditional view - that identity is created by links between the present and the past provided by the memories of autobiographical experience. Yet Schechtman (1994) questions this as an oversimplified and problematic view of the actions of memory. Placed in the context of our interview, this traditional ‘psychological continuity theory’ supposes that the candidate in the present is the same person as that individual in the past if, and only if, the present person remembers the relevant experiences of their past. That of course extends to their future self; the qualified teacher is the same person they were at interview, and previously (if they remember those moments of conscious experience and intention). Analysis of identity has more or less stopped at the fact that it is constituted by memory. So prevalent is this theory that there is little discussion of memory’s role in the constitution of personal identity which could be applied to our encounter.

Put simply, established psychological continuity theories view memory as a simple connection between discrete moments of consciousness, and that identity is constituted not by sameness of substance, but

by sameness of psychological features, as John Locke proposed in the seventeenth century, and that memory constitutes the consciousness of our subject. The object human is thus to be broken down into atomic units, and their continued existence is open for analysis in terms of unbroken connection between those units across time. Schechtman (1994) describes this idea thus, "that a person-time-slice at t_2 is a part of the same person as a person-time-slice at t_1 ."

A general psychological account has identity created by memory-like connections, but also by their 'ancestral relation,' and other connections; for example, between an intention and the action which carries it out, or between the different temporal parts of persistent belief, values and desires, among others. Identity is formed then if the candidate is psychologically continuous over time - that person persists through memory connections. Theorists seek to define psychological continuity in terms of relations between particular moments in the life of the person. The relations must be seen as simple, countable, discrete between moments of consciousness. Memory is seen as a straightforward link between a present moment and a single, well-defined past experience. This of course echoes the way that suitability for teaching, and the character of our candidate is seen as simple, countable, discrete attributes and moments of behaviour defined in the past, persisting through the present and into the future being.

However, memories of particular experiences are only one of the kinds of autobiographical memories we have (Barsalou, 1988), and do not even seem to be the most common. Memory is not composed of simple, countable connections between two well-defined moments of consciousness; rather we often condense experiences, presenting to ourselves a fictitious event or experience which is a composite of essential features of a series of those which occurred in reality. But how much similarity must there be between the two moments of consciousness in order for the second to count as a memory of the first? How much of the content of a relevant educational experience must be reproduced and how accurately for it to constitute any useful truth – we cannot count the number of connections of similarity between two discrete moments of consciousness. Schechtman (1994) describes the subtlety of our constructed biographies as follows:

“The goal of making sense of the unfolding of our lives - of writing our own biographies--would require that we interpret and reconstruct our experiences to create a coherent life history. Anomalous events may thus be recast, representative ones emphasized, and other changes undertaken to make one's past more smooth and comprehensible... If our autobiographical memories are the way we tell ourselves and others the story of our lives, a consideration of the way these memories really work suggests that we are rather subtle authors. We do not need to resort to crude, literal reproduction of our physical and psychological histories, but pick and choose the important elements, use sophisticated representational devices, and shape a story... Memory, on this view, is not only a reproduction of past experiences or discrete moments of consciousness. It is also a way of weaving the facts about ourselves and

our histories into intelligible story which expresses the overall contours of character and life.”

Our autobiographical memories draw a smooth, part fictionalised, storyline or contours between memories which is constrained by the sheer number and complexity of those experiences, but which gives our lives a narrative unity and useful sense. Not only this, but thinking and memory are intrapersonal and interpersonal, both individual and personal, but also social and public (Harre, 2006). For our candidate the process of remembering includes conversational as well as introspective activity whereby those they have had do contribute to the construction of their past, and therefore present. This communal construction forms some basis on which action is based. We are able to perceive artefacts as well as memories as part of a single integrated whole which constitutes personal identity – a complex narrative very different to the reality of isolated units of real existence which it integrates. This integration blurs the distinction between different moments of the candidates lives, in the same way that perceived attributes integrate to form an evolving unity of being. And these influences are what ‘shows up’, indirectly, in what we say and do.

These autobiographies are constructed and revised throughout our personal and professional lives. The details which our candidate includes are not all given before the fact; they may be and often are influenced by their own understanding of the story to date. And as we see, this understanding is limited by each aspect of investigation within this thesis – linguistically, perceptually, temporally, dispositionally and intentionally.

1.3 An Instrumental and Fallible Mechanism of Revealing

What of the essence of the interview itself? We can say that by ordering its stockpile in service to teaching, its Heideggerian ‘standing reserve,’ its own essence is one of revealing - and this by reduction - the totality of the candidate. We can also say that it throws down a challenge to the candidate. Its framework is only able to reveal by reductionist claims which describe the complex phenomenon of teachers in terms of simple and fundamental constituent parts and by enclosing, or enframing, all teachers and all candidates in its particular claim to teacher effectiveness. It does so by calling each to presence (and to present) and follows this by means of systematic unconcealment. We might even call this an enlighten-ment in Kantian terms, as an emergence from the shadows of immaturity, and to build yet further and finally on this analogy, as an area of existence for our candidate, Heidegger’s “clearing,” or open space of meaning (Cromwell, 2001) by which the person, their social systems, histories and futures can be discovered.

‘Revealing’ often seems the most pervasive act of our time and the candidate has no option but to submit to its process; they are unable to opt in or opt out of this scrutiny, which orders the nature of both the teaching profession and the humans at its core. But it does so by necessary disengagement from the very activities it hopes to assess – suitability for teaching. It is isolated from the phenomenon it studies. The expression of the candidate’s Being can only take the form of ‘talking about’ or ‘talking after,’ and never ‘talking while.’ Its technology appreciates the worth of qualities of character by listening to how they operate in the lives of others – admiring and accepting Candidate Smith for her honesty and concern for others at the same time as it suspects and rejects Candidate Jones for an inadequate expression of this, or a perceived meanness and temper.

It is therefore a means to an end, an instrument. In what follows I shall take this proposition, itself a platitude, as starting point and seek to posit this end point and the means by which its human activity, its contrived technology, is utilised within interviews for Initial Teacher Training in general, and within the Multiple Mini Interview specifically to classify and define our candidate body. Accordingly, while progress in the sciences is made by proceeding to real essences distinct from properties in order to stop the mistiness of contrived meaning or a slippage of signification, by the nature of its subjectivity and brevity our interview cannot do so. Candidates for teaching are grouped together based on a notional common constitution “despite...manifest sensible differences” (Bhaskar, 2008, p210). However, interview reproduces the privileged situation of identity which has been effectively critiqued by Deleuze (1994) in which everything relies on a form of necessarily presupposed identity to ground the objectivity and intelligibility of our thoughts, for us about teaching. Our processes of interview are fallible attempts to capture in language the real essences of one classified form of being – that of prospective effective and moral-bound teacher.

Whereas the deterministic technologies of our selection interview attempt to first model and then interpret hidden realities, uncovering its truths of the candidate’s nature and suitability, or ‘fit’, a new science (Fleener, 2005) of complexity fundamentally challenges underlying epistemologies of modernity and “disrupts the quest for certainty, truth and objective knowledge,” (p3) of our subjects. Reducing processes of selection and interpretation to heavily structured practices and the emotionally satisfying products predicated on ‘theory’ and ‘evidence’ essentially destroys complex relationships and properties of that dynamic theory. These instead seem based upon pre-20th century scientific thought operating within a paradigm of mechanism (Capra, 1996) with a view of the world which is primarily Newtonian and ‘clock-work.’ A plausible and uncontestable interpretation of the person and a judgement about their life suits both them and the teaching profession.

Thus, we might challenge Newtonian assumptions of orderliness and an impersonal underlying analytic. But Education's emphasis on quantification and empirical alignment with the normative disregards complex and evolving phenomena and concentrates instead on mechanisms of teacher

behaviour and reductionist ‘calculation’ of character, approach to teaching, pedagogical processes and effect. Generic standards and pre-determined, measurable outcomes of student attainment are now extended to the nature of those entrants to the profession. This standardisation of both practice and Being suggests a vision of teaching without *difference*, where there is little that is distinctive about the practice of individual teachers. But such an understanding of the practices of education and its participants does not account for cultural and contextual difference; nor do they account for variations in the professional identity or educational and linguistic background of the candidates who wish to enter the teaching profession. Individual measurements of these generic, standardised practices focus on ‘the what’ of teaching and those individuals involved. In other words, ‘what they need to know and be able to do’ as indicative of their being. The life of the teacher thus constituted amounts to what Cavarero (2000) might call their ‘mere empirical existence.’ These ‘what stories’ lack a sense of what she calls ‘the who’ of the individual – that is, the ‘unrepeatable uniqueness’ of the individual teacher (p.58). At its most complex, the ‘who’ of our candidate’s critical autobiography, that part fictionalised narrative, is complex and intertextual; there is no “compact or coherent identity” (p.63) which can be located easily. The ‘who’ of more an authentic teacher is not a ‘true’ or a singular self, with any stable, essential core. Rather, it is a complex heteroglossic self (Parr et al. 2014), interwoven by those memories, history, biography, culture – a universe of utterances (Bakhtin, 1981) which recognises the candidate’s participation in particular prior language communities and various social groups but also a sense of the individual who is shaped by a complex of personal and educational biographies and histories. This ‘unrepeatable uniqueness’ is ours, and ours alone, because of the linguistic combination of communities and discourses and the ways these are embodied and inscribed.

1.3.1 Teacher supply as an ecological system

As Capra (1996, p17) says, “The basic tension is one between parts and the whole. The emphasis on the parts has been called mechanistic, reductionistic, or atomistic; the emphasis on the whole holistic, organismic, or ecological.” We might easily use this expression of parts and the whole to view not only the humans at the interview’s heart, but also teacher supply itself as an ecological system. The ecological system of teacher supply consists of the early seduction and initial recruitment, preparation and training, first employment, professional development, and retention (its alternative being migration, *away* from the system). The origins of recruitment include all that leads to our moment of selection, potentially looking back to childhood and being grounded as it is in notions of experience. The populations of stake-holders, which represent the different ‘species’ within the system have always demonstrated unevenness rather than any real equilibrium or primordial balanced nature. Populations of teachers rise rapidly and can collapse just as quickly, caused by extreme events such as global

financial uncertainty and associated moments of professional churn, but also by smaller changes which drive variables or inputs – often magnified by methods of feedback – and which can produce disproportionately large outcomes in professional supply and sustainability. Rather than dependency on stable relationships between populations, intrusions of policy and well-publicised working conditions, even (like natural world eco-systems) migrations of populations into and out of the education system - career changers and the movements of European or Commonwealth teachers – and recent pandemic disease have limited the likelihood of balance and repose (NFER, 2022). The impact of these systemic changes is only seen over extended periods of time. Teacher supply has never demonstrated a docile nature; its systems are neither anarchic nor ordered but are underpinned by complex structures of cause and effect.

1.3.2 Essentialist Definitions of the Teacher

The process of interview and its list of those objective yet abstract ideal attributes is a product of the limiting condition of history and as such is entirely logical. Education's history has generated its own dispositions, strategies and style of reasoning that serve to only constrain its actions of teacher selection. By pointing first to the essences which make up the 'ideal teacher,' and by naming them, the interview procedure attempts to describe the object, and in doing so to impose these meanings. In our ordinary language it states, "The ideal teacher is committed to the profession and to the welfare of their pupils." The object, Teacher, is described as Committed. Leaving aside the authority on which that description is based, the 'how do we know?', the term itself has become defined and determined. The series of definitions with which the interview determines the object is therefore able to answer the question, "What is a teacher?" It asks which essences (attributes – A1, A2) are denoted by the term 'teacher.' It also answers the question, "What does Teacher mean?" Both these questions are answered by a defining formula, which characterises this essentialist view: $T=A1+A2+A3$ etc. The scientific view of this defining formula asks of the definition, "A teacher is committed, motivated, reflective, intellectually curious, resilient etc" the answer to the following question: "What shall we call a teacher? Can we call this candidate the same?" It places the *question* of the attributes ahead of the answer, which becomes interchangeable and seeks equivalence between teacher and candidate. The process therefore has become quantitative. It recognises that some things (Teachers and Candidate) can be the same type and that properties and sets of universal features are ways of measuring these things. The interpretations of the interview process therefore are nominalistic – there is little if any correspondence to reality (Popper, 1945) beyond the names of these universalist features, and yet the interviewer is engaged in an essentialist search for each. For thinkers such as Popper, the mining for attributes which answer the question "What is this Candidate? And is the answer to this question the same as What is a Teacher?"

are unnecessary. It would be better for the process to ask, “How can this candidate best be prepared for the world of the teacher?” and that we should not depend on definitions and the inherent vagueness of words. The essentialist view of the definition of the Teacher/candidate is rendered untenable and unnecessary, even damaging. “This concentration on the problem of meaning fail(s) to establish precision; it is itself the main source of vagueness, ambiguity, and confusion.” (Popper, 1945, p19).

So, while the interviewer and interviewee are both attempting to establish a truth, to locate the ‘self-evident’ nature of the latter via intellectual or inductive intuition, to understand one another intuitively, and that it may be self-evident that the argument that the “Ideal Teacher is defined as $A1+A2+A3$ etc, in fact, “the way of science is paved with discarded theories that were once thought self-evident,”(Popper, 1983, p94) and a definition then, is unable to establish the meaning of a term. The logic of a formula (constituted by the terms motivated, committed, high-expectations, resilient, curious etc) cannot establish the truth of its statement. Meaning via defining terms is vague and would require an infinite regress of further definitions (What is ‘motivated’? What is ‘curious’?). Furthermore, narrowing the penumbra, the partially illuminated areas of scope and meaning, contained within these words themselves is elusive; all we can do is create a shorthand of often borrowed meanings to strike as closely as possible to our desired intention (Nielson, 2020). For example, ‘Creativity,’ and theory-laden terms such as, ‘Intelligence’ and ‘ability’ are concepts never so settled that we are forbidden from calling them into question or revising them.

Demand for definition is as untenable as the demand that all statements uttered by the candidate should be proven. While it may be believed that the demand for definition eliminates the many ambiguities in question, namely that of The Ideal Teacher, Performance, Best Practice, even Education itself, and that clarity is helpful, we should be careful not to burden the terms in use with the overwhelming task of being *true* and *precise*. Education is laden with terms which are vague: classroom (what precisely constitutes its meaning and population); or behaviour (what precisely constitutes that which is acceptable or otherwise; what are the circumstances in which it arises, what are its causes, and so on). If accuracy is needed then it is easily differentiated (the space in which twenty five children in age group X are taught Mathematics) and ranges are accepted including those of error.

So, while Aristotle, and to some extent Wittgenstein have insisted that demonstrations of proof, such as those demanded at the interview, and definitions, such as the sharp delineation of suitability for teaching set out by clear sets of attributes are two primary methods of obtaining knowledge of the object under scrutiny, there might instead be a new tendency: to throw away proof and the rational arguments of claims to knowledge which so often demand it. The only fundamental rational attitude which is tenable is that which recognises that judgement results from a tentative act of faith. The choice in front of the interviewer is not simply that of selection, interpretation, taste, or even intellectualism. Their decision (and that of the entire interview process) is one of morals. It is not merely a private affair – it

affects the life of others. It results in the division of Being into successful and unsuccessful, worthy and not worthy, 'fit' and fail. This division of who belongs to the profession and its emotional community and who must exist outside of it. It therefore demands consistency, and a rationalism which is critical, primarily of the authority on which their knowledge judgements are based and the acceptance that this knowledge, being incomplete, is the perfect example of what Popper (1983, p104) describes as "conjectural character of human knowledge." We reach the realisation that all human knowledge is fallible and therefore cannot be ascribed any validity. A comprehensive rationalism is not therefore logically tenable and an admittance of irrationalism would require any rules of consistency to be discarded.

The judgement and justifications can only rely on what the ears and the eyes are able to witness, not on any previous knowledge of the candidate, nor on any contextual foundation, knowledge of place, social conventions relevant to the candidate (other than the language game in which they are currently engaged). If asked to justify any assertion made the interviewer is not able to make use of any source of knowledge which is not empirical and the truths offered certainly cannot be manifest. All observation involves interpretation but here is founded on limited theoretical knowledge. Their assertion cannot be tested (yet) and neither can the historical assertions made by the candidate. The knowledge at which the interviewer arrives is without authority – it has little purity and is not untainted – its sources are scant; it has no genealogy and little origin. This knowledge then is guesswork and opinion and based upon the common belief or doxa of the wisdom of the selected teacher-attributes as the sole authority which commands the process. The authority of the interviewer has become deferred to the authority of the judgement criteria and thus, to borrow from Stenhouse (1983, p163), the virtue of humanity diminished in *us* when considered judgement is overruled by external authority.

It believes that 'the truth is out there,' and that if there exists an ideal teacher it must be found *within* those who wish to join the profession, our pool of candidates, and must exclude those within whom it does not reside. But forming beliefs of truth about our candidate *must* be possible only if there is a background of intelligibility within which identification, ascertainment and communication exist as a means to bring these beliefs about. "Meanwhile," as Wittgenstein compels us to realise, "we do not see how it occurs there, nor do we understand the nature of this *must*. We think it must be in reality, for we think we already see it there..." (1953, 101-103). But, reality is mind-dependent and instead we should seek out a "change of aspect," akin to putting on a new pair of spectacles, in order for us to see and make sense of the world in which we exist and perceive others differently. To remain Aspect-blind makes us "incapable of seeing shades of meaning, and thus incapable of change," (ibid, 214). And without agreement about the meanings of the language terms in use in the artificially constructed universal language expectations of the interview there can be no guarantee of mutual intelligibility.

1.4 Indifference to the Human

The limitations and fallibilities of our senses are notorious. The means by which we perceive the world – the candidate’s perceptions of themselves and the world in which they are projected; the interviewer’s perception of the candidate, or indeed their failure to perceive, are well known to be illusory and imprecise. I discuss these notions of Perception in Chapter 2. I shall turn now to discuss not what the interviewer hears and thinks of the candidate’s attributes, nor what the candidate believes (I am not qualified to do such a thing) but rather the conditions which govern the way things appear to our participants: how things seem (feel and sound).

The rationale of the Multiple Mini Interview presupposes much as we begin to see – that the attributes of effective teachers are such, effective teaching is such, the teaching profession is improved by such, the attribute is *measured* as such. The selection interview therefore stands as a potent sign of modernity’s obscuring of being and its preoccupation with the scientific account, with systematic improvement and with measurement - measuring up, measuring against and measuring out. Such is its focus on qualities, by which I mean the properties and attributes of those it seeks to select, that we may even say that it confronts with oblivion the humanist axiom on which the West has for so long hung its beliefs of agency and autonomy, Pico della Mirandola’s (1486) assertion that “we can become whatever we choose to become.” If we ever truly believed that the human will is sufficiently powerful to overcome personal and professional necessity, those things which are deemed required of us in the service of our fate (Carroll, 1996), then the rigorous measurement, match and fitness for purpose demanded at the selection interview process and its commitment to empirical and correspondence theories of truth must surely disavow its participant, and much more so those who fail to meet its requirements.

In the constant competition and match with and against the other selection and choice rests above all in our modern age upon what Heidegger, in his 1947 Letter on Humanism, terms “the peculiar dictatorship of the public realm,” (1978, p197). The fact that we nourish our human selves by attempting to withdraw from it, and by choosing between the self and others we affirm the existence of both (Merleau-Ponty, 2012), demonstrates our subservience to this public realm in which Dasein, Heidegger’s term for human existence as it manifests itself to us and is experienced on a daily basis (Braver, 2014), is absorbed. Language itself has come under this dictatorship, and the public realm represented within the institution of Education at interview has decided what is intelligible, and therefore acceptable, and what is unintelligible – the function of Being a Teacher has become socially determined. Society has laid out the webs of meaning, the grounds, by which we recognise the term Teacher – the tasks involved, the tools and language, and the properties required of the humans who undertake to enter the profession. In the face of the dominating subjectivity of the public we might

summarise the modern condition of Being as one of self-doubt, anxiety and insecurity, busyness and exhaustion, an over-confidence which shields actual timidity, indifference and boredom. Our daily lives overlook that the data of our existence are collected, analysed, stored and password protected. More assessed and made public (literally, published) than any previous generation yet fiercely indignant about any breaches of privacy, we find ourselves constantly observed, monitored, measured and assessed, and yet paradoxically the truth of our natures is obscured from view. As an act of accountancy of a predetermined set of essences, which may or may not be present to varying degrees as a description of the being of our candidate, our selection interview chooses between the world of sciences and the world of everyday human actions and experience, and decides on only a version of truth and representation which can be carried by calculation. This calculative thought is governed by a method that in principle anyone can follow and repeat. The difference between the candidate A, judged suitable for teaching and the candidate B, judged unsuitable for teaching becomes 3 marks, rather than Candidate A said... while B said...and therefore its claims to truth, while accountable, are claims which prove an indifference to the human. A line has been drawn between those qualities of character which can impartially claim to determine accurate measurement of theoretical teaching success and those which cannot – those measurable dimensions of scientific theory which Ryle describes as “blue-blooded Primary Qualities” and “Secondary Qualities” respectively (1969, p84). These secondary qualities are perhaps the greater measure of description used by those who know our candidate well and whose totality are absent from view. Their siblings may describe them one way, as messy and unfair, their friends as enormous fun but sometimes serious, their teacher of mathematics as able to grasp new concepts with ease, their teacher of physical education as often lazy. These remain redundant in the indices of teacher selection on which we ground our judgement of fit; and can be seen as a judgement which is *given* rather than determined by the candidate’s own construction of self.

Existence here has had the *choice* of its own essence removed – it has not been described, it has been accounted for. Its calculations are content to remain at the level where technical precision and definite outcomes are sought rather than deeper dimensions of meaning. Attempts to improve the quality of teaching through applied standards, formal inspection, incentives for teachers, performance management and appraisal, competency criteria, tests, indeed anything that is quantifiable and easily measured have often resulted in quantification replacing wisdom. The worth of teaching, and therefore of teachers themselves, is largely seen in terms of the economic value of qualification. The teacher is portrayed as a technician charged only with tasks which are measurable as teacher outcomes rather than on who that teacher is (Cavarero’s ‘who,’ mentioned previously, or Heidegger’s understanding of mundane know-hows located in their actions (1962), the *way* they are) and who they can become. As Carr (2016) argues “a significant problem to which such work has responded has been recent official or centralist policy promotion of technicist models of professional practice that have sought to reduce teaching to the mastery of a repertoire of behaviourally conceived teaching skills or ‘competences’ for

the purposes of teaching”. It is not possible to detail the full range of human abilities and qualities of a teacher within the concept of competence, although some competences under scrutiny at interview, including the ability to reflect, or work collegiatively, and arguably the application of resilience, are also classifiable as dispositions, “with a basis resident in the competent agent, one that would in appropriately normal conditions ensure (or make highly likely) the success of any relevant performance issued by it.” (Sosa, 2007, p. 29).

1.5 The Matter of Dispositions to Act

That our process relies on the doctrine of the two-substance account of the individual is self-evident. In the absence of the material substance of the future actions of the qualified teacher our interview seeks to perceive the mental substance, the capacities, properties and dispositions *to act* which it believes will determine those future actions. These sets of attributes are not spatiotemporally locatable in reality – they are seen to compose an unseen spirit of being which determines that which is or *will be* spatiotemporally located. But a determining spirit is a very different thing to any action which can be carried out in the day-to-day of teaching practice. Take the quality of being curious, seen to be an important attribute in our trainee teachers due to its links with inquiry and a desire to know. We cannot see a spirit of curiosity. How can we? We can only see a person engaged in an act from which we can infer a spirit of curiosity, but this remains episodic and susceptible to errors of judgement and perception. We should therefore consider the need for a clear and explicit grasp of the language of attribute and begin to reflect on the terms in order not to misinterpret them, or view them as disembodied or abstracted from their everyday contexts of action. Gilbert Ryle famously suggested that the mind, rather than being another substance in addition to the body, is just a set of dispositions for the body to behave in certain ways (Ryle, 1949). Whether we accept this claim, individuals have behavioural and affective dispositions that impact our judgments of those persons. It is to these moral character traits that I now turn.

The non-cognitive character traits in question are those dispositions of character for which our systems of interview consider it appropriate to hold our prospective teachers responsible. We seek those traits deserving of positive praise (which we can therefore classify as virtues) and for which the interviewer allocates credit. We presuppose that these are character traits which are stable, fixed and reliable dispositions of action, capable of affect. Aristotle stated that these excellences of character must be informed by one’s practical wisdom (*phronēsis*), itself a disposition to make morally discerning choices in the practical activities of classroom practice. This suggests a link to intellectual virtues and therefore begins to encroach upon the determination that our interview be dedicated to the valorisation of the non-cognitive alone.

But when our candidate asserts that “I am anxious,” or “I am committed to teaching,” how does she know? Is this statement an observation, a perception, an inference, direct knowledge? On what evidence does she make this self-assertion, and how does this differ from the evidential basis on which a third party makes the same assertion, “This candidate is committed to teaching”? In his theory of self-perception, following extensive review of multiple psychological and behavioural studies, Bem (1972) asserts that individuals come to know their own attitudes, emotions and internal states largely by inferring them from observations of their own overt behaviours and the circumstances in which these behaviours occur. Thus, to the extent that these internal cues are weak, ambiguous or uninterpretable the individual candidate is functionally in the same position as the external observer, the interviewer, who must rely upon those same external cues to infer an individual’s inner states. If an individual’s own behaviour is the source of evidence of their beliefs and attitudes, and that external cues control attitude-statements then self-perception theory considers subjects as merely observers of their own behaviour. Just as our interviewer asks “What must this candidate’s attitude to teaching be if they are willing to behave in this way in this situation?” then so too must the candidate ask of themselves, “What must my attitude be if I am willing to behave in this way in this situation?”

Yet of course we have no sight at interview of that behaviour nor the situation in which it arises. We have put the cart before the horse; the attribute before action. The candidate has not been witness to the action to which they are committed; they have not yet seen the object of their curiosity, not the source of their self-efficacy, and so on. To separate attribute from the context of its use leaves only a word for some ghostly absent thing, a noun (Harre, 2006) – and what use are nouns without the meaning of their use? The segregation of mental attributes from physical action is diagnosed by Ryle (1990) as a fundamental category mistake. While we cannot deny that there is a domain of personal experience which remains private and unique for our candidate, what Ryle does call into question is a realm of cognitive entities beyond the realm of action, and therefore teacher behaviour, which *explains*. There is no meaningful language of thought with which our candidates can discuss their personal and professional lives, and which can be made separate from their public behaviours. Mysterious and static properties are redundant in the face of action, which is the only true home of mental activity and being. We see here a nexus, between the thinking of Heidegger – that the meaning of being can only be grasped as a trajectory of action through time, and Wittgenstein who as we shall see considered language as meaningful only when put into individuated action, and now Ryle. All three are cynical of attempts at explanation, despite a compulsion in modernity to seek out explanatory structures which, to Braver (2014) produce more smoke than light.

In particular, modern experimental psychology has discovered that circumstance has surprisingly more to do with how people behave than the traditional images of character and virtue supposed by the interview allow (Doris 2002, ix). These new theories consider how much of what we can empirically divine we can attribute to an individual’s character and how much can be attributable

to outside features. According to theorists and social scientists such as Harman (1999), most individuals overestimate the role of dispositional factors such as character traits in explaining behaviour and underestimate the role that specific situation and context plays in explaining human behaviour. Harman (2000) asserts that such opinions are held quite independently of their truth and can be explained in terms of confirmation bias and while our ground-floor thinking lead us to suppose that differences between people are due to distinct and robust character traits and dispositions to act these ordinary opinions can be completely explained away.

“In trying to characterize and explain a distinctive action, ordinary thinking tends to hypothesize a corresponding distinctive characteristic of the agent and tends to overlook the relevant details of the agent’s perceived situation.... Ordinary attributions of character traits to people are often deeply misguided and it may even be the case that there... [are] no ordinary traits of the sort people think there are,” (Harman, 1999, p315).

If character and traits prove to be situation-specific (and therefore occurrence depends on situation rather than robust permanent and static ability) and situation plays a greater part in our behaviour, then our entire endeavour can be seen as at risk of being thrown from its axis.

1.6 Ending with Choice and a Natural Selection

Choice lies at the centre of the interview process. But the choice before us following the interview is not simply intellectual or rational, and it cannot be a matter of taste. It is a moral choice. Its decision is one of morals in that it is not a private affair – it affects the lives of our candidates. As the cause which brings the interview into being, the centre-point of presence and origin forms the nucleus of the event. It orients and organises the circular process of stimulus and response revolving around its point and brings the process of perception (and its act of noticing), knowledge and judgement to rest. Looking for the attribute is its task; seeing it, knowing it and judging it is its achievement, its end-in-view. What unnerves most about the doctrine of judgement and choice espoused by this act of selection at the heart of the instrument (e.g. We choose A, but we do not choose B) is that, by granting Education its right to choose who it allows entrance, it confronts the institutions of the University and Education with a humanistic possibility of choice by eliminating that very possibility of choice for our human candidate. While some selection methods are used to select *out* individuals, such as the screening of academic records and the subsequent reduction in the candidate pool, the structured interview selects *in*, doing so by a process of reductivist observance of essences which characterise-as, rather than characterise-by. This leaves no room for considering behaviours of teachers as actioned by being-in-general, or from above. It places the essences of being a teacher before the existence of the teacher and understands the latter in terms of the former, what Popper (1983, p249) would describe as the “upward causation” of

small parts influencing the action of the whole and an associated demand that we explain everything a teacher does in terms of elementary particles. This one-sided vigilance may ease one set of worries but leave us silent in the face of countervailing worries which are no less urgent. Its systems of regulation are aligned precisely with those of the systems of education to which the candidate has already become accustomed: examination, observation, grading, measurement, score, and quantification. Each successful candidate must become a realisation of a conception of the teacher which dwells in the understanding of those who make the choices, or who design their entry requirement. We have then a system of on-going ‘natural’ selection: our processes mould the matter and instruct the shape of the teaching profession by downward causation on its elementary particles. The choice process becomes a selection process *from* its random and fluctuating elementary particles – the structure interferes directly to determine the genesis of profession.

Similarly, this process continues beyond selection. If we consider the training of the teacher, the production and practice of those specific skills encased within the role of the classroom teacher, we understand that the teacher is made (I hesitate at the use of the phrase ‘manufactured’) according to a programme of study and practice in school and a conception of what the outcome should be and the purpose they should serve. Each qualifying teacher is a realisation of a conception which dwells in the understanding of those involved in the training or increasingly of policy. Both candidate and qualifying teacher are examples of universal and predetermined conceptions.

Suppose we were able to show that the behaviours of these teachers *were* caused by their pre-existing dispositions (which we are not), or by the action of the environment upon them, or by other determining psychological factors. The profession may well be reassured and justified in exclaiming, “That is what teachers are like, we are all the same, no one can do anything about it.” But a different outlook, more existentialist in its manner, offers that, for example, when teachers demonstrate resilience or commitment, it shows them as being responsible for their resilience. They are not like that on account of a pre-existing commitment to the job, they have not become like that through pathological psychologies; they are like that because teachers have developed within themselves commitment or altruism by their demonstrated actions. What produces resilience for example is the *act* of carrying on through, of bouncing back from adversity – an attribute or disposition to act in a certain way is not an action. Therefore, a teacher is defined by the sum of their undertakings. There is always in this model the possibility for the previously uncommitted candidate to become committed; and likewise the previously motivated candidate to lose their motivation. On this theory, the dignity of the candidate remains, and they are not objectified. Teacher action is not reduced, via a form of materialism, to a set of causally dependent and determinate physical processes alike to a matrix of qualities and audited fact. The claims to a science of objective choice or scientific truth make way in the face of claims to indifference to the personal and our horse is placed securely back in front of the cart.

1.7 Chapter Summary

In this first investigation attention has been drawn to an emerging indifference to the human represented by the mechanistic and reductionist view of attributes, character traits and dispositions inherent in technologies of selection. The Multiple Mini Interview engages its arguments from analogy which is reductionist. It relies upon the analogy that teachers, engaged in a community of similar action must have similar characteristics. It uses accepted similarities between two systems, qualified teachers and unqualified potential teachers, made up from a single body of those who *wish* to teach, to support the conclusion that some further similarity exists, and places this similarity within the characteristics of those who wish to teach. It positions successful action as being determined by these shared characteristics, within those who teach, rather than an indeterminacy of autonomous action. Formally, its analogy between Qualified and Prospective teachers is a direct mapping between the properties, relations and functions of the two groups. Not all of the items can be placed in correspondence, of course – the professional functions of the two groups cannot yet be alike. But in order to succeed in this analogy it makes multiple sacrifices. Selection by defined attributes has substituted the temporal complexity of contingent Being for a historical (past, present and future) unity.

This categorisation has become the means by which we make separate our candidate and how, as composite wholes, they are deconstructed. Selection by these methods is grounded by a theory of universals which satisfies our craving for generality and simplicity rather than an acknowledgement of the complex nature of identity and the part-fictionalised narrative of the candidate's autobiography and self-perception.

The essence of the interview is one of revealing, but only as an instrumental means to an end. We have begun to challenge these Newtonian assumptions of orderliness and woolly-headed physically determinist views, that like causes produce like effects, and like effects follow necessarily from like causes among our teacher population. We might regard this as impersonal and inconsiderate of any notice to systems theory, to which we shall return in forthcoming investigations. We have begun to realise the way in which teachers and candidates for teaching are defined and determined as What they are, rather than Who they are. We have opened the door to the inherent vagueness of words, to which we soon turn. We have acknowledged the conjectural character of the knowledge gathered and have begun to see modernity's obscuring of being and its disavowal of the timeworn platitude that human will can overcome professional necessity. The socially determined function of being-a-teacher has displaced human essence to a position of accountability and calculation rather than its everyday use and action. Yet action, and knowledge of action, is the only true home of mental activity and being and it is to this matter of Being, and Being-a-teacher, that we now turn.

Chapter 2: On Being, Becoming, and the Interview as a Technology of Revealing the Teacher

If “what does ‘being’ mean?” is, according to Heidegger in his 1928 lectures, “quite simply the fundamental question of philosophy,” then the extensional question, ‘what does being a teacher mean?’ is logically the fundamental question of any philosophy of teaching. Any activity which attempts to ascertain a suitability for teaching must therefore concern itself with the nature of meaning contained within the terms ‘being’ and ‘teacher’. It is therefore the matter of being, and being-a-teacher in particular, which forms the central concern of the following investigation. I consider how the moment of the university admissions interview provides a border crossing, a further allusion to the ecology of teacher supply mentioned previously, but also of states of being. As such, the interview might make a justifiable claim therefore to be a freeing. From being the other-directed self of their own schooling to the directing-other being of the teaching profession, the candidate looks to make the uncertain transition from one place of residence to another, literally and figuratively, temporally and cognitively.

As an early move to attempt to locate a true self our candidates must negotiate the social forces which shape and constantly reshape who they are. As biological organisms our candidate has adapted to their existent environment, and it seems adequate to say of human experience that they organise their cognition as representation of those environments in which they have lived (Maturana, 1980); social, educational, historical. Through their experiences they have accumulated information about it and coded this within their cognition. This functional organisation gives rise to phenomena such as conceptual thinking, self-consciousness, interaction, language and its use. Whilst seemingly contradictory, the existent state of our candidate, that which is the object of scrutiny, is then in a permanent simultaneity of temporalities (Gutierrez, 2007), or past, present and future at the same time. The event of interview for a place on the applicant’s chosen degree programme, and which allows access to that future-possible professional route, signifies the place and time at which the selves-in-transition seem potentially most discordant. My concern in the investigation that follows is that the dangers of calculative thought within the technicity embodied by our interview result not in a freeing, but in a distortion of human nature and a subsequent loss, or lessening, of the meaning of the term teacher. I will attempt to describe the notion of being-a-teacher as a series of transition points made possible across those situations and uses of the terms which folk psychology deems suitable attributes. These uses of action and on-going self-perception, and perception of the other, suggest perpetual redescription beyond the bounded (or hand-drawn) limits of the Multiple Mini Interview’s (MMI) predefined character traits.

The central position of several of the presuppositions at interview whose establishment I began in the previous section are as follows: that the being of the candidate is fixed; that our candidate can be understood by another in terms of 'what is' and what can be permanent and unchanging that the characteristic traits which can be attributed to people are typically expressed in their behaviour in ways that are consistent across variations in situation – at interview the same as the classroom; wherever in fact is 'outside their skin'. This 'what-is' are the essences of character, attribute and disposition, its laws of behaviour and action recognised since Plato as Forms. Knowingly imperceptible, the technologies of the interview must nevertheless make these essences of the possible teacher intelligible. Heidegger (1962) on the other hand suggested that Being is not fixed or fixable, rather it is a temporal unfolding – a wholly more unreliable phenomenon, alike to time itself. In addition to the examination of the candidate to discern their properties, and by seeking to reveal the existence of those pre-determined essences, it also considers the respect by which the entity is what they are. In what *sense* are they real and in what does their being consist? It concerns itself with the 'what-is' throughout, not 'are you someone who..?' So, what is your motivation to become a teacher? What is your commitment to the profession and your programme of study? What is your understanding of the role of the teacher? What is your suitability to teach? What is it to be a teacher and what is it to be you and are we able to map one to the other? Our interview therefore is fundamentally an engagement in ontology. Yet it assumes that the qualities of the mind of the candidate, and those of the teaching profession, are reflected in the things that are said and done, and that there is a correlation between what is said and what is done. For one this corresponds to the response to the questions set at interview, for the other in their actions in the classroom.

However, the assumption that these definable substances are existent, discernible, continuous, and enduring over time – has assumed an aura of self-evidence which surrounds the collection of attributes and essences of the ideal teacher within, and is in fact an uncritical set of presuppositions, a Traditional View of character-based explanations which "presuppose the existence of character structures that actual people do not very often possess," (Doris, 2002, p6). It presupposes that the essential being of our candidate remains constant through changes brought about in circumstance, context, experience, and time, whether identified as the mind and the mental states of the candidate or their physical being (Guignon, in Shand (ed.) 2006). Our interview therefore embodies a reductionist characterisation both of our participants and the natural language of everyday life they employ, reduced to discussion about the physical object of the candidate and causal interactions between attributes and their behaviour. The design of our process seeks to ask for demonstrations of the what-is, but we can see that in formulating our interview questions our *own* sense of perceived reality, as the institutions of education and modernity, and how teaching exists for *us* have become implicated by setting the limits of acceptance. The profession can be seen to be coming to define itself – what does *it* desire, and what do *we* believe to be the case?

We already of course have a pre-existing sense of the reality of teaching. An understanding of what it is to be a teacher is supposed and made familiar by our previous embodied dealings with schools, classrooms, and those we have met there. Our candidate has moved around within these spaces physically and intellectually for most of their life. But up until the threshold moment of the admissions interview this understanding is merely tacit, without cogent description, and certainly pre-theoretical. If we consider that understanding *of* teaching is a central part of knowing *how* teachers work and make their decisions, we see that for such understanding (of the movements and informed performances of being a teacher) the knowledge the candidate requires is an already existing competence in those movements and performances. For our candidate, for them to understand is for them to be a certain way, to embody a particular way of existing in the world (ibid), that world of education, rather than to simply think or believe or even to know that such and such is the case. An understanding-laden discussion of the tasks associated with teaching would require at the very least knowing how to plan lessons, assess progress, and manage children's behaviour and so on, if those are the topics under appraisal. At the stage of interview, all our candidate can offer by way of knowledge is one which 'works' for them in the narrow connotations of their own personal context, that which is emotionally satisfying or intellectually comforting. The logic of appraising the candidate's pre-understanding of the form of life of the teacher is non-sensical, other than in what can only be an interpretation of perception. We must accept therefore that any judgement following these interpretations can only ever be open-ended and on-going and certainly not based on any systematic theory of pre-determined propositions containing the phrases, "this candidate understands..." or "teachers are/this candidate is..." Interpreting meanings enframed by previous experience, habitual perceptions and the interests and prejudices of the candidate reveals neither essences nor 'reality' operating behind their habitual thinking and the façade of language use. There are no essences to be grasped, only interpretations which stand behind interpretations (Fairfield, 2011). The entire narrative of structured being can only be a partial description then, and one which conceals as much as it reveals and speaks only of sectarian interests which function beneath the surface of our process.

It is to the matter of how we might instead orient our interview towards an understanding which strives for agreement which I now turn: a revealing of what things *might* mean for the candidate, but an agreement which is not so settled that it might later be unsettled; the first in a cycle of perpetual retelling of what education and being a teacher means to *them*, and their first participation in the personal habits and traditions of the forms of practical and professional life of the teacher.

2.1 Being-in-the-world of Teaching

An existential involvement in the contingent world of the teacher *should be* grasped if we look beyond the sense of containment hinted at in the term ‘being *in* (the world of) teaching,’ and in the hollowness of the term ‘the self,’ that thing which our interview presupposes our candidate is capable of being ‘conscious of’ without danger of misreporting, whether by any of the terms we have come to attach to it – self-consciousness, introspection, reflection (which suggests our candidates’ mind is able to heed itself in the way their face does in a mirror, as an optical phenomenon). Stepping beyond the lines drawn by these words ‘in’ and ‘self’ our candidate can then consider being involved “in the teaching profession” without being *inside* the profession. They have handled the familiar language and terms of the world of the teacher throughout their everyday practical experience of school; they have been absorbed in its tasks and systems, its behaviours and traditions, but they have never attempted to separate themselves from its component parts until this point. The candidate must grapple now with these metaphysical constituent parts of the requirement of the interview *a priori* of teaching experience, for example, the nature of the reality of teaching or professionalism itself. However, the experience of teacherly everydayness is unknown other than as a pupil, as a willing recipient (or otherwise) of teaching. The ontological meanings of those issues in which the being of our candidate has been involved and preoccupied by is wholly temporal. This grasping the meaning of those things with which the candidate has had concern, Heidegger finds in the use of the term ‘care’ – those things we care *for* and take care *of* and therefore become the necessary condition for them to exist (Braver, 2014). For Gilbert Ryle this care equates to “heeding” and the meaning granted by the contested notion of consciousness-of, or noticing. Their concern for the people they have encountered is temporal, their thoughts and reflections in service to the things they do and practice; their awareness of their own being, is entirely situated in temporality. This notion of ‘care,’ for Heidegger (1978) expresses the movement of life - out of their past, into a hoped-for future, through the present of the event itself.

In the experience of everydayness, the totality of meaningful language and events and the equipment of education melds for us into a single engagement, what Heidegger (1962) describes as “ready to hand” - handy in completing the tasks required to participate and succeed in school but passively observed and part of an eco-system. The language and concepts of education and the equipment in use, form a holistic and taken for granted ‘what-is’ in their real-life situation. They have spent years sat in classrooms, not amidst a collection of individual items that they have individually pieced together into a whole and been conscious of. These items which make up the educational system of their experience withdraw from the attention, or “dissolves into the project at hand rather than standing out as discrete objects with notable characteristics” (Braver, 2014, p33). The terms in use and under scrutiny at interview have become part of this holistic, pre-ontological (for our candidate),

quantifiable, antecedent brew – to be motivated, be committed, be resilient, have high expectations, be hard-working, be reflective in their thinking. And now these objects, our attributes and ways and forms of being are made separate; previously part of a single archived collection, each is now placed in its own glass case and placed on display, made “present at hand” (ibid). Our participants are forced to stand back and view these items objectively, from a position of detachment, observed and made conscious of, the candidate as curator, the interviewer as investigative visitor. Our interview presents a series of objective scenarios and questions and demands that both participants observe and reflect upon their occurrent nature within, frozen in time as contingently related objects in a defined space in the world. This world is presented as one both participants have in common, one which is shared, those familiar cultural contexts of the classroom or the home. Our process therefore presupposes common reactions – what one does in reaction to the question is what *anyone* would do. How our candidate should react to a problem composed around children working in groups or misbehaving is how anyone (who fits our pattern of common acceptance) would react. What they do, is what *one* does. And what one does, *they* do. An altruist reacts with pleasure and selfless support for the well-being of the children their care, that is what one does. Similarly, one/they finds distasteful and shocking matters of children's inattention, teacher workload, parental neglect. These are the socially determined and educationally accepted ways of doing things, and our candidate must meet these expectations in the way they are supposed to. The unique or extraordinary is forbidden. And such is the origin too of the image of culture we find enclosed in all examination, but especially in the unifying universality envisioned by our prescribed measured teacher effectiveness: as Deleuze (2004, p197) states, “be yourselves – it being understood that this self must be that of others.”

By means of our defined attributes then we self-censor and conform to the expectations of a profession and the society in which it is grounded. This surreptitious or “inconspicuous domination by Others” (Braver, 2014, p45) which ignores the varieties of ways to be fixates on a single way of being a candidate for teaching and has been applied to everyone that is. Our candidate can be recognisable as teacher only if they follow what is expected and are initiated into the norms and conventions by which we have regulated and systematised the practices and character of the teacher. The interview is this first initiation. The candidate's interpretation and acceptance as teacher is only made possible, the theory of interview tells us, because of their attunement to those shared practices and ways of being. By such methods we keep in line (and ‘keep within the lines’) the make-up of the profession, and involvement in those societies is characterised by the lowest common denominator of existence (Guignon, in Shand ed. 2006). For our candidate there is no escape from the all-pervasive what-is of the essential structures and community of existence which constitutes teacher-being and being in teaching. The dispositions and attributes of the teacher, what they do and what they are, have become the ultimate source of the possibilities of self-interpretation for our candidate. Significance is only found with reference to those contexts.

Heidegger uses the term *Dasein* to designate human being, a concept characterised by historical context and trajectory and including the historical development of its languages. He goes further: that existence is an emergence of an open space of meaning (Cromwell, 2001), and employs the analogy of a clearing amidst the trees, whereby other persons, groups and social systems can arise and be discovered as they come into view, though inevitably mediated by discourse. As such a clearing, and mediated by the voices and conceptual frameworks in question, the interview is the means by which the self is discovered as an entity of a particular sort, a first recognition *as*, and is marked as such. Its language literally transforms us; the candidate is thrown into the midst of a world and by their disclosures and shared public language project outwards and into a future of possibilities for action. Thus, the candidate finds themselves at issue and in question and situated amidst their own possibility of being, and by language and discourse is able to order and compile, assimilate and differentiate the content of the process and its representation of teaching by direct engagement with it. The discourse of the exchange places the candidate in education's midst, engaging directly. We have seen that our candidate has previously been absorbed in only mundane affairs of teaching, during which thinking has been characterised by the 'dictatorship of the they' and normative systems of folk psychology and performance which lives up to certain norms and standards. They become, in that way, intelligible by only what it made sense to do (McGeer, 2007). This 'doing what one does' (Heidegger, 1962) and the public intelligibility which follows allows our process to "ride on the inertia of accepted behaviour," (Braver, 2014, p45), and stymies the authenticity of the candidate by the pressure to conform and to fall into step. Violating the norm, or deviating from the demands of the standard, does not cause merely strange looks, but an end to any hope for acceptance into the world of teaching. These webs of acceptability and the nodal points of identification, are what Dreyfus (2017, p27) described as shared, public, average practices on which everyday intelligibility depend, made up by an "interrelated totality of equipment, norms, and social roles (which) form a whole." It is this average intelligibility of our candidate which can and must be articulated in their language.

Folk psychology, then, and this domination by what one does (the 'they' which Heidegger terms *das Man*) and how one thinks is the means by which the candidate becomes intelligible and by which the interviewer can empathise. It is idealised in that "it produces its predictions and explanations by calculating in a normative system; it predicts what we will believe, desire, and do, by determining what we ought to believe, desire, and do," (Dennett, 1989 p. 52). It allows the quick and dirty predictions of everyday behaviours and thinking at the heart of judgement.

The centrality of prediction (of the future) in this way demonstrates the way time has become definitive of existence. Our candidate is required to give an account of what will be via an explanation of what has been and what is. But through expressions of the lived time of their everyday life ('earlier', 'now', then 'later') the interview is a working out of temporality and also the arising of being from out of itself. Our interview then is an act of *poiesis*, a bringing forth into the present that which did not exist

before. Heidegger uses the analogy of a blossom bursting into bloom to describe the sense in which an entity can be brought forth out of itself (1978), but the previously concealed being-of-a-teacher's unconcealing, brought forth or *caused* by the interviewer and the technology of the interview. We have here then two opposing justifications for our interview. One, that of the Multiple Mini Interview, which justifies its approach as that of a technology of prediction of future behaviour; the other that of an instrument which sets upon the nature of the candidate, their attributes and dispositions, to yield the teacher within; it challenges the candidate unapologetically to unfold and reveal expression of potentiality for being yet to be. What unites both is the fact of their being forward-directed. But while the second approaches a resolution of sorts, a commitment to its own possibility, the first suggests merely a hopeful conjecture.

Seen as an exercise in conformism the potential authentic self of our candidate is in danger of remaining hidden. We might view interview encounters as a previously under-appreciated technology to reveal both the subjects involved (and the objectification of the candidate) and the encounter between them. But how the product of the interview, the student teacher, comes to be defined is as a malleable, systematised, docile body (Foucault, 1991) having been inscribed upon and defined much like a text by its own experiences of education prior to its event, and by the very expectation of the event itself. The scope of the candidate's self-reporting is limited to sensory input and accumulated other data, the Humean "phosphorescent cascade of consciousness" (Ryle, 1972, p123) which constitute the mind to make them the individual they are, and those reports are weighed and categorised as 'respectable' or otherwise. The scope for a freedom of discussion is thus narrowed to an insistence on acceptability of thought and behaviour. 'Mind experience' therefore is merely a raw material from which each candidate has built a cognitive map of the intelligible world as presented to them in experience, 'inside their head.'

But contrast this instead with Heidegger's account – that Dasein has as one of its essential dispositions a "coming towards" (*zu-kommen*) experience. The interview by these lights is an expression of potentiality, for being to come or yet to be, and within the spaces of its happening or movements our candidate steps towards their own possibility. Being then exists within the unacknowledged spaces and silences *between* language not merely within the uttered out loud responses to the interview's interrogation. And those possibilities, of being well motivated, of being reflective thinkers, of being resilient and curious about the world of teaching *already* exist within the candidate; we should stand upon the platform in anticipation of their arrival, not suspicious that they may never arrive at all.

2.2 Perception at Interview – Hearing the Waves in a Sea-shell.

The familiarity of seeing and hearing and few other methods of perceptual detection are the only means available to our participants in their determining of and discrimination between the established ideals

of being a teacher we have set out above. The very meaning of the word ‘perception’ (our experiencing) implies a relation between subjects and objects each of which has a degree of independence from the other. A phenomenological description of perception (Merleau-Ponty, 2004) is not an account of the purely inner world of subjectivity, detached from its object, nor a causal account of the way in which one kind of objects – education, teaching, the candidate’s histories, the language of the question and response, the things both participants perceive, affect another kind of object, the self. Rather, it is an account of how the world presents itself to subjects who are “permanently rooted” (ibid, p240) in it and actively engaging in it – not merely thinking of it. In this sense perception is an extension of Heidegger’s Being-in-the-world and (for our candidate) a communication with the world of teaching which must by necessity be communicated to the interviewer, who perceives them in exactly the same way. Language provides the model for this complex relation (Peim, 2018) which makes the relationship between perception and understanding or knowing the other slippery. The everyday language we use to describe the constructed nature of perception – the verbs listen, see, reflect, consider, remember, for example – set the conditions which govern the way things appear to us or how they seem. But we are also familiar with the many ways in which our senses are limited and fallible. We even construct proverbs and idioms should we need reminding of the fact that all that glitters is not gold, that delusion is commonplace, that there is more to seeing than meets the eyes (Kant, 2003), and that the imprecision of our perceptions can often lead to errors: to us hearing the sound of the waves in sea-shells.

The limits of our perceptual equipment are well understood and accepted. That every single proposition or assertion made at interview by the object of our perceptions is true seems a remarkably foolhardy belief, and yet we cannot bring ourselves to discard the means by which we decide the worthy, between those in which we have confidence as prospective teachers and those we do not, because of this uncertainty. Nor do we have the time to be sufficiently watchful of error to conduct our calculations of measurement twice (before cutting). We accept therefore that mistakes can and will be made but at no time do we equate “it is possible that I have judged this candidate incorrectly,” with “it is possible that I judge all candidates incorrectly.” A candidate whose responses might be fraudulent to the senses does not demonstrate the fraudulence of the senses. Our interviewer may be able to see fallacies in their judgement when the error is pointed out to them, or when the candidate themselves elucidates further on their meaning, provided that they are not victims of rigid habits of poor interpretations of perception. There is a great deal that we are simply not equipped to perceive (Ryle, 1969). This is not to say that the interview is unable to perceive the suitability of the candidate in any way, merely that there is much that we cannot due to hindrances in context, the scope of our questioning, and the language we have at our disposal. That the perceptual or interpretive senses of the interviewer, the employed reporters on the object under scrutiny on which we rely for our data, are often confused and error-prone adds an additional layer of unreliability to our technology.

Many of the formulated questions from the stock incorporated into our Multiple Mini Interview provide relatively easily perceived and interpretable responses from our participants. Although by the nature of our instrument any answer is brief, a response to a question regarding an experience or recollection (“Tell me about a time when...”) is perceived simply enough. It is taken as given. But seeking an answer to a question which asks the candidate to manifest attributes or sensations or to engage in introspection on some internal state or feelings, has been rejected as unreliable by behaviourists (Walsh and Yoshimi, 2018). This requires the use of private languages to report undiscoverable and publicly unavailable data or processes. The interview is laced with speculative questions of this nature (“How do you see yourself...?”) but what these questions require of the candidate in order to manifest those attributes and therefore lay them at the feet of the interviewer for judgement is to supply the answer to the question “what is happening in you when you see yourself...?”. In the first, “I recall”, “I saw”, “I wondered,” namely items reclaimed from a stream of consciousness and a knowledge of what was done and that it was done, are needed – a perception of the physiological rather than any evidence of strict reductive identity between brain state and mind state, between something which has occurred in a given episode and a permanent unobservable disposition. But the latter involves seeking the presence or absence of psychological dispositions, the potential presence or otherwise of which is possible without knowledge of the named attribute itself: A candidate may demonstrate resilience or altruism without knowing what these traits entail.

This noticing, or the perception (seeing, detecting, recognising, finding) of our candidate’s attributes is not a process or a sensation or a feeling in its truest sense. I therefore argue that our use of the term “the interview process” is a misnomer and a misclassification, and the decision-making-process much more so. The perception of the attributes and the succeeding decision and judgement of fit with the teaching profession declares a terminus; it does not continue once its point has been reached. Traces of motivation to teach or commitment, of altruism or resilience cannot be *undetected* and *unnoticed*. Our decision is our final destination – the journey towards it ends the instant the decision is reached, and once reached it cannot go on for a further time, nor start and stop, nor resume. In the same way that a solution to a problem once found cannot be unfound, or a marking point scored in a game cannot be unscored; at any given moment within the interview exchange the interviewer either has not yet perceived or seen the attribute or they have. And to measure that moment of fleeting witnessing of a psychological disposition in the same way that we might measure the size of an elephant which arrives into our sight on a safari is a hopeless endeavour.

We have seen previously that suitability for teaching is not a physiological state, readily identified like smiling or speaking. Neither is it a psychological state such as confidence or determination or resilience, which occur momentarily and then retake their seats. To call upon an example of Rylean analysis, having witnessed a teacher respond swiftly and decisively to an extreme moment of duress, or to a lesson appraisal which goes disastrously wrong with a pragmatic smile and

the promise to examine what could have been organised better, an observer cannot point out the teacher displaying the action of resilience, or even the moment at which it occurred, like a handkerchief withdrawn from their pocket - “There! I see it now!” The presence of these attributes is situation-dependent, is not constant and never visible – no teacher or teacher candidate stands in a permanent state of being resilient or of determined commitment. Rather they are called upon in the way that an architectural structure has engineered within it sufficient strength that when adverse forces are applied in a certain situation its strength and resilience should suffice. The steel does not *present* its strength. The assertion that the surveyor identifies these capabilities and decides upon their appropriateness has a great deal to do with the context of their appraisal, complex calculations of load, facts about visibility, the position of his access to the structure, the distance from which he is able to view it, access to blueprints, his mood, the clarity of his vision and training, and his reliance on experience and habits. All of these provide the conditions in which he applies his perception. He does not make his decision at the moment of the structure’s maximum duress, but his decision must be reliable in order to avert disaster. The verbs of perception therefore carry complex connotations and must meet certain conditions – in claiming to have found or seen the object of our search we must be certain that we can describe the grounds on which we have sought or found them. Without certainty our claims to the validity of our detection are suspect, or only partial. Perhaps we have been deceived by errors in subjective calculation or by poor visibility which have acted like a screen. Perhaps we believe that our senses are reliable, that we really do hear the sound of the sea in the shell. But “to discover that something is the case is to know that it is the case” (Ryle, 1969, p109) and to answer honestly the question ‘Do you know that you have found candidate A to be a suitable fit for teaching?’ admitting to untechnical generalities about seeing those attributes accurately, we must agree that no, we do not know.

2.3 Perception and Knowing

Any notion of depicting, describing or explaining the phenomenon of teaching success in terms of abstract notions of accountable essences is an exercise in what amounts to an assimilation of the dissimilar. To cover such a highly disparate collection of dispositions, united by nothing but the ambiguous umbrella term ‘non-cognitive attributes,’ as an explanation of success smothers the complexity of the differences between technical and non-technical concepts at play in the business of teaching. Now teachers' lives are characterised by those human excellences, or powers, called the moral virtues. We have come to accept and expect them, not because it has previously been required or imposed on us, “but [as] something to which we aspire when we too have discerned the great value of those qualities of integrity, honesty, discipline, tolerance, care, courtesy and so on which shine forth in the lives and conduct of those who, with luck, have been charged with the task of instructing us,” (Carr,

1991, p9). But here lies a further presupposition: that those qualities in question are able to be readily known and apprehended in the minds of those in whom they exist, and can be communicated to another just as readily. For us, this would entail that the mind of the candidate has at its disposal a state of constant awareness of its own contents which are easily accessible and can be deliberately scrutinised by inner perception. For Ryle, this constant awareness is generally called ‘consciousness’ and inner perception is what we might term ‘introspection’ (1949). Our model supposes this inner perception to be free from error; that while we may doubt the evidence supplied to us by our senses, our participants do not doubt the direct knowledge of their own state or “the deliverances of consciousness or introspection,” (ibid, p148). But the prompt recollections demanded of inner perception at interview are subject instead to failures to recognise the nature of their feelings – The ‘I’ of the self is more elusive than we suppose. A chronicle of past episodes or actions, provided by our candidate as a response to questioning, is not explanatory of what it records, and an assumption of clear-headed self-examination followed by self-reporting is problematic.

We attempt to distinguish between the essence of the being at hand, its spirit to be captured and scrutinised, and its substance in existence; its actions in the moment of the encounter and beyond, in the classroom. To do so the interview process relies entirely on a presupposition of objective reality, that universal truths apply to all, to all teachers, to you and I, to the interviewer and the candidate. It suggests that we might perceive the existence of others via inferences from analogy and correspondence between *myself* (the elusive ‘I’ mentioned above) and *yourself* and in this sense fulfils for both parties the notion that the existence of both the physical world of teaching and the ideas within it rely on their being perceived. The world is generated from the consciousness and, being combinations of ideas and therefore mind-dependent, the matters of interest at interview are *esse est percipi*; their existence consists in the condition of their being perceived. For example, the candidate witnesses other teachers using techniques, ‘tools of the trade,’ in a certain way and can then apply inference from analogy with themselves to understand how to enact that technique. Or alternatively, that the interviewer comes to understand the mind of the candidate and to make a forecast of their future behaviour by use of analogy i.e. the interviewer perceives the outward behaviours/language of the candidate and attributes mental states which are based on their own first-person experience of similar behaviour and the corresponding mental states they consider themselves in at that time. But for Merleau-Ponty this exercise of analogy is insufficient to help us know the other, as this perception or observance of the other takes place in the physical world; identifying likenesses of emotional expressions between the self and another is too difficult for us. Alike to simulation theory, whereby we simulate the other’s actions, emotions, intentions and behaviours to know what they think (Kelly, 2015) the belief on the part of the participants includes a presupposition that the other’s behaviour is like their own and their behaviour is like the behaviour belonging to the other. As Wittgenstein (1992: 272) reminds us however, “the essential thing about private experience is not that each person possesses his own exemplar, but that nobody knows

whether other people have this or something else.” When the candidate responds in a certain way the interviewer draws parallels between the pair, between what the other might be thinking and what they might think in that moment. They employ knowledge of the self to infer knowledge of the mental state, the dispositions, of the other. Thus, the self becomes the instrument or technology of prediction of future behaviour of the other. Whether we term this empathy, perspective-taking or mind-reading this always uses analogy with oneself.

Often our distrust of sense-perception leads to a denial of its credentials for accuracy, and this leads us to turn instead to calculation, demonstrations or faith. The norm of presupposition-laden perception about the world allows for everyday function – we take our experience to be that of a world already there; we come to consciousness in a world that already exists - into which we come into awareness with our desires for it, and to be part of it. As Zahavi and Gallagher (2012) put it, reality is assumed to be out there, waiting to be discovered and investigated. The perceived discovery of such, via observation and the attribution of causal relations is never knowledge of those essences, however. We might perceive these relations to be regular, appearing in the consciousness and behaviour of our candidate in the same way whenever similar conditions are encountered, and for Popper (2002) causal explanations follow deductions whose premises are universal laws together with these initial conditions. The ontological consequences of this understanding are an absence of internal structure and complexity and an acknowledgement that things behave as they are required to by certain laws of nature which are universal regularities.

But as finite human creatures we know things only as they appear to us, and in space and time - at interview for our brief window of minutes. We cannot know things as they are, in themselves, nor in their totality – their past, present and future all at once opened out before us. We see things instead as substances with properties and subject to laws of cause and effect and as such the candidate is constrained by their own limitedness, as set out above. It is these limits, our very finitude or bounded nature, that create the conditions for the possibility of the candidate’s knowledge-of and the interviewer’s knowledge-about. The interview therefore requires acknowledgement of the very limitedness of its participants in order to gain any insight at all. To borrow from Kant’s Copernican revolution, we must come to understand the movements, those essential properties of the objects of knowledge in question (say, the candidate for the interviewer, or classroom practices for the candidate) as merely functions of the movements of the mind and its perceptions. This demands mutual intersubjective and intentional empathic acknowledgment by our participants of the limited conditions of knowledge of both the self and the other. We have here a repetition of our earlier ontological presupposition – that of other minds and our understanding of them being defrauded by analogy. This Being towards Others is what makes the interview process possible at all. As a beginning, the ‘life of Others’ must be accepted and this phenomenon provides a first bridge from one subject (interviewer) to another subject (candidate) - both at first closed off and alone from the other. Three relationships are

therefore present in our interview experience: the relationship with the hollow, contingent, self; the relationship with the world (of Education); and the relationship with other.

One immediate consequence of this realisation must be that we do not know the object of our scrutiny *except* as they appear to us. I cannot experience others as they experience themselves or as I experience myself. My experience is always uniquely *my* experience and is a constituent of *my* essence. But, my awareness of others is also fundamental to my experience. The candidate does not know things, teachers, states of affairs, intricacies of practice and behaviours and strategies, except as they have appeared to them in their own limited history. And the interviewer does not know the candidate except as they appear to them, fleetingly, at interview. As Kant explains, we do not know things-in-themselves. The candidate creates rather than detects the world of the teacher; there is no way of knowing for them that their limited conditions of knowledge are those which reveal the nature of teaching apart from those limited conditions. Whatever the interviewer's judgement of the candidate's relation to the world of teaching turns out to be it cannot be one of knowledge. For either of them. For Kant the limiting knowledge of the world is acknowledged in order to make room for religious Faith (Cavell, 2004), and for the interviewer this acknowledgement must also make way for faith, but in the candidate, the university and in the technology of the process itself.

Further limitations to knowing, based upon the deliverance of the world to us by the senses and the empiricists claim that knowledge of the world, of teaching and of others within it begins with experience, are due, in Hume's words, to the nature of experience, "so limited in extent and duration." So limited are these that he urges us to confine our intellectual aspirations – our senses are able to reach out only so far into the world. Our senses prepare the world of appearances by packaging experiences and things into blocks, of space and time, of wheres and whens; these are the forms which categorise our understanding of the world.

2.4 A Note on the Fuzzy Logic of Measurement and Score

Our thinking in the Chapter here has moved us to consider the candidate as an entity in perpetual motion and transition, whose Being is rarely static or stable and exists instead as one of movement and emergence. The term autopoiesis to signify the conception of our social being's self-reproduction, following Maturana and Varela's (1980) original biological conception, has been appropriated by Lurhmann (1986) and offers a representation of the emerging or unfolding of a new revised identity offered by the interview. If we see the task of the interview as seeking to transform that object, the candidate, into an object which is open to view, specified and defined more precisely than it was before the meeting, then its systems of measurement face uncertainty, vagueness and blink-and-you-miss-it

phenomena which precludes any adequate objective judgement and analysis. I should like to conclude this Chapter therefore with some consideration of marking criteria often used in technologies of interview and selection (Klassen and Kim, 2021). We have spoken at length of the ways in which being has been made calculable, or accountable. A logical classically bivalent calculus regarding the presence of any given attribute, or suitability in general, is impossible. It requires an alternative multi-valued logical device dealing in uncertainty - possibilities, predictions and probabilities - with which to approach the constructs of natural cognition and the social action phenomena and their impulses. The fact that our interview's criteria of measurement propose a linear image of a non-linear world demands some consideration of the concept of fuzzy logic with which we are forced to replace classical logic (Kosko, 1993). Fuzzy Logic's similarity with natural language and natural thought, our next topics of analysis, and its relaxation of any pretence to logical truth, acknowledges that our judgements are only ever imprecise.

What is 'true enough' in our judgement of being is a matter of context and occasion, and subject to the indeterminate movements and impulses of change over time which Heidegger has affirmed. We might even apply the indeterminate, or uncertainty, principles of the sciences proposed by Heisenberg as an analogy for the difficulty of our undertaking - that both position and movement of an object cannot be determined or pinpointed or measured exactly, at the same time, even in theory. Our measurement being nothing but a form of perception or observation, our interviewer casts their gaze at the matter in hand in the way that light is beamed at a particle to affect an understanding of its properties. It can locate our attribute in time, but not speak of its position, or vice versa, and the very act of observation affects its position. Concept creation, or understanding, is limited to making observation but omitting measurements.

If logic is indeed a useful point of view from which to understand natural phenomena or the human sciences then fuzzy logic is the only possible instrument with which to build description as answers, without offering a key to any complete formalisation of the natural languages of the question-response, given the vaguenesses and need for relaxations of logical truths. Vagueness entails any situation in which a word's application is 'ill-defined' or 'in doubt.' C.S. Peirce's (1902, p748) definition of the term vagueness itself is clear: "A proposition is vague when there are possible states of things concerning which it is intrinsically uncertain...because the speakers habits of language were indeterminate." Linguistically problematic variables which are under scrutiny at the interview, such as Communication or The Ability to Communicate, must accept values such as *clarity* or its antonym *vagueness* to help express what are essentially uncertain and indeterminate variations within this particular universally agreed most valuable of teacher attributes. These values attempt to pinpoint the variable's position. Because natural language does not contain sufficient value terms to express a scientifically viable value scale, it is common practice to modify linguistic values, rendering vagueness at least a logical vagueness (Licata, 2012). This fuzzy logic is at least a notional solution to the fact that

numerical scoring (or grading) proposes a linear image of a non-linear concept in the world - in this instance a candidate's temporally situated skills of communication and associated expression, vocabulary, persuasiveness etc. For example, the terms (we might call 'hedges') "rather" and "somewhat" may be used to construct the additional values rather vague or somewhat clear. Add to this any number of similar hedges, for example 'a bit,' 'quite,' 'borderline,' 'satisfactorily,' 'outstandingly.' etc.

Whichever term we use it is highly unlikely that any candidate could be naturally classified in absolute terms – as 'absolutely without ability to communicate' (0), or 'utterly perspicuous' (1, in value terms). Or 100 percent motivated; lacking commitment to any degree whatsoever, and so on. Any alternative value granted to the candidate between 0 and 1 is represented by a degree of uncertainty within what might be described as a 'fuzzy set,' although value 0 must sit outside of the value set unless the candidate fails to utter a single word – a rare occurrence. This has become the mode by which we are able to reason linguistically with such slippery concepts and their associated terms. The degree of membership which we can assign to the fuzzy set of "Able to Communicate" is therefore the result of fuzzification. This fuzzy logic addresses forms of uncertainty, and is able to represent certain types or degrees of subjective belief, for example, "How much of what I am witnessing or observing lies within the vaguely defined set we have denoted as Ability to Communicate." It models uncertainty and vagueness and offers a device with which to face the ontology of complexity (taking here the example of Ability to Communicate) in its similarities with natural thinking and natural language. The need to relax any pretence of logical truth, substituting imprecision and approximation in its place, allows the treatment of natural phenomena and their quantification. The number of (truth) values the Multiple Mini Interview permits for each attribute is exceedingly limited, and not only that, the process of fuzzification or defuzzification requires a double (truth) value: the 'hedges' – rather, somewhat, poor, borderline, good, outstanding etc – and a score value – say, from 1 through to 10.

If Candidate A is judged to be a borderline case of Committed to Teaching, for example, the proposition of the interviewer who states that "Candidate A is committed" has no determinate truth value. Whether this statement is true depends on where the line of acceptably committed is drawn. At what stage does it become permissible to make this statement? Where does its truth begin? The belief of the interviewer that this statement is nearly permissible, but not yet permissible is never demarcated. Relative to some perfectly reasonable ways of drawing a precise boundary between Committed and not committed, the judgement is true. But relative to another delineation, also perfectly reasonable, it is false. Nothing in the use of the language within a marking criteria makes one of these delineations between committed and not committed correct and all others wrong. We cannot pick a permanent delineation (or at least, not if we remain interested in the ordinary language of the everyday), especially if we consider Being to be a movement and temporality. If we judge it as true over a large enough part of the range of delineations of its vagueness it is true *enough* (Lewis, 1979). If the proposition

‘Candidate A is committed to teaching’ is true enough (according to the judgement) we are happy to assert it, without qualification; but what is true enough is a matter of context and occasion and time, and differs from conversation to conversation. It is those matters of conversation and its language which form the content of our next investigation.

2.5 Chapter Summary

Despite being that moment of ‘border crossing’ considered in Chapter One, the opportunity for any notion of honest self-creation is thwarted by the selection interview, as is the opportunity to bring something new into being, which is excluded by its technologies of calculation. The meaning of the term teacher itself has become limited and delineated by interview which presupposes that the substance of teaching is definable, existent, continuous and enduring over time. But it is the concept of time and our candidate’s position within it that should be what enframes being-a-teacher, taken alongside the temporally situated notion of Care, which Heidegger believed to be the united meaning of existence. The world of the teacher is first removed from the taken for granted and placed on display in a way that the candidate has never previously experienced, but this assumes a shared understanding, between them and the interviewer, and between all suitable candidates for teaching. Teacher effectiveness then is seen to be grounded in conformity and universality, to which the candidates must remain attuned and similarly delineated – to the all-pervasive ‘what-is’ of being-a-teacher. We concluded by considering the unreliability of introspection and the trickery of senses of perception and suggested that suitability for teaching is neither physiological nor necessarily psychological; the invisible moment of an attribute’s presentation is often imperceptible. It is action which is required, not merely language. Language can merely help us to recognise the limited conditions of knowledge of the self and the other. Yet our methods of interview presuppose that those private tendencies are made observable ‘out loud’, and so our thinking must now be necessarily directed towards the language of the encounter.

Chapter 3: On Language and Reporting the Self

In the previous Chapters I considered the notion of Being and Action. The proofs of these actions however must be delivered in language. They must therefore be statable in an everyday public language. As Ryle (1972, p128) reminds us, an “unworded proof is no more a proof than an unworded poem is a poem, an unformulated verdict is a verdict,” or any more than an unworded joke is a joke. This presupposes that the result at which a thinker arrives is, in most important cases, a series of statements, and therefore printable and interpretable, true or false. Yet this overlooks entirely the fact that many of the actions and undertakings to which we have linked our assertions about teaching are unstateable. In the same way that a composer’s thinking results in something playable rather than sayable, grammar is not involved; or a sportsman’s thinking results in a perfectly weighted pass or well taken goal, it cannot be evidenced, or contradicted, or its truth measured. We cannot always judge the truth of a teacher’s thinking and resultant choices, for example of sympathy for a child’s predicament or their reaction to pupils’ misunderstanding and instant correction. This reaction is not linguistic.

Nevertheless, there arises within the pretext of the selection interview a special pressure upon its language. Language is the primary means by which the transportation of the contents of mental states from one being to another occur ‘out loud’ in response to the puzzles of the interview exchange which make possible bridges to other minds (Braver, 2012). The wider totality of what can be at some point in the future – in our case qualification as a teacher - can either be said or shown. But within the selection interview there is no opportunity to show - to demonstrate by putting into action; it must therefore be said, and the issues of thought must of necessity be demonstrated by the issues of language. This Chapter will investigate the legitimacy of the presupposition that commitment, motivation, ethical beliefs, expectations as we have seen, can be said or reliably and verifiably proven to be so in truth. I propose that they cannot be shown in the normal business of interview. Take the attempt to gather sufficient evidence of a candidate’s altruism, for example. A self-evidently desirable attribute to have of someone in a position of care for others; but how can we bring into the open, or make occurrent, behaviour which attempts to (or demonstrates a potential capacity to) promote the welfare of others; how can we make a private tendency or dispositional mental state an observable behaviour within the limits of the interview exchange? I shall attempt to elucidate these matters by drawing on the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, in particular his philosophical concept of language-games which are applied to the interview encounter’s simple examples of language *use* and the *thought* and *action* it attempts in vain to describe.

I assert that this pressure occurs primarily within and between those supposed attributes, or essences-in-common, therefore requiring a language-in-common. The interview’s argument for “things in common” between candidates for teaching undermines the autonomy of not only any character traits,

identity, or fundamental being, of the candidate but also that of the language in use. Language is what grounds its presuppositions of each of these on a set of universals. But I hope to argue in the following chapter that a grasp of these universal definitions is not required or, in some cases, even possible for our candidate. The predetermined definitions of predetermined universal attributes cannot depend on an aligned in-common use of language and meaning between candidate and interviewer. We may draw concepts of an idealised teacher and the attributes of their constitution rigid boundaries and limits if we wish, but we cannot demand that our candidates recognise these boundaries simply.

I aim to locate some sympathy here for an increasing understanding of this language-in-common, or otherwise, and of the ordinary language of the encounter between our candidate and their interviewers. I shall investigate the actions of the collective language of education and its institution, and the ways in which the individual consciousness of the candidate remains in danger of remaining intangible at best or, at worst, invisible and undetectable. I understand language as the means by which our candidate represents their social and material world. It provides the model for the complex relation (Peim, 2018) which makes the relationship between our perception and the requisite knowing the other problematic and unreliable, as we have seen in our earlier consideration. Ryle (1990, p56) goes as far as to say that, in language, “understanding *must* be imperfect.” The everyday language our candidates use to describe the constructed nature of their perception – the verbs listen, see, reflect, consider, remember, for example – set the conditions which govern the way things appear to them, or how they seem. But this involves a further supposition: that the overt words of our candidate correspond perfectly to those internal processes of perception. Here we must acknowledge that what both of our participants come to conclude about the nature of the other, or surmise about the nature of teaching, the calculations of response, objects, decisions, or forecasts must be something which is stated or storable in a public language. Yet this making the mind accessible is, of course, untestable. It also supposes that the internal processes of our candidate are clear; the individual is not confused or puzzled by their streams of consciousness. It assumes that the qualities of our candidate’s mind, which include our muddled alloys of attributes and dispositions which constitute their professional capacity, are reflected perfectly and unambiguously in the things they say.

Our interview assumes this ability for introspection: that the candidate can view the thoughts which pass through their mind in the same way and with the same clarity as they may view the words on a page or hear the sound of an alarm; that they are able to reflect upon or observe what may appear in their mind without doubt and without confusion. We also assume that the candidate can report clearly and with certainty descriptions of thought, or knowledge, just as they would if asked to describe a vehicle passing the window of the interview room. Wittgenstein illustrates the errors in this assumption (PI.78) and asks us to compare the difference between knowing and saying: if we are surprised that a candidate can know some thing but not be able to say it out loud, we must be thinking only of the response to a simple recall of the factual and have become fixated on the kind of information that we

can put into words. The example he gives is of saying how high a mountain is, or a retrieval of a well-known fact; we may use the example of ‘Can you recall the name of a teacher who inspired you?’ But compare this to knowing the sound of a clarinet, another equally well-known fact, and being asked to recall what it is. Some insist on the primacy of mind over language (Addis, 2005), whereas the intentionality of thought, whether of teaching or a noise, as a wholly private phenomenon contrasted with the public nature of language, can only be made respectable in the eyes of the interviewer by way of it being made public, in conversation.

Conversation, that basic model of understanding the other, involves an exchange between two or more partners which seeks an agreement – that what is said is understood. In this way then the entire Multiple Mini Interview process can be viewed as a single conversation, an engagement, an intra-acting explicit and implicit hermeneutic of self-understanding by means of interpreting others (Ricoeur, 2004). Through a multitude of language exchanges and its signifying milieu between multiple participants it constitutes a single discussion whose purposes are uncovering or revealing (on the part of the interviewer), persuasion (on the part of the candidate), agreement and decision. Gadamer (in Fairfield, argued that all understanding involves a common language, not merely as the instrument by which we engage with the world but as the *medium* for engagement. It is within it that our participants encounter and comprehend the other, and language shows itself as being the work of thought (Hegel, 1991). If it is the case that understanding involves a common language, as both instrument and medium of engagement with the world of education and our candidate’s access to it, then we can surmise that understanding itself is linguistic.

In what follows the account of language and ways we might attempt to categorise its use is founded on those interrelationships between the candidate’s use of structures of language, concepts, beliefs and communicable meaning on one hand, and the primarily social and experiential forms of life of the communities with vested interests in the interview’s conclusions on the other. These communities have reached a stage where matters of choice and acceptance must be decided by a special *kind* of talk, in which every significant word or symbol (including multivocal expressions representative of meaning) of the interview exchange belongs to a ‘system.’ For Wittgenstein (1992), the meaning contained within each word or term is its ‘place’ in this grammatical system. In this context language functions as a general structural practice of both communicative and performative activity and I hope to show that Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘language games’ acts as an intermediary which operates between this function of language and the discourses of education more broadly. This meaning as use is the way that the instrumentality of our process might be redeemed.

Wittgenstein’s early work, along with that of Russell, constructs the world and the language used to represent it as an atomistic model (Russell, 1956): that the world of facts depends on simple discrete entities consisting of simple qualities which come together to construct complexes, and that

language represents this as combinations of basic concepts and vocabulary. This Atomism establishes truth as consisting layers of atomic facts, in turn consisting simple particulars which demonstrate a quality. These particulars stand together in a relation: The candidate feels anxious; The candidate speaks eloquently; The candidate *seems* suitable for training to become a teacher. The atom relates to the smallest constituent part of the declaration. I aim to show that the Multiple Mini Interview constructs the character fit to the World of the Teacher in the same way; structuring character as a complex of simple discrete but interrelated attributes. Its method rests on its assumptions that Beings are complex and structured and that therefore the structure can be deconstructed for analysis into simpler and more basic elements. Its propositions are attribute-asserting and declarative; its processes are logical and its structure is truth-functional. To arrive at conclusions of truth and decision we merely measure via analysis the attribute on show. If language is the sum of propositions made describable as essences, then language and Being, as perceived by the MMI, have parallel structures: an underlying logic of discoverable and revealable essences explained by an analysis of language and the world. Both wholes (that of language use and that of the professional being of our candidate) are conceived of as functionally composite units that depend on the nature of their parts.

Even when the far from simple matter of the indispensable preconditions of an openness to what the other has to say have been met, the conditions that make ‘someone saying something to someone about something’ possible also include “attentive minds and a shared language that is rich enough to enable others and ourselves to express our claims and counterclaims in ways that may be heard,” (Kearney, 2002, p79). But the communication of the selection interview is far from a neat, well-regulated exchange of arguments. Its propositions and their elements remain misty, largely indiscernible and frequently unexplained, and, when we also consider the subtle uses and multiple distinctions of ordinary language (Austin, 1962) we can see the scale of the task which faces our interpretation of their hidden meaning, the intentionality we discuss in our final analytical chapter. I begin now to attempt to elucidate the systems of language which form the conditions of the exchange, beginning with Wittgenstein’s concept of language-games followed by his earlier well-known analysis of language in terms of a form of logical atomism, which I conflate with our interview’s approach to the representation of teacher attributes.

3.1 Language Games and Needing Language-in-common to Express Essences-in-common

If the intelligibility of our candidate is to be articulated then the source of this intelligibility is those average everyday public practices we discussed earlier – that which Heidegger called *Das Man* - articulated in ordinary, or natural, language – the language of life, imperfect and often illogical:

common understandings, articulated through a common language, of common averageness. We have also already seen that the exposure to public view, being made perceptible, are symptoms of the modern everyday. Heidegger (1962, p165) concluded that, “publicness proximally controls every way in which the world and Dasein get interpreted,” and for both he and Wittgenstein, the source of the intelligibility of the world and of Dasein (being-there, in the world) is the average public practices which are articulated in ordinary language, and which must be mutually understood. What we shall go on to acknowledge here is that ordinary language lacks sufficient transparency when it comes to exploring those meanings and logical relations between words and sentences and propositions and states of affairs expressed by our participants.

The language in common at interview is necessarily self-contained. But the parallel grammars, or structures of operation, of the interview and of the propositions employed within it must be such that we are able to establish connection between the language use of the candidate and (their) reality if we wish to be successful at all. Only when the expressions of language, or signs, connect with each other through a mutual picturing relation can the separate meaning-making candidate and interviewer make sense of one another. Both are united by the common reference term of the entity – for example a classroom – but the entity is known, experienced and understood differently (Peim, 2018). The construction of a universal language is not difficult, it is absolutely impossible (Toulmin, 1990). Our interview assumes that the modes of life and conceptualisations of both the cultures of the candidate and the interview are similar enough that they yield a common language which enables both parties to perceive and interpret the experiences of the candidate leading up to this point in the same, or similar enough, way. The language of our participants must be applied to rules which ‘work’ pragmatically - they must act to lead to the desired result. The words and concepts employed are therefore instruments for the achievement of a goal. But while the aim of the language of the interview may be clear, its function is not. The use of language certainly has primacy within our event – how can it not, it is all that we have? But its mere use is not where language stops. It continues instead to address questions about mental states or internal conditions. The point at which the explanations of the candidate should come to an end, in their activity in school, are impossible to gauge within the interview. The interviewer instead must rely on its revelation of some inner state of knowledge, and a certain kind of knowledge at that, such as how our candidate knows what motivates them to become a teacher and what terms such as ‘resilience’ and ‘reflection’ mean. We presuppose that our candidate knows what to do with our questions and the terms which we have used to construct them – neither of which are basic. For Wittgenstein (1992) the meaning of words within a phrase surrounds their working “with a haze” (p5) or fog, and what constitutes meaning something can only be the phrase’s accompanying thought. Therefore, with a phrase uttered by our candidate about, say, the origins of their motivation to be a teacher comes an unspoken, immanent meaning.

The empirical demand of the interview relies on the candidate being able to think, and to talk about the things they think about. It also assumes that they mean the things they talk about. The things and facts of which our candidate speaks are taken by our interviewer as ostensibly defining their world. In this theory, meaning is taken as coming from outside language - it is the object referred to which gives meaning to the word, i.e. "Here is a classroom. This is what *classroom* is." And in the example above, 'a teacher' is the word used to denote what that word stands for: a generalised notion or concept and a simple label which is attached to it.

But there is an unbridgeable space, a chasm, between 'this' candidate, including their manner, thoughts, responses and demeanour, and 'that' teacher, with an unknowable mind, an unpredictable future and an indefinable potential. The meanings of these words and their uses are derived from the nature of these objects – this candidate, that teacher.

But attaching labels should not be the goal of our interview. We have attached labels to each of the attributes which are the object of our interview, but we have left out any ostensive definition. Consequently, there are many possible uses of these words, and their labels merely prepare us for their use; these terms remain ambiguous and understood in many different ways. Take our 'simple' object of focus at the very heart of our concern and its contingent meaning: This teacher, those teachers, a teacher, her teacher, your teacher, the perfect teacher, a natural teacher, any teacher, teacher workload, teacher attributes, qualified teacher status and on. How much more so for the abstract, complex labels we have attached to our teacher attributes. For our candidate to recognise and comprehend several or all of their possible uses, in the context in which they are intended by our process, they must already have grasped the utility of its description within the context of education, as a teacher as it were, and existing in a teachers' space. While we are attending to the attribute we do not simply use its term in language, nor additionally in thoughts and emotions, but in the entirety of its contextual uses in an educational setting. And this, our candidate is as yet unable to do - they meet these terms as novices.

Our attributes can be described in many different ways – their simple labelling does not reveal the way they might be used. Besides, there is no such thing as absolute simplicity that can be the metaphysical underpinning of our languages (Arrington, in Shand (ed), 2006). An item's simplicity depends on how we are using that term 'simple.' Take the candidate's awareness of their motivation to teach – this awareness, if there is one, does not reveal any simple or single use of the word 'motivation'. And nor does its labelling reveal the manner in which their motivation might be defined and described. How then are we justified in insisting upon a single predetermined use? The nature of the candidate's motivation, that object which the interviewer attempts to perceive, does not supply its word's meaning – the terms in use by our candidate and our interviewer are autonomous, free, self-governing (ibid). Yet the descriptors and criteria for acceptability employed by our process are predetermined, rigid and

unchanging. For our attributes-in-common to be demonstrated as such and demonstrated at all we require language-in-common, definitions-in-common, and mastery-in-common.

The same can be said for the most basic of terms, that centre-point of our entire endeavour, our understanding of what the teacher *is*. Our interview asserts that there must be something, or some *things*, in common amongst all the things to which we apply this term. But our association with multiple uses, multiple activities, multiple ‘forms of life’ (Wittgenstein, 1992) renders a single correct predetermined response highly problematic. Any rational consideration of this concept requires that there be universals which justify the application of that word. But Wittgenstein’s concept of language-games and family resemblances suggests an alternative. The similarities between words need *not* always be the same. While all games may resemble one another, as do tables, teachers, classrooms and interviews, they may not do so in the same way. And while motivation and commitment and resilience et al in Candidate A might *resemble* that of Candidate B, we cannot locate a universal motivation and commitment and resilience. Both of our participants may have and offer up a general idea of these attributes, but each may take their schematic understanding differently: for our interviewer’s ‘all teachers’ our candidate might apply ‘a particular teacher,’ for example. Both see their sign-posted term differently and presuppose the route to its use autonomously. While we accept that by offering signposts to practice and use others might tend to follow the rule of going in the direction in which it points, and that our interview points us in the direction of its standard and repeatable manner of acting, its use can be otherwise - it can misdirect, or direct correctly but still result in becoming lost. Our candidate might not know to follow the pointed end.

If we should stop attempting to suppose that language at interview requires and is built upon a set of rigid rules for its use, that we must follow a single direction to apply the signpost analogy, or a set of universal meanings, or a set of simple in-common objects in the world, we can also transpose this to the rule-based set of attributes which are the object of our interview – that set of objects in the world with a given nature. If the actual use of the words lack foundation in either reality or in thought and are autonomous and newly emerging and the actual constitution of our candidate is likewise semi-stable and vulnerable, what Prigogine (1997) termed dissipative, the entire grammar of interview seems then to be constructed on shifting sands.

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To summarise this introduction to language games and their relevance to the linguistic milieu at interview we can make comparisons between Wittgenstein’s two defining eras of thought. Whereas his early work rested on the link between the name and the object denoted (‘teacher’ means ‘a teacher’) Wittgenstein’s later work rejects this as simplistic, putting to one side the earlier single ‘logics of language’ and essences in favour of multiplicities of language, collections of practices each of which

may contain its own logic, but more like echoes, traces or ripples in a pool – where a word falls, the ripples may move outwards to wash up on different shores, each with different nuanced meaning, sense and honesty. An example of these comparisons of meaning which Wittgenstein provides is that of the various handles within a locomotive cabin (1953,12); all looking more or less alike but used (moved, pulled, switched, yanked hard, applied softly etc) differently. This assimilation of expression and use can be applied to all signifiers. While a ‘name’ attaches a label to a thing, the label itself is not always the same. This notion of use and what it means to give and present it demonstrate that expressions are not presented free from the influences of time, and that, “use can be seen only as belonging to the spatial, temporal phenomenon of language,” (Diamond, 1991, p.32). The picturing, ‘projecting’ relation between proposition and fact is replaced and meaning now consists in its use, in its practice. Human thought and language are viewed as embodied within social systems and customs, each tied to a particular community. This later ‘practical holism’ replaces the earlier conception of ‘logical atomism’ and language as a calculus with one which has its origin in action and practice (Stern, 1995). This provides a much more helpful foundation on which to examine the requirements at interview, where demands are made on the recall of experience – both the candidate’s own and that of others. The language of the interview therefore now becomes the container for not merely the fact of human essences of character and attribute, but also their experiences, beliefs and understanding. It is in this way the medium of existence and what Heidegger (1959, p.63) calls the “House of Being”. Even the subject of the interview, the candidate themselves, is revealed to be not merely a ‘thing’ and its properties (the candidate is committed, the candidate is motivated, the candidate is intellectually curious), what Kohlberg might have termed “a bag of virtues” (1970, p.63) but instead, she is complex and assailable – candidates are themselves states of affairs. We have now the *experience* of the candidate and the words used to denote that experience, not merely the objects which constitute the states of affairs within the experience. Put another way, we now have both the experience and the *expression* of that experience.

3.2 Sources of Meaning – Action and Experience

Wittgenstein’s (1953) simile of the language-game, that which “plays a particular role in our human life” in the intricately associated aspects of human action, thought, and language, is used to describe the custom-regulated and socially constrained, often concealed, patterns of interaction which provide significance to words and expressions. Regarding the being of our candidate and its intrinsic nature objectively accepts that an attempt to synchronise the concealed descriptions enfolded within words with fixed referents – each attribute – removes rather than enhances any precision of meaning from the variety of contexts in which these attributes come into use *outside* of their immediate use at interview;

in reality, as it were. Take any of those terms of description we have so far referenced: the candidate being committed, motivated, resilient, curious, and reflective; and the nouns to which they are bound - our use of each word circumscribes its meaning, regardless of when, where or by whom it might be used. The unalterable internal qualities of the ideal teacher remain so, like those of the language used to reveal them, independent of continuous use in a practised, situated world.

If understanding is to be gained from propositions our understanding of those propositions depends upon understanding the language in which they are spoken (Wittgenstein, PG). Here Wittgenstein considers propositions as existing within systems of other propositions and within the actions into which each proposition is woven. The context of the use of a word such as 'resilience' both defines its meaning and encompasses the attendant behaviour. Our use of the term Language-game, itself a pragmatic meaning-making device to contextualise which "brings into prominence the fact that the speaking of a language is part of an activity, or of a life-form," (1992, p.23) shows how one-off attachments between a word and a thing (our attribute and the thing it describes) are often discredited. Distinctions between multiple meanings of a term are based on practice and use, and therefore may not be easily anticipated (Pears, 1988). We might extend this to our use of the proposition 'The candidate is...': the distinction between obeying this proposition and disobeying it must be based on their practices, not on one single action, but sustained action across time – the background to its use is what grants its meaning – the cultural practices and the often-repeated patterns of behaviours which make up the opposing lives of our participants; the average everyday habits and habitats of normal use. If we attempt to detach the words, terms and language of the interview from the habits and contexts of the life of each, and of education, and school, and professionalism, and home, and cognition, we no longer have the same word. A change in the language-game and the circumstances in which it takes place results in a change in the concepts in play.

The language games of the interview include those of supposition, trust, enquiry and low informational content. Its examples of language are meaningful only in the context in which they are uttered — that is, according to the rule of the game being played. As a very simple example, the response to "Why do you think that?" is an explicit request for additional information that might be interpreted as "you haven't given enough information for me to be able to form an opinion based on your initial answer," or it may be an interested invitation to prolong the discussion, or an instant reaction, or an expression of surprise, or something else. And each of these must have an implicit foundation in trust - that truth is being spoken. In this sense, language-games help us interpret the use of its expressions. So, our concept of language-game brings to the fore the idea that the honest speaking of a language is a part of an activity, a form of life, which varies with circumstance. When one is conceptualising a language-game one is also deciding upon how a word is embedded in human behaviour — in our actions and reactions, and in which we make our move accordingly.

Another of Wittgenstein's own metaphors, the stream of life (Schatzki, 1993), conjures well the courses, eddies, obstacles, and perpetually moving, ever-shifting flows of language use within our specific educational forms of life. And each with its own rules, features, goals and family resemblances. The many possible potential applications of the interview's terms-in-use are not fixed but come in and out of existence, with different meanings in different contexts each of which must be learnt but may be connected only by resemblances. As an example, see the easily recognised hypothetical passage of speech from our interview encounter below, and note the various categories of utterances contained within it:

Good morning. Thank you for coming today. Have you had our teacher-interview system explained to you? Was it clear and did you understand? First you should read the scenario we have given you about a child in a class who is experiencing difficulties understanding a mathematics problem set by their teacher. You are able to write notes about what you think is causing him difficulties and how you might help him if you were his teacher. After 5 minutes I will ask you to describe what you believe can be done to support this child. You may use your notes. Do you understand? I will then ask you to tell me about a time when you experienced difficulties understanding something your teacher had set. Which strategies did you use to overcome these issues? How did this help to make you more resilient in that area? Can you describe an example of something you have seen a teacher do which you consider to be an excellent example of effective practice? You will have heard of the challenges facing teachers in terms of workload. What do you think are the challenges and rewards of becoming a teacher? Why do you think that?

Wittgenstein proposes that being in the world involves following sets of implicit rules, and that actions and language relate to pre-existing structures and codes. Each utterance above could be defined in terms of rules which specify their properties and the uses to which they could be put. Within the interview exchange itself, for each candidate new language and language games may come into existence; there is certainly little freedom to break from the rules of the game which must be followed – the ethics of reciprocal exchange, of the greeting, of the statement of intent, of the query and question and so on do not allow it, even if we consider the unstable exchange between speakers as Lyotard (1991, p.10) might, that “to speak is to fight,” and the taking of tricks within what is an essentially conflictual relationship between our participants. The candidate is learning to talk and to express the complex meanings of the language of education for the first time away from their form of life as a student but here under the testing and inscrutable gaze of the institution. Every utterance above can be considered as a move within a game, and the whole as a game within a game. Although a word and the general notion of that word's meaning is familiar there remains that haze around its aim and functioning which

makes clear vision impossible. Take the multiple uses of the word ‘teacher’ in the passage, or the difficulty a candidate might experience with the different uses of the word ‘difficulty’ for that matter. In this way then the candidate is like a child learning to talk – but the interviewer rarely takes the time to teach or explain the language in use. In fact, it may cloud and disrupt the efficacy of the interview to do so.

Take for example the terms within the question above, ‘What are the challenges and rewards of becoming a teacher?’ The candidate has understanding of earlier more primitive primary forms of the concepts of challenge (that which is difficult), and reward (that which is received in return for effort, an achievement) but here they are placed alongside the context of the temporal notions of “becoming” and the object, the professional “teacher” – a position with which the candidate is as yet personally wholly unfamiliar. The interviewer takes no time in the ostensive teaching of the words; no time in establishing an association between word and thing or in defining the term by direct demonstration; no time in checking for understanding with which the candidate might make sense of the terms. And it is the candidates’ training (via their past experience) which affects the different states of understanding between one candidate, A, and another, B, and provides the stream into which they step to draw their response. Thus reality and meaning represented in language can be said to be perpetually out of focus and only ever presented through the different perspectives or frames of our participants within the present event. Each draws the boundary line around their meaning differently. These factors inevitably fail to do reality justice.

Wittgenstein’s metaphor of the game in no way trivialises the processes of language. Rather it provides a system by which social lives and messages might be organised, ordered and given shape. While unique in context, the interview overlaps in content as forms of life collide. One domain of existence must open out to or step aside from the next, giving space to conflicts of comprehension and interpretation in search of meaning behind the ‘response’. Like any game the selection interview provides a problem to be overcome. The encounter with the questions of the exchange, such as that above relating to challenges and rewards of teaching, takes place within a language context which has already been sorted and partially revealed – “there runs the stream of language, content and thought into which I wish you to step; now look downstream towards its source,” it demands. But our interview is far from the well-regulated exchange of arguments which we assume and make our judgements in the light of. It is instead “an affair in which questions, requests, assertions, and narratives are launched pell-mell into battle,” (Lyotard, 1991, p.17) as we have seen, and the game changes from one utterance to the next.

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Amidst the terrain of the interview exchange itself lie various oases of often long held desire, mythologies of teaching, past resentments, the will to power, and dominance. The task of the interviewer is to navigate these, to eliminate the noise, to locate the hiddenness of Heidegger's concept of Dasein (Dreyfus, 2017). In its showing, language brings the being (Dasein) to light rather than being having language at its disposal. The hermeneutic of the interview then is, to appropriate Heidegger's assertion from his *A Dialogue on Language* (1982, p11), "the art of understanding rightly another man's language" to uncover the human. This uncovered truth consists in illuminating, or shedding light, and this by degree throughout the process of interview, but understanding that this illumination is never complete – areas of shadow and total darkness will remain. Shadows can now be added to our earlier analogies of 'haze,' fog and the absence of focus.

The discourse of the interview consists in a series of choices by which meanings are selected and alternatives rejected or excluded. The choice, or decision, to say something *about* something is the essence of the act of speaking. And speech, merely the execution of this choice, requires comprehension. If language constitutes a code, the rules of the code, the institution within which the code is employed (Saussure, 2011; Ricoeur, 1988) then it provides the stage on which the speech of our participants perform. Observable in such a way, the language and discourses of interview become an object for an empirical science of perception by observing, and of accounting. The intention above – to say something about something – requires both candidate/speaker/sender and interviewer/hearer/addressee to understand this intention, and to understand it immediately. The expression of response aims to cross a threshold – from saying, to saying about something and in doing so to express *meaning* via language: it takes the reality of the speaker's idea and expresses the hold of this reality on thought. We then must consider two things – the immanence of language (its existence, restricted, within the mind) and its transcendence or manifestation, to where 'its effects of meaning are offered to the bite of the real,' (Ricoeur, 1988, cited in Idhe, 2004).

Any question which commences, "What do you think about..?" opens up maps of immediate possibility: various tracings, scenarios and memories racing back across years in countless directions, towards different horizons; to continents of memory, time and relationship. Any resultant internal analysis of these possibilities on the part of the candidate prior to response and performance exists in a state of captivity, a prisoner to both their personal signifying milieu but also to the 'historical embeddedness of thought,' the situatedness of experience and the conditions that have given those experiences meaning. The life of the mind in general is occupied with these social inventions, "a certain store of previously evolved meanings or at least of experiences from which meanings can be educed," (Dewey , p33). A word of warning however: memories, or other such forms of recognition which take up such a large part of our daily lives – this is a table, a route to work, what I remember I had intended to say in answer to a question, while all summoning of memory and acts of thinking are merely acts of recognition. They are no different to those of a cow in the presence of grass as Deleuze (2004) would

remind us. Thought must be judged instead on its claims to principle rather than merely recollecting an event, and should “seek its models among stranger and more compromising adventures” (ibid., p171)

3.3 Picturing the World of Teaching and Teacher Attributes

The encounter of the interview, for all involved, is that of an exchange between the familiar and the alien; the alien in each case requires translation and interpretation. Within this language clearly has primacy. Wittgenstein’s well known early position, that “by means of propositions we explain ourselves,” and that since we cannot “step outside of language, the limits of my language are the limits of my world,” provides the presupposed grounds for the justification of the efficacy of our interview process. It supposes that the constituents of language used at interview have a unique and discoverable essence which describes the reality of our candidate. Furthermore, in this search for the essences of thought and language, and in their logical analysis we see clearly mirrored the belief and enterprise of the Multiple Mini Interview - in fact any interview process which seeks to ascertain the nature and quality of the essences of the individual themselves which constitute ‘being’ and ‘fit’ to a position. Wittgenstein, in his *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* (1922) explains language and the limiting world it constructs by way of a logical scaffolding to reveal the structures and truths of each. It establishes a ‘picturing’ relation between the two. Again, our interview seeks to reveal the *necessary* structure and truth of the candidate, justifying this as having a direct relation to the world of teaching and the truths of teacher effectiveness – *its* picture projecting forward in time from the present; its *lines* of projection mapping on to future teacher effectiveness in an exercise of identical logical calculus.

The foundation on which Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* rests and which I believe is mirrored by the demands of the interview, is language’s ability to describe the world. Meaning is identified by naming, which renders language derived from ‘pointing’. The treatment of the complex open systems of the nature of the candidate and interview’s purpose – to capture within a single brief action a formula and solution to the problems of fit with the teaching profession - neatly mirrors Wittgenstein’s early simplification of the complex issues of language as containing a unitary nature to solve the problems of thought; “It thinks first and foremost of nouns,” (Wittgenstein, 2005, p56), in much the same way as the Multiple Mini Interview does with its elementary focus on the candidate, their commitment, motivation, curiosity, ethics, integrity, reflection. In language, elementary propositions combine to form structures which organise these objects and nouns into states of affairs in the world. Both its plea and its method is to link well-constructed signs to allow their combinations to shine forth. At interview this suggests a solution to the problems of teacher selection, a way of reading and quantifying thought and Being: the world-view of the candidate, matters of personal values and institutional values, truth and validity – ‘This candidate is committed’. Its aim then is remarkably ambitious. But the means by which

these ambitions are realised – powerful well-executed expression and necessary representation in language - like the personality, identity and character of the candidate themselves, is instead a collection of interlinking activities and belief, each with their own logic.

The interview therefore threatens to offer a distorted view of Being, and the language that Being employs. For example, the intersubjective exchange at interview presupposes that the essences of the candidate, the teacher, and of individual being are discoverable and measurable. Whilst desirable in its simplicity – that sense and ‘fit’ can be quantified via a process of calculus - and by eliminating any potential metaphysical arguments around nature, context and use, it discards any grounds for considering the complex nature of Being and Authenticity (or at least it proposes one picture of authentic being over another and places components of character, disposition and attributes within a hierarchy). The selection interview bases its analysis and subsequent judgements on the assumption of a single *resolved* form of being. Just like elementary propositions which enjoyed truth values independently of the rest of language, and each state-of-affairs existing in isolation, unaffected by the presence or absence of any other (Braver, 2014), at interview the elementary, or essential, attributes are treated as single, hermetically sealed points of reference within the individual to be hermeneutically isolated as self-sufficient behaviours. Its progress is made analytically by breaking down the issue of fit for the profession into the candidates’ smallest parts, the multiple interviews of our technology then dividing up the labour of analysis on those conceptual atoms. It forgets, conveniently, that “a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves within it, is not part of the mechanism,” (Wittgenstein, 1992, 271).

We rarely go about our usual business, our work and our relationships, expressing opinion (the usual business of life) in a constant state of exhausting logical or metaphysical analysis, as if there is something hidden in our activity that must be ‘brought to light’ (ibid, 91). Rather, our activity and the decisions which brings it about are the result of the natural muddled alloys of attribute, experience and Being. It is Being which lies open to view by others, not a cluster of attributes (which we could term essences) lying hidden and ready to be revealed within some private grotto of the consciousness, and which in the normal activity of university study and the practice of teaching are of little interest to us. The interview and its separation of attributes by station attempts to contain each stream of character within its banks, and to direct the flow of each characteristic into the open via an engineered structure of questioning and analysis. But the human consciousness, the self within the world, resembles more a flood plain, where the streams break their banks and coalesce in one body, the identity of each impossible to isolate from the other, but present and surging nonetheless. And all the while this body is subject to temporally and spatially situated conditions of context and emotion: the terrains of custom and language-use through which our multiple identities flow and swirl, and each contaminates the next with its own silt. What is more, the intention of each river, the nature and meaning which attaches

exclusively and characteristically to each, is distinct: the character of each serves to designate the individual.

The interview process plays ping pong with two contradictory viewpoints of science, itself operating within particular discourses of meaning, performativity and social understanding of social practices and truth status: first, its demand that our and the candidate's models of reality are taken *to* our experiences of the world, set out as a Kantian view of Science (Monk, 1991) – the candidate is required to set out their reality in response to the experiences established by the process, the scenarios and the questions posed to them; second, the empiricist tradition's understanding of a model of reality which is derived *from* the world, in the attempt at judgement from a certain objective knowledge of the candidate by the interviewer. Thus, in precisely the same manner as Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* the interview's goal is to draw the limits of the interviewee's thought by locating the limits of the *expression* of that thought – the essences of the candidate, described as their teacher attributes are reduced to *only* what is sayable. Furthermore, the application of criteria and grading of Attribute, and subjective hermeneutics draws the limits of permissible thought by the requirement to provide only a suitable, bounded predetermined response which aligns with that of the interviewer.

3.4 The Hidden Nature of Thought and Its Revealing

Any intersubjective exchange consisting question and response such as the interview, demands a mutual 'grasping the meaning,' constituted in the minds of the subjects, of the signs which are used. If it hopes to uncover at all any authentic and honest nature of the candidate within a single event, it demands that the exchange of thoughts be as clear and distinct as possible, and that all inhabitants of the exchange, whether candidate novice or interviewer expert, be in the business of communicating these ideas and meaning as effectively as possible. We already suspect that the interview provides insufficient space for the requisite excogitation; As Ryle puts it, academic thinking, of theory or explanatory narrative needs time to 'germinate, grow, flower and seed'—it is not a 'five minutes' task, like a piece of long division... Hunch, native sense of direction, though indispensable, are no longer enough' (1962b, p. 445). One aspect I now present as of interest for us, central to any understanding of the interview process, is the notion of propositions in the philosophical knots of the interview. A proposition fundamentally entails something which is asserted (or proposed) for acceptance as true (Grayling, 2001). This seems as neat a summary of the intention of comment and response at interview as can be, whether simplistically as in, "I have travelled from Bournemouth on the train for this interview," or, "I feel quite nervous," or, "I would like to find out about your ability to express ideas or concepts."

A word has logical properties dependent on where and how it occurs in the sentences of our exchange. Each proposition the candidate offers must instead *assert* by means of the sentence as its vehicle. Yet it is entirely feasible for the same vehicle to be used to convey two different propositions: Candidate A states, “I’m quite nervous,” and this can be an entirely different proposition to that of Candidate B who also states, “I’m quite nervous.” Two different things are being said, the experience being located separately and being experienced in different ways and at different levels of intensity by different subjects, both unaware of the internal sensations of the other. The proposition here can be understood as the *thought*, which has been conveyed via the use of a sentence, and which is received. The proposition has *meaning* within the sentence received. When the candidate remembers, or recognises an event, or believes an idea in mind to be ‘just so’ then the object of their belief is proposed out loud. The thought (in the form of a memory, belief or opinion) is expressed. The thought expressed then becomes the object of the *interpretation* by the interviewer which subsequently leads to judgement.

That this thought must come wrapped up in a perceptible linguistic form at interview presents us with a dilemma. The interviewer’s primary task of interpretation is to establish the Truth within expressions of thought, but language imposes distortions. Here is a dilemma at the heart of our interview: if we wish to access the thoughts and concepts of others it is impossible to circumvent the obstacle of language – it is indispensable. But, language – by nature, sensible – obscures thought, which by its nature is insensible (it is not perceptible by sense). If we acknowledge the possible influences upon the candidate’s thought of, say, their own Primary school teachers and their memories of a particular teacher, we are acknowledging and speaking about various acts or processes of thought which exist in a subjective sense. The word ‘influence’ in the question, “Can you think of a teacher who has particularly influenced your thinking?” indicates clearly a context of thought processes and various acts of thinking which are not perceptible by sense, but are dependent on sensation, intuition and imagination, and are a construction of the mental. We can see here illustrated Popper’s two senses of knowledge or thought (1983): firstly, of knowledge and thought in a subjective sense, consisting of states of mind, or dispositions to behave or act; and secondly knowledge and thought in an objective sense. This objective sense of thought consists of theories and arguments. Knowledge in this sense is independent of the candidate’s claim to know; is independent too of their belief, or disposition to act. Within Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* the primary thesis corresponds neatly with this task: a proposition is True if it corresponds to what is the case. With a purely descriptive function of our candidate’s language, regulative ideas of truth emerge, expressed by Popper (1983) as that of a description which fits the facts, of truth content, and verisimilitude – truth-likeness, or truth-content, as in “there is truth in what you say”. The interviewer gathers up these truths as commodities and, via an act of accountancy, surmises ‘fit’ for course and the teaching profession - or otherwise.

The only natural alternative to this gathering up of truths by our interviewer is that an expression is False. But the interviewer cannot say of something that does not exist in reality and sense—impressions and cannot be empirically accounted for whether this is the case. The interviewer, as onlooker, “be he teacher, critic, biographer or friend, can never assure himself that his [here, the candidate’s] comments have any vestige of truth,” (Ryle, 2009, p5). What the candidate means, or supposes, as Hegel (1991) believed, is theirs alone: it belongs only to them. The interviewer’s ideal result can only be to reveal via the extraction of meaning what is being said without risking misunderstanding – to lay bare the structure of the candidate’s legitimate thought about the world of education and their suitability for it. Wittgenstein describes this task as that of uncovering the ‘hidden essences’ of thought; to Heidegger it is the fundamentally phenomenological task of making apparent what may be inconspicuous.

For Hegel again, language can express nothing but generalities: it cannot express what is *truly* meant in different cases and contexts or at different points of the interview. The interviewer is required to recast what has been said into a form which appears to denote suitable meaning, but which on first receipt might not refer to anything apparent. Caused by their perceptions of the world and resulting knowledge, our participants come armed and pre-loaded to the interview with intentional states which, combined with will and desire, dictate choice. The interviewer seeks out this intentional thought – that is, each question is directed in order to direct the attention of the interviewee upon these objects of perception. When asking, for example, “What do you think about...the behaviour policy in this school example?” the candidate’s thought is the ‘intended’ object, and in this case what the candidate is thinking about *exists* in the world, or school - the policy example here. Another question however may call to mind an object which has merely ‘intentional’ existence – it exists only as an object of a thought, and outside of reality, “What do you think are the main rewards of teaching?” for example. While using some elements of similar language, it is not encounterable in schools in the way that systems of reward and sanctions are encounterable.

When the interviewer is able to translate the clearly expressed and easily understood sentences of ordinary natural language into the formal language of their interpretations we have the ideal response. What is said is exact and clear and without risk of misunderstanding – thoughts about the world of the intended future teacher are interpreted as legitimate. Of thought in an objective sense, Frege wrote that, “I understand by a thought not the subjective act of thinking but its objective content...” but that “I cannot put a thought in the hands of my readers with the request that they should examine it from all sides,” (1997, p333). These ‘hidden essences’ of our candidate’s thinking are revealed but only through the acts of interpretation, which for Ricoeur (2004, p12) is meant “the work of thought which consists in deciphering the hidden meaning, in unfolding the levels of meaning implied in the literal meaning.” Interpretation then is an act of overcoming the distance in thought between the history and culture of the candidate and that of the interpreter/interviewer, who must make *it* their own to resolve and clarify, “as if there were something hidden in them that had to be brought to light,” (Wittgenstein, 1992, 91).

Both parties must try to “eliminate misunderstandings by making our expressions more exact” (ibid); only then when the essence of the language, proposition and thought which lie beneath the surface are brought out into the open can meaning, truth and understanding be revealed. But which features of the ‘perfect language’ of response help the interviewer understand the true nature of thought – to what extent can the interview be said to have ‘truth-functionality’? The interviewer must be able to give credit or make truthful inferences from the ordinary language of untechnical terms at the disposal of the candidate – their job is one of extraction, first of value, then truth.

3.5 Logical Validity and Essentialism

Propositional calculus and predicate calculus was considered by Russell (1959) to be the perfect language. It provides a simple but powerful language which can equip logicians and philosophers to explore forms of valid inference and a tool for investigating the structure of language and thinking. However, it was Wittgenstein who commented that “all philosophy is a critique of language,” and that the apparent logical form of a stated proposition may not in fact be its real one, (2012, 4.0031). Consider the logical argument within the inherently true statement, ‘Either Candidate A has met the threshold we consider adequate for suitability, or they have not. Candidate A has met the threshold. Therefore, the candidate is suitable.’ The premisses constitute the grounds for conclusion, introduced by ‘therefore’. The interviewer task is easy when the interview design has identified a form of propositional responses such that if their premisses can be deemed true, the conclusion of the interviewer can also be guaranteed to be true. The conclusion or argument for acceptance can be said to be not only valid, but also sound. This elusive soundness goes some distance towards guaranteeing elements of truth to the conclusion. The interview attempts to do so by use of the fuzzy logics of its scoring system which attempts to employ logical truth to explain its validity in terms of the essential ‘if’: “IF the candidate score is 70 out of 100, or greater, then the process deems the candidate as suitable for teaching. Candidate A scores 71. Candidate A is suitable for teaching.” Validity being granted to the argument for or against acceptance is proposed when the argument’s form is such that if the premisses are true then the conclusion is also true. Fundamentally the instructions of the interview process similarly prescribe the following:

If all Effective Teachers (T) are necessarily Motivated to teach and are Ethically Committed to High Standards and Inclusive Practice, and Candidate (C) is sufficiently Motivated to teach and is Ethically Committed to High Standards and Inclusive Practice THEN the similarity of Candidate to Teacher is sufficient and presents a clear picturing relation between words and the world, true or otherwise.

Within this logical model, teaching is understood tendentially in relation to the selected essences (our attributes). It proposes that Candidate A has the tendency to be committed to teaching on

account of their intrinsic structure, their nature, inferred at interview and will behave in a certain way given appropriate circumstances by virtue of this predisposition. Logic has captured the essence of our candidate and describes the way they will act. The intrinsic structure is read as constituting their natural tendencies, which feeds the suggestion of a natural ‘kind’ of teacher, or natural teachers. Analytical logic excludes the possibility that the processes of teaching, essences of character, human behaviour and situations which arise are inextricably intertwined. Must we not question the plausibility of this proposition?

Bhaskar (2008, p210-211) reminds us that, “the justification of our systems of taxonomy, of the ways we classify things, of the nominal essences of things in science thus lies in our belief in the fruitfulness in leading us to explanations in terms of their generative mechanisms contained in their real essences,” and that, “real definitions... are fallible attempts to capture in words the real essences of things.” Despite the manifest differences between individuals they have been grouped based upon a notional common constitution of essences. Deleuze however, argued that nature and properties are merely enduring assemblages, or a series of interrelated traits or dispositions to act; existence is contingent. Following this we are justified in suggesting that our candidates and teachers are who and what they are by virtue of an ongoing process of formation – the intrinsic essences consist in ongoing intra-action, processes of individuation (whereby our candidates form a sense of their dynamic personality by becoming separate), generative mechanism and relations of exteriority (Rutzou, 2015). Essences are therefore less stable, less self-sufficient, less dense than our interview presupposes, and no disposition or trait stands as independent of relations to another or to its context and situation.

We therefore move from a reified and hierarchical conception of those structures of attributes as internal essences, to a complex responsive model of multiplicity and difference. We can understand our candidate as a totality which is changing, emerging, an ensemble embedded and constituted by situation.

3.6 The Picturing Relation of Words to World of Teaching

We have seen already that objects, being the ultimate constituents of the world, are denoted by names, or labels. Names (the ultimate atomic constituents of language) combine to form elementary propositions, which are compounded to form propositions for use. In the same way, the world consists of facts, made up or compounded from ‘states of affairs’, made up of objects. The structures of Language and the World then are mirrored by the other, and Wittgenstein’s paradigm has become our ability “to reconstruct an object from its representation” (Biggs, 2021, p175), to reconstruct a thought (about the world of teaching and the character and suitability of the candidate) from a sentence and via a proposition.

Elementary propositions (combinations of names) correspond to states-of-affairs which make up the world of our candidate. States of affairs, or situations, are ways in which the objects in the world our interview hopes to reveal are arranged in order to make a given proposition about the world true. They are complex structures constituted by entities and can be atomic, in which case a particular entity contains a particular property (say, “The candidate is motivated,”), or relational involving multiple interconnected particulars (say, “The interviewer is pleased that the candidates on Tuesday seemed committed to teaching,”). The world is therefore a set of states of affairs, or situational conditions (Sosa, 1999) made up of facts, not things. It is facts, therefore, which make the truth of true propositions (Vallicella, 2002, in Butchvarov, 2021).

States-of-affairs combine to form facts which propositions ‘picture’. Wittgenstein’s picturing theory is an attempt to explain the nature of thought and intentionality (Glock, 2001). Take the example of the proposition, “The classrooms in the school I visited were too small...”; this representation of a state of affairs is a model or picture and this picture could be said to be constituted by the elementary propositions built from objects with names: small (a name denoting size) classrooms (a name denoting a structure in which children are traditionally taught), and the school (a name allocated to denote a series of classrooms, corridors, office and communal spaces within which the various processes of ‘education’ takes place, and so on). The elementary propositions are granted sense, or meaning, by a picturing relation. The reality of the proposition is visually depicted and we might understand this by use of the analogy of the way engineering drawings (pictures) are constructed using lines of projection that map on to the object - language has this same relationship to the world it describes. We, the candidates, the interviewer, are able to picture each constituent element to make sense of the meaning inherent within the proposition. We are able to picture the classroom – and by extension the elements within: the desks, the windows, the children (or perhaps the children are absent or outside, at play), the chairs, the reward charts upon the wall, a reading area, carpeted space, lurid primary colours adorning the display boards – each of which we can picture in turn of course - and the corresponding glimpses of the behaviours and action within such. These elements construct a state of affairs enfolded by the term ‘the classroom,’ small or otherwise. Any complete account of reality here consists of further states of affairs: the children as a group and the tinny, high-pitched echoes of their sound from the playground seeping into the classroom space, the arrangement of the desks, the setting of the school and therefore the view from the classroom window. And layered within and around this the simultaneous realities of the agents within the interview encounter when presented by the original proposition, all of which are diverse and independent. The pair are able to understand, or intuit meaning, due to their mutual exposures to a shared culture; experiences of examples of ‘classrooms’ and settings in education have accrued and both are members of a community of users whereby one representation intends one thing (say, to Candidate A) while a cultural interpretive visual strategy allows the Other (say, Interviewer) to accept

‘meaning’ differently but without loss (Biggs, 2021). But merely recognising those objects, recalling those objects of recognition within a classroom environment, or a state of affairs which existed there, cannot be guaranteed to disturb thought in the way we would hope, or stir our attributes into sufficient action and thereby show themselves; for Deleuze (2004, p175) “thought may busy itself thereby, but such employment and such activity have nothing to do with thinking.” And so thought here consists of no more than an image of itself, and is merely an act of recognition.

Meaning then attaches to what we say when the candidate arranges language within the proposition and this meaning depends upon the candidate’s anticipation that the interviewer will realise and understand the terms employed – we presuppose a shared understanding of the realities represented within these names. These shared understandings, or senses of meaning, are also likened by Wittgenstein to *atmospheres* (PI.117) which accompany the word, and which the word carries with it into each application. Each attribute in question during the interview exchange is accompanied by such an atmosphere: consider Motivation, Expectation, Desire, Responsibility, Challenge, Inspiration: each has meaning, and atmosphere; word, and use; currency and purchase - “The money, and the cow you can buy with it.” (PI.120).

For a proposition to be true, it must be because something in the world is a certain way (Horwich, 1998). The truth of, “Candidate A is anxious,” is explained by the candidate *being* anxious, by being the ‘way’ it is, in this case containing the property of anxiety. It is not the property of anxiety alone which explains this proposition’s truth, but that the Candidate *has* it, on this occasion and in this situation. Gestalt psychology provides a plausible explanation of the manner in which we perceive states of affairs in the world. Westerhoff (2005) says that we perceive wholes, or “complexes” (p74); rather than the particulars which make up the state of affairs, which itself often goes unrecognised. A newborn child for instance may notice a hand but does not see *that* it is a hand, and an adult does similar: they may see their hand, or the pen upon the table, or the child sat listening to the teacher, but do not see the particulars beyond the taken-for-granted. Our participants see the world of teaching as an aggregate – a whole formed by its elements. In this way, “states of affairs provide the primary epistemic point of contact between us and the world,” (ibid, p71). They perceive *things* prior to their judgement of the particulars of the thing *as* a state of affairs; although the candidate sat listening to the interviewer is a complex individual thing with constituent parts, and states of affairs have constituent parts it may not follow that the prospective interviewer *perceives* the way in which the state of affairs is constituted, or the states-of-affairs within the states-of-affairs.

While states of affairs, or situations, events and so on cannot be easily disputed (the candidate *is* curious about effective teaching techniques; the child *was* sat listening to the teacher), facts may seem to be ‘man-made fictions,’ which “can be disputed, challenged, assumed, proved,” (White, 1970, p81). *Was* the child listening? They are not entities, or things, in the same way that animals, or objects, or

colours, or the spaces between objects can be said to be entities. The interview room being hot is an undisputable state of affairs, but the *fact* of the matter, the extent, or degree to which it is hot may be disputed by individuals, each of whom has gauged their response to the room's heat fictionally. We cannot speak therefore about the logical properties of any sentence in isolation, but only as it is uttered by a speaker (S) in a context (Q). Without context, or in differing contexts, one and the same sequence of words might be thought to express any number of thoughts or intentions. Take again, for example, the atmosphere expressed by both the candidate (S1) and the interviewer (S2) within their uses of the proposition "I feel anxious." The particular utterance of S1 in the specific context of the interview room may be entirely understandable and relevant to our understanding of the statement; it requires little analysis beyond empathy and understanding of the fact that in speaking and listening they are concerned with evidencing fit for their future career – no small matter. This could have been determined or predicted in advance. There is little chance, however, of S1 determining in advance the contextual considerations relevant to what S2 is stating: they are not concerned with proving anything; there is no pause to consider whether S1 has got S2 right. Instead, matters of the institution's course numbers, suitability of acceptances, sufficient student/teacher quality, inspection and performance management regimes, accountability, institutional expectation, all remain hidden from sight and buried, to S1 and those outside of and unfamiliar with these regimens.

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It is an illusion to believe that knowledge of the candidate is relatively easy to achieve or that what knowledge requires is a range of degrees of evidence, or "epistemic probability" which in the everyday life and thought of the interview exchange provide a way of clearing our moral conscience (Butchvarov, 2015). As cognitive beings, with vested interests in teaching and notions of quality we seek knowledge because it is truth we want. But the idea that evidence comes in degrees and possession of this evidence summons only an approximation of knowledge. Taken logically then this may suggest that there can be such a thing as an approximation of truth or fact – the truths of the propositions made at interview may certainly be incomplete, they may be irrelevant, or even misleading, but they cannot be only partial: "this truth scores 9 out of 15," or "This candidate is 70% intellectually curious."

The manner in which evidence can and cannot bear witness to fact was addressed by J. L Austin (1962, p115), who wrote of the difference between gathering evidence, "marks on the ground, noises and smells," and the object which stands plainly in view which provides no more further evidence, merely that the question becomes settled. The candidate however never comes in view - it can never be self-evident that the candidate is an effective teacher. We may call responses offered "evidence," although, even if it is itself self-evident, it does not make what we want to know evident.

One further question regarding evidence might serve well to outline scepticism of the taken-for-granted ritual: that our candidate must justify or provide evidence to support their assertions. If a candidate states, before the interview begins, that they are experiencing acute anxiety, the statement that “I am incredibly nervous” is not evidence that they are, truly, in pain. Neither is it a report on their state, or a description. We cannot know the likeness to truth of their claim, and yet we do not doubt this as an out-loud behavioural expression of their own knowledge or belief in their experience (of feeling pain). The interviewer’s own understanding and acceptance of their utterance is grounded in their reaction to the candidate’s suffering: to their sympathetic or unsympathetic reaction to it. And this based on their own experience of sensations of anxiety or the nervous sensations in similar situations, their own prior uses of that same behavioural expression. “Yes, you are anxious,” equates to “I know how you feel.”

Why is our reaction to their subsequent behavioural expression so much more sceptical that *its* evidence must be scored and accounted for? For example that “I have high expectations of myself,” or, “I committed to teaching as a profession.” Behaviour is a logically adequate criterion of ascription. We cannot get better or more logically adequate (and that is not to say that this is necessarily sufficient) evidence than behaviour or its expression.

3.7 The Picturing Character – of Language and Being

The earlier thesis of Wittgenstein, his *Tractatus* (1933), asserted that making sense of one another in issues which lie outside of the world of facts and their constituent states of affairs is impossible – it falls into the category of non-sense. So, while matters of commitment, motivation and ethics themselves are not nonsense, any attempt to talk of them is; they are unstateable.

Neither evidence gathering nor the meanings of these words can be discussed in isolation within our exchange, to follow Frege’s principle, for meaning must be positively determined to avoid it being *nonsense*. The term Child Protection within the question ‘What is the role of the Teacher within the Child Protection process?’ for example, has logical sense to most candidates but the psycho-logical world of the teacher/interviewer is excluded from the language of the question and its sense is absent from circulation for equivalent meaning-making to take place for the candidate. Only those responses whose language succeeds in connecting with the dual worlds of the self and that of the interviewer have any chance of meaning. Davidson (1974) concluded that to be recognised as interpretable many beliefs must be shared between the interpreter and the speaker. In other words, we cannot recognise someone as a linguistic being with an accompanying world view unless we consider them as having an intelligible language which makes that world view accessible. The interpretation of the speech of the candidate by

the interviewer is interdependent with the interviewee first attributing beliefs and meaning to the candidate's expression of thought. Interpreting speech requires a knowledge of a "good deal about what the speaker believes (and intends and wants), and that fine distinctions between beliefs are impossible without understood speech," (Davidson, 1974, p. 195). Therefore, to assume that practices of intersubjective interaction and interpretation can take part in a situation of complete ignorance must be discarded if we follow Davidson's steps. Both knowledge about some of the speaker's beliefs and their knowledge about the world are therefore crucial. Without such, our interview is merely guesswork and lacks credibility and validity. So, within the simple picturing theory of the everyday and commonly experienced states of affairs such as the objects within a classroom we have complexities and difficulty in reaching common understanding; how much more so of interpretations of the *understandings* and *psychological* dimensions of the complex overlapping events which occur within that space, and the terms we have attached to such matters?

We have seen that the thoughts of the individual connect to the world via what could be seen as a 'picturing relation.' When we are asked about our experiences, or items within our understanding, our thoughts construct a logical picture of each fact within the thought; we express those thoughts as propositions and "Propositions *show* the logical form of reality," (T.4.121). Propositions then are pictures of facts. As we cannot picture the *fact* of resilience or commitment to the teaching profession or some similar abstract terms attributed to the character, we instead must picture someone *in the act of* resilience to locate someone being as such, or as such a being. The interview seeks out motivation and commitment, but as these cannot be expressed as fact the candidate must paint a picture of themselves which shows them in the act of being motivated or committed. They must denote the occurrence of motivation and commitment in their consciousness (Ryle, 2009). Wittgenstein says that, "a thought finds an expression that can be *perceived* by the *senses*," (1922, 3.1) and the candidate must therefore find an expression (with words as its elements and signs) that collects together facts which the listener is able to perceive and successfully analyse. It must describe using simple signs as the elements or building blocks of the proposition offered. The question orders thoughts to rally; these must mirror the facts of their world, and sign-language must be made to stand in line ready for battle. Furthermore, the propositional response must show how things are, as pictured reality – and this reality is restricted to only two alternatives: yes – it is truth; no – it is false. It is impossible for any proposition to be partially factual; it either pictures a fact, or it does not – it is a "truth function" of its elements, made up from a series of connected names and simple symbols, for example as School, Book, Shout, Policy, Protect, Risk.

When Wittgenstein states that the world is the totality of facts, not of things, and specifies facts as the existence of states of affairs, he explains the structure of the 'world' itself. He warns that the world should not be considered as the sum of the 'things' which exist within its fold – in the classroom the chairs, the desks, the teacher, the pens, the chewing gum beneath the desks; or in the interview room

the paper, the pens, the clipboard, the clock, the atoms which make up these ‘objects’. Facts instead consist of events aligned with time or spaces: the school bell rings at 9:00am; the teacher in Class Three is the longest serving member of staff; the school sits on the outskirts of an industrial town in the North of England where levels of socio-economic decline are considered high; the desks are arranged in groups of six, and so on. These facts are the building blocks of thought onto which we add our lines of projection to the logical picture. The pictures which we project are not in any way photographic but rather logical “models of reality” (T 2.12), which does not represent an object but the network of the possible connections and relations that object might hold with other objects (Hussein, 2020). These can be considered ‘the way things are’ and as a combination of objects they can be broken down into aspects for analysis; they consist of components which constitute the building blocks or structure of the state of affairs.

What may matter most in this picturing relation is not the resemblance it shows to ‘reality’ (to the level of the colour of the teacher’s tie, the pencil shavings on the floor etc), but how far it demonstrates the way objects are related to one another in a specific state-of-affairs (Hulster, 2015). Consider the concept of chess as an example: a logical picture when considering chess is not a picture that resembles the actual elements of chess (although we may first imagine a board with opponents in the process of a game), but rather what is depicted are the relations that hold among and between its pieces to gather a *sense* of the concept: pictures of moves upon a chequerboard and clocks; of clocks and the game’s history; of history and recent television shows depicting female chess masters, and so on.

It is at this level of thinking at which we can begin to ascribe the characteristics of ‘states of affairs’ as comparable to the nature of being as set out within the structured propositions suggested by the Multiple Mini Interview. We can compile an inventory of the individual’s attributes (the building blocks of character); we can ‘know’ the candidate as subject by knowing the combinations of itemisable and identifiable traits, *partes extra partes*; we can dare to predict the body’s dispositions towards aspects of the life of the teacher by its simple constituent parts and by understanding its essential nature. When these simple constituent parts are in combination, constituting the state of affairs of the individual, we can define the character; the arrangement of attributes determines the structure of Being. These determinate *facts* of attribute (or lack thereof) denote the logical specification and termination point of the combination of objects/attributes. By means of a logical operation, making legitimate use of language to construct the evidence of the building blocks of attribute if we can denote the state of affairs which meet our need – that of teacherliness – and we can by their absence determine those states of affairs which do not exist, or at least do not equate to *sufficient* teacherliness: we can Accept or Reject.

In the same way, as a logical truth function, intentionally and linguistically, when the candidate sets out their understanding of how things *are* and what their experience *has* been, if accepted as truth

by the interviewer (and, after all, each question at interview is a demand for truthfulness which is met by either honesty or fraudulence, and each of which is largely unverifiable) then they have also determined which states of affairs they understand not to be so, and which experience they have not. While this seems obvious, it serves to underline the truth/falsity or fact/fiction or honesty/dishonesty of the response. Their reality, if accepted, is the totality of existing states of affairs (Grayling, 2006) together with everything their existence excludes as being *non-existent*. While Wittgenstein's early interest lay only in creating an account of the logical character of language needed for the connections between language and the world to be made possible, our undertaking must be to concern ourselves with the particular propositions: the expressions, sentences, natural language employed concerning the school, the nature of education and their experiences of it, the candidate's preparedness, and character. By making the symbolic forms of argument explicit, he helps us examine the way structures of language mirror structures in the world. Nowhere is a structure of language needed to be more concomitant with the structure of the world than in a first meeting, and the revelation of self within a high-stakes, life-defining moment of interview.

It is important therefore that the language the candidate is able to offer is a clearly discernible picture and model of reality. The elements within the constituted picture must relate to one another in a way which is exact – it must determine the thought within a limited form, and the elements of the picture represents intentionality in the same way. The structure of the picture offered must depict the collection of objects of the intention, *just* as it is, like a still life painting. It is the pictorial form - the identity of the structure between the picture itself and what it pictures; the canvas and the items on the table, the utterance and the intention, which makes the picturing relation possible. The shared structure between the picture and the reality is a structure of elements and the structure of these elements is the corresponding way that the picture reaches out to, or “touches reality” (Wittgenstein, T. 2.1515). This reaching out to touch neatly corresponds to the importance of the extent to which the candidate is able to reach out to the interviewer and their responses' ability to touch their reality in order to be measured. The interview metric is then, using one of Wittgenstein's figures of speech, “laid against (their) reality like a ruler” (ibid. 2.1512).

As we have seen reality can only be the sum of facts, the existing states of affairs or how the world *is* (and, by its existence, how the world *is not*). To the interviewer then, the *reality* of the candidate is *only* the sum of the facts they present; these facts are all that matter and any attempt to talk or to think about matters which do not fall within the realm of fact, or existent states of affairs, has no sense – such thoughts and expressions do not picture anything. The consequences of this for the interviewer are profound: nothing can be said which has sense or meaning about ethics or belief, emotion or the problems of situation because these lie outside of fact. And any attempt to allocate judgement to a discourse of non-sense, to identify as fact an attribute which lies outside of fact, is similarly impossible.

However, the processes of interview are laced with language of value and ethics. While Wittgenstein characterises values and ethics as transcendental and detached from fact, the values of teaching and morally problematic situations arise every day in the classroom. The sense in which they *are* problematic and the application of ethical principles to solve these problems features large at interview. For example, within the consideration of the candidate's grasp of issues around safeguarding we may ask, 'What are the characteristics of neglect?' or 'What may be the reason this child is behaving in such a way (he struggles to express his feelings, he avoids playing with his friends, he is reluctant to leave the adult's side)?'. A judgement must rest on the candidate differentiating between the morally (and ethically) acceptable and the immoral. The candidates' judgement rests on their understanding of the facts about a child's capacity to feel pain and the nature of neglect. Knowledge of these contingent facts about how things are in the world make a difference to the teacher's actions in the daily life of the classroom and the candidate's responses to the questions at interview.

Wittgenstein presents us here then with an impossible paradox. As philosophy and attempts at wisdom cannot be constructed by propositions of fact, and therefore lies outside of sense, these theories themselves are sense-less; it renders opinion, question and decision invalid and inaccurate. The solution lies in Wittgenstein's own responses to what philosophy is, that all we can attempt is the logical clarification of thoughts (4.112), that its work consists essentially of elucidation and clarification. "Without philosophy thoughts are...cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries." This logical sense-making appeals to the MMI and its prime concerns of extraction and examination which clarify likelihoods of teacher effectiveness.

This activity of clarification of thought and talk, its 'elucidation,' is achieved by working outwards through what can be thought in order to establish a vantage point from which to survey the limits of discourse. The telos of the MMI is as an instrument or technology, a mode of revealing, (Heidegger (1978) describes instrumentality as the fundamental characteristic of technology) used to first read and then describe the structure of the world and language of the candidate. It attempts at logic to describe the scaffolds of the being. It shows what has to be the case for the selection of teachers to have sense, but simultaneously we acknowledge that logic has little to do with what the world of education, the school, the teacher and the trainee is really like. The use of the term World of Education itself is merely a collective noun used to corral together all objects, states of affairs and matters pertaining to the process education – and by its use we separate it from the other worlds in which the candidate may be invested, or their everyday. By a logical structuring of attribute and language, the interview seeks to connect the individual with their past and their future, but within this world.

While the concepts of value (as non-sense) and language (fact) are utterly distinct it is not possible for language to be used to describe, for example, ethics or one's curiosity. These, and in fact all values, can only be manifested and brought into sight in the physical realm; we cannot therefore use

language to describe or evidence anything to do with ethics - these are “transcendental” and “cannot be expressed,” (6.421), values and attribute – these lie outside of, or beyond the limit of the visible world of the teacher candidate.

3.8 A Brief Returning to Use

Wittgenstein recognises that there exist logical relations between propositions that cannot be captured by truth-functional or formal logic. It is there within the spaces between concrete entities that hermeneutics and interpretation are required, if we understand hermeneutics as “the art of understanding rightly another man’s language...and the methodology for every kind of interpretation,” (Heidegger, 1959).

Here we return to where this Investigation began. Consider again Wittgenstein’s later investigations and the search for what ‘gives life’ to language: “If we had to name anything as the life of the sign, we should have to say that it was its use,” (Blue Book, p 4). This proposal, that the meaning of a word is the *use* to which it is put, not only assigns a normative status to everyday language clearly enough, but for our interviewer and interviewee it clears the way of the specialised forms of discourse and communication and the single logical application of language to reality and replaces it with a pragmatic distinction of language as it enters human intercourse (Hertzberg, 2001). Now brought back to their everyday use, where the interviewee is confident in the sensible and mundane use of language which serves practical situations and purposes, we are allowed an access point to the candidate’s thinking which resides where they are: cognitively, emotionally, contextually bound in a time and space within an interconnected system of understanding, action and use. These language-games include propositions (which are still held up to reality) but also the actions “into which this language is woven” (PI.7). The interviewer’s interpretation and resultant judgement must now look at words of the response and discussion and the context that defines them and consider that the speaking of a language is part of *one* activity, one “form of life,” (PI.23), and acknowledge that the way language meshes with our lives, those of the candidate, is infinitely various – it has no fixed essence nor firm borders at its limits, and instead constitutes a ‘teeming sea of incommensurable games’ (Braver, 2014, p21). While hoping that language and its representations of Attribute *ought to* provide us with the means by which we can make our judgement, the removal of the single calculus with its claims to a superior vantage point, and the troubled articulation of the candidate demand a revision of what we acknowledge language *does*.

3.9 Chapter Summary

Any attempts to apply propositional calculus to the humans at the heart of teaching is problematic. The language and words in use during the interview exchange cannot be certain to correspond perfectly, or even particularly well with intention. Consciousness remains often intangible given the ordinary or everyday language in use. The muddled alloys of the two sets of experience, dispositions, emotion and available terminology makes understanding, itself linguistic, and the agreed upon underlying purpose of revealing the nature of the candidate, problematic. A common language is required which locates the meaning of the interview's terms within a grammatical system – meaning is the use to which it is put. We have investigated the atomistic model of language's logical form and found a parallel between this characterisation of language – as atomistic constituent parts of propositions – and the interview's atomistic isolation of constituent parts of being a teacher. The words and phrases of the propositions exchanged at interview are frequently misty, indiscernible and subtly indistinct. The source of the intelligibility of both participants is the average everyday public practices of their everyday language, which lacks sufficient transparency within the time-limited moment of the encounter. A mutually grasped universal language is not just difficult, it is impossible; their expressions require a mutual picturing relation in order to make sense of the other. Meaning within a phrase surrounds its working with a haze – with each phrase comes an unutterable, immanent meaning of its accompanying thought.

Even the key simple terms and concepts are contingent and ambiguous. Simple correspondence between words and their use, labels and meaning is impossible given the abstract and nebulous nature of the concepts. We therefore face a fundamental problem of attributing suitability or success to a response given this ambiguity of language and the concepts to which they are attached. Wittgenstein's 'language-games' offers one way out of the dilemma surrounding correspondence between word and meaning and a different way of drawing a line around the meaning within a term if we accept the autonomy of the language of each person; the individual delineates the meaning of their use autonomously, selecting their own boundary line. Statements form systems and propositions exist within these and within the actions into which each is woven.

Language is the means by which we shed light upon being. But in its aim to capture within a single brief action a formula to solve the problem of who forms a suitable fit for teaching we should accept that in illuminating one aspect we cast others necessarily into shadow. This distorts both what it means to be a teacher and the language they employ. Neither professional 'attributes' nor elementary words are independent hermetically sealed points of reference. But our participants see the world of teaching as an aggregate – a whole formed by elements, which usually go unnoticed. By drawing the limits of thought by locating the expression of that thought the essence of being-a-teacher is reduced to only what is sayable.

Chapter 4: On Knowing the Other - Subjectivity and Difference

The aim of our interview is to recognise and bring into focus the Other, to understand the way they *are* in order to develop an explicit theory of their *being*. I suggest in this chapter that this constitutes an act of human social ontology carried out in order to ascertain professional fit. Because ontology is created in thought, I shall begin with a consideration of those properties of mind that *create* the versions of reality which our candidate attempts to express and which both of our participants attempt to analyse. I have composed here a consideration of intentionality, the capacity of the mind to be directed at, or *about* objects, state of affairs, goals and values (Giovagnoli, 2020). An intentional state has an object – that at which it finds itself directed, an object of attention. In Chapter Three I previously considered how Wittgenstein set out first how logic constitutes the preconditions for the possibility of how things in the world are represented – we represent reality through thought - and his assertion that thought and its directedness is intrinsically linked to the expression of that thought through language. I hope to illustrate how the essence of linguistic representation and the picturing theory attempt to explain intentionality (Glock, 2001), and how a proposition depicts a thought. Understanding the Other of our candidate - and the other itself a category of human thought as fundamental as consciousness itself (De Beauvoir, 1949) – is rooted from an understanding of their behaviours, prior-intention and intention-in-action (Searle, 2010). Any confidence in the competence of our interview to predict the behaviour of our candidate must involve firstly their being recognised as an intentional being, interpretable by an intentional state, their beliefs and desires. Their subjective state, which also includes their perceptions, likes and dislikes, preferences, anxieties and hopes, is the means by which they are able to relate to the world of teaching and their experiences and, for both, to one another. For Searle, (1999, p85), “the general name of this relationship is intentionality.” It is here I begin.

To recap on the concepts I set out in the previous chapter on language and its use, there are few more perfect examples of an encounter between two (or more) strangers that fulfil what Ludwig Wittgenstein denoted a “language game,” the means of everyday linguistic meaning-making which reveal social systems, than the meeting of minds and intentionality, subjectivities and being, knowledge and judgement than the University teacher selection interview. It is, metaphorically, a game of high stakes guesses between speaker and listener, within which participants play to understand underlying meanings within a familiar though uncomfortable ritualised context of questions and answer. When the interviewer asks for the response to a question it is not clear whether they are playing to ‘find a specific answer’ or to ‘find a knowledge about’ or to ‘find an essence,’ and so on. The central concern of the candidate must therefore be to guess which game is being played and respond appropriately to allow their fit for the teaching profession to become believable and self-evident, the touchstone of logical

truth. The central concern of the interviewer on the other hand must be *to do justice* to the *difference* of the Other, locating truth within the propositions offered. These truths the candidate has idealised in the moment of the question with little time to interpret their own most relevant experiences.

But while the candidate seeks merit, and nothing but merit, for this to occur they must first be understood, their meaning mediated within the shared community of this particular organising system and its language game. The interviewer must then undergo a process of coming-to-know, which can only take place following a shared consideration in which use of language has allowed for the fixing and signification of the candidate's thought. This is dependent on the conceptual schemes of each, arising as differing points of view, being translatable from the conceptual scheme of one to the other. Davidson (1984) argues that there is a close connection between the ability to translate, via an act of interpretation, the other's language, and being able to describe their attitudes. Given the complexity of communicative intention in which the interview deals, it seems unlikely that attitudes and attributes, values and beliefs can be attributed to one without the other translating them into their own language, and subsequently into the organisational system of the judgement criteria of the interview itself.

To understand meaning within language exchanges requires a grasping of the subjective consciousness of the other, 'from the inside' as it were (Schwandt, 2000). This entails our interviewer having an empathic identification with our candidate, what Schwandt describes as "an act of psychological re-enactment – getting inside the head of an actor to understand what he or she is up to in terms of motives, beliefs, desires, thoughts, and so on," (p192). Our interview presupposes that it is possible for our interviewer, in the act of interpreting behaviours and language to transcend their own historical circumstances to reproduce the meanings or intentions of the candidate. Even the conceptual schemes of the mechanism of interview itself, dictated by its causal ends and aspirations to modernity, is "a way of coping with (the) sensory experience" (Donaldson, 1984, p192). It does so by systematising, by dividing up the question prompts and the subsequent notations of sense-data of what is given as response and content. While in theory it permits the participants differing points of view, or the change of aspect described by Wittgenstein (1953) as alike to putting on a pair of glasses allowed by the empathy of the interviewer, for Davidson the different points of view make sense only, "if there is a common co-ordinate system on which to plot them," (ibid). This common co-ordinating system can by necessity merely consist of educational settings in general, and beliefs-in-common from the ordinary or everyday world of education. These have more truth-*potential* than truth-likeness given the inexperience of the candidate. If we are to avoid any theory that assumes neither shared meanings, concepts or beliefs about education this requires the indispensable precondition of being open to what the candidate has to say – a far from simple matter.

4.1 Intentionality and Belief

Dennet (1987) considers an intentional stance as the primary method to predict human behaviour. This stance treats people as rational agents who make their choices in conformance to their own tendencies beliefs and desires. Thus, via folk psychology (Turner, 2017), it has been possible to assess what the candidate *ought* to do, and to then infer what beliefs and desires they must have in order to attain those rational teacher-behaviours. Teacher beliefs, then, are invented constructs of the theorist, or the architects of our process, rather than actual entities and our interview proposes a systematic reasoning causal explanation for the actions of teachers based on deeply embedded presuppositions about its subjects. It assumes that teachers and those appropriate for training as teachers hold certain beliefs, and desire certain things, and that any future action or behaviour is able to be systematically predicted from these beliefs and desires. Dennett (1987, p. 52) argues that, based on the views of what all humans (for us, what all *teachers*) ought to believe, desire and do, we predict or explain the beliefs, desires and actions of others "by calculating in a normative system," and, driven by the not unreasonable assumption that all our candidates are rational beings – who do have specific beliefs and desires and act on the basis of those beliefs and desires in order to carry out their will – these predictions are based on simple rules, or further presuppositions. For example that our candidate holds beliefs grounded in their capacity to perceive rationally and possess their own unique biography. Our candidates' beliefs, about teaching and biography, are involuntary and unchangeable; they are not subject to the will, but rather consist, according to Hume, "in a certain feeling or sentiment...that depends not on the will, but must arise from certain determinate causes and principles of which we are not masters," (Swinburne, 2002, p39).

Of direct relevance for us in investigating the phenomena of the interview and its perceptions of the other are intentionalist theories such as those which hold that sensory experience does not involve the awareness of "qualia", or intrinsic qualities or properties, of any object which is the subject of our introspection (Crane, 2000). For example when we experience a property of an object, the blue of the ocean for example, we experience that as a property of the object not as a property of our experience. The observer's experience is not blue, it is the experience which represents the ocean as blue and what that observer takes delight in are specific aspects of the content of that experience (Tye, 1992). Introspection therefore reveals only represented facts about an object, and all introspection can reveal are facts about the content of the experience.

In all understanding by our participants however, there is judgement to be made of what *matters* in what is said and perceived, an identification of what is salient and important – indeed, a conscious *inattention* to what is considered irrelevant or secondary. These important intentional states which manifest at interview are always about, or refer to, the propositional content of the question or prompt, and the beliefs, memories, wishes and desires, and anxieties which are subsequently revealed. These

beliefs, that something is the case, the way things are, become the intentional content. Intentional objects (the thing at which attention is directed) can therefore have multiple, and fine grained, intentional contents (Crane, 2000). There can be multiple fine-grained beliefs about what teachers do, about a candidate's motivations, about the way a response to a question is framed, and so on. If the interviewer believes that the candidate is unable to acknowledge mistakes and lacks clarity of thought, for example; if our candidate's mood is one of anxiety about performance and this mood colours how the interview shows itself to them; if the interviewer wishes for more detail than has been provided; if the candidate prefers discussing their personal motivation to discussing matters around safeguarding children's welfare. In each case the subject resides in an intentional state, and each intentional state is about or refers *to* something. Searle (2010) goes further: that understanding a society (our candidate population) requires understanding its collective behaviour which is a manifestation of shared or collective intentionality; and to understand this we must understand individual intentionality; and to understand individual intentionality requires an understanding of consciousness.

For Addis (2005), "any adequate philosophy of mind must reflect, at the basic ontological analysis of consciousness, the uniqueness of mind," and the mind both as a phenomenon in and of itself, and the mind as representative of and an attribute of any individual thinking being. As we have heard, for our process the evolution of each candidate is a natural, explainable, though largely unintended sequence of events that has taken place in the world (*ibid*). As such, the essence of the candidate's consciousness is characterised by their Intentionality, what Brentano (1874) believed to be the hallmark of the mental. By intentional mental acts most relevant to the subjective interpretations of our interview I take the concept of imagining and calling to consciousness as opposed to experiencing; I take it to mean internal recognition, of its knowledge and significances, of discernment and differentiation, and of an occurrence or event within us, usually in response to external stimulus, that results in an affective mental state - in other words having ideas and making judgements (Ryle, 1970). Intentionality pervades the directedness of the mental processes of both our participants and is the cause of the action and behaviours. It is the cause of our making mistakes or being correct – getting it right or getting things wrong. Of course these are not restricted to the event of the interview but in experience in general. The judgements reached are usually propositional and these propositions form the *content* of belief. This term itself has a range of meanings worth clarifying, given the enormous gordian knot of associated beliefs at the heart of any interpretation of self or the other at interview. Dennett (1987, p. 46) produced a precise definition helpful to our understanding: that "folk psychology has it that beliefs are information-bearing states of people that arise from perceptions and that, together with appropriately related desires, lead to intelligent action." The interviewer's ability to attribute mental states to the candidate, including their beliefs about children and learning, their desires and attendant motivation to fulfil those desires, is referred to by this folk psychology. By necessity therefore these psychologies of interview are normative, and while there may be no single correct or incorrect response to the matters

in question, there most definitely exist ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ answers. The language terms of the interview align within a normative system which explains, predicts and calculates and the normative assumptions of folk psychology reduce the mental states, the dispositions and attributes of the candidate to ‘right’, a match for the profession, or ‘wrong’, an ill fit.

So, caused by their perceptions of the world and resulting knowledge, our participants come armed and pre-loaded to the interview with intentional states which, combined with will and desire, dictate choice. For example, the interviewer, ‘by their lights’ and by their hospitality to the truth-claims of the candidate, comes to choose to believe that “Candidate A is sufficiently motivated to become a teacher.” This is an example of the simple subject-predicate proposition in which our interview deals. It provides its theory of suitability easily and therefore as discussed at the beginning of this thesis it provides comfort and emotional appeal. This proposition forms the intentional content of the belief, about the Candidate, A. The ultimate aim of our interviewer is for their belief to be true, for their belief to match and correspond to the world of the candidate as it is; that their belief fits with or accurately represents the truth of the motivation of Candidate A. However, the logical and empirical demands of our interview, and any commitment to a correspondence theory of truth has somewhat hit a dead end, Rorty (1979) reminds us. We should instead turn to more ‘edifying’ discourses of hermeneutics and interpretation in order to address humanistic questions, made so problematic by the rather *inhuman* instrumentalism and functionalist reduction of thought shown by the simplicity of the proposition “Candidate A is sufficiently motivated to become a teacher.” Truths or falsehoods on very different levels of complexity and generality, but precisely the same level of grammatical simplicity are much more probable, but much more problematic; “My uncertainty about Candidate A’s motivation is unsettling,” for example. But how might that be attained? How might we reappropriate reason and tolerance in a spirit of a more humanistic outlook?

The interviewer must differentiate between two different components of candidate intentionality: its type or “Psychological mode,” and its content, typically propositional (Searle, 2010, p27). For example, the candidate may have their attention drawn to the fact that research suggests that teacher workload is a significant factor in teacher retention rates. The Candidate may already or subsequently *believe* or *accept* that workload accounts for poor teacher retention, or they may be *anxious* that this is the case, they may be *disinterested* that this is the case, or they may be *confident* that this will not be a factor for them. The propositional content is the link between workload and teacher retention which must be made explicit by the interviewer within the question which raises it. But the *telling* state, “our ideas, our values, our yeas and nays may well grow out of us with the necessity with which a tree bears fruit,” (Nietzsche, 1962, p16) which are demonstrated and made harvestable for subjective interpretation, must be seen to be directed at the object, or state of affairs, contained within the proposition (workload affecting teacher experience negatively) rather than the proposition itself. The danger here for reliable scrutiny is the remove between the candidate and the object-in-question

which results from shadowy and remote conscious awareness. The intentional state of *belief* is relatively easy to identify as being true or otherwise, of the belief matching the world as it is in the proposition (what Searle termed the Mind to World fit). But the emotional intentions elicited, such as anxiety, desire, disinterest or confidence, which do not match in the mind in any way with the world as it is, are more akin to how we would/would not like the world to be, and instead show the world's effects in and on the mind and its use. It is the responsibility of a belief to match the world – the interviewer supposes it to be so; but the candidate's hopes, their intention to prove suitable for teaching, cannot be said to *match* the world, to correspond with truth – their hope can merely be satisfied, or otherwise. But Hallett (1988) helps us to understand the difference, that Belief is a mental process (or, more correctly, termination point) involving ignorance. Our candidate is ignorant of the knowledge of teacher workload affecting retention, yet they believe it to be so. Our interviewer is ignorant of the knowledge of our candidate's suitability for teaching, yet they believe it to be so. This belief without certainty might provide the elbowroom which thinkers such as Toulmin (1990) believe might protect diversity and a belief in the adaptability of the human condition above that of a notional stability and uniformity.

The intentional states we each encounter do not occur in isolation – when we are made aware of an object there are complexes of elements inherent in consciousness that allow the object-in-question to appear (Smith, 2006). The objects make their appearance in consciousness, not as the object but as a creation or, for Husserl, “constitution” (1999, p71). Similarly, for the candidate their intentional state, realised in consciousness, is constituted by many associated, even contradictory, beliefs and desires shaped by what is known about the educational object-in-question as a network of intentional states. A single intentional state requires this complex set of interrelated states, but also sets of enabling presuppositions and abilities, structures of attributes and dispositions which are *causal of* and *realised within* consciousness. Dispositions allows certain mental states to occur. Addis (2005) treats these dispositional background mental states as dispositions-to-act (to behave in a certain way) and occurrent mental states as properties of these. The desire on the part of the candidate to successfully respond to a next question (indeed, the hope on the part of the interviewer that they will) for example requires innumerable other beliefs and desires but also the presupposition that the question will be understood and that there is in place sufficient ability to communicate which are taken for granted, that the interviewer will hear and understand the response. This background of abilities (capacities, attributes, know-how and ways of being and doing) is enabling and provides the means by which the candidate makes themselves known to the interviewer and vice versa - the canvas on which their consciousness is painted. In order to allow the candidate to “listen in” to themselves and the inconspicuous phenomena of their consciousness, the objects at the heart of the interview process, must be first coaxed out of hiding, and then read correctly. The candidate's understanding of self or teaching cannot lie on the surface to be seen and grasped by either the candidate themselves or the interviewer simply. But, although dispositional descriptions are hidden goings on and carry the promise of a tendency, for our mechanism

a likelihood to perform a relevant behaviour in a certain way, the equipment it describes, for example commitment, cannot be reduced to an explicit thought. They cannot describe their commitment in any way other than, “I am committed” - it defies any attempt to be made irreducibly present-at-hand to be grasped as an occurring thing. Being committed does not have any knowledge of its own commitment.

The thesis that a belief is a disposition to act and is signified by a tendency verb, believe, (Ryle, 1949) and our interview’s stance that understanding should be treated dispositionally goes beyond treating intentional states as signifying fixed identity or character and describes a state as providing an explanation for behaviour. For example, our participants may have a permanent (whether asleep, or driving, or engaged in any non-teaching activity) dispositional mental state such as the belief that all children can improve, or that all teachers are altruistic by nature; these mental states are dispositions to some kinds of future behaviours and to certain occurrent or observable mental states. They erode or evolve over time, but nevertheless travel with us daily. States-of-mind and understanding itself are always present and determine one another. Understanding in this sense means knowing-how, a competence in interacting appropriately with the different concepts or entities attached to teaching, and which are the subject of focus at interview. For our candidate knowing how to move along these “lines of significance” as Braver (2014) denotes the essential concepts of being in the world already understood – of being a student – is easy; they understand how to use the tools of education, its environments and spaces, behaviours, equipment and technologies, as recipient. They know how behaviours interconnect with these environments, how environments interconnect with technologies and relevant goals – building learning for example. However, their know-how of teaching is restricted to that of being-as a student. They are now forced to project their understanding of these tools forward, expressing the possibilities of their own teaching. These previously contextually understood tools must be pried free of the background of that previous context and reattached to that of being a teacher in order to define the possibility they project themselves onto. Heidegger urges us not to think of this idea of possibility in the traditional sense, of a potential ‘one day but not yet’ – “I could be and will be a teacher, but I am not at present.” A possibility is not something our candidate is not, but rather something they already are – the project of their becoming a teacher is already underway and was underway before even the momentous decisions of application were made. The climactic moments of completion are therefore never fully arrived at, but instead always just beyond the horizon. The journey towards the actualisation of their choice to be a teacher (dependent on the choices made by our interview) are only fully made at the point of *departure* from teaching rather than at its beginning.

4.2 Intention in Action: Attributes as habits

The positive attributes in question provide the focus for the relation between the intentionality of the individual agents and the collective intentionality of the pair involved. Taken as intention-in-action these habits (by which Aristotle characterised behavioural tendencies and virtues as dispositions to deal with emotions) are considered as natural mechanisms. The premise of our interview acceptance criteria understands these as a guarantee of a uniform repetition of emotions, actions or behaviour over time in the same way that Hume recognised that almost all personality is rooted in habit (Laursen, 2011). We can see human habits as essentially based on two aspects most relevant to our selection interview: (a) the stable character of an acquired quality across time; and (b) the capacity for new actions that arise from that quality, or the affective nature of that quality. Habits, as repetitions of thought and action without conscious reasoning and rationality, are exemplified by the search for an identifiable mindset which believes for example that all learners should be given the opportunities to achieve their potential, and an appreciation of pupils as individuals. Yet a habit is not merely automatic or repetitive behaviour – it is a stable but dynamic disposition for action and a practical skill (Giovagnoli, 2021). This disposition works in a *subordinate* form when not the dominant activity. For Graybiel (2008) there exists a fruitful relation between habitual disposition and goal, classifying habits as neutral, good, or bad. The good habits sought at interview would seem to be those which *guide* the candidate’s behaviour increasing cognitive control over the action rather than those which *take* control. We might call these ‘habit-as-routine’. The former entails a cognitive capacity connected to the habit which can be used flexibly by the candidate and across different contexts in school.

Whereas Locke wrote of ideas about the world emerging from our “customs and manner of life,” and these being a frequent bad influence leading to confusion and prejudice caused by “Education, custom, and the constant din of their party,” (1975, in Laursen, 2011, p88), Hume saw beyond this negative to almost every important aspect of life and personality belonging to this realm of custom and habit. For our interview, custom and habit then are necessarily taken as the *foundation* of all belief, reasoning and judgement, and not reasoning which exists as the *cause* of evidenced based practices and thought, as we might suppose from philosophies of modernity (Toulmin, 1990). These customs compose the irreducible natural function, the power of perception, of our participants. In forming our judgement and perceptions of cause-and-effect habits, customs and their repetition have become the ultimate principle of any conclusion we draw about our own experience, or that of the other and on which everyday life is dependent.

Hume’s ideas of the motivating power of habits and customs provide an easy relation to the fundamental attributes of our candidate’s Commitment and Motivation for entry to the teaching profession. Little else “causes any sentiment to have a greater influence on us than custom, or turns our

imagination more strongly to any object,” (Hume, 1978, p556); and habit therefore provide clues to the candidate’s likelihood to remain so through the adversity of the training period, for “constant perseverance produces a strong inclination and tendency to continue for the future,” (ibid,p133).

4.3 The Habits of Being a Teacher

Charles S. Pierce’s pragmatic criterion of meaning is helpful here to understand the difficulty that candidate and interviewer have of understanding the habits and customs of the other. Consider the living definitions of the everyday activities of being a teacher: the use of planning to structure learning; the use of explanations and activity to expose new concepts to the uninitiated; the use of techniques and systems to manage behaviour; the use of resources to clarify thinking; the use of questioning to check and extend thinking; the use of assessment to understand levels of that learning gained by the pupils; and so on. The terms associated within these everyday activities which make up the form of life of teachers are easily understood as habits of action by those already experienced or qualified. What these terms mean is simply interpreted as the habits they involve. For example, planning is interpreted as an activity in terms of habits of structuring learning; assessment is interpreted in terms of habits of monitoring pupil learning gain; behaviour management is interpreted in terms of techniques of habits of control – they are exercises which nourish the habits. In the daily life of teachers, the use of planning, assessment, careful explanation, and the habit of these things simply *is* the meaning of these things. They are meaningful in their own right as practices and the meaning of the linguistic expressions here is their use in the context of its practice, as we noted previously. The result is a complex layered system of meanings and meaning as the use of these different signs; that is, signs which are vehicles for meaning. These habits have become behavioural dispositions that signal belonging to, or being-within, a tribal group; even moving beyond a rational set of beliefs and practices, or outside the space of reason (Stanley, 2015). Borrowing from Merleau-Ponty (1962), knowing what is the case, engaging with the world of education guided by visual representations, or what the candidate has merely *seen*, is very different to *practising* what is the case, interacting bodily with its ways of being. The relation with an object or phenomenon is fundamentally different in character when we use it, as a skill or technology, than when we merely perceive it.

These habits become the foundation of the professional and personally embodied routines that have come to comprise the routines of a teacher's everyday life. They do not engage in cautious assessment of what they are doing at the moment of planning, or explanation. As Hubert Dreyfus stated, habits are part of our everyday coping practices (2003) whereby no conscious deliberation of meaning is required, yet they are intelligently context sensitive and scaffold each goal or decision. Cognitive science models these as ‘species of belief’ (Miyahara and Robertson, 2021) and by promoting intelligent

behaviour they have come to shape their very perception, and the skilled human actions which the ancients termed ‘Techne’, manifested in teachers required to intervene in the natural processes of learning, to affect the course of events in the classroom.

For the candidate, these habits have no entity within thought or experience. Habits act in series, and so for Pierce, these habits are tendencies - to behave in a similar way under similar circumstances in the future as in the past, and for Ryle (1949) one performance is a replica of its predecessors. As Wittgenstein notes, language use is extended in time, as a “spatial and temporal phenomenon” (1953, 108) as is the form of life and habits constituted by the language of teaching. The teacher and the interviewer understand the meaning of the terms when they hear it, in a flash as it were. However, for the candidate, for whom the use and therefore meaning is unfamiliar, their understanding and thinking in the moment of the question does not deal with something extended in time. For them, the object of this act of mutual inter-subjective understanding is a non-temporal phenomenon. The meaning of the word ‘assessment’ does not exist in its own right and the expression of its idea is independent of the existence of the ‘assessed’ or ‘assessing.’ We could say that the teacher/interviewer has sung the tune, knows the tune held in their mind in its entirety at the moment of the singing; whereas the candidate has only heard fragments of the tune, perhaps as a member of the audience. For the teacher, skills have become embedded within being as habits and settled belief (Stanley, 2015), even resistant to rational revision as Bourdieu might have it, or evaluations demanded by counterfactual evidence-led arguments. Teachers’ practice often transcends mere systems of belief. Language rarely places a boundary around these skills emerging independent of knowledge. For Heidegger, the action of bodily interaction with the world (for us the professional practices of the teacher) does not constitute conceptual representation that can easily be translated into propositional structures of language – the habits of action engrained in the skills of teaching are not even based on a set of beliefs necessarily, which can be easily pictured by propositions. The inherent skills encapsulated within the terms ‘teacher’ and ‘classroom practice’ cannot be easily spoken as we saw in the previous chapter, and besides, those well versed in the pragmatics of classroom experience understand that habits of action can and should be changed as situations evolve and dictate.

Even thought of these habits in general terms is impossible for the candidate. Generality itself is repetition (‘steady action’ as Kant has it) and therefore requiring a temporality. Constrained by their own limiting circumstance, the candidate lacks the treasure trove of available responses to the situated environment of the interview. What may be spoken of can only refer to the indefinite future of expectations and inferential belief, and therefore for the candidate these habits have only potentiality, “its mode of being is *esse in futuro*,” (Pierce, 1932, 148): will be. Not is. And this, we can see clearly described is precisely what is the case for those inferred conclusions arrived at by the interviewer at our encounter’s close: “I expect *this fact* to be the case.”

So, if to think is to anticipate the outcomes of an act on the basis of previous experiences of performing similar acts under similar circumstances (Määttänen, 2005), the possible thinking of the candidate in response to any questions which refer to the actions of a teacher can only be an anticipation of action to come, as can the conclusions of the interviewer. Once we consider that the habitual skills of the classroom teacher are independent of any propositional knowledge participants may have of process, the value of certain cognitive states including knowledge and belief is that it results in (or is the cause of) skills *yet to come*, we can see that the interview offers the clearing, that space of meaning, into which these states might step.

4.4 Systems of meaning, mythical scaffolds of identity and a Return to Being

Three relationships are already present for both participants in the encounter: their relationship with self; their relationship with world; and their relationship with other. Neither can experience the other as the other experiences themselves, nor as they experience their own self. Their experience is uniquely their own and is constituent of their essence. The tradition of the selection interview serves to place the individual self-consciously within their own history and trajectory.

Notwithstanding the formality of the exchange, its non-reciprocal, orchestrated nature, increasingly planned and managed, everything depends on the conditions of the communication, the procedure lending legitimacy to the interviewer's opinion-formation of the candidate. The truth of the proposition, "This candidate is a suitable 'fit' for the teaching profession," must be determined by a process of open discourse and reasoning that leads, in principle, to Habermas' universal recognition by others (1992). Following this line of thought, the foundations of knowing-the-other are not found in merely subjective experiences as Husserl had suggested, but in the analysis of intersubjectivity occurring exclusively in the language used in the discourse of the exchange, and in disentangling thought-content from its rhetorical form. This must accept the fundamental intimacy of language and thinking, but also appreciate the living, human phenomenon of the language of the prospective inexperienced teacher candidate whose language is comparable to their worldview. But where Habermas (1992) and Apel (1980) claim that language is the exclusive source of meaning, relying on the notion that meaning is grounded in logical linguistic analysis, Zahavi (2001) argues that intersubjectivity is the experience shared by two embodied entities, our candidate and interviewer. This reading of phenomenology makes meaning inside *and* outside of language central to the process of our participants' coming-to-know the other.

The pure signifiers employed at interview both designate and constitute the identity of the teacher beyond the variable cluster of descriptive properties. The chief danger for any epistemological

study of the interview is the false security found in any assumption that this coming-to-know is either demonstrably or intuitively objective. That the interviewer has been provided a sufficient knowledge of the ‘causes’ of the candidate’s response or can grasp the ‘indivisible form,’ the essential nature of their characteristics. Belief in its certainty should remind us of what F.P. Ramsey (1931, p269) described as “scholasticism...treating what is vague as if it were precise.” All that is possible is for the knowledge of the interviewer to be derived from the premisses given by the candidate. The proof of their conclusion regarding the successful fit of the candidate can only be true provided that these premisses are true. Within the timed limits of the interview the interviewer cannot demand that each premiss be demonstrably proven, nor can they obtain an encyclopaedic list of statements about the candidate, the most basic premisses, which describe the essence of the candidate, and which combine to form a definition of their being.

Analytical and Continental philosophy would be critical of the metaphysical reification of phenomena such as the mind, the self and the identity or character of the candidate. It is therefore important to distinguish between identity in the sense of ‘sameness’ and identity in the sense of self: the identity of the candidate cannot be understood in the same way as its permanence over time. If we overlook this difference, as Ricoeur (1986) contends, since the candidate is not either their physical *body* or their *experiences and actions* (described as a proof of their essences), their ‘self’ or Being must be something else, some further fact. The concept of identity, as a teacher or a student or anything more complete, in this reading is empty - a floating signifier. While we do not renounce any talk of ‘the self’ we are able to conceive of the *object* of person-ality as a thing, ambiguous and unknowable, which therefore “drops out of consideration as irrelevant.” (Wittgenstein, PI, 293). While not an illusion then, the self as a reified concept requires an alternative account. Blamey (1995, p583) describes personality and its identity as forming an “ambition” which takes shape over the course of an entire lifetime; it resembles a story or narrative more than a substance. This provides a helpful explanation of self; it is one of coming-to-be and raises suspicions when talking of personal attributes in terms of facts and objects. The process of self-formation, of being a teacher which began at the moment prior to application and interview is seen here as the construction of a meaningful whole of uninterpretable sequences and events which form a narrative unity. The legacy of previous thought, ideas, expressions that inform the being of the candidate is elusive even to themselves. These legacies insinuate their order into their being as language and experience are acquired and used, the sedimentary layers of which are laid down and support consciousness. This understanding renders it impossible for the interviewer to come-to-know all change and permanence. The teacher-identity of the candidate is born from a coherent succession of occurrences (which of course includes the interview itself), and it is the cultural symbols received via these events or occurrences which provide Being its unity – not of substances or essences but narrative wholeness (Ricoeur, 1986).

We should not view the teacher-self, nor the 'I' commonly used when describing it at interview, as a label for objects of either a mental or physical nature ('I' is not used to denote the candidate's body, for example). There are differences between the grammar of statements about psychological phenomena such as motivation, or commitment and that of statements about physical objects or experiences. The life-views of the candidate cannot be reduced to some static internal or intentional state; they and their convictions show themselves in the different things they undertake and undergo (Bax, 2005). Life is both a biological phenomenon of use and a meaningful whole before it is narrated. The figures or patterns within this narration of meaningful whole are what the interviewer must attempt to see, but there can be no 'knowledge' in the sense in which Aristotle understood the word, that which implies a certainty and finality. In the empirical 'science' of the selection, which is all that can furnish the interviewer with information about the world of the candidate, proof does not occur.

4.5 Resemblance and Difference

Gilles Deleuze (1994) asks how, if there exists a group, or set, is it possible to go beyond measuring differences or similarities between its entities on some predefined scale external to them, and understand them instead as simply different, even if they are merely repetitions of the same pattern? It is self-evident that our set of candidates are not identical in all their qualities, and as entities they must be different, rather than mere repetitions. "We wish," he begins, "to think difference in itself, and the relation of the different to the different, independent of the forms of representation which lead back to the Same," (p1-2). Repetitions of the same or not, our different entities should be treated as separate and different in themselves. We are considering entities within a given context – candidates for positions within the programme of training for teaching and the current educational environment, and so the characters of the separate entities we are interested in (our candidate teachers) must exist among a group alongside other members (our field of candidates). According to Deleuze's principles, the members of our group, or set, cannot be identified or governed by any overarching universal principles. This condition of identification can, however, be fulfilled if the set in question, the teaching profession, is open for the membership of newly appearing members and new claims to membership, and likewise to the disappearance of members already present. Then, while there are a number of entities in the putative set, there are no restrictive presumptions about them, or about whether and how they relate to each other. This absorption and loss, over time and setting, is enough to avoid what is excluded by Deleuze: being ruled by a principle for the set. Here we have precisely the situation in the educational environment, an ever-shifting set of players and a membership in perpetual motion. Deleuze's approach is not only possible in the context of the judgement for suitability for teaching, but also apposite. It is to define the identity of our candidates in the absence of any presuppositions about overarching concepts which compare them, or any prejudgments about the nature of their autonomous existence or the

existence of teachers. Instead of the priority of our overarching and universal similarities then, difference emerges between our candidates through processes of perceived differentiation prompted directly by our two particular identities, the interviewer and candidate, reacting with one another, and "...by virtue of which the distinct entity is gathered [alongside others] rather than being represented by virtue of some similarity." (p154).

The task of the interview is to substitute particulars - particular attributes, strengths, weaknesses, and particular responses which align with expectations and demands for similarity and selection criteria - for generality; the exchange of these particulars defines the candidate's future 'general' practice. From the candidates' responses the interviewer must discern similarity, or resemblance, to the prescribed descriptors of attribute. This primarily empirical interpretation of the response is non-egalitarian in its presupposition that not all candidates are equal and equivalent. The attributes of the candidate must be seen to resemble sufficiently the attributes of the ideal teacher, as generalised. For Deleuze, this "generality presents two major orders: the qualitative order of resemblances and the quantitative order of equivalences...generality expresses a point of view according to which one term may be exchanged or substituted for another," (1994, p1).

This consideration of Difference between our entities and our account of how these entities might become differentiated in the context of each other can support us to overcome the absence of any ontology for the situation where entities emerge, arise, appear to the other, fuse, dissolve, or re-emerge the same but different (Parker, 2009). The frontiers and borders of candidates' identity are impossibly hard to realise. Prior to application, as individuals they have exercised their capacity to choose the professional identity they wish to embrace, that of student teacher, their perceptions of being interacting and becoming fused across boundaries of time, context, culture and circumstance (Cohen, 2000). At the point of interview this now spills over, into the *collective* identities of the groups, as students or future teachers. To examine and account for the emergence and change in relation to the context of self and other of entities which are continuously shifting and in states of perpetual motion at this time, we have chosen to first refer to qualities of initial sameness. For Deleuze (1994) the individual without yet its expression is a larval subject – they are solitary and solipsistic, their uncertain thinking centred only on self and their own experience. The phenomenon of the interview however offers an encounter with an Other who expresses an alternative and possible world and the structures that will allow an understanding of self within the world of teaching and "individuation within the perceptual world," (Deleuze, 1994, p281). For Plato, the individual exists by means of their participation in an already defined type, species, or ideal form – for us, of our defined teacher - but for Deleuze rather than accounting for existence of being in terms of these essences to which they align our individual might better be understood in terms of the process of becoming which brings it into existence. For example, the individuation of our student to student-teacher to teacher is understood in terms of development and differentiation over time, and not in terms of the essences of that species of teacher to which they will

belong. Our candidates are distinguished by *difference* to one another through their coming to be, and not through static characteristics, qualities, dispositions, or any universal type. Furthermore, this process of becoming takes place intentionally without reference to what *will* be or the spaces it *will* come to occupy during training or following qualification once actualised and fully formed. The ‘whole’ of the teaching profession is the expression of differentiated singularities; individuals expressing difference, combined as a single. The power to become different to how we are, our capacity to be developed denotes our candidate as such. A Nietzschean framing of this privileging of the good that might be obtained from the exchange, sees the objective and final cause as a search or will to power. This analysis of an individual’s action in terms of the power that is provided – not power *over*, but a power *granted* by achievement, more personal or intimate, is then centred in self. This reading sees each response as an action which seeks power as the end, the ‘good’, the final cause which motivates.

4.6 Chapter Summary

Understanding the Other is as fundamental as consciousness itself and is rooted in understanding their behaviours, prior intention and intention in action. The interview requires its propositions to depict thoughts alone, and whatever we might be required to think must be there to provide the thinking with its object – a triangle must be there to provide its difference from a circle, the *misbehaviour* of a child must be there to provide its difference from the desired behaviour. In an unapologetic Ryle-ism, the thought’s arrowhead must hit its target. For the target to be successfully struck it must be perceptible and sufficiently close to be present at hand.

Being, understood within the interview’s organising system and its array of language games, is its central concern; to do Being justice, but necessarily dependent on the conceptual schemes of each participant. It systematises by division, by attribute and question prompt, as a means of coping with sensory experience. Therefore, understanding the intentionality, the directedness of thought, requires a common co-ordinating system, which mirrors the common-language we experienced in Chapter Three, on which to plot the points of view of the Other. It primarily requires an openness to what people have to say. However, we cannot experience truly any subject whose behaviour we calculate or attempt to predict – Calculations are made within a normative system based on the views of what all teachers ought to believe. Judgement must be made on the presented beliefs, taking into account what matters in what is said – identifying only what is salient.

That understanding teaching requires understanding teaching’s collective behaviour presents us with difficulty. The interview’s response is to show its preference for simplistic and unproblematic intentionality in the form *subject-predicate; the candidate is...* which frequently belies the complexity

of the candidate present at hand. It is the responsibility of belief to match the world, but the hopes and suitability of our participants cannot be said to match or correspond with truth. Ignorance is necessary if the diversity and adaptability of the human at education's heart is to be protected and placed above that of uniformity.

The intentionality of dispositions such as commitment cannot describe itself in any other way than within the proposition, "I am committed." It cannot be grasped as an occurrent thing. We can make the explicit link between these dispositions and habits of thought and action over time as repetitions of thought and associated action without reasoning and rationality. This has implications for what I shall consider finally within closing remarks: modernity's demand for precisely that – reasoning and rationalism. Instead, custom and habits of being-a-teacher become the foundation of belief and professional judgement. These come to compose perception, and the embodied routines of teachers scaffold their decisions. But if performances are replicas of their predecessors, and teachers practice transcends systems of belief, the candidate has no extension in time and is therefore constrained by their limiting circumstances: their inferred conclusions have no basis in professional practice.

Chapter 5: Closing Remarks and Conclusion

5.1 Closing Remarks: On Modernity and The Search for Certainty

The beliefs in objective measures, social progress, evidence-based practices and the powers of rationalism are the cornerstones of the modern age, affecting all aspects of the social and practical lives of education, as well as politics, economics, social and healthcare (Fleener, 2005). Postmodern logics of relationship, meaning, and systems are defined by complex social phenomena capturing *variety*: of context, perspective and understanding. Unlike Modernism it eschews foundations, universality and uniformity, determinism, control, objectivity and certainty; in fact all those central premises of the selection interview rooted in control, method and measurement. Postmodernism, “more a diagnosis than a theory,” (Schwandt, 2001, p120), opposes several key doctrines of the Enlightenment tradition, which include notions of the rational self and its essential human nature; reason as a universal *a priori* capacity of those individuals; and belief in social and moral progress through the application of scientific theory to social institutions – it distrusts meta (or Grand) narratives (Lyotard, 1991) which purport to explain and dictate (best-practice, evidence-based), and endorses instead difference, fragmentation and indeterminacy (ibid). Nevertheless, these notions of master-narratives remain unconsciously effective as ways of thinking about education and its means, and especially visible in our consideration of our first meeting. Whitehead (1964) declared that the notion of an actual entity as a stable, unchanging subject of change should be abandoned, introducing the term “superject” - an individual that progressively emerges through feelings and by attaining satisfaction is *self*-realising, capable of autopoietic self-creation (Maturana and Varela, 1980). But our MMI is a mode of production, *other*-realising, a ‘knowledge producer,’ whose nature consists in industrial production, sorting, grading which seeks to extract value and commodity, regardless of such humanistic concerns.

The design of any change in approach to our practices in Education allows us to take stock of our history and communal (as opposed to individual) epistemological origins of belief as a profession. The origins of the MMI become an attempt at a kind of social forecasting - what kind of teacher will we need the profession’s next generation to become, what will we need those teachers to be - by selecting from the pool of candidates based on who they are now. These predictions of course are almost impossible - accurate forecasts are notoriously inaccurate. The most we can foresee are the limits within which the human futures of education may be drawn from the pool, consistent and stubborn, available to us. These futures cannot happen of themselves, but can be made to happen, or *created* (Toulmin, 1992), if wisdom and corrective, practicable policies are applied.

But these approaches to the future need of the teaching profession do not depend on locating a method to quantify and extrapolate current perceptions of trend, in the manner of a stock exchange or marketplace: a calculation of a necessary exchange of teacher ‘stock’ for future outcomes. Structural inequality inherent within the relation between labour and capital is based on the shifting dynamics between use-value and exchange-value. Where Use Value refers to the value of things at hand, its usefulness - the traditional common currency within previous employment or selection contracts - Exchange Value refers to the value of something registered against a common currency: gold, money, employability. Within this system of exchange value everything has become commodifiable as an object of exchange, and for education this now includes the human and their idealised attributes. This corruption is easily discernible in Education in general and teacher selection in particular. In the UK hope has become pinned on the instruments of Education to yield enhanced productivity, economic growth, social development and mobility, and reductions in poverty (Kingdon, Little, Aslam, et al., 2014). Teachers are required to be resilient to adversity, committed to their charges, bound by the desire to nurture, skilled technicians of behaviour management, accountable, and so on. At the selection stage the attributes of each candidate, the models of inherent idealised behaviour most likely to bring these truth-making states-of-affairs about, are commodities, weighed and traded for access to the profession.

To avoid the risk of unrealistic or irrational horizons of expectation Toulmin (1992) suggests a coherent intellectual posture be adopted to confront the future, and to challenge the preoccupation with the ‘modern’ and the assumptions of ‘modernity’, whether technological, scientific or philosophical. Instead, we should suspend the belief that we already have the intellectual and practical means ready at hand to improve our systems of education and those who populate them. But rather than novelty this movement paradoxically seeks new theoretical certainties in the traditional and in its derisive abandonment of the progressive. These progressive approaches are seen as existing outside of the rational community, as an ideology which needs to be overcome, as strangers to rationalism (Biesta, 2006). The ‘theory centred’ style of teaching, which notices a practical problem and seeks its solution in the scientific, timeless and universal, has the same origins as the agendas of modernity from the Renaissance on. It has circumvented the post-modern appeal for the practical, based in the context and locality of the individual, and any scepticism towards stable meaning. It attempts to wriggle free of an acceptance in the uncertainty that haunts all things human (Braver, 2014) and immerses itself instead in objectivity and rule-following. It refuses to acknowledge that our “postmodern times are marked by an almost universal agreement that difference is not merely unavoidable but good, precious, and in need of protection and cultivation,” (Bauman, 1995, p214). The essentialism of education’s modern project instead seems to insist on one right way, those “imperialist tendencies of scientific thinking that result from the idea that science is the measure of all things,” (Glock, 2001, p214): theories which try to provide causal explanations of all the messy empirical phenomena. This contrasts with the everyday experiences of those involved in education for whom the struggle of practice is not easily solved by

ready causal explanation since the phenomena are conceptual, not factual: for example, ‘Why wont the learning behaviours of this child align with my expectations today, but yesterday they did?’

Rather than suspend judgement in the cold light of the early twenty first century and to concentrate on an accumulation of multiple perspectives as Montaigne argued, both on the natural world and human affairs including education, the search for certainty in what we know has come to characterise the present (Kmunicek, 2021). Our “civilisation is characterised,” as Wittgenstein wrote in the preface to his *Philosophical Remarks*, “by the word ‘progress.’ Progress in its form rather than making progress...it constructs. It is occupied by building an ever more complicated structure,” (1975). This modernity then foregoes the humanistic respect for possibilities and the more delicate feeling for human experience within limits. The abstract, timeless, universal applications of theoretical propositions deny the humanist right to adopt different positions to those whose experiences are unproven (as opposed to the proofs of science) and tentative as in the case of our candidates for teaching. But the natural scepticism of humanism does not attempt to refute claims to truth; instead, it offers, much like Wittgenstein, an alternative way to understand life in use, and motives – it recognises that theoretical claims to wisdom, whether of such practices of education or those embedded within its systems, overreach rationality’s limits. Similarly, scepticism asks for limits to the appeals to certainty or necessity and the generalisable based on experience. The spirits of tolerance, ambiguity, ambitions which are limited, difference, the disorder of identity and attribute – a *lack* of certainty – is no mistake but merely, “the price that we inevitably pay for being human beings, and not gods.” (Toulmin, 1992, p30).

As Aristotle reminds us in the *Nichomachean Ethics*, any sound moral judgement must respect the detailed circumstances of specific cases. The MMI attests to the freedom of interactionist approaches and their expression of traits and attributes dependent on interaction between person and situation (Klassen, 2021) – what could be claimed to be specific case. But the MMI is non-freedom operating in the name of freedom: non-free because its telos, its end-in-view, is completely predetermined. It bucks the trend towards a postmodernist open future, pluralistic and free. It limits, and tailors the profession to fit. It seeks plausible determinate and astute truth, and as such fits the narrative of Education’s search for certainty and unity and demands that we dismiss what Teacher selection actually is: the confirmation of social division. The end in sight, telos, of the interview process is to bring forth from the pool of applicants only the individual - to reveal them - the candidate as teacher. As such, in the same way Heidegger’s account of technology acts to express Being as made, but also manifests possibilities (1993), the interview - via its technology and technique - reveals the candidate and the first truths of teaching. Its paradox is that in its determination to reveal something that has potential to be there but is not yet there (teacherliness, expertise, qualification as a teacher and so on) it is capable of revealing only the preconditions for such – from a point of origin it can only gesture through the fog to the road which leads to that end point. It exists as a technology of assessment, much like many others in

education, which has designed its own categories, has designed the ‘work’ to be done within that category (Peim, 2018), and has defined the expressions of language required to demonstrate the truths of the identity of what is revealed and its success. It does this by a design which has reconstructed the teacher in terms of isolated, inert, lifeless units (the attributes) granted meaning independent of context. This satisfies the demands of disengaged reason or rationality by separating them from the mundane: the easy performances of everyday actions and language use. In this way Being is not revealed as ‘we are what we do,’ described by Braver (2014, p78) as “the humble preoccupation of our days is precisely the stuff our selves are made of.”

Education and educational purpose is laced with such axiomatic slogans with no actionable meaning such as, “teachers must be motivated and committed to helping all children reach their potential,” to those of issues of ‘workload’ and standards, or the benefits of technology, examination, the need to become a reflective resilient practitioner, a Life-long Learner, the desirability of effective classroom management and the best-bets of Systematic Synthetic Phonics. These accepted universal and timelessly valid axioms exclude the possibility of plural explanations, or limited scope and duration. These have become propositions which ‘go without saying,’ accepted without question, a framework of belief established over time which became imbued by an empirical rationality, and which go beyond assumption to become the presuppositions of educational certainty. The ability to generalise in such terms has created our modern framework within which arguments are constructed; what Toulmin declares an “intellectual scaffolding” (p116) which defines any future lines of demarcation. Whether speculative or provisional, anything proclaimed as ‘going without saying’ declares itself part of the rationally committed structure or scaffold of presuppositions about the nature of teaching and the humans who make up its community. We are returning to where this thesis began.

5.2 Conclusion

“The rune also recalls the constellation of the Virgin.”

“I dabble in astronomy.” Diotallevi said shyly. “The Virgin has a different shape, and I believe it has eleven stars.”

The colonel smiled indulgently. “Gentlemen, gentlemen, you know as well as I do that everything depends on where you draw the lines. You can make a wain a bear, whatever you like, and it’s hard to decide whether a given star is a part of a given constellation or not. Take another look at the Virgin, make Spica the lowermost point corresponding to the provincial coast, use only five stars, and you’ll see a striking resemblance between the two outlines.”

“You just have to decide which stars to omit,” Belbo said.

(Umberto Eco, Foucault's Pendulum, 1989, p124)

In the investigations presented here everything could be said to depend on how we draw the lines. This thesis is not a resistance to change but I remain 'immune to the allure' of its own delineated functions of regulation. I have therefore attempted to elucidate, or stiffen the slack phrasing of those presuppositions on which the selection interview for programmes of teacher education is founded.

The interview provides as best a vantage point as it may, the only position from which the interviewer might project qualities, drawing the lines of value and meaning around the world of the candidate by their subjective search for significance. The candidate is forced to think about their own fundamental terms of existence, to turn inside out their experiences, hopes and identity in one 'form of life' but in the context of another (which is unknown and as yet unknowable – that of the teacher). Within that moment the two different forms of life collide, the candidate expected to move seamlessly between one and the next; past and future revealed in the present. The sense of personhood is analysed as a sense of living a continuous trajectory in time and space. This comprises beliefs about one's past life, capacities and powers, social location and bodies of knowledge and belief concerning correct and proper action.

This seems entirely logical – character has come to define who we are, and how *things* appear. But the frontiers of character and the borders drawn around the constituent parts of professional suitability are impossibly hard to realise. The interview is an unsettling, transformative experience, a specialised form of discourse within which the candidate must give *an account* of their own history and their 'self' in relation to their pictured futures. There can be no genuine knowledge of empirical facts gathered at the interview, since the possibility of error can never be absolutely excluded – the claims to knowledge made there are hypothetical, and therefore only conditionally valid. The inability of the candidate to answer a question does not reveal ignorance, it manufactures it. Insofar as "facts is precisely what there is not" (Nietzsche, 1968, p267) the truths of its confessions can never be nailed down.

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Advocates of selection by attributes present a dispositionist or psychologically determinist portrait of teacher practices, and within the paradigm of 'teacher effectiveness' a model of selected values and dispositions and their correspondence to behaviours has been drawn from inference. Character traits, they say, lead an individual to act in certain ways across a range of circumstances. The concept itself, however, remains elusive both empirically and linguistically within the context of professional and prospective teachers' actions. There is sufficient doubt in the interview's

philosophically vague determinist presupposition that ‘like causes produce like effects’ and ‘like effects necessarily follow from like causes,’ and that ‘consistent effective classroom events follow nominal shared attributes as causes’ that they should instead be regarded as *indeterminate* (Popper, 1983). If not all events in the enclosed arena of classroom practice are predetermined, and certainty is contingent and doubtful, its reasoning is compatible with almost *any* degree of regularity and precision. Neither introspection on the part of the candidate, nor perception and decision on the part of the interviewer can supply any, certainly. The difference between two events, and two sets of moving parts operating within them is unobservable, despite appearances.

Furthermore, education’s sectarian interests, an unacknowledged new feudalism of trainee teachers, early career teachers, experienced teachers, leadership, through to academisation and government, operate in the spirit of modernity below the surface of our selection practices and impose their own limits. These outline one idealised form of teachers and their practice. Modernity’s desire for a unitary and totalising truth, stability and system (Toulmin, 1992) are seen to have led to the unitary and totalising practice of management, and systemic self-regulation. The interview’s systems of regulation apply rational bureaucracy and a traceable genetic blueprint for all teachers ostensibly instituted to improve the procedure of selection, amidst claims to impersonal unbiased judgement and rules for conduct. Sets of conditions contribute to the maintenance of its systems and now extend to its processes of teacher selection.

The subjects’ consciousness are structured as a series of delineated attributes and associated demonstrable processes which denote suitability (or otherwise). It attempts a rational analysis of complex and ungraspable notions of self, being, identity, ability and personality. This analysis seeks to predict, and in doing so ultimately control the profession; it excludes moral complexity, ambivalence within the process, and any possibility of development, change and growth from a fixed-point A, at the moment of selection itself, to point B at qualification (and beyond). Teachers, their identity and specific characteristics are being redesigned as symbolisations of the self, their defined characteristics commodified. The interview asserts that the form is set. Power to adapt and change resides within the institution of education alone, not those who inhabit it. It classifies, grades and orders, and in doing so assumes its authority.

While there can be no quarrel with subjecting particular constructs of being, models of idealised behaviour, and the enhancement of the human to critical scrutiny, in choosing to pursue a rational, moral and theoretical agenda (in the spirit of modernity) I believe that the interview process sets aside the tolerant yet sceptical natural attitudes of humanism, and focuses instead on mathematical abstractions of exactitude, rigour, intellectual certainty and professional purity. Measurement has become a practical art aiming to produce inductive prediction and repetition – it “can calculate” (Husserl, 1997, p33), and confuses mathematics and logic for a representation of reality. It therefore risks human failure at the

expense of technical success based on a clockwork behaviourism (as we know, clocks invite measurement, checks, and readings) and causal determinism of person and action: A follows B; If...then.... Anything or anyone who fails to live up to prediction demands first suspicion, then remediation and intervention. A universal system of composition has been designed which suggests an *a priori* understanding of teacher-effectiveness which claims to have determined success. However, the open system which is the world of education and educational practice is not consistent and is rarely coherent. Its world operates instead as a patchwork of local operations. We should therefore attempt to combine this abstract rigour and exactness with a more practical concern for the content of human life in all its concrete (non-abstract) contextual detail. We cannot draw the lines around our chosen particulars to demarcate the effective teacher without leaving others outside of those demarcations. Whichsoever dispositions our interview single out and shine the light of scrutiny upon cast their shadow over others. The seers have merely decided upon which stars to include, or omit.

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In these constructed assemblages, whose lines I have unapologetically drawn to constitute four areas or themes, I have presented mere segments of a philosophy which only begin to determine a partial grammar of the selection interview. I too am guilty here of drawing my own boundaries around those aspects of its process which provide a suitable target for thought's arrows. I believe that the interview's accounts of Being, Language, Thought and Action investigated here are bound together by common assumptions and presuppositions; those of rationality and decontextualised ideals. However, I have taken pains not to deny that there are possible unities in the world of teaching, or in those who put themselves forward as the teachers of the future. Nor do I deny that there are objects in the world of education which resemble one another, that there do exist analogies and inferences to be made between practices, or that the representation of character is possible. Instead, I maintain merely that the horse must be placed before the cart: the language and thought of candidates for training to become teachers and its representations should be understood as both products of historical processes and a "form of life." In short, the communication and understanding of being a teacher require more than particular facts and loosely defined character traits – they require a world, or to return to this conclusion's opening analogy, an entire firmament.

If we accept the foundational premise of those presuppositions on which the selection interview is founded, starting with 'Dispositions provide the grounds for future events', and taking the attributes as a collection, a 'bag of virtues' (Kohlberg, 1970, p63) and a system of atomised characteristics, we see that this runs at odds with Heidegger's assertion that Being-In-The-World (us being-in-the-world-of-teaching) stands for a unitary phenomenon, that Being should be seen holistically. A holistic outlook on the occurrence of attributes would shift this placement of meaning to one within a network of complex inter-relatedness. For example, considered as elementary attributes described by elementary

propositions ('This candidate is committed. This candidate is also motivated. But this candidate is not sufficiently resilient.') the interview has decided upon a series of hermetically sealed single points, unencumbered by temporal or spatial influence, or indeed by the influence of other occurrent traits at play. These unadulterated attributes and the words used to determine them, and the unreliable instruments of judgement and measurement – descriptors, proxies and scoring metrics – make their contact vertically, unaffected by “horizontal matters of other words or objects,” (Braver, 2012, p82) or horizontal ways of organising knowledge. This excludes consideration of systems of attributes and propositions, or intra-actions (Barad, 2007), in which responsibility for the agency of each candidate is distributed among the constitutive entities of character and self. Rather than interaction, where the attributes each maintain a level of independence, in existence before they encounter one another, we witness instead intra-action where aspects of character meet in co-constitutive ways, with behavioural responses to situations and the ability to act emerging from within the relationship between each.

Arguments have been presented which suggest that it may well be a mistake to suppose that people have distinctive and stable character traits at all, casting doubt on the reliability of any activity which depends on their attribution. Accepting the supposition of interconnectedness, within and between attributes, loads any claim to a simplistic perception or discussion of each attribute in isolation with suspicion. It denies that elements of character come bundled together. What is presented in speech *and* in behaviour is therefore, in the real ordinary-language of our candidate, an aggregate.

How a person acts, and talks about acting, and recollects acting owes more to the situation in which they find themselves than on any internal state of mind, or attribute. Asserting a tendency to act in a certain way is not a law. But our interview uses this in a very law-like way – namely to support our expectation of what the candidate is likely to do in particular unknowable circumstances at some unknowable point in their unknowable future. But an ability to *be* ethical, for example, does not guarantee that the candidate will always behave ethically. Having the human quality of character of resilience ascribed to them does not entail that our candidate is in a permanent state of being resilient. On the contrary, it may only very rarely be called upon. In addition, its actualisations are rarely uniform, but depend on situation and context and degree of requirement or duress. This particular property might take an unlimited variety of shapes, be drawn and drawn *on* in a thousand different ways. And one performance or occurrence of resilience may be a replica of a prior performance and so on until these become habitual practices which are the essences which we had previously believed determined the behaviour. Properties and attributes therefore are their enactment, not a pre-existing cause, and behaviour is its own mental predicate.

The selection interview seeks to know – what can be its purpose otherwise? - but we have seen that there are no reliable sources of knowledge of our candidate's suitability which can be assayed by language. I have suggested that Life is lived in a world of words, however, the human form of the

prospective teacher's life is imagined as an evolving pattern of language games *and* activities in which words are the essential ingredient. In postmodernity one finds a plurality of language games, none of which has privileged status over another and communication is far from the regulated exchange of arguments of which the MMI supposes and which is perhaps its greatest presupposition of all.

This is a necessarily performative moment, and because of this there is an excessive haste in interpretation and representation. The incalculable requires us to calculate in the present, to speak what is properly unspeakable and present what is un-present-able in a moment. Heteronomy, heterogeneity and change are the states we must expect to encounter in the world. As a result, reality is understood as complex, ambiguous and sometimes undecidable. Above all it resists inscription into a common-language. This is a world which does not sit still for long enough, is not understood clearly enough, and is not present enough for us to take a snapshot of it and present this snapshot as any kind of final or definitive truth (DeLanda, 2002). Unable to examine the sources of the linguistically represented facts in context, our technology is limited to conjecture. We cannot ascertain whether the propositions of the candidate are true. Knowledge of the candidate cannot start from knowing nothing, nor from 'observation.' Perceptions mislead - we believe we hear a note, and by so doing believe we hear the entire melody.

All human action (which we distinguish from mere behaviors or mere spatio-temporal events) involves understanding (Wrathall, 2013). For our candidate, to understand is for them to *be* a certain way, to embody a particular way of existing in the world (ibid), in that world of education, rather than to simply think or believe or even to know that such and such is the case. Our interview presupposes that they understand a language, they understand how to use the tools of teaching which orchestrate learning, they understand the social norms of the profession (those habits of teaching), and that they even understand theories of effective teaching and learning. Centrally for Heidegger, we understand a world and we understand being, including what it is to be a being-there, in that world. And so, understanding is definitive of a being-a-teacher. But it cannot yet be definitive of not-yet-a-teacher despite understanding for Heidegger being a matter of seeing in terms of possibilities. We therefore see the schism between candidate and experienced teacher.

What the interview excludes is the possibility for discussion and arrival. The question, or puzzle, of an individual's suitability for teaching requires not a telling, or even a convincing, which terminates in an instant of decision; rather it might instead be approached as a moment of dis-covering of one particular feature in the world. We have seen that the meaning-cargos of the propositions at interview are problematic - and how both the interviewer and the candidate are unable to decide whether they are crediting the same terms and propositions with the same or even with similar objective meaning. By accepting that the issue of one prospective teacher's suitability cannot be settled, or even

partly settled within the limits of the interview there is always the future of thought, an openness of the 'to come', which distinguishes the future from a mechanical repetition of the present.

After Heidegger, it cannot be said that the entity which presents itself at interview "is" and nor can it be said that it "is not," but if Dasein, being-there, is already "ahead of itself and beyond itself" we can see that our candidate is already projecting themselves onto the possibilities they find available in the world of teaching. By their arrival in this moment of clearing and first recognition they are standing outside of themselves, doing so towards qualification and being-a-teacher. Our selection interview is a restriction of this possibility; the point at which it ends possibility is the human limit. It becomes a location which offers considerable obstructions to the light rather than a step into the clearing, where individuals manifest themselves by their appearing, and by their being allowed the boundary's crossing point. Its necessary conditions, my preferred suppositions, might be instead those of a clearing, and of attention, or care.

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